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### Viewing cable 08MUSCAT565, OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08MUSCAT565 | 2008-08-07 07:07 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Muscat

`

    VZCZCXRO5264
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHMS #0565/01 2200743
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 070743Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9835
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000565

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2018
    TAGS: PREL PARM IR MU
    SUBJECT: OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM

    Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).

    Summary
    -------
    ¶1.  (S/NF)  Minister of the Royal Office and head of the
    Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
    Lieutenant General Ali bin Majid al-Ma'amari, reviewed Oman's
    view on Iran from a security perspective, highlighting Omani
    awareness of Iran's deceptive tactics and expansionist
    ideological desires in the region.  During an introductory
    meeting with NAVCENT commander VADM William Gortney,
    accompanied by the Ambassador, General Ali addressed the
    Iranian nuclear file, security in the Strait of Hormuz, and
    Iranian interference in the region.  Ali Majid's suspicious
    view of Iran stands in stark contrast to conciliatory if not
    obsequious public comments of Omani Minister Responsible for
    Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi regarding Iran and its role
    in the region.  End summary.

    Won't Oppose Further Sanctions on Iran
    --------------------------------------
    ¶2.  (S/NF)  Characterizing Oman's preference for "frankness
    and clarity," General Ali began his comments on Iran by
    noting the reality of Iran as a nearby neighbor, which
    influenced Oman's relations with Iran.  Toward the end of the
    discussion, he compared Oman's normal relations with Iran to
    the relations of other GCC members with Iran.  Throughout the
    meeting, he frequently touched on the theme of how different
    Oman was from other GCC member states, whose real intentions
    and positions often eluded Omani comprehension.

    ¶3.  (S/NF)  The Iranian nuclear issue stood at the forefront
    of the General's mind.  He described the nuclear file as an
    international issue, noting that resolution of this issue
    should be dealt with through international bodies such as the
    UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy
    Agency (IAEA).  Oman would respect decisions of these groups
    and play its role in the international community.  Oman would
    not oppose imposition of further measures against Iran by the
    international bodies; however, Oman did not want to play an
    active role in advocating for such measures itself.

    Iranian Intentions Clear:  Stall for Time
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶4.  (S/NF)  Ali Majid stated that Oman was aware of Iranian
    stall tactics in the talks over the nuclear issue.  Instead
    of responding by the August 5 deadline, the Iranian side
    offered a new initiative for talks, confirming reports from
    the U.S. and others that Iran indeed is trying merely to buy
    time.  Letting the 5 August deadline pass in responding
    positively to the P5 1 proposal made the Iranian intention to
    stall "very clear to Oman."  The Ambassador noted that the
    U.S. has been working with allies around the world, and
    especially within the EU, to further restrict Iranian
    economic activity in an effort to influence Iran's position
    on the nuclear file.  General Ali agreed that sanctions to
    date were having an impact on the Iranian economy, despite
    Iran's public denials.  Moreover, he said, Iran believed the
    U.S. would never attack Iran, a belief that encouraged Iran
    to persist in its stall tactics.  Nevertheless, he advocated
    a non-military solution as the best option for the U.S., and
    suggested that over the long term, establishment of U.S.
    relations at some level with the Iranian government might
    enable the U.S. to better influence the Iranian government
    and people.

    Empty Threats Against the Strait
    --------------------------------
    ¶5.  (S/NF)  Responding to the Ambassador's question about
    recent Iranian statements threatening the Strait of Hormuz,
    Ali Majid dismissed the threats as "empty words" and perhaps
    a feeble attempt to up its bargaining leverage vis a vis the
    P5 1.  VADM Gortney echoed the Ambassador's comments that
    such rhetoric negatively impacted the world's view of Iran
    and ultimately would undermine Iran's standing in the
    international community.  On this same issue, the General
    expressed his pleasure with the White House press statement
    on August 5 responding to the IRGC commander's comments
    regarding closure of the Strait, agreeing that Iranian
    closure of the strait would be suicide (i.e., more harmful to
    Iran's own economic interests).  He also commended the U.S.
    for not escalating the rhetoric but instead putting Iran's
    comments into proper perspective.

    Iraq and Iranian Expansionism

    MUSCAT 00000565  002 OF 003

    -----------------------------
    ¶6.  (S/NF)  Prior to delving into the nuclear issues, Ali
    Majid acknowledged that Iranian interference in Iraq
    prevented achievement of a stable security environment there.
     He allowed that, at a minimum, Iran indirectly supported
    Shi'a militia in Iraq.  Elaborating on his theme of "Iranian
    expansionist" ideology, he noted that the Iranian national
    radio broadcast commenced with the prelude "the voice of the
    Islamic Republic from Tehran."  Focusing on "from Tehran," he
    astutely raised Omani concerns that such language revealed
    Iran's true intentions:  a "greater Islamic Republic" with
    Tehran at its center.  He further speculated that Iran wanted
    to give the impression that the Islamic Republic might
    already encompass "Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and even the Gulf."

    ¶7.  (S/NF)  Ali Majid linked the nuclear issue and the
    interference in Iraq by speculating that a resolution might
    entice Iran into ceasing its interference in Iraq.  He
    offered a rhetorical question on whether Iran was serious
    about challenging the major powers or is it posturing in the
    media for domestic consumption.  He conceded that he truly
    did not know the answer, but that with Iran's continued
    attitude on the nuclear issue, the security situation in Iraq
    would remain unresolved.  Citing Oman's preference for a
    non-military solution, he nevertheless acknowledged that a
    nuclear-armed Iran as opposed to war with Iran posed "an
    extremely difficult dilemma for all of us."

    Playing to Their Domestic Audience
    ----------------------------------
    ¶8.  (S/NF)  Acknowledging Iran's revolutionary zeal, the
    General attempted to put Iranian public statements in
    perspective when he described as exaggerations those comments
    by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmed-I Nejad or other Iranian
    figures, particularly regarding military capabilities.
    "Countries that believe they have some specific military
    weapons advantages usually keep them secret," he averred.  He
    asserted that in the end, all power resided with Supreme
    Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

    ¶9.  (S/NF)  Ali Majid portrayed Shi'a ideology as another
    factor complicating possible military conflict with Iran.
    Iranian leaders would not balk at sacrificing a quarter of
    their 60 million citizens in a military conflict.  The Shi'a
    tradition of martyrdom spanned 14 centuries.  The annual
    self-flagellation of Shi'a over 1,400 years served as an
    example of this martyr psychology.  Beyond its Shi'a
    ideology, pride in its Persian national identity compelled
    Iran to demand international recognition and respect.

    ¶10.  (S/NF)  Returning back to comments about GCC countries,
    General Ali singled out Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar as three
    Gulf countries that probably would want the U.S. to strike
    Iran.  However, he urged the U.S. to determine whether such
    voices were speaking on the basis of logic or emotion.  He
    likened private entreaties of these countries to the U.S. for
    military action on Iran to the Iraqi opposition in exile
    providing the U.S. false information on Iraq that led to the
    invasion of Iraq.  At the beginning of the meeting, Ali Majid
    had noted that, in contrast to Oman, other GCC members did
    not always speak with candor or clarity, leaving Oman to
    question the real motivations or intentions of its GCC
    brethren.

    ¶11.  (S/NF)  Punctuating his comments about Iran's
    irrationality, Ali Majid pointed to Libyan leader Colonel
    Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's recent comment that "Iran is crazy" not
    to pay attention to the history of Yugoslavia and Iraq, whose
    ignoring of U.S. pressure resulted in their collapse.
    Interestingly, he referred to Qadhafi's transformation from
    pariah to emerging member of the international community by
    noting that Qadhafi had once been "our enemy."

    Oman in a "Strategic Relationship" with the U.S.
    --------------------------------------------- ---
    ¶12.  (S)  Shifting from Iran, Ali Majid underscored Oman's
    "strategic relationship" with the U.S. and highlighted Oman's
    cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism issues.  He
    described Oman's zero tolerance for extremism and refusal to
    negotiate with terrorists as a policy established at least
    since 1970 (the year of the Sultan's assumed power).  Oman
    has been and continues to prepare itself to confront
    terrorism, he said, as it is not exempt from the plotting of
    terrorists.  While Oman is "encircled by problems" --
    specifically mentioning Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan --

    MUSCAT 00000565  003 OF 003

    Oman remains vigilant in preventing such problems from
    reaching the Sultanate.  On the topic of Oman's partnership
    with the U.S., he harkened back to when the Soviets had
    sought a warm water port during the time of their invasion of
    Afghanistan and were rebuffed by Muscat as an example of how
    "Oman has stood at the side of the U.S."  He also highlighted
    the irony that now the world faced "not the Soviets but the
    Taliban."  He quickly followed this by noting that the U.S.
    would be wise to support talks with moderate members of the
    Taliban, which Oman encouraged as a way toward achieving
    security in Afghanistan.

    ¶13.  (S/NF)  Participants in the meeting included VADM
    Gortney, the Ambassador, the admiral's executive officer,
    Embassy Muscat's OMC Chief, and GRPO (notetaker).  Sayyid
    Munthir bin Majid al-Sa'id, head of the Royal Office Liaison
    and Coordination Service participated as notetaker and
    translator for General Ali.

    Comment
    -------
    ¶14.  (S/NF)  In light of recent, more conciliatory statements
    by Minister Responsible for foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi,
    Ali Majid's blunt assessment of Iranian intentions comes as
    refreshing reassurance of the official Omani position on
    Iran.  While careful to flag Oman's longstanding preference
    for a non-military solution to the Iran question and, less
    directly, Oman's inability to actively confront Iranian
    obstinacy, the Sultanate nevertheless maintains a clear-eyed
    view of Iran, its increasingly threatening behavior and the
    potential repercussions for the region.  His comments
    regarding attitudes and perceptions of fellow GCC members
    were startling as they would appear to confirm oft stated
    views of GCC counterparts of Oman as the sometimes "odd man
    out" in the GCC.  Ali Majid's comments suggest that while not
    entirely comfortable with this, the Omanis acknowledge it.
    Ali Majid, as the Sultan's top security official and advisor,
    is known for taking a more hard-line view of matters relating
    to regional security.  However, given his closeness to the
    Sultan and his status as a member of the inner-most circle of
    the Sultan's confidants, such views to a senior U.S. officer
    can be assumed to accord with those of Qaboos.
    GRAPPO

`