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### Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2652, U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07TELAVIV2652 | 2007-08-31 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO5629
    PP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #2652/01 2431245
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 311245Z AUG 07
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3082
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0817
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1007
    RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0441
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0434
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 002652

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
    TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS KNNP UNSC PK IR IZ ZP
    JO, EG, RS, CH, LE, SY, IS
    SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
    CHIEF MEIR DAGAN

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones.  Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (S) In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir
    Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of
    Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU
    that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security
    assistance from 2008-2018.  Dagan provided his assessment of
    the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressing
    Israel's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being,
    (b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and
    (c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are
    unstable with unclear futures ahead of them.  Dagan probed
    for more detail about U.S. military assistance to the Gulf
    states, and -- while signaling agreement with the U.S.
    approach to the Gulf states vis-a-vis Iran -- cautioned that
    they may not be able to absorb significant military
    assistance.  Dagan reviewed Israel's five-pillar strategy
    concerning Iran's nuclear program, stressed that Iran is
    economically vulnerable, and pressed for more activity with
    Iran's minority groups aimed at regime change.  Dagan urged
    caution in providing assistance to the Siniora government in
    Lebanon, noting Syrian and Iranian efforts to topple the GOL.

    ¶2. (S) Under Secretary Burns cited the MOU as tangible
    evidence of the USG's commitment to Israel, and stressed that
    the U.S. would support all of its friends -- Arabs included
    -- in the Middle East, and will remain engaged in the region
    for the long term.  He described U.S. efforts to support the
    Musharraf and Karzai governments as they face opposition from
    Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and explained that the Gulf
    Security Dialogue is meant to bolster Gulf states facing
    threats from Iran.  The Under Secretary reviewed U.S. efforts
    to isolate Iran and increase pressure on it, stressing that
    the U.S. is currently focused on the diplomatic track.  He
    shared USG thinking about the Siniora government in Lebanon,
    and urged that the U.S. and Israel continue to consult on
    Lebanon.  END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------------
    THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL'S QME
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶3. (S)  Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU on
    security assistance could not have come at a better time, and
    stressed that Israel appreciated America's support.  The
    Under Secretary agreed about the timing, noting that the
    U.S., Israel and like-minded countries were facing multiple
    threats around the world, and that the Middle East is a very
    dangerous region.  He said that the MOU serves as a concrete
    reminder that the U.S. stands by its long-term security
    commitments to its friends, and is ready to help them with
    their needs.  The Under Secretary noted that the Middle East
    is now at the heart of American interests.  Because Egypt
    also plays a vital role in the region, the U.S. would also
    renew its security assistance commitment to that country.
    U.S. relations with the Gulf states were longstanding, and
    America would stay true to those friendships, as well.  The
    Under Secretary stressed that the USG is committed to
    Israel's QME.  He noted that the majority of systems and
    equipment that the U.S. would sell to Egypt and other Arab
    partners would replace items that had been sold to those
    countries in the past.

    -------------------------------------------
    DAGAN REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST, PAKISTAN, TURKEY
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S) Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in
    the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which the
    fate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another.
    Dagan then said he was concerned about how long Pakistani
    President Musharraf would survive:  "He is facing a serious
    problem with the militants.  Pakistan's nuclear capability
    could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime."  Turning to
    Iran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period.
    There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani and
    Ahmadinejad and their respective supporters.  Instability in
    Iran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic
    minorities.  This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities,
    and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in

    TEL AVIV 00002652  002 OF 005

    their lifetimes.  As for Iraq, it may end up a weak, federal
    state comprised of three cantons or entities, one each
    belonging to the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias.

    ¶5. (S) Dagan said that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are
    concerned about the growing importance of Iran and its
    influence on them.  They are taking precautions, trying to
    increase their own military defensive capabilities.
    Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warned
    that these countries would not be able to cope with the
    amount of weapons systems they intend to acquire:  "They do
    not use the weapons effectively."

    ¶6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down
    threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egypt
    is struggling with the question of who will replace President
    Mubarak.  He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and
    that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees only
    instability.  Further afield, it looks at Turkey and sees
    Islamists gaining momentum there.  The question, he asked, is
    how long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defender
    of Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.

    ¶7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough,
    Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a
    "very negative role" in the region.  He observed that all of
    these challenges have to be addressed globally -- they could
    not be dealt with individually.  Returning to Jordan as an
    example, he noted that the more than one million Iraqi
    refugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and
    forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia.  This
    is evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan,
    which implies greater understanding between the Jordanians
    and the Saudis.

    ----------------------------------------
    DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan
    said that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states "is
    the right direction to go," especially as they are afraid of
    Iran.  Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor in
    the region.  Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S.
    security assistance to America's Arab partners.  He expressed
    concern, nevertheless, about the current policies of those
    partners -- especially with regards to Syria and Iran.  Dagan
    added that if those countries must choose between buying
    defensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he would
    prefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bring
    them closer to the U.S.

    ¶9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now
    is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, and
    pointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying to
    play all sides.  Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S.
    is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issues
    from a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in a
    unified way.  Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressed
    understanding for Israel's frustration with how the region
    looked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did not
    engage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation would
    become much worse.  It is critical to get the Gulf states
    focused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approach
    to countering it.  Encouraging and supporting their
    counterproliferation efforts would be crucial.  Dagan said he
    agreed with this approach, stressing that the threat of
    radical Islam is real.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL'S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the
    U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning when
    Iran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability.  He clarified
    that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetable
    is purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considers
    other factors, including the regime's determination to
    succeed.  While Dagan acknowledged that there is still time
    to "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iran
    is making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability:
    "The threat is obvious, even if we have a different
    timetable.  If we want to postpone their acquisition of a

    TEL AVIV 00002652  003 OF 005

    nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort
    ourselves."

    ¶11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of
    five pillars:

    A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iran
    before the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuit
    of a third sanctions resolution.  He acknowledged that
    pressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone
    will not resolve the crisis.  He stressed that the timetable
    for political action is different than the nuclear project's
    timetable.

    B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed not
    to discuss this approach in the larger group setting.

    C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need to
    prevent know-how and technology from making their way to
    Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.

    D) Sanctions:  Dagan said that the biggest successes had so
    far been in this area.  Three Iranian banks are on the verge
    of collapse.  The financial sanctions are having a nationwide
    impact.  Iran's regime can no longer just deal with the
    bankers themselves.

    E) Force Regime Change:  Dagan said that more should be done
    to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of
    student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris,
    Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.

    ¶12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-minded
    countries must push on all five pillars at the same time.
    Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in due
    time, especially if more attention were placed on them.
    Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting that
    more could be done to develop the identities of ethnic
    minorities in Iran.  He said he was sure that Israel and the
    U.S. could "change the ruling regime in Iran, and its
    attitude towards backing terror regimes."  He added, "We
    could also get them to delay their nuclear project.  Iran
    could become a normal state."

    ¶13. (S) Dagan stressed that Iran has weak spots that can be
    exploited.  According to his information, unemployment
    exceeds 30 percent nationwide, with some towns and villages
    experiencing 50 percent unemployment, especially among 17-30
    year olds.  Inflation averages more than 40 percent, and
    people are criticizing the government for investing in and
    sponsoring Hamas, saying that they government should invest
    in Iran itself.  "The economy is hurting," he said, "and this
    is provoking a real crisis among Iran's leaders."  He added
    that Iran's minorities are "raising their heads, and are
    tempted to resort to violence."

    ¶14. (S) Dagan suggested that more could be done to get the
    Europeans to take a tougher stand against Iran.  Under
    Secretary Burns agreed, and suggested that Israel could help

    SIPDIS
    by reaching out to the Europeans.  Dagan said that Israel is
    already doing this, and would continue to do so.  Dagan
    reiterated the need to strike at Iran's heart by engaging
    with its people directly.  Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts
    are important, but more radio transmissions in Farsi are
    needed.  Coordination with the Gulf states is helpful, but
    the U.S. should also coordinate with Azerbaijan and countries
    to the north of Iran, to put pressure on Iran.  Russia, he
    said, would be annoyed, but it would be fitting, as Russia
    appears bent on showing the U.S. that it cannot act globally
    without considering Russia.

    ¶15. (S) Under Secretary Burns stressed that the USG is
    focused on Iran not only because of its nuclear program, but
    also because it supports terrorism and Shiite militias in
    Iraq.  The U.S. approach is currently focused on the
    diplomatic track and increasing pressure on Iran through
    sanctions.  Work in the UNSC helps to define the Iranian
    nuclear threat as one that affects international security,
    and not just that of Israel.  While UNSC members Russia,
    China and Qatar will water down efforts to increase pressure
    on Iran, it is still worthwhile to push for a third sanctions
    resolution.  In the meantime, the U.S. will encourage the
    Europeans, Japan and South Korea to implement unilateral
    sanctions against Iran outside the UNSC framework.  The U.S.

    TEL AVIV 00002652  004 OF 005

    will continue to encourage banks and financial institutions
    to slow down their operations in Iran and financially isolate
    it.  Regarding military pressure, the Under Secretary noted
    that the U.S. has deployed 1-2 carrier battle groups in the
    Gulf over the last six months, and that President Bush has
    stated that he will interrupt Iran's activity in Iraq.  As
    for outreach to the Iranian people, the VOA is now
    broadcasting programs in Farsi, and the USG is trying to get
    more Iranian students to visit the U.S. to promote
    people-to-people relations.

    -----------------------------------------
    PAKISTAN:  ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is
    losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could
    threaten him in the future.  The key question, Dagan said, is
    whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in
    addition to his role as president.  If not, he will have
    problems.  Dagan observed that there has been an increase in
    the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered
    whether he will survive the next few years.  Under Secretary
    Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in
    American foreign policy since September 11.  The U.S. is
    committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban
    and Al-Qaeda activity.  The USG will continue to support
    Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his
    military defensive capabilities.  At the same time, the U.S.
    is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each
    other militarily.  Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns
    noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and
    that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions
    between India and Pakistan.

    -----------------------------
    LEBANON:  DAGAN URGES CAUTION
    -----------------------------

    ¶17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, noting
    that the results of efforts there to bolster the Siniora
    government would impact Syria and Iraq.  The U.S. and Israel,
    he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon,
    and so cannot afford to drop their guard.  What is necessary
    is finding the right way to support PM Siniora.  "He is a
    courageous man," Dagan said.  Syria, Iran and Hizballah are
    working hard against him.  Dagan noted that much of what is
    animating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria is
    personal:  "Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents
    executed by the Syrians."  This anti-Syrian sentiment has
    forged an alliance based on personal and national interests.
    Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagan
    suggested that the odds are against him.  Under Secretary
    Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora as
    much support as possible, and that we would continue to
    consult closely with Israel on Lebanon.  He noted that he
    would return to Israel in October.

    --------------------
    MEETING PARTICIPANTS
    --------------------

    18, (SBU) Accompanying Under Secretary Burns in the meeting
    were:
    -- Ambassador Richard H. Jones
    -- Acting PM Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull
    -- Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Affairs Mary Beth Long
    -- NEA/IPA Deputy Director Nicole Shampaine
    -- Embassy Tel Aviv Counselor for Political Research
    -- Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer (notetaker)

    ¶19. (SBU) Accompanying Mossad Chief Meir Dagan in the meeting
    were:
    -- Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Salai Meridor
    -- Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni Omer Caspi
    -- Two unidentified Mossad officials

    ¶20. (U) Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns cleared on this
    cable.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    TEL AVIV 00002652  005 OF 005

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************
    JONES

`