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### Viewing cable 08STATE116392, S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08STATE116392 | 2008-10-31 15:03 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State

`

    R 311525Z OCT 08
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
    INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
    AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
    CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 116392

    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2033
    TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPAL PREL PTER XF
    SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN
    ISSUES

    REF: A. 08 STATE 001379
         ¶B. 08 STATE 64936

    Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS, INR/IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).

    ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:  This cable provides the full text of the
    new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on
    Palestinian Issues (paragraph 3-end) and encourages
    Department personnel at post to assist in compiling
    Palestinian biographic information (paragraph 2).

    ¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD results from a recent Washington review of
    reporting and collection needs for Palestinian Issues and
    sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide
    participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and
    update plans to collect information on Palestinian Issues.
    The priorities may also help the Embassy manage reporting and
    collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans
    (MSPs).

    ¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National
    Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was
    established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003.  If
    needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and
    the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following
    each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.

    ¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often
    is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose
    agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD's
    issuance.  COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can
    assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to
    encourage relevant reporting through their own or State
    Department channels.

    ¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting - including on
    Palestinians:

    ¶A.  (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State
    reporting officers for much of the biographical information
    collected worldwide.  Informal biographic reporting via email
    and other means is vital to the community's collection
    efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for
    dissemination to the IC.  State reporting officers are
    encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as
    information becomes available.

    ¶B.  (S/NF) When it is available, reporting officers should
    include as much of the following information as possible:
    office and organizational titles; names, position titles and
    other information on business cards; numbers of telephones,
    cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact
    information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc
    or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings;
    internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses,
    web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers;
    frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other
    relevant biographical information.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD outline - priority issues:

          ¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process
                1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations
                with Israel (SRCC-1)
                2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1)
                3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process
                (SRCC-1)
                4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1)
                5) Role of International Community in the Peace
                Process (SRCC-1)

          ¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance
                1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1)
                2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1)
                3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1)
                4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1)
                5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2)
                6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1)
                7) US, Regional, and International Foreign
                Policy (FPOL-4)

          ¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control
                1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and
                Response (TERR-2)
                2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security
                Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2)
                3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces
                (CINT-5)
          4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4)

          ¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism
                1) International and Indigenous Terrorist
                Activities (TERR-2)
                2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian
                Terrorists (TERR-2)
                3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1)
                4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2)

          ¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure
                1) Human Rights (HRWC-3)
                2) Demographics (DEMG-3)
                3) Water Management (ENVR-4)
                4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5)
                5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3)

          ¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions
                1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on
                the Peace Process (LEAD-1)
                2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1)
                3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1)
                4) Military Response to Palestinians and
                Terrorism (FMCC-2)
                5) Settlements (SRCC-1)
                6) US and International Community (FPOL-3)

          ¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications
          Systems (INFR-3)

    ¶4. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD - Full text  -- reporting and
    collection needs under priority areas listed in paragraph 3
    above:

    ¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

          1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with
    Israel (SRCC-1).
    --Key positions, negotiating strategies, red lines, and
    points of flexibility of Fatah-affiliated Palestinian
    Authority elements, HAMAS, and other Palestinian parties
    concerned with the peace process, conflict resolution, and
    future dealings with Israel.
    --Negotiating positions for Palestinian talks with Israel on
    bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Palestinian
    Authority control in Jerusalem, right of return of
    Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the
    West Bank, and East Jerusalem, exchanges of territory,
    borders and security, and "end of claims".
    --Attitudes of the general public toward Palestinian-Israeli
    talks.
    --Attitudes of Palestinian security forces toward peace
    negotiations with and attacks on Israel inside Israel and the
    Palestinian territories.
    --Details of all formal and informal channels, used by the
    Palestinian leaders to discuss peace steps with Israel.
    --Palestinian perceptions of and relations with Israeli
    leaders and negotiating counterparts.
    --Palestinian positions on negotiations with Israel regarding
    water, transportation and energy infrastructure issues,
    access to the Israeli economy, and safe passage between areas
    of Israeli and Palestinian control.

          2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1).
    --Details regarding final-status arrangements on issues of
    security, borders and border crossings, and refugees.
    --Information regarding final-status agreements on water,
    economics, legal matters and prisoners, infrastructure and
    environment, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty,
    governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin").

          3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process
    (SRCC-1).
    --Palestinian leadership and citizen perceptions regarding
    the US role and efforts to influence the Israeli-Palestinian
    peace process.
    --Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US
    positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
    Palestinian  efforts to galvanize regional and international
    support to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli
    peace negotiations.
    --Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities
    related to US policies and programs on the peace process
    including extent of support for US and other counterterrorism
    efforts.

          4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1).
    --Palestinian perceptions of the policies of regional
    neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya
    and other Arab states and Iran) regarding a
    Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement.
    --Views and perceptions of regional neighbors on the impact a
    Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement would have on
    neighboring Palestinian populations.
    --Palestinian views of other countries' plans and efforts to
    support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
    --Palestinian perceptions of plans and efforts by individual
    regional neighbors to facilitate or hinder the development of
    institutions needed for a free and democratic Palestinian
    state.
    --Palestinian views about plans and efforts of Syria or
    Lebanon to resolve border disputes with Israel.

          5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process
    (SRCC-1).
    --Palestinian perceptions about policies, plans, efforts and
    support for strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli
    issues from European Union members, especially France,
    Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia and multilateral
    bodies, including the Quartet (United States, European Union,
    United Nations, and Russia), the Organization of the Islamic
    Conference, the Arab League, and the United Nations.
    --Palestinian views on amounts and uses of international
    assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority as part of
    bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

    ¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance

          1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1).
    --Status and relative strength of factions within the
    Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and internal
    decision-making processes of these factions.
    --Relations between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and
    its factions.
    --PLO and HAMAS finances and sources of funding.
    --Evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Palestinian
    Authority in governing areas under Palestinian Authority
    control; status of political reform and influence of
    President.
    --Indications of challenges to Palestinian Authority rule.
    Extent of popular loyalty to Palestinian Authority
    leadership.
    --Information on municipal government structures, independent
    local power bases, and relationships between the Palestinian
    leadership and local leaders.
    --Plans and intentions of the Palestinian Authority to
    consider or reject the formation of a new Palestinian
    National Unity Government.
    --Details on efforts of HAMAS to exert influence over
    Palestinians to consolidate their support.
    --Attitudes, plans, and tactics of Islamist and secular
    groups to determine or affect the choice of a successor to
    the current Palestinian Authority President.
    --Level of Palestinian support for HAMAS elected officials.
    --Palestinian perceptions of the Palestinian legislative
    council and its ability to exercise power.

          2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1).
    --Plans, intentions, and willingness to sustain efforts to
    reform the security forces.
    --Relations between the security forces and foreign security
    services, especially for cooperation, training, information
    sharing, and funding including efforts to target terrorist or
    extremist threats to the peace process.
    --Changes in the senior leadership of the Palestinian
    Authority security forces, including the general intelligence
    organization (Mukhabarat) and the Preventive Security
    Organization (PSO).
    --Leadership dynamics and power relationships among the
    Palestinian Authority security forces; relations between
    civilian leaders and security forces commanders.
    --Level of responsiveness of security forces to civilian
    control.
    --Decision-making processes and rules of engagement of the
    security forces in specific security situations.
    --Organizational structure of the Palestinian Authority
    security forces.
    --Command, control, communications, and intelligence
    infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces.
    --Information on personnel strength, budget, weapons,
    training, force readiness, targeting, tactics,
    transportation, and logistics of the Palestinian Authority
    security forces.

          3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1).
    --Goals and strategies of Palestinian officials in the West
    Bank and Gaza to insure/undermine the viability of a
    democratic Palestinian state.
    --Plans and intentions of Palestinian President to call
    elections.
    --Role of the Prime Minister.
    --Identification of key advisers to the Palestinian Authority
    President and Prime Minister and their respective areas of
    influence.
    --Decision making processes within the Palestinian Authority
    leadership, including the roles of key ministries and the
    views of their leaders on priority issues for the government.

    --Palestinian leadership attitudes toward and perceptions of
    the US.
    --Status of the current Palestinian Authority president's and
    prime minister's health.
    --Identification of possible successors to the current
    Palestinian Authority president, views of these possible
    successors, and those of other Palestinian leaders outside
    the government, on Palestinian-Israeli issues and information
    on the relationships of these possible successors with key
    Palestinian groups and Israel.

          4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1).
    --Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority leadership and HAMAS
    efforts to resolve issues related to reconciliation or to
    continue competition.
    --HAMAS reaction to peace negotiation efforts.  Relationship
    between the Palestinian leadership, to include the
    Presidency, and HAMAS officials in Gaza and rejectionist
    elements.
    --Leadership plans and efforts in Gaza and the West Bank to
    unify or maintain the division between the two territories.
    --Efforts by the Palestinian Authority leadership to involve
    HAMAS elected officials in negotiating strategies for the
    peace process.
    --Details of travel plans such as routes and vehicles used by
    Palestinian Authority leaders and HAMAS members.
    --Biographical, financial and biometric information on key PA
    and HAMAS leaders and representatives, to include the young
    guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside.

          5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2).
    --Economic decision-making processes within the Palestinian
    Authority government and plans and actions to implement
    economic reform, liberalization, and development.
    --Palestinian Authority budget allocations and funding
    streams.
    --Details about employment data and government plans and
    efforts to increase employment.
    --Plans by Palestinian officials and Palestinian businessmen
    in the West Bank and Gaza for coping with economic downturns
    caused by political problems.
    --Data on Palestinian trade with Israel and Jordan.
    --Data on the impact of border closures and
    Palestinian-Israeli violence on economic development,
    including on the livelihoods of Palestinians with jobs in
    Israel or Jordan.
    --Information on levels of financial savings by Palestinians
    and their ability to withstand prolonged economic hardship.
    --Palestinian efforts to develop trading relationships with
    non-Israeli buyers and attract foreign investment.
    --Plans and efforts to seek funding from international relief
    organizations.
    --Palestinian plans and efforts to develop and exploit
    natural gas reserves off the coast of Gaza.
    --Plans to develop or expand energy infrastructure, including
    petroleum and natural gas storage/distribution facilities and
    electric utilities.
    --Financial flows from Diaspora Palestinians and the
    motivations for such investment.
    --Information on close ties between business families and
    politicians.
    --Corrupt practices by businessmen and politicians.
    --Trends in the business practices of local Palestinian
    businessmen, such as changes in enterprise ownership and
    control mechanisms and shifts in contract bidding methods.
    --Plans and efforts to counteract Israeli closure policies.
    --Palestinian perceptions regarding fulfillment of aid
    pledges from Donors' Conference.

           6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1).
    --Plans and intentions of leaders of the Palestinian
    Authority to encourage political openness, protect civil
    liberties, and promote fiscal transparency.
    --Plans and actions of Palestinian Authority to implement
    judicial and financial reforms.
    --Details about the Palestinian justice system and
    Palestinian attitudes towards the Palestinian Basic Law and
    Sharia/Islamic law.
    --Capability and commitment of Palestinian officials and
    organizations to maintain order and confront threats posed by
    extremist and terrorist groups, clans, and criminal
    organizations.
    --Details of plans and programs intended to promote and
    maintain public order.
    --Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups
    on Palestinian plans, policies and actions aimed at promoting
    the rule of law and public order.
    --HAMAS and other Palestinian efforts to apply Sharia and
    promote Islamic alternatives in civil society.
    --Details on HAMAS' social welfare network to include
    hospitals, education systems, textbooks, libraries and social
    services in the Palestinian territories and their funding
    sources in the region and worldwide; efforts by PIJ and other
    Palestinian organizations to provide similar services and
    details of their sources of funding.
    --Financial systems used by HAMAS charities in Europe to move
    funds to the Middle East.
    --Popular attitudes towards HAMAS and other organizations
    that provide social services.
    --Views and attitudes of the younger generation on HAMAS and
    their control of municipalities as well as their social
    service programs.
    --Evidence of control of the media by Fatah-affiliated
    Palestinian Authority or HAMAS to influence the Palestinian
    population.
    --Details on development of political parties, labor unions,
    and/or worker groups.

          7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy
    (FPOL-4).
    --Efforts by the Palestinian Authority to gain support for
    its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues
    from the US.
    --Palestinian Authority's objectives and strategies on key
    issues in US-Palestinian relationship and views on future of
    US relations.
    --Information on Palestinian Authority negotiating positions
    before discussions with the US and views of Palestinian
    officials after discussions with the US.
    --Popular attitudes toward and perceptions of the US.

    ¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control

          1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and
    Response (TERR-2).
    --Palestinian counterterrorism and internal security
    policies, plans, attitudes, commitment and actions in dealing
    with extremists and terrorist groups, and clans.
    --Actions, ability and willingness of the Palestinian
    security services in the West Bank and Gaza to thwart
    terrorist attacks and maintain public order.
    --Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities
    regarding support to and cooperation with US counterterrorism
    efforts.
    --Cooperation between Palestinian security and intelligence
    services and Israeli counterparts on terrorism, including
    targeting efforts, technical operations, surveillance,
    interrogation, capture and prosecution of known terrorists.
    --Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups
    on Palestinian counterterrorism plans, policies and actions.
    --Views of Palestinian Authority President, his advisers,
    Palestinian Authority security chiefs and senior Palestinian
    officials toward the US and its counterterrorism policies;
    perceptions of US expectations for Palestinian cooperation in
    counterterrorism campaign.

          2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security
    Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2).
    --Ties between the security forces and Palestinian Authority
    leaders and other groups, including Palestinian political
    parties, militias, and rejectionist and terrorist groups.
    --Participation by Palestinian Authority security forces
    personnel in attacks against Israeli targets outside Israel
    and the Palestinian Territories.
    --Links between intelligence services and terrorist groups.
    --Locations of neighborhoods controlled by rejectionist and
    terrorist groups.
    --Indications of cooperation between Palestinian intelligence
    services and terrorist groups.

          3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5).
    --Plans, intentions, key focus and rivalries of senior PA
    security force officials, including the General Intelligence
    Organization (Mukhabarat), the Preventive Security
    Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), the
    National Security Force (NSF), and the Civil Police, as well
    as HAMAS's Security Support Force in the Gaza strip.
    --Command, control, communications, and intelligence
    infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces.
    --Indications of counterintelligence operations conducted by
    the security forces against foreign intelligence services
    operating in or through Palestinian Authority areas.
    --Information on signals intercept capabilities and targets,
    decryption capabilities, intercept sites and collection
    hardware, and intercept operation successes.
    --Plans and efforts to illicitly collect classified,
    sensitive, commercial proprietary, or protected technology
    information from US companies or government agencies.
    --Counterintelligence organization plans, efforts, and
    abilities, and warning of their use against US personnel.
    Details on security forces' penetrations of Palestinian
    rejectionist groups including electronic penetrations.
    --Technological capabilities, targets, and activities of
    Palestinian security forces.
    --Unit deployments and locations, infrastructure and
    facilities of Palestinian Authority security forces.
    --Details on processes used by Palestinian Authority security
    forces to acquire weapons and equipment, either legally or
    illegally.
    --Intentions by Palestinian security force leaders or rogue
    elements to use new capabilities against Israel or the US.

          4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4).
    --Indications of levels of corruption among Fatah-affiliated
    Palestinian Authority and/or HAMAS leaders.
    --Individuals, governments, organizations, routes, and
    methods involved in arms smuggling, human
    trafficking/smuggling, money laundering and corruption in
    financial transactions in support of illegal activities.
    --Information on illegal weapons transactions with Israelis.
    --Activities of Palestinian gangs and irregular militia
    forces' involvement in crime and terrorism.

    ¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism

          1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities
    (TERR-2).
    --Structure and internal dynamics of HAMAS militant wing (Izz
    al-Din al-Qassam Battalions), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
    (PIJ), al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the
    Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and
    Popular Resistance Committees, Army of Islam, and other
    terrorist groups with a presence in the Gaza Strip or the
    West Bank, including leadership, membership, decision making
    processes, command and control, and factions.
    --Popular support for rejectionist groups.
    --Tactics, techniques, and operating methods of Palestinian
    terrorist groups, including tradecraft, counterintelligence
    measures, recruitment activities, underground facilities,
    operational tasking, and travel, infiltrations into Israel,
    disinformation, denial and deception techniques, and
    training.
    --Plans and intentions for, and extent and details of
    Lebanese Hizballah activities in Palestinian areas or within
    Israel, including retaliation for the deaths of Hizballah
    senior military leaders.
    --Relationship between Palestinian terrorist groups and
    al-Qa'ida, and indications of interest by Palestinian
    terrorist groups to work with global jihadists.
    --Indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups in
    the acquisition or use of chemical, biological, or nuclear
    weapons, longer range missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles
    (UAVs).
    --Communications systems used by senior leaders of
    Palestinian terrorist groups to direct and control
    subordinates and field operatives.
    --Use of Inmarsat, fax machines, cellular telephones, and
    computer communications, including the Internet, to conduct
    terrorist activities.

          2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian
    Terrorists (TERR-2).
    --Evidence of Palestinian popular support for Palestinian and
    other terrorist groups; Palestinian public perceptions of
    rocket attacks against Israel.
    --Contacts and relations between Palestinian terrorist groups
    and other terrorist or rejectionist groups, especially
    Lebanese Hizballah, al-Qa'ida, and elements of the Arab
    population in Israel; influence of Islamic militants.
    --Extent and nature of control, sponsorship, and financial
    support of Palestinian terrorist groups by Iran, Syria, Saudi
    Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, or other
    countries.
    --Plans and intentions, capabilities and motivations of
    Palestinian terrorist groups and/or their state sponsors to
    conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian,
    or other western or allied targets.
    --Encouragement from state sponsors to conduct attacks
    against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western
    or allied targets.
    --Support mechanisms for Palestinian terrorist or
    rejectionist groups, including identities of key individuals
    and mechanisms for procuring and moving funds and weapons.
    --Smuggling between Gaza and the outside world, including
    routes and methodologies; information on weapons shipments
    into territories via tunnels, and maritime means for
    terrorist use.
    --Contacts and relations between HAMAS militants, the
    Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees,
    Popular Front  for the Liberation of Palestine-General
    Command (PFLP-GC), Lebanese Hizballah, Fatah al-Islam (FAI),
    and other known or emergent terrorist or rejectionist groups
    in the region, and elements of the Palestinian Authority.
    --Attitudes and motivations of the Palestinian Authority
    leadership regarding the activities of HAMAS, al-Aqsa Martyrs
    Brigades and other terrorist or rejectionist groups.
    --Evidence of Palestinian Authority's, or PA senior
    officials' prior knowledge of, funding of, authorization of,
    or participation in popular unrest, violent outbreaks, or
    terrorist acts.
    --Financial support to NGO's from foreign governments, to
    include Venezuela and Turkey.
    --Contacts and cooperation between NGOs and terrorist groups,
    especially HAMAS charities and any political/humanitarian
    entities suspected of passing funds to militants.

          3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1).
    --Details about Islamic reformer, oppositionist and militant
    (activist) leaders, organizations, adherents, and supporters,
    including objectives, plans and strategies, tactics, and
    efforts to achieve goals.
    --Plans and efforts of internal or external Islamic activists
    to affect governance in Palestinian areas.
    --Islamic activist plans and efforts to develop political
    parties or organize opposition to the governing authorities.
    --Relations and cooperation among internal and external
    Islamic activists.
    --Cohesion and divisions within and among Islamic activist
    groups.
    --Influence of religious leaders on Islamic activist leaders,
    adherents, and supporters.
    --Islamic activist influence on national leadership, military
    and security services, educational institutions, government
    agencies, and NGOs.
    --Islamic activist use of public media, including the use of
    internet web forums, to achieve strategic, tactical and/or
    operational objectives.
    --HAMAS ownership of broadcasting stations.  Government plans
    and efforts to support or defeat Islamic activist efforts.
    --HAMAS contacts or connections with Muslim Brotherhood in
    other countries.
    --Details of HAMAS connections to HAMAS external leadership
    in Damascus; HAMAS financial ties to external funding offices
    such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

          4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2).
    --Indications of Americans (officials, tourists, or
    residents) becoming targets of any terrorist groups operating
    in or near Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
    --Palestinian terrorist groups' perceptions of US
    vulnerabilities and their perceptions of how the United
    States would respond to attacks against the homeland or US
    interests overseas.
    --Palestinian authorities' response to terrorist threats and
    attacks against the US interests, persons or facilities.
    --Policies, plans, and efforts regarding cooperation by
    Palestinian or Israeli officials with the US and regional
    neighbors concerning US POW/MIA accounting and recovery
    efforts and capabilities to assist or cooperate in recovery
    efforts.

    ¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure

          1) Human Rights (HRWC-3).
    --Palestinian data and perception of the humanitarian impact
    of Israel's closure of Gaza and lack of freedom of movement
    in the West Bank due to security checkpoints, the barrier,
    and other obstacles to free movement.
    --Details about HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority's
    facilitation of humanitarian operations in the West Bank and
    Gaza.
    --Information on treatment of prisoners or detainees from
    opposition groups.
    --Palestinian intelligence and security forces' attitudes
    toward and participation in torture, and other human rights
    violations.

          2) Demographics (DEMG-3).
    --Population data for Palestinian areas and Palestinian
    Diaspora.
    --Details about, and changes to, key demographic indicators,
    such as birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, and
    internal migration.
    --Palestinian leadership's view of demographic trends; use of
    data in consideration of two-state solution.
    --Palestinian officials' efforts to deal with the 'youth
    bulge' and resultant educational, training, and employment
    challenges.
    --Efforts by Palestinian Authority or HAMAS officials or
    institutions to co-opt the youth.

          3) Water Management (ENVR-4).
    --Plans and intentions of Palestinian officials in West Bank
    and Gaza to confront environmental issues, particularly
    problems with water and waste management.
    --Palestinian perceptions of efforts to mitigate the impact
    of power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil
    services.
    --Palestinian strategies and efforts regarding water
    management and protection of infrastructure against attack.
    --Details about annual water use, and renewable surface and
    groundwater reserves.
    --Cooperation and disputes with other states regarding
    regional water resources to include the aquifers.
    --Details about plans and efforts to augment supplies from
    non-conventional sources, such as desalination plants.

          4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5).
    --Information on the effects of Palestinian-Israeli violence
    on public health conditions in Palestinian-controlled areas.
    --Details about prevalence, and outbreaks of infectious
    disease to include HIV and avian flu H5N1.
    --Palestinian Authority plans and efforts to prevent and
    manage outbreaks.
    --Statistical information on the incidence of chronic and
    infectious disease among various population groups (Gaza,
    West Bank, Bedouin, urban, agricultural areas, and so forth).

    --Details about location and level of contaminants in air,
    water, food, and soil, including threat to health from
    accidental or intentional release of toxic industrial
    chemicals.
    --Military and civilian medical capabilities and
    infrastructure.
    --Details about HAMAS and other Palestinian groups' medical
    assistance to Palestinians.

          5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3).
    --Information on location and condition of power plants,
    roads, hospitals, waste treatment facilities and financial
    institutions in the Palestinian areas.
    --Information on Palestinian access to fuel for power plants.

    --Palestinian perceptions of efforts to deal with impact of
    power shortages and efforts to mitigate power shortages on
    sewer treatment and other civil services.

    ¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions

          1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace
    Process (LEAD-1).
    --Government of Israel (GOI) leadership's negotiating
    positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with the
    Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority officials, with
    supporters or elements affiliated with HAMAS, and with other
    Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process.
    --Israeli leaders' perceptions of and relations with
    Palestinian leaders and negotiating counterparts.  Evidence
    of informal channels, either sanctioned or unsanctioned by
    the Israeli leadership, to discuss peace steps with
    Palestinian leaders.
    --Israeli leadership views and intentions regarding the
    impact of their negotiations with Syria on their negotiations
    with the Palestinians.
    --Israel's decision-making process for launching military
    operations and determining retaliation for terrorist attacks.

    --Israeli leaders' involvement in decisions on response to
    terrorist attacks.
    --Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing
    the US relationship; views of prime minister and advisors
    toward the US and its counterterrorism policies.  Israeli
    thoughts and views on impact of Israeli domestic politics,
    including changes in GOI leadership, on GOI approach to and
    conduct of the peace process and negotiations.

          2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1).
    --Negotiating positions for Israeli talks with Palestinians
    on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Israeli
    control of Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees
    to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and east
    Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, and "end of claims".
    --GOI views and positions on final-status issues; water
    rights, transportation and energy infrastructure issues,
    access to the Israeli economy, security, and safe passage
    between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, legal
    matters and prisoners, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty,
    governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin").
    --Attitudes of the Israeli public, including Israeli Arabs,
    toward Israeli-Palestinian talks.  Efforts by opposition
    parties or members of the ruling coalition to influence
    government positions on the peace process.
    --Attitudes of Israeli security forces toward peace
    negotiations with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
    Current plans and intentions regarding Palestinian access and
    movement, in particular, access and movement with economic
    consequences, e.g. movement of produce, access to fields, and
    movement of commercial goods between Palestinian villages.

          3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1).
    --Government of Israel (GOI) views and assessments of
    military strengths and vulnerabilities.
    --Perceptions of threats posed by Palestinian rejectionists,
    including the potential for conflict with their state
    sponsors, Syria and Iran, and Lebanon.
    --GOI negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in
    interactions with Syria, and Lebanon, especially on final
    status issues.
    --Israeli views of an Egyptian or Jordanian role in the
    context of final status issues.
    --Israeli views on a future regional security pact.
    --GOI plans, intentions and reactions to Palestinian
    intentions to develop Gaza off-shore natural gas reserves.
    GOI plans and actions to continue construction of security
    fence including views on boundaries, funding constraints, and
    external influences on decision-making.
    --GOI plans and actions to implement agreements with
    Palestinians on bilateral security measures and to implement
    unilateral security measures over Israeli- and
    Palestinian-controlled areas.
    --Views and actions on prisoner swaps/releases; information
    on Israel's treatment of Palestinian prisoners or detainees,
    including interrogation methods.
    --Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli
    population emigration from Israel.

          4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism
    (FMCC-2).
    --Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway
    or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants
    in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including
    targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground
    and air units.
    --Israeli efforts to counter short-range rockets and mortars.

    --IDF preparations to conduct increased operations against
    Palestinian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
    Lebanon.
    --Impact of Israeli efforts against rocket attacks on Israeli
    views of security.
    --IDF preparations to conduct combat operations against
    Hizballah or Syrian targets along Israel's northern border or
    inside Lebanon or Syria.
    --IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale,
    and operational readiness.
    --IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting
    conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and
    counterterrorist operations.
    --Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the
    territories on IDF readiness.

          5) Settlements (SRCC-1).
    --Evidence of Government of Israel support for or opposition
    to actions to limit and/or reduce settlement and outpost
    growth and construction.
    --Information on leaders of the Israeli settlement
    establishment, including Golan settlers, their ideology,
    motivations and who they claim to represent.
    --Divisions among the various settlement groups.
    --Details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies.
    Settlers' relationship with the Israeli political and
    military establishment including their lobbying and
    settlement methods.
    --Golan settlers' views of any potential peace agreement with
    Syria.
    --Support for settlers within Israeli society.
    --Indications of Israeli extremist groups becoming more
    active.
    --Perceptions of US demands or requirements of Israeli
    government regarding, security fences and settlements.

          6) US and International Community (FPOL-3).
    --Israeli perceptions of US peace process approach;
    indications of critical or hostile reaction to US policies
    and views of Israeli leadership after discussions with the
    US.
    --Attitudes of key political and military officials
    concerning the state of the relationship with the US.
    --Plans to influence views and positions of academics,
    journalists, and business, religious and professional
    organizations towards the US and the US-Israeli relationship.

    --Views of and responses to role of the Quartet.
    --Israeli plans and intentions to support US positions in the
    UN and other international fora.
    --Israeli support for US Iraq/Iran policies and US policies
    and attitudes toward other Middle Eastern countries, and
    European Union countries; relations with Russia, China,
    Turkey, Pakistan and India.

    ¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems
    (INFR-3).
    --Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and
    planned upgrades to national telecommunications
    infrastructure, networks, and technologies used by government
    and military authorities, intelligence and security services,
    and the public sector.
    --Details about command, control, and communications systems
    and facilities.
    --National leadership use of and dependencies on a dedicated
    telecommunications infrastructure.
    --Details about national and regional telecommunications
    policies, programs, regulations, and training.
    --Information about current and planned upgrades to public
    sector communications systems and technologies used by
    government, military personnel, and the civil sector,
    including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones,
    very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile
    radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption,
    international connectivity, use of electronic data
    interchange, and cable and fiber networks.
    --Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular
    communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular
    phones and their operating systems, to include second
    generation and third generation systems.
    --Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication
    purposes, including planned system upgrades.
    --Details about internet and intranet use and infrastructure,
    including government oversight.
    --Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications
    service providers and vendors.
    --Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled
    telecommunications equipment and technology.
    --Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art
    telecommunications equipment and technology.
    --Details about information repositories associated with
    radio frequency identification (RFID)-enabled systems used
    for passports, government badges, and transportation systems.

    --Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and
    e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.

    RICE

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