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### Viewing cable 07ABUDHABI187, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07ABUDHABI187 | 2007-02-07 06:06 | SECRET | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    VZCZCXRO0118
    PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHAD #0187/01 0380621
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 070621Z FEB 07
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8204
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000187

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017
    TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR AE
    SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH
    GENERAL MOSELEY

    REF: A. ABU DHABI 97
         ¶B. ABU DHABI 145

    Classified By: Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

    ¶1. (S) Summary.  Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
    Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
    (MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted Chief of Staff USAF General T. Michael
    Moseley on February 1, 2007.  MbZ warned Moseley of the
    growing threat from Iran, stating that they (Iran) "can't be
    allowed to have a nuclear program."  MbZ further emphasized
    that Iran's nuclear program must be stopped "by all means
    available."  As expected, MbZ inquired about Predator B.
    Moseley informed MbZ that the question of Predator B would
    require further discussion within the interagency and with
    our MTCR partners, while Ambassador noted that the USG looked
    forward to discussion of UAE defense requirements and our
    shared security objectives in the context of the Gulf
    Security Dialogue.  MbZ expressed a desire to have a missile
    defense system in place by Summer 2009, and was looking to
    add ship-based launch platforms as a part of that system.  He
    also noted that the UAE had identified a location on the
    northern border at an elevation of 6,000 feet that may be
    suitable for installation of an early warning radar system.
    End Summary.

    Iran
    ----
    ¶2. (S) Stating that "we are living in a dangerous
    neighborhood," MbZ stressed the importance of curtailing
    Iran's nuclear program to the overall stability of the Gulf,
    the Middle East as a region, and to the world's energy
    markets.  Pointing out that a nuclear weapon with even a
    short-range delivery system puts all the critical
    infrastructure in the Gulf at risk -- as well as the oil
    shipping lanes -- MbZ asserted: "If Iran can increase oil
    production to more than 15 million barrels of oil per day,
    let them have nuclear power, but until they can replace (the
    Gulf's) oil production they can't be allowed to have a
    nuclear program."

    ¶3. (S) MbZ told Moseley that the US should not focus too much
    on Ahmadinejad as the problem, but should focus instead on
    "the greater Iranian threat."  Calling Ahmadinejad  "merely
    the driver" of a bus (nuclear program) that has been running
    for a long time in Iran, MbZ described Iran's nuclear program
    as one that is no longer driven by personalities -- but which
    has become part of the Iranian identity.  Noting that even if
    Ahmadinejad or other leaders were to change, the nuclear
    program would still continue, MbZ stated: "Even a siege at
    this point will not change anything."   In answer to
    Moseley's question what should be done, MbZ responded: "Delay
    their program -- by all means available."  He added: "I am
    saying this knowing that I am putting my country at risk and
    placing myself in a dangerous spot."

    ¶4. (S) Speaking about his fears of Iran's growing hegemonic
    aspirations, MbZ warned the US not to underestimate the
    Iranians characterizing them as "extremely smart."  "It
    amazes me," MbZ continued, "that the Muslim Brotherhood,
    which controls Hamas, has at its core an opposition to all
    things Shi'a, and yet they (Hamas) cooperate with Iran.  That
    shows you how smart they are."  MbZ then pointed to what he
    called successful Iranian actions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
    and Palestine to illustrate how Iran has managed to
    manipulate Muslim extremism in order to advance Shi'a and
    Iranian goals.

    UAV/Predator B
    --------------
    ¶5. (S) MbZ again asked about the status of the UAE request to
    acquire Predator B.  GeneralMoseley informed MbZ that the
    question of Predatr B acquisition would require further
    discussionwithin the interagency and with our MTCR partners.
     MbZ nodded in understanding: "We are patient." He then
    added: "I hope the Iranians give us time; they are aggressive
    and are moving fast."  MbZ also mentioned that there were
    several other countries offering UAVs to the UAE.  Ambassador
    added that the U.S. and the other 33 MTCR members would be
    meeting in March to review the MTCR control list.  Growing
    demand worldwide for unmanned aerial vehicles had led to the
    need for a general discussion of how the MTCR controls UAVs
    and cruise missiles, and the USG looked forward to further
    discussion of UAE defense requirements and our shared
    security objectives in the context of the ongoing Gulf
    Security Dialogue (GSD).

    Strategic Interests
    -------------------

    ABU DHABI 00000187  002 OF 002

    ¶6. (S) Moseley's meeting with MbZ immediately followed a
    Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing of MbZ on the ongoing
    development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared early warning systems.
    Speaking of a time frame for the first time, MbZ said he
    wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009.  MbZ
    expressed particular interest in the possibility of mounting
    PAC-3 on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).  Learning that PAC-3
    cannot yet be mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased
    to note that SLAMRAAM has already tested successfully on a
    wide variety of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh
    (Major) Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on
    critical infrastructure protection, took particular note of
    this fact and asked about upgrading/extending their existing
    Hawk/AMRAAM assets.  When briefers noted the 32km limit of
    unelevated radar, MbZ stated that he has a location
    identified on the UAE's northern border at an elevation of
    6000 feet that he would like contractors to come back and
    look at as a possible location for an early warning radar
    system.  Also present was International Affairs Advisor to
    the Crown Prince's Court Yousef Al-Otaiba, who is a UAE
    representative to the GSD.

    ¶7. (S) Comment: Although MbZ is increasingly talking tough on
    Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with
    Iran sooner rather than later" (ref A), his comments should
    also be taken in the context of strong UAE interest in
    acquiring advanced military technology and, specifically,
    MbZ's repeated requests for Predator B (ref B).  The UAEG is
    clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their
    much larger and militarily superior neighbor. The UAE's
    significant trade relationship with Iran--approximately $4
    billion--is another complicating factor in the relationship.
    On more than one occasion, the UAE leadership has expressed
    trepidation over the prospect of being caught in the middle
    between the US and Iran.  End Comment.

    ¶8.  (U) POLAD, Chief of Staff USAF, Ambassador Marcelle M.
    Wahba has approved this message.
    SISON

`