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### Viewing cable 09BEIJING3313, UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING3313 | 2009-12-11 10:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO3525
    OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #3313/01 3451022
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 111022Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7177
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003313

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2034
    TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC PGOV KN IR CH
    SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR
    WANG JIARUI ON IRAN, NORTH KOREA

    Classified By: Political Minster Counselor Aubrey Carlson.  Reasons 1.4
     (b/d).

    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Under Secretary Burns met with Director of the Chinese
    Communist Party's Central Committee International Liaison
    Department (CCID) Wang Jiarui December 9 to discuss
    U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran.  Wang said
    that the "ideal outcome" of Special Representative for North
    Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth's current visit to Pyongyang
    would be a meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il.  The very
    fact of the visit, Wang emphasized, was important because it
    sent a signal to the DPRK that the United States was serious
    about negotiating a settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue.
     The DPRK would be unwilling in the short run to publicly
    announce denuclearization or an immediate return to the
    Six-Party talks, but would not want to lose the opportunity
    presented by Ambassador Bosworth's visit.  The important
    thing was to keep things moving in the right direction and
    prevent the situation spinning out of control.

    ¶2. (C) Wang praised U.S. policy on Iran, calling it a
    "practical" approach.  He said China was in agreement with
    the United States "in principle" that Iran should not be
    allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that the consequences
    of such an event would have a negative impact on Chinese
    interests.  He also said that China would cooperate in
    persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the
    October meeting in Geneva with the P5-plus-1 to resume
    discussions on the nuclear issue and allow third countries to
    reprocess its nuclear fuel.  However, Wang insisted,
    continued diplomacy, rather than military action or stronger
    sanctions, was the best option at present.  U/S Burns
    stressed the importance of China's cooperation and would not
    close the door on diplomacy but that U.S. patience was
    wearing thin and Iran had to soon show it was complying with
    international agreements or face real consequences.  End
    Summary.

    China Pleased With Bosworth Visit to DPRK
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Asked his views on the North Korea nuclear situation,
    CCID Director Wang stated that China was very pleased that
    Ambassador Bosworth was in Pyongyang, noting that the visit
    would be "cost effective" because the North Koreans had made
    clear there could be no resuming the Six-Party Talks without
    first convening a bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue.  Ambassador
    Bosworth's visit effectively "kicked the ball" back to the
    North Koreans.  When asked what the likely outcome of the
    talks would be, Wang said the ideal outcome would be a
    meeting with Kim Jong-il, which would send a very positive
    signal, but it was impossible to predict North Korean
    behavior through "normal" means of reading public indicators.
     Wang said that Ambassador Bosworth would likely meet with
    First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who was "a
    hardliner" with "strong views" and whose opinions were valued
    by the DPRK's top leaders.  However, Kang had to follow
    orders from above, Wang noted, and would not want to lose
    such an opportunity to improve relations with the United
    States.  The negotiations with Ambassador Bosworth would be a
    bargaining process, with each side trying to discern the
    other's bottom line.

    ¶4. (C) The North needed a breakthrough in its relations with
    the United States, Wang asserted, both because of its
    domestic situation and the current international environment,
    but it would not be easy for North Korea to make a specific
    promise regarding a return to the Six-Party Talks or to
    announce denuclearization.  Ambassador Bosworth's trip itself
    was important because it demonstrated that the United States
    was serious about preventing a nuclear Korean peninsula and
    was committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue.  Wang
    said China was aware that the United States worried that it
    would be deceived by the North but in China's view there was
    no need to worry because the current process of promoting
    dialogue and negotiations was quite transparent and the
    international community would know what the outcome would be.

    ¶5. (C) Wang reiterated China's long-standing position that
    the key objective at this stage was to prevent the situation
    on the Korean peninsula from spinning out of control and to
    establish a positive direction through dialogue and
    negotiation.  He said that Ambassador Bosworth should make
    clear to North Korea that it was not in U.S. interests to
    prolong the current state of hostility, that the United
    States had no intention of promoting regime change in the
    North, and that international sanctions and relations with
    the DPRK's neighbors could be changed and they could help

    BEIJING 00003313  002 OF 003

    with North Korea's economic development.  This was contingent
    upon a change in North Korean behavior and an eventual North
    Korean pledge to the world that it would not embark on the
    road to nuclear weapons.  U/S Burns responded that the United
    States understood the complexity of the situation and
    emphasized the great importance of joint U.S.-China and
    Five-Party efforts to bring North Korea back as soon as
    possible to the Six-Party Talks and its denuclearization
    commitments.

    Unified U.S.-China Effort Needed on Iran
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) U/S Burns emphasized that the nuclear weapons
    challenge in Iran required a similarly unified U.S.-China and
    international effort.  The United States was profoundly
    concerned about Middle East stability, which was crucial to
    both U.S. and Chinese security and economic interests.  If
    Iran continued developing a nuclear capability, Israel would
    "no doubt" act, and concern among the Arab states might
    trigger a regional arms race.  President Obama had repeatedly
    reached out to Iran's leaders, but had yet to receive a
    positive response.  Moreover, Iran had not followed through
    on the understandings reached in Geneva in October, including
    Iran's commitment to meet with the P5-plus-1 countries for
    talks focused on the nuclear issue and its initial acceptance
    of the IAEA's TRR proposal.  The United States would continue
    to take a diplomatic, creative and flexible approach working
    with our Russian, Chinese and European partners, but time was
    running short.  By the end of the year, President Obama would
    have to evaluate Iran's actions thus far.  If Iran did not
    live up to its agreements, the United States would work with
    its international partners to make clear to Iran the
    consequences of its unwillingness to engage seriously.

    Wang Pledges Chinese Support...
    -------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Wang had high praise for U.S. efforts in the Middle
    East in general and the approach to Iran in particular,
    stating that China viewed U.S. measures in Iran as very
    practical and as based on realities on the ground.  China had
    economic interests in Iran, but, in principle, China had no
    differences with the United States on the nuclear weapons
    issue.  China agreed that Iranian nuclear weapons would bring
    great instability to the Middle East, including possible
    warfare, even on a global scale, with consequences far
    greater than China's economic interests.  China agreed with
    the IAEA proposal and that Iran should live up to the
    commitments it made in Geneva, but unfortunately, Iran had
    not responded positively to this proposal despite many
    efforts by the United States, China, and the international
    community.  China had consistently told Iran that China
    strongly opposed Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.  This
    message, he claimed, has been conveyed in party-to-party and
    government-to-government meetings and in "all channels."
    However, Iran maintained it had no nuclear weapons and was
    simply pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

    ...But Urges Continued Diplomacy
    --------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Wang pressed U/S Burns for details on when the limits
    of U.S. patience might be exhausted and counseled further
    efforts to find a diplomatic solution.  Burns replied that
    U.S. patience was nearly exhausted.  Wang acknowledged that
    there was a potential for an Israeli military strike were the
    situation not handled properly, which was of grave concern to
    China, but insisted that harsh actions were not yet
    warranted.  Recent U.S. experience with a military option, he
    said, should teach some lessons, and the outcome of tougher
    sanctions was also unpredictable.  The United States needed
    to understand that Iran was not Iraq, and the best way
    forward was to continue to pursue peaceful dialogue and
    negotiations and to carefully examine previous diplomatic
    efforts to see what changes needed to be made.

    North Korea and Iran Similarities
    ---------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) Wang also claimed similarities between the North Korea
    and Iran nuclear issues.  The solution in both cases was to
    persist over the long haul, continuing intensive efforts with
    the objective of ensuring that the situation did not spin out
    of control.  Wang noted that in his several recent visits to
    Iran anti-American sentiment was strong, everywhere, and
    palpable, which, he said, was not conducive to resolving the
    issue.

    ¶10. (C) Wang asked U/S Burns for his views on who made final
    decisions in Iran, President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader

    BEIJING 00003313  003 OF 003

    Khamenei.  He said it would be very helpful to China if the
    decision-making process in Iran could be sorted out.  Wang
    appeared to agree with the Under Secretary that Khamenei was
    the final arbiter of Iranian policy and concluded by stating
    that there might be a way for direct communication with the
    Supreme Leader.  He said direct engagement would avoid the
    distortions of message that occurred when communicating
    through an intermediary.  Wang noted that there was not one
    country in the international arena that supported Iran's
    quest for nuclear weapons and emphasized that there was a
    need for a unified international view on Iran.

    ¶11. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States had made
    very clear its willingness for direct diplomacy, but that it
    took both sides to make direct communication work.  He
    emphasized that this was a core national security issue for
    the United States, which could not abide greater Middle East
    instability, and said the United States would continue its
    diplomatic efforts in a creative and flexible manner.
    However, he stated, at some point there had to be results and
    U.S. patience was fast running out.

    U.S.-China Cooperation
    ----------------------

    ¶12. (C) Wang said China would continue to make its own
    efforts on the issue but China was willing to do more to
    cooperate with the United States to facilitate a resolution
    to the Iran nuclear problem.  He welcomed further U.S.
    suggestions on measures to achieve a breakthrough and asked
    what the United States would like China to do or whether
    there were areas in which China could make a contribution.
    U/S Burns emphasized that the United States would like to
    cooperate with China and needed to work closely with China to
    find a way to persuade Iran to make the right choices.  The
    current focus was on persuading Iran to live up to the
    commitments it made at the Geneva meetings on the TRR
    proposal and by meeting again soon on the nuclear issue.  The
    two P5-plus-1 tracks -- diplomacy and sanctions -- were not
    mutually exclusive.  The United States had tried many
    approaches to Iran in the past 11 weeks, and none had borne
    fruit.  The United States would not close the door on
    diplomacy, but as in the case of putting pressure on North
    Korea through UN Resolution 1874, we had to work together to
    apply pressure to get Iran back to the diplomatic track.
    Iran had to understand that it faced a clear choice.  Iran
    could choose to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
    which the United States supported and would work to implement
    if Iran demonstrated the exclusively peaceful nature of its
    nuclear program.  But Iran had to understand there were costs
    to not following this path.  Wang agreed that both sides
    should try very hard to resolve the problem.

    HUNTSMAN

`