Currently released so far... 220 / 251,287

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/11
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE AU AR AF AORC AJ ASEC AM
BH BA BY BU
CASC CF CH COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV CVIS
EG ECON EINV ETTC EFIN ENRG ETRD EFIS EXTERNAL EPET EAID EUN ELAB ECUN EU EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GR GM GOI GE GG GA
HO
IR IZ IS INRB IN IRAJ IQ IAEA IT
JO JA
KPAL KNNP KU KWBG KJUS KG KSPR KDEM KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KCRM KHLS KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KPKO KUNR KTIA KWMN
LE LY
MASS MK MNUC MCAP MARR MOPS MU MAR MTCRE MY ML MR MPOS MOPPS
NATO NG
OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA OPDC
PREL PARM PGOV PTER PINR PHUM PINS PBIO PA PBTS PREF PROP PK PECON POLITICAL PARTIES PM PEPR
QA
RS RW RU
SA SY SM SU SCUL SNAR SOCI SENV SYR SP SG SO SF
TU TI TX Terrorism TRGY TFH01 TC TSPA
UZ UE UK US UNESCO UNSC UP UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 10PARIS170, SECDEF GATES'S MEETING WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE HERVE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others.
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10PARIS170.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10PARIS170 | 2010-02-12 13:01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO4066
    RR RUEHSL
    DE RUEHFR #0170/01 0431349
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 121349Z FEB 10 ZDK
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8302
    INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/ISA/ISA-EURNATO//
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6557
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3937
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1783
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0955
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000170

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12598  DECL: 02/12/20
    TAGS: PREL MOPS MAR FR IR AF NATO
    SUBJECT:  SECDEF GATES'S MEETING WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE HERVE
    MORIN, FEBRUARY 8, 2010.

    PARIS 00000170  001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Alexander Vershbow, ASD/ISA. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

    Ref: USNATO 56

    ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) was
    hosted by French Minister of Defense Herve Morin for a working lunch
    during an official bilateral visit to Paris on February 8, 2010.
    SecDef and Morin agreed on the basic themes to be included in NATO's
    revised Strategic Concept.  On Missile Defense, SecDef refuted Morin's
    contention that a European Missile Defense system is both unwise and
    unnecessary but pledged to give France and other Allies better
    information on the costs and command and control structure of the U.S.
    proposal.  Both Morin and Gates agreed that Iran's rejection of an
    engagement track meant that the time for pressure had arrived, but both
    noted concern over China's opposition to a new UN Security Council
    Resolution (UNSCR).  On Afghanistan, SecDef praised French
    contributions and highlighted ongoing trainer shortfalls.  SecDef
    raised U.S. concerns over the sale of a Mistral-class helicopter
    carrier to Russia as sending a mixed signal to both Russia and our
    Central and East European Allies.  Morin refuted this idea, arguing
    that the sale was a way to send a message of partnership to Russia at a
    critical time.  Morin requested that the upcoming U.S. Air Force
    Request for Proposal (RFP) for a new in-flight refueling tanker
    aircraft be unbiased.  SecDef told Morin that he had full confidence
    that the RFP would be as fair as possible.   END SUMMARY.

    ----------------------
    NATO Strategic Concept
    ----------------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) Morin welcomed SecDef to France and asked about U.S positions
    regarding the revised NATO Strategic Concept.  Morin noted France's
    interest in a document that would inject new ideas, be adopted with
    great momentum, and define NATO's roles and missions. It should not
    just be a restatement of the conventional wisdom.

    ¶3. (S/NF) SecDef told Morin he favored a short document that was
    perhaps three to five pages in length.  The Strategic Concept should
    move NATO from a traditional defensive alliance to a security alliance
    that can address a wide range of global threats.  SecDef said that the
    Strategic Concept must better align resources with NATO's level of
    ambition; it must lay out a comprehensive approach to civil-military
    cooperation and enhance partnerships with the EU, UN and other
    international organizations.  SecDef concluded that, above all,
    financial and broader structural reform must be pursued -- either as
    part of the Strategic Concept or in parallel.

    ¶4. (S/NF) Morin agreed on length and the need for NATO to take on new
    missions, but he wondered what types of missions members had in mind.
    Cyber attacks?  Terrorism?  Proliferation?  Missile Defense?  Morin
    also stated his belief that NATO needed to bring some clarity to its
    area of operation so that NATO did not end up extending to the Pacific.
     He added that, in his view, extending the Alliance to Georgia would
    weaken Article 5.  SecDef stated his preference for NATO to focus its
    efforts in the Euro-Atlantic area, perhaps extending into the
    Mediterranean.  He concurred with Morin that a bigger Alliance posed
    challenges.

    ¶5. (S//NF) Morin told SecDef that the UK MoD had proposed drafting a
    joint French-UK proposal on NATO reform to then present to the U.S.
    Noting that the objective was to overcome blockages from those
    countries that had underwhelming General Staffs, Morin asked whether
    SecDef thought it would be better for Europe to build consensus at home
    and work its own ideas, or for Europe and the United States to develop
    joint proposals.  SecDef replied that he thought it best not to have
    two proposals, but that he would consult with SecState.  He also said
    he hoped that the Senior Officials Group would come up with some
    concrete and viable ideas for reform.

    ---------------
    Missile Defense
    ---------------

    ¶6. (S/NF) Morin, having expressed strong reservations to new U.S. and
    NATO missile defense (MD) plans at the NATO ministerial in Istanbul
    (reftel), said he wanted to explain how France sees MD and raise some
    questions.  First, he believes that the shift from Theater Missile
    Defense (TMD) to defense of populations and territory will give publics
    a false sense of security, since the sword was ultimately stronger than
    the shield.  For France, security came from strong defense and
    deterrence.  Second, Morin asked what threat the system aims to
    counter.  Nuclear states or rogue states?  Third, Morin asked about
    funding and how European countries would participate in command and
    control (C2) decisions.  Morin summarized his own personal opposition
    to MD by asserting that the U.S. and Europe have differing mentalities
    on defense spending.  He said the U.S. has true resiliency with

    PARIS 00000170  002.2 OF 004

    "infinite" means, while in Europe defense spending has collapsed in
    every country but the UK and France.  As a result, any development
    needing common funding will dilute the already weak European defenses.
    Morin concluded by stating that it was folly to assume that MD would
    give us added security.

    ¶7. (S/NF) SecDef refuted Morin's arguments, pointing out that MD
    contributes to deterrence.  SecDef explained to Morin that the system
    was aimed at nations with a handful of nuclear weapons and a limited
    but growing missile capability to launch them.  Noting Iran fits that
    profile, SecDef said that MD provides a good deterrent against limited
    attacks.

    ¶8. (S/NF) SecDef agreed with MoD Morin that the U.S. owed NATO answers
    on C2, costs, and the role of common funding.  He pledged to provide
    more details on these issues, as well as on how ALTBMD and the U.S.
    Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) fit together.  However, SecDef said it
    was important to move ahead with the MD study that was endorsed at the
    2009 NATO summit, since it would provide some of the answers France was
    seeking.  SecDef reminded Morin that POTUS will want to obtain a
    decision affirming the Alliance role in MD at the Lisbon summit in late
    ¶2010.

    ¶9. (S/NF) Responding to SecDef's discussion of MD, Morin asked why
    there was a need to shift from theater to population defense.  SecDef
    said the systems the U.S. was deploying have broader applications.  For
    example the THAAD system, which the U.S. had deployed to Hawaii as a
    measure against North Korean threat, protects both the theater and the
    population.  Gates offered the Aegis ship-borne SM-3, which was used to
    shoot down a defunct satellite, as a second example of a system that
    could also have broader applications and deter Iran from holding us
    hostage by threatening missile launches.

    ¶10. (S/NF) Recalling that Russian Prime Minister Putin once told him
    Iran was Russia's greatest threat, SecDef noted that Russia could plug
    into the new system.  SecDef highlighted two Russian objections to the
    former system:  first, the radar in the Czech Republic would have been
    so powerful that it could see into Russia; second, Russia believed that
    the three-stage Ground-Based Interceptor could have been converted
    easily to an offensive weapon.  The SM-3 missiles in the new approach
    can only be defensive in nature, however.  For these reasons, the U.S.
    believed partnering with Russia is once again potentially possible.
    (NOTE:  Following the meetings, Morin's critical comments on Missile
    Defense were disavowed by senior officials at the MoD and the MFA, who
    said that his views were his own and that the U.S. should essentially
    "erase" what he had just said.  END NOTE.)

    -----
    Iran
    -----

    ¶11. (S/NF) Shifting from Missile Defense to Iran, SecDef noted that
    Russia is now of a different mind on Iran because of Tehran's
    persistent rejection of international proposals for negotiated
    solutions and its concealment of the Qom facility.  SecDef believed
    Russia would be supportive of a new UNSCR, although it may have
    different views on the severity of sanctions, but he expressed concern
    about China.  SecDef said that Russia could perhaps help on China, but
    that securing the support of other non-permanent Security Council
    members was also an issue.  In this regard, SecDef told Morin he had
    been blunt with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, telling him that if
    Iran developed nuclear weapons, we were facing two scenarios:  nuclear
    proliferation in the Middle East or a regional war (or perhaps both).

    ¶12. (S/NF) Morin asked SecDef if he believed Israel had the capability
    to strike Iran without U.S. support.  SecDef responded that he didn't
    know if they would be successful, but that Israel could carry out the
    operation.  SecDef told Morin that he believed a conventional strike by
    any nation would only delay Iranian plans by one to three years, while
    unifying the Iranian people to be forever embittered against the
    attacker.

    ¶13. (S/NF) MoD Morin agreed that China could be problematic on the
    UNSCR and queried SecDef how the U.S. believed we could ensure their
    vote, especially in light of the upcoming Dalai Lama visit and the U.S.
    weapons sale to Taiwan.  SecDef told Morin that because of
    Congressionally mandated rules, the U.S. was required to provide
    defensive weapons for Taiwan.  He observed that every time the U.S.
    makes the sales to Taiwan, the Chinese suspend military-to-military
    relations, but only for the short term.

    --------
    Pakistan
    --------

    ¶14. (S/NF) Morin expressed doubt about the willingness of the Pakistani

    PARIS 00000170  003 OF 004

    government to fight extremists at home.  He noted that Karzai had told
    the French that if the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were closed, it
    would largely solve issues in Afghanistan.  SecDef replied that he had
    told the Pakistani government two weeks earlier that Al Qaeda was
    helping the Pakistan Taliban to destabilize Pakistan.  SecDef
    highlighted the dramatic changes in Pakistan over the past 18 months,
    especially in Swat and Bajaur provinces, which offered some hope of
    progress.  SecDef said that there was increasing coordination between
    U.S. and Pakistani forces across the border.

    -----------
    Afghanistan
    -----------

    ¶15. (S/NF) Turning to Afghanistan, MoD Morin began by stating that
    although he had announced an additional 80 trainers, France had also
    sent a non-official contribution as well.  (NOTE:  Morin was referring
    to a classified deployment of French Special Forces that have a limited
    mission to find two kidnapped French journalists. END NOTE.)  France
    had also sent an additional deployment of engineers to work exclusively
    on the Counter-IED mission.  Morin underscored that France had
    significantly increased its contributions in Afghanistan in the past 18
    months from 2700 troops to nearly 4000.

    ¶16. (S/NF) SecDef said the U.S. understood the domestic situation and
    that he would not have pressed France publicly for more forces until
    after the March elections.  However SecDef requested that France
    strongly consider substantially increasing military and police
    trainers.  SecDef said that while he would publicly praise French
    troops, which U.S. troops consider terrific fighters, he was fine with
    keeping these discussions close hold.

    ¶17. (S/NF) Shifting topics, Morin questioned the decision to
    specifically name mid-2011 as the start of a withdrawal, which Morin
    thought would simply make the Taliban wait it out.  SecDef noted that
    whether to set a date for transition had led to one of the most
    protracted debates in Washington in recent months.  SecDef had come to
    the conclusion, however, that the Afghans needed to be put on notice
    that they would need to take responsibility for their own security.  He
    pointed out that there is no end date for U.S. involvement; July 2011
    is just the beginning of a process.  POTUS was very clear that the
    transition would be conditions-based.  Morin agreed with this and urged
    that clear benchmarks be set that could reassure public opinion.
    SecDef concurred and observed that the U.S. public will not tolerate a
    prolonged stalemate.

    --------------
    Russia/Mistral
    --------------

    ¶18. (S/NF) SecDef expressed U.S. concerns about the Mistral sale to
    Russia.  He told Morin that because of Sarkozy's involvement in
    brokering a ceasefire in Georgia, which Russia was not fully honoring,
    the sale would send the wrong message to Russia and to our Allies in
    Central and East Europe.

    ¶19. (S/NF) Morin told SecDef pointedly that he had pushed hard for the
    sale.  He conceded that it was indeed a warship for power projection.
    But Morin asked rhetorically how we can tell Russia we desire
    partnership but then not trust them.  Morin told SecDef that he
    understood the U.S. position on considering Central and East European
    Allies' concerns about the perceived threat from Russia.  Morin argued,
    however, that this single ship would not make any difference with
    respect to Russian capabilities, as Russia's naval production ability
    was severely degraded.

    ¶20. (S/NF) SecDef replied that U.S. concerns were not about military
    capacity but about messaging.  Some allies, because of their past
    experiences, are still very concerned with Russia and are not sure how
    much to trust the West.  SecDef observed that Russian democracy has
    disappeared and the government was an oligarchy run by the security
    services.  President Medvedev has a more pragmatic vision for Russia
    than PM Putin, but there has been little real change.

    --------------
    KC-X Tanker RFP
    --------------

    ¶21. (S/NF) Morin told SecDef he had one final, but major, topic to
    raise, the U.S. contract tender for a new tanker plane.  He asked that
    the RFP be issued so that competition was equal for both companies and
    there was no bias.  Morin stressed that it was important for our market
    economy to be a two-way street.  He told SecDef that if the terms of
    competition are unequal, EADS would not submit a bid.

    ¶22. (S/NF) SecDef stated his belief that the RFP would be fair.  He

    PARIS 00000170  004 OF 004

    told Morin that the Air Force had established the requirements.  He
    noted that since the previous competition, he had fired both the
    civilian and military leaders of the Air Force and that there was a new
    person in charge of the Pentagon's acquisition policy.  SecDef said
    that it would be disappointing if EADS did not submit a proposal.

    ¶23. (U) SecDef has cleared this cable.  Drafted by OSD Staff.

    RIVKIN

`