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### Viewing cable 08CAIRO9, CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08CAIRO9 | 2008-01-02 18:06 | SECRET | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHEG #0009/01 0021807
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 021807Z JAN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7833
    INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1637
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0246
    RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0972
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1126
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1849
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0945
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T CAIRO 000009

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV IS IZ SY EG
    SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones
    Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)

    ¶1. (S) Summary.  EGIS Chief Omar Soliman told Ambassador and
    a visiting Codel led by Senator George Voinovich December 31
    that he is optimistic progress will be made on
    Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.  However, Soliman was
    concerned with continuing Israeli criticism of Egyptian
    anti-smuggling efforts.  He was worried that the Egyptians
    would not be able to work out an arrangement with the
    Israelis for Hajj pilgrims to return to Gaza.  On Iran,
    Soliman said that the USG's release of the National
    Intelligence Estimate had altered the calculus through which
    Arab states are interacting with Iran.  On Iraq argued that
    the Iraqi government needed to amend its constitution and
    that Prime Minister Malaki should not deal with the Iraqi
    people in a "sectarian way."  End summary.

    ¶2. (S) Soliman led off the New Year's Eve meeting by telling
    the Codel that the region is at a special, critical juncture.
     Egypt is America's partner.  Sometimes we have our
    differences.  But Egypt will continue to provide the USG with
    its knowledge and expertise on the critical regional issues,
    such as Lebanon and Iraq.  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
    remains the core issue; Soliman contended a peaceful
    resolution would be a "big blow" to terrorist organizations
    that use the conflict as a pretext.  For this reason,
    President Mubarak is committed to ending the Israeli-Arab
    "stalemate."

    ¶3. (S) Soliman applauded the Administration's efforts,
    commenting that Annapolis had given hope and begun a process.
     The timing is right for progress based on four factors.
    First, the PA leadership is moderate and willing to
    negotiate.  Second, Hamas is isolated and politically cut off
    in Gaza.  Third, the Israelis are ready for peace; Soliman
    assessed that the GOI coalition is broad and strong, and
    larger than Rabin's coalition of the mid-nineties.  Fourth,
    Arab states are ready to see an end to "the struggle."

    ¶4. (S) Soliman stressed that Egypt stands ready to help the
    U.S. effort.  The GOE knows both the Palestinians and the
    Israelis, and knows the obstacles to peace.  Soliman
    recommended two steps be taken. First, both the Israelis and
    Palestinians must be pressed hard to sign an agreement, which
    the U.S. and international community could endorse, to be
    implemented at the proper time.  Second, the U.S. should
    insist that "phase one" of the Roadmap should be completed
    before the end of 2008.

    ¶5. (S) Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:  Soliman opined that the
    Palestinian Authority was ready to sign an agreement, but
    that establishment of a state may take between 1-3 years.
    While Hamas is isolated politically and unable to stop an
    Israeli-PA agreement, it remains entrenched in Gaza, and it
    was unclear to Soliman how long that would last.  At one
    point in the discussion, Soliman seemed to imply Hamas may
    remain in control of Gaza for more than a year; at another
    juncture, he told Senator Voinovich that if negotiations
    proceeded briskly, Hamas may be forced to cede power in Gaza
    in 3-4 months.  The bottom line for Hamas, according to
    Soliman, is that they must be forced to choose between
    remaining a resistance movement or joining the political
    process.  They cannot have it both ways, he said.

    ¶6. (S) Palestinian training: Soliman reiterated GOE
    willingness to train and support Palestinian security forces.
     He claimed that the GOE had training facilities ready, but
    that he was waiting for an answer from U.S. Security
    Coordinator General Keith Dayton.  (Note: We have advised
    Soliman that initial training of Palestinian security forces
    will take place in Jordan, and that we will revisit the
    option of training in Egypt this spring.  End note).  He
    continued that the GOE would keep pressure on Hamas but will
    maintain "low-level" contacts with Hamas.  Egypt, he said,
    wants Hamas isolated.  The Qassam rocket attacks must stop.
    When they do stop, the GOE will ask Israel to "meet quiet
    with quiet."

    ¶7. (S)  Border issues:  Senator Voinovich asked Soliman why
    the Israelis continue to report problems with Egypt's
    anti-smuggling efforts.  Soliman said that the Israelis do
    not complain to him directly, and that GOI-GOE cooperation
    and exchange of information continues.  He was at a loss as
    to why Israeli politicians continue to criticize Egypt
    publicly.  The GOE would like the USG to be included in the
    GOI-GOE LAWIO discussions, but the Israelis continue to
    object.  "They don't want a witness in the room," Soliman
    said.  Nevertheless, Soliman was willing to turn the page.
    "We have a short time to reach peace.  We need it.  We need
    to wake up in the morning with no news of terrorism, no
    explosions, and no news of more deaths.  We want everyone
    happy.  That is the Egyptian dream."

    ¶8. (S) Syria:  Congressman Turner asked if Iran and/or Syria
    might be play a spoiler role.  Soliman answered that Syria
    wants desperately to halt the United Nations special tribunal
    on the Hariri assassination.  At the same time, the SARG is
    ready to negotiate with the Israelis, and Soliman believed
    that the GOI also is ready.  Syria, Soliman said, can be
    induced to play a constructive role but added that there are
    no guarantees, however, on Syrian performance.

    ¶9. (S) NIE:  Regarding the USG's National Intelligence
    Estimate of Iran's nuclear program, Soliman was concerned
    that many in the Arab world were recalculating their position
    vis a vis Iran based on an assumption that the NIE
    represented a USG policy shift.  Soliman said the Egyptians
    are working to correct this misimpression among Arab states.
    "We tell the Arab world:  Don't be happy with the NIE and
    don't warm up to Iran. We know that the United States will
    never allow Iran to have a nuclear bomb."

    ¶10. (S) Iran:  Soliman said that Iran remains a significant
    threat to Egypt.  It continues to influence Shiaa in Iraq and
    the Gulf.  Iran is supporting Jihad and spoiling peace, and
    has supported extremists in Egypt previously.  If they were
    to support the Muslim Brotherhood this would make them "our
    enemy," he said.  The GOE continues to press the Iranian
    regime to turn over extremists given "safe harbor" in Iran.
    This issue, he said, will remain an obstacle to improving
    Egyptian-Iranian relations.  (Soliman met with Iranian former
    nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani earlier in the week.
    Larijani was in Egypt on a week-long "private visit."

    ¶11. (S) Iraq: Soliman said he remains concerned that the
    Maliki government in Iraq is not representing all Iraqis
    (i.e. the Sunni population).  The GOE has urged Maliki not to
    deal with the Iraqi people in a sectarian way, and to amend
    to constitution to allow greater Sunni representation.  In
    addition, the Iraqi government must remove militias from the
    ranks of the army and police.  In the long run, Soliman did
    not think that the decrease in violence would be sustainable
    absent these two steps.  In addition, Iranian influence is
    problematic.  Soliman said that the GOE had worked to
    reconcile 21 clans and tribes in Iraq, with good results, and
    that this kind of efforts had to continue.  He assessed that
    both Sistani and Sadr were practical men, and able to be
    dealt with.

    ¶12. (U) Delegation composition:

    Senator George Voinovich (R-OH)
    Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH)
    Congressman Steve Pearce (R-NM)
    Congressman Rob Bishop (R-UT)
    Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-GA)

    ¶13. (U) The delegation did not clear this message.
    Ricciardone

`