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### Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2529, ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S SEPTEMBER 30 VISIT TO MOSCOW:

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09MOSCOW2529 | 2009-10-06 14:02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #2529/01 2791432
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 061432Z OCT 09 ZDK
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4996
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002529

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS IR AF UP GG
    SUBJECT: ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S SEPTEMBER 30 VISIT TO MOSCOW:
    BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE,
    MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for
    reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During consultations with GOR officials on
    September 30, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for
    International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow discussed
    ways to implement bilateral cooperation in a number of key
    areas of mutual interest.  Both sides praised progress since
    the "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations during the first
    Obama-Medvedev meetings, though both agreed that concrete
    actions are necessary to realize true cooperation.  ASD
    Vershbow emphasized that the reset needs to be reciprocal and
    noted that Iran would be a critical test case.  Both sides
    expressed interest in further cooperation on Afghanistan,
    especially in the sphere of counternarcotics.  While the
    Administration's missile defense announcement has met with a
    generally positive reaction in the Russian media, Duma and
    Security Council representatives made clear they had
    questions about the later phases of the new U.S. plan and
    questioned whether the U.S. would be prepared for cooperation
    going beyond information exchange.   Russian interlocutors
    acknowledged the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program, but
    stressed Moscow's skepticism about sanctions.  Throughout the
    meetings, ASD Vershbow emphasized that Russia's efforts to
    assert a regional sphere of influence posed a threat to the
    reset in bilateral relations, and reiterated the U.S.
    commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial
    integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and other partners in the
    region.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2.  (C) OVERVIEW OF MEETINGS:  ASD Vershbow met with the
    following GOR officials:  Viktor Mikhaylovich Zavarzin
    (Defense Committee Chairman of the State Duma), Aleksandr A.
    Gorbunov (Chief of the Main Directorate for International
    Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense), General
    Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy (Deputy Secretary of the
    Security Council and former Chief of Defense), Aleksey
    Nikolayevich Borodavkin (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs),
    and Grigoriy Borisovich Karasin (First Deputy Minister of
    Foreign Affairs and State Secretary).  He also met informally
    with academic experts and pundits and gave an interview to
    Interfax.

    --------------------------------------------- ---
    U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION -- WORDS ARE NOT ENOUGH
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶3.  (C) At all meetings, ASD Vershbow and his Russian
    interlocutors noted that U.S.-Russia relations since the
    "reset" have been moving in the right direction, with
    opportunities for increased bilateral cooperation in areas of
    mutual interest.  The Bilateral Presidential Commission and
    associated working groups will be useful to inject momentum
    into our work.  However, ASD Vershbow stressed that words
    alone or mere information exchanges are not enough, and the
    reset must be reciprocal.  Both sides need to take action to
    implement agreements already concluded and to pave the way
    for additional areas of work and to identify concrete
    projects for cooperation.  Mechanisms for enabling these
    efforts need to be established (e.g., the Ministry of Defense
    is currently undergoing a major organizational reform, which
    has hampered efforts for implementing the previously approved
    2009 military-to-military work plan, and both sides need to
    ensure that planned events are conducted).

    ¶4.  (C) ASD Vershbow agreed that next steps must be taken in
    other areas where we have agreed to cooperate previously
    (e.g., implementing a ballistic missile joint threat
    assessment, a Joint Data Exchange Center, and the lethal
    transit overflight in support of efforts in Afghanistan that
    was agreed to at the July summit).  The U.S. and Russia must
    be united in addressing common threats, such as the nuclear
    and ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea.

    ¶5.  (C) During his meeting with MOD International Military
    Cooperation Chief Gorbunov, ASD Vershbow emphasized that
    transparency should be a major aspect of cooperation.
    Vershbow observed that DoD has been very open with the
    Russians about sensitive issues.  For example, DoD has shared
    information about efforts to help prepare Georgian troops for
    deployment to Afghanistan in support of ISAF efforts;
    however, the Russians have not reciprocated in this vein
    (e.g., their Zapad 2009 and Ladoga exercises).

    ¶6.  (C) Both Duma Defense Committee Chair Zavarzin and
    Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy stressed that
    they are ready to work on all areas of mutual interest on the
    BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE,
    MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION

    condition that Russia's voice be heard.  In particular,
    Zavarzin cited the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
    (1997-2002) in which Russia claims its views were ignored,
    the NATO-Russia Council (the PJC's successor) in which Russia
    "still did not have a full say," and Russia's interest in
    working on anti-missile defense since 2000 which "did not pan
    out."  ASD Vershbow acknowledged that both NATO and Russia
    bore responsibility for areas where cooperation was not
    successful, but suggested that we need to look ahead rather
    than debate the past.

    --------------------------------------------- ------
    RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY REFORM POSES CHALLENGES TO
    MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶7.  (C) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) is in the midst
    of major reform.  International Military Cooperation Chief
    Gorbunov described the main goal of the reform as the
    creation of the "most effective military force in the world,"
    despite existing limitations (e.g., demographics, large
    landmass and borders, resources, and various threats along
    the borders).  He identified two distinct processes as part
    of the reform -- building of the armed forces and control of
    the forces.  Today, Russia is focusing on building the
    forces, including a large influx of civilian personnel in
    management and specialist roles, improving pay/benefits of
    service members, improving quality of equipment, and trying
    to change decision-making processes at all levels.  Gorbunov
    emphasized that these changes are intended to make Russia a
    strong competitor, but also a reliable partner.

    ¶8.  (C) Gorbunov explained that the reform process is having
    a significant impact on the Main Directorate for
    International Military Cooperation (GUMVS) at the MOD.  The
    Foreign Liaison Directorate (UVS) is being closed on October
    1, and a new International Liaison Directorate is being
    created.  Because of these changes, correspondence will be
    slow over the next six weeks or so, which will impact the
    Attache Corps in Moscow.  Gorbunov offered his personal
    assistance during this period.

    ¶9.  (C) ASD Vershbow raised the Bilateral Defense
    Consultations (BDC) which the U.S. had proposed for November,
    and suggested the possibility of a broader dialogue between
    the MOD and DoD on policy and strategy issues to complement
    State-MFA exchanges.  Vershbow explained that DoD's proposed
    BDC topics (including confidence-building measures and
    transparency, risk reduction and notification procedures,
    expanded military technical cooperation, etc.) were carefully
    considered, but we welcomed Russia's suggestions for
    additional topics.   Gorbunov responded that the MoD agrees
    with the general notion of the BDC, but stipulated that the
    General Staff needs to identify the right experts to address
    topics to be discussed, and they plan to propose other topics
    for consideration.  He gave no indication as to when a
    response would be provided.

    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    AFGHANISTAN:  NARCO-TRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, ILLICIT FINANCE
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶10.  (C) ASD Vershbow's meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister
    Borodavkin and MOD International Cooperation Chief Gorbunov
    particularly focused on Afghanistan.  Borodavkin mentioned
    that Russia views Afghanistan not only as a threat, but as an
    opportunity for cooperation with the U.S. and other countries
    (e.g., NATO), and suggested that ISAF could play an important
    role in fighting illegal drug trafficking.  He recalled that
    the U.S. and NATO had participated in the March 2009
    conference held in Moscow at which counternarcotics was a top
    priority.

    ¶11.  (C) When asked by Borodavkin about whether more U.S.
    troops will be sent to Afghanistan, ASD Vershbow explained
    that General McChrystal's assessment is being reviewed at the
    highest levels.  He noted that while the situation in
    Afghanistan has not gone as well as hoped over the past six
    months, the U.S. cannot allow the Taliban to regain control.
    Expansion and training of the Afghan National Security Forces
    (ANSF), improving governance, and economic assistance are all
    still essential components of the U.S. strategy in
    Afghanistan and we will continue to seek cooperation in these
    areas.

    ¶12.  (C) Borodavkin introduced a number of proposals for
    increased Russian contribution.  He said that Russia would
    like to launch cooperation with the U.S. on the economic
    rehabilitation of Afghanistan and referred to a clause in the
    July Summit Joint Statement that without economic
    improvement, terrorism and other threats cannot be
    eliminated.  Borodavkin suggested tripartite cooperation
    (Russia-U.S.-Afghanistan) to reconstruct the Soviet-era
    Salang Tunnel to provide a much needed reliable
    transportation route.  The Russians have already undertaken a
    technical study on this project and Borodavkin said that with
    adequate resources, it would be a useful cooperative effort.
    (Note:  Borodavkin's staff confirmed that the MFA has
    submitted a proposal to the State Department on the Salang
    Tunnel.)

    ¶13.  (C) Russia considers narco-trafficking to be its highest
    priority vis-a-vis Afghanistan.  Borodavkin said Russia is
    ready to help the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Interior
    Ministry in these efforts.  He noted that Russia is already
    providing counternarcotics training to the Afghans at the
    Domodedovo Center, and mentioned Russian counter-narcotics
    chief Ivanov's statement that he is ready to provide
    increased assistance on bilateral and multilateral levels
    such as NATO and the OSCE.   Both Borodovkin and Vershbow
    agreed that while the U.S. and Russia are currently working
    together on this and the related issue of threat financing
    through the Bilateral Presidential Commission, we need to
    address these problems more forcefully.  Illicit financing
    has been raised at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
    and OSCE meetings, offering one area of possible cooperation.

    ¶14.  (C) At his meetings at the MOD and MFA, ASD Vershbow
    expressed appreciation for Russia's expression of interest in
    providing weapons and equipment to the ANSF, and requested
    that any such help be made in the form of donations with no
    fees attached, as those charges would have to be paid for by
    the U.S.  He underscored that some of the equipment/weapon
    donation requests provided to Russia are intended to support
    counter-narcotics efforts, so the U.S. hopes Russia will be
    able to provide this support.  ASD Vershbow also asked that
    Russia work with the Combined Security Transition Command -
    Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to ensure that ANSF priority
    requirements are met and provided a list of requirements.

    ¶15.  (C) Borodavkin said that Russia will be able to supply
    limited numbers of weapons to the ANP as aid and will
    consider selling more weapons to the ANP and the Afghan
    National Army (ANA).  He also expressed concern that there
    are unlicensed (counterfeit) Russian weapons on the market,
    which are of inferior quality.  Gorbunov explained that
    donating equipment and weapons to Afghanistan is a
    presidential decision, which would entail President Medvedev
    asking the military services to donate items from current
    stocks.

    ¶16.  (C) Borodavkin also asked ASD Vershbow's perspectives on
    the European proposal for a conference on Afghanistan after
    the new Afghan government is established.  ASD Vershbow said
    the U.S. saw merit in this idea as a means of seeking
    additional international support for Afghanistan, but noted
    that the timing of the initiative will depend on
    Afghanistan's domestic politics; given the problems with the
    Presidential elections, conditions were not yet right.

    ¶17.  (C) Borodavkin mentioned the work of the Afghanistan
    sub-working group under the Bilateral Presidential Commission
    and stated that the Foreign Ministry is hoping that Amb.
    Holbrooke can reschedule his planned visit to Moscow.
    Borodavkin requested that ASD Vershbow pass on the invitation
    to Amb. Holbrooke.

    ¶18.  (C) ASD Vershbow also raised the lethal transit
    agreement signed at the July summit in his meetings with
    Gorbunov, Borodavkin, and Zavarzin.  He underscored the
    importance of a timely Duma decision now that the General
    Authorization has been delivered.  ASD Vershbow expressed
    hopes that the inaugural flight of the agreement could take
    place prior to Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Moscow
    on October 12-14.  Zavarzin thought the Duma would approve
    the agreement without any problem; Borodavkin confirmed that
    the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on the request,
    but warned that they do not have the sole voice on this
    matter.

    ---------------------------------------------
    MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION:  NEITHER CONCESSION

    NOR THREAT TO RUSSIA
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶19.  (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the recent U.S. missile
    defense decision during each of his consultations.  In his
    meeting with Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin, ASD
    Vershbow observed that the Russian press may have been overly
    positive in its assessment of the September 17 announcement,
    focusing on the cancellation of the Program of Record rather
    than the new MD architecture.  While the new phased adaptive
    approach to MD does not pose a threat to Russia, there will
    likely continue to be missile defense elements in
    central-eastern Europe, with an SM-3 site in Poland if the
    Government of Poland agrees.  However, the physical
    characteristics of the new system are different from the old,
    and the U.S. believes Russia has no basis for concern that
    the system could threaten its strategic forces.  The new
    architecture will be more effective and be able to provide
    protection to vulnerable parts of Europe more quickly.
    Vershbow emphasized that the U.S. intends to be open about
    the new architecture, citing information available through
    congressional testimony and other open sources.  The U.S. aim
    is to make this a project for NATO because the system is
    designed to protect all of NATO's territory (starting in
    southeastern Europe, where the current threat is, but
    eventually covering all of NATO).

    ¶20.  (C) ASD Vershbow affirmed the U.S. also views missile
    defense as an opportunity for cooperation with Russia against
    a common threat, noting Secretary of Defense Gates' support
    for cooperation on missile defense.  Vershbow emphasized to
    Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy
    that we should begin by implementing the Joint Data Exchange
    Center (JDEC), on which the Russians had postponed a decision
    until after the U.S. missile defense announcement.  Vershbow
    told Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy that linking radars could
    follow, which could then lead to broader areas of cooperation
    that could be implemented either bilaterally or within the
    NATO-Russia Council (NRC) framework.  He suggested that U.S.
    and Russian experts explore concrete ways to implement
    military technical cooperation, noting that such cooperation
    would be mutually beneficial and would send a strong signal
    to Iran that could help in resolving the nuclear issue.

    ¶21.  (C) Zavarzin acknowledged that the Russian political
    elite has no illusions about missile defense and understands
    this was a U.S. decision with no quid pro quo expected from
    Russia.  Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy noted
    that the system's planned capability to intercept ICBMs does
    raise some of the same concerns Russia has had before.
    Zavarzin agreed that we need to identify specific projects to
    work on together, but that Russia wants to ensure its voice
    will be heard.  Both Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy stressed the
    need to develop bilateral cooperation methods, potentially by
    linking existing U.S. and Russian early warning systems to
    gather and share information about threats.  They also asked
    whether the U.S. was prepared to go even farther, to include
    joint technology projects, which would of greater interest to
    Russia than information exchange.

    ---------------------------
    U.S.-RUSSIAN UNITY ON IRAN?
    ---------------------------

    ¶22.  (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the serious test that Iran's
    nuclear program will pose to both Russia and the U.S. in the
    coming months, noting that our interests coincide in many
    ways, even if they are not identical.  The U.S., he stated,
    wants to see if diplomacy can succeed, but we need to be
    realistic and be prepared for tougher measures if diplomacy
    fails.  Citing the recently exposed covert nuclear facility
    and the recent missile tests, Vershbow described the
    situation as urgent, and said that the U.S. was encouraged by
    President Medvedev's recent comment that sanctions might
    become necessary.

    ¶23.  (C) ASD Vershbow mentioned that the Islamic world is
    very concerned about Iran's nuclear program (e.g., several of
    its Arab neighbors have asked the U.S. for Patriot missiles
    and other measures to protect them against Iranian attack).
    The ability of the U.S. and Russia to work together on the
    Iran challenge over the next few months will be just as
    important as our work on missile defense will be over the
    next few years.  ASD Vershbow stressed that if we fail to
    stop Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, we could have a
    "volatile, possibly explosive," situation in the Middle East.

    ¶24.  (C) In their respective meetings, Duma Defense Committee
    Chairman Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary
    Baluyevskiy agreed that Iran is a concern, but said that
    Russia continues to work closely with them and that sanctions
    cannot be pursued until after diplomatic efforts have been
    made.  Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin expressed concern
    that sanctions could be ineffective (citing past experience
    in Iraq) and could have a negative impact on the wider
    Islamic world.

    ----------------------------------------
    RUSSIA'S "SPHERE OF PRIVILEGED INTEREST"
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶25.  (C) ASD Vershbow stated in several meetings that our
    interaction in the post-Soviet space continues to be a
    sensitive issue and, if not handled carefully, could
    undermine recent gains in bilateral relations.  In this
    regard, President Medvedev's proposed amendment to the law on
    use of Russian forces overseas has raised many questions.
    Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin said that Russia
    will not interfere with the U.S. as it engages with nations
    in the region, and that there is no cause for concern
    regarding the legislation about use of Russian forces -- it
    is intended to protect Russian citizens living in those
    countries and that other countries have similar provisions.

    ¶26.  (C) UKRAINE:  ASD Vershbow spoke of his visit to Ukraine
    immediately preceding his arrival in Moscow, and cited
    Ukrainian concerns about Russian respect for Ukraine's
    sovereignty and borders.  Vershbow stated that the U.S.
    continues to support the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security
    Assurances and Ukraine's freedom to choose its security
    relationships, and encourages Russia to reaffirm its
    adherence as well.  He suggested that President Medvedev's
    open letter to Ukraine had been counter-productive.  The U.S.
    favors close and mutually beneficial Russian-Ukrainian
    relations -- this is not a zero-sum game.

    ¶27.  (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin said that Ukraine is
    Russia's closest neighbor, and is a "key partner" in
    international activities.  Russia is not trying to influence
    Ukraine, but wants a stable Ukraine and a secure
    neighborhood.  He also said that Russia cannot ignore
    attempts to depict it as a major threat to Ukraine.  Foreign
    Minister Lavrov will be visiting Ukraine this week to meet
    with Ukrainian Acting Foreign Minister Khandogiy and there
    even is a possibility that Medvedev and Ukrainian President
    Yushchenko will meet at a summit of CIS countries shortly
    after that.  Karasin said that Russia wants to deal with
    Ukraine in a normal way and that Ukrainian citizens are the
    ones to decide what they want.

    ¶28.  (C) GEORGIA:  Security Council Deputy Secretary
    Baluyevskiy, Zavarzin, and Karasin asked why the U.S. is
    providing military assistance to Georgia when it threatens
    stability in the Caucasus region.  This causes concern and
    Russia cannot allow renewed aggression against Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia.  ASD Vershbow explained that as a matter of
    principle, the U.S. will help Georgia protect its sovereignty
    and independence, but stated that the U.S. is not rearming
    Georgia, as Russia has repeatedly alleged.  Since the August
    2008 war, there has been no U.S. lethal assistance to
    Georgia; DoD funds were transferred to the State Department
    for humanitarian purposes.  In the short term, the U.S. is
    proceeding with great care and focusing on training,
    education, and helping prepare Georgia to participate in
    Afghanistan under the command of U.S. Forces.  At the same
    time, Georgia is a sovereign state with the right to
    self-defense.  We do not accept any arms embargo, and we may
    provide weapons to Georgia in the future.

    ¶29.  (C) Zavarzin made a point of saying that Russia does not
    dispute Georgia's sovereignty, but it cannot allow new acts
    of aggression; a regional consensus is necessary.  Karasin
    said that, in Russia's view, the current Georgian leadership
    is irresponsible.  ASD Vershbow reiterated that the U.S. had
    made clear to Georgia that there is no military option
    regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that the Georgians
    need to take a long view on reintegration of the territories.
     Karasin noted some successes in repairing relations since
    last August, including the Geneva talks that enable the
    Georgians to talk directly to the Abkhaz and Ossetians.
    Vershbow said that stability in the Caucasus and creating
    conditions to help improve Georgian-Russian relations is very
    important to the U.S.

    ¶30.  (C) Karasin mentioned the EU independent report on the
    August 2008 conflict in Georgia, which had just been released
    on the afternoon of September 30.  ASD Vershbow mentioned
    that he looked forward to reading the report and stressed
    that even if we do not agree completely on the report's
    findings, we need to look ahead and promote stability in the
    region, including an international presence in the
    territories.  Karasin said that international presence in
    Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be discussed with the Abkhaz
    and the Ossetians (not the Russians).  Russia has "bilateral
    agreements" with them, and Russian border guards are
    protecting them to help restore stability.

    ¶31.  (C) Karasin asked whether the U.S. intends to establish
    a military presence in Georgia by contributing personnel to
    the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).  This would be a serious
    problem for Russia, as they believe it would send the wrong
    message to President Saakashvili that he could use force
    again.  ASD Vershbow said there has been lots of speculation
    on this subject that was not based on fact.  If the EUMM did
    make such a request in the future, the U.S. would consider
    it, but this would likely involve civilian monitors.
    Vershbow added that Russia needs to fully withdraw its forces
    from positions beyond the line of the outbreak of hostility,
    per the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, since this non-compliance
    was a continuing source of tension.  Karasin insisted that

    Russia was in compliance, while acknowledging that the U.S.
    does not see it that way.

    ------------
    OTHER ISSUES
    ------------

    ¶32.  (C) EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY:  In response to
    Baluyevskiy's inquiry about President Medvedev's proposed
    European Security Treaty, ASD Vershbow acknowledged there
    could be ways to improve the effectiveness of existing
    conflict-prevention mechanisms, but that the U.S. and most of
    our allies did not see a need for new structures or a new
    treaty.  However, the U.S. is ready to engage with Russia on
    this issue in the Corfu process and other fora.

    ¶33.  (C) CENTRAL ASIA:  Karasin inquired about the Manas
    Transit Center and the numbers of U.S. military personnel
    that would be deployed under the new arrangement.  ASD
    Vershbow said that he did not have precise figures.  However,
    in contrast with the previous agreement, security for the
    facility is now being provided by the Kyrgyz, which reduced
    the U.S. presence somewhat.

    ¶34.  (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this cable.
    Beyrle

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