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### Viewing cable 09BERLIN1162, GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER?: THE WORLD

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BERLIN1162 | 2009-09-18 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO9293
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #1162/01 2611602
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 181602Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5243
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BERLIN 001162

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
    SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER?: THE WORLD
    ACCORDING TO FDP CHAIRMAN GUIDO WESTERWELLE

    REF: BERLIN 594

    Classified By: MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO
    R REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.  (C//NF) Free Democratic Party (FDP) Chairman Guido
    Westerwelle may be on the verge of becoming Foreign Minister
    and Vice-Chancellor in a Christian Democratic Union
    (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)-FDP government after the
    parliamentary elections on September 27.  He has a strong
    craving for political power and recognition after spending
    eleven years in opposition.  Westerwelle previewed his
    foreign and security policy objectives and views in a major
    speech at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on
    May 4, a speech for which the media nicknamed him "Guido
    Genscher," playing on Westerwelle's ideological leanings and
    close relationship with former FDP Foreign Minister
    Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

    ¶2.  (C//NF) Westerwelle's DGAP remarks provided us with a
    glimpse of Westerwellian thought.  They were short on
    substance, suggesting that Westerwelle's command of complex
    foreign and security policy issues still requires deepening
    if he is to successfully represent German interests on the
    world stage (see REFTEL).  While he is a Transatlanticist,
    Westerwelle questions the breadth of U.S. power and U.S.
    calls for stronger German engagement.  He also harbors
    resentment that he has not been taken more seriously by the
    Washington political establishment.  (NOTE: Embassy will
    report SEPTEL on more detailed foreign policy implications
    for the U.S. of a Westerwelle-led MFA).  END SUMMARY.

    WESTERWELLE'S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (C) Westerwelle's most important foreign policy
    priorities will be focused on global disarmament and arms
    control.  In remarks in Schwerin on September 17, Westerwelle
    called again for the removal of all U.S. tactical nuclear
    weapons -- within the context of negotiations with NATO --
    from German soil.  He was very critical of the Bush
    Administration's Missile Defense plans but was quick to
    praise President Obama's recent announcement on Missile
    Defense, saying "this move created additional international
    confidence."  Westerwelle remains a committed
    Transatlanticist but he has been consistently cautious of
    committing German troops to out-of-area deployments.
    Afghanistan was the exception.  Westerwelle continues to
    support Germany's ISAF mandate, but he has also indicated
    that the FDP wants to bring German troops home from
    Afghanistan as soon as possible provided the mission has been
    successfully completed.  Westerwelle and the FDP support
    close engagement with Russia and see it as a "strategic
    partner.  Westerwelle has pursued close ties with Russia's
    leadership during his eleven years in opposition.  On Iran,
    Westerwelle has talked about the need for dialogue but his
    party's pro-business orientation makes him particularly
    skeptical of sanctions and resistant to unilateral efforts to
    cut back trade.

    THE UNLIKELY FOREIGN MINISTER
    -----------------------------

    ¶4.  (C//NF) By his own admission, Westerwelle has never
    seriously harbored a fascination for international affairs.
    FDP Bundestag member Marina Schuster told PolOff recently
    that foreign policy is not Westerwelle's "true love," but
    that he will take this position due to its high profile and
    as it is tied to the position of Vice-Chancellor.  FDP
    contacts tell us that he plans to remain a foreign policy
    generalist, which suggests he will have plenty of time to wax
    lyrical on domestic politics - to the potential detriment of
    political harmony in a possible future CDU/CSU-FDP coalition.
     He also finds very appealing the prospect of being one of
    the only cabinet members besides the chancellor who can
    choose his media advisors, which suggests that Westerwelle
    will continue to place great emphasis on cultivating his
    public image.

    ¶5.  (C//NF) There is a contrast between Westerwelle's
    increased public support and successful leadership of the FDP
    versus the continued skepticism, often bordering on contempt,
    shown by much of the German foreign policy elite toward him.
    Opinion polls show that Westerwelle's public image has
    improved substantially in the last year in particular. But,
    as one well known foreign policy analyst in Berlin told
    PolOff, he lacks the gravitas and is seen as too

    BERLIN 00001162  002 OF 004

    opportunistic to be trusted as foreign minister.  At the
    conclusion of his DGAP speech, several MFA desk officers
    remarked to PolOff that they were not yet persuaded that
    Westerwelle had the "foreign and security policy expertise
    necessary" to become a successful Foreign Minister, although
    they had no doubts about his ability to get up to speed
    quickly.  There was a consensus among desk officers --
    driven, perhaps, by political bias -- that Westerwelle was
    arrogant and too fixated on maintaining his "cult of
    personality."  Negative reaction to his DGAP speech reflects
    the foreign policy community's skepticism of Westerwelle.

    HE'S NO GENSCHER
    ----------------

    ¶6.  (C//NF) Like Dan Quayle in 1992, Westerwelle wants to
    compare himself to his mentor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, but in
    the eyes of the foreign policy community, he is no Genscher.
    Nevertheless, Westerwelle's world-views have to a large
    extent been shaped by "Genscherism."  British academic
    Timothy Garton Ash described "Genscherism" as an attempt "to
    maintain and improve Germany's ties with a wide range of
    states, which were themselves pursuing quite different and
    quite contrary objectives.  This complex balancing act
    involved saying somewhat different things in different
    places."  Genscherism also embraced a foreign policy "culture
    of restraint," while emphasizing the models of "cooperation"
    and "continuity" in German foreign policy, which Westerwelle
    discussed in his May 4 speech at the DGAP.  Genscher's
    "culture of restraint" had a profound influence on
    Westerwelle's thinking, thus making him very skeptical about
    committing Germany's armed forces to overseas military
    operations  (NOTE: Afghanistan was an exception, although
    with the caveat that Germany's area of responsibility there
    would remain limited to the north and would concentrate on
    police training and civil reconstruction efforts (SEPTEL).
    END NOTE).

    A TRANSATLANTICIST WITH A TWIST
    -------------------------------

    ¶7.  (C//NF) At the June 30 meeting, Westerwelle quickly
    confirmed his Transatlanticist credentials.  Westerwelle's
    views on the United States' role in the world, however, also
    defines his brand of Transatlanticism.  According to
    Westerwelle's political biographer Majid Sattar, Westerwelle
    has never been able to shake his skepticism about how the
    United States wields power in the world.  Citing an exchange
    with former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Burt
    (1985-1989), Sattar recalls how Westerwelle forcefully
    intervened in a discussion the Ambassador was having on U.S.
    foreign policy during the Cold War to say: "But you are not
    the police of the world."  Sattar comments further that
    Westerwelle was immune to any "transatlantic brainwashing."
    Although Westerwelle used his DGAP speech to criticize the
    United States under the Bush Administration for its excessive
    focus on the War on Terror and unilateralism, saying that the
    United States had lost its compass more than once,
    Westerwelle quickly changed his tune when he talked about the
    positive impact that President Obama has had on U.S. foreign
    policy since his election.

    ¶8.  (C//NF) Westerwelle also made clear that he believes
    Germany needs to be more engaged in U.S. policy-making.  He
    criticized Chancellor Merkel for not having been more engaged
    with Washington on issues of mutual interest, especially arms
    control, when Washington has been engaged in extensive policy
    reviews.  He suggested that the FDP would quickly fill the
    vacuum should they enter government.

    WESTERWELLE TO WASHINGTON: WHAT ABOUT ME?
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶9.  (C//NF) Westerwelle has found it hard to conceal his
    resentment toward Washington based on his feeling that
    neither its top leadership nor the Embassy in Berlin had
    courted him during his time in opposition.  At a June 30
    meeting between the former CDA and Westerwelle, he criticized
    the Bush Administration for its failure to seek a political
    dialogue with him.  Also revealing was Westerwelle's slight
    edge on his sense of humor, first charming us by inquiring
    about Secretary Clinton's health after her elbow injury and
    next joking that he would ask the Secretary if the Embassy
    had conveyed his best wishes.

    ¶10.  (C//NF) Partially due to his insistence on only
    high-level meetings in Washington (and therefore limited
    contact), Westerwelle remains a relatively unknown political
    figure in the U.S., although he has traveled there many
    times.  Unlike his future potential cabinet colleague,

    BERLIN 00001162  003 OF 004

    Christian Social Union (CSU) Economics Minister Karl-Theodor
    zu Guttenberg, Westerwelle has little professional experience
    in the United States since he never made extensive efforts to
    introduce himself to the Washington policy community.
    Unfortunately, our attempts to reach out to Westerwelle were
    often rebuffed with the excuse that he would only meet the
    Ambassador.  Only after extensive Embassy negotiations with
    Westerwelle's staff were former CDA and PolOff able to secure
    the June 30 meeting.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11.  (C//NF) One week before the parliamentary elections,
    polls indicate that Westerwelle stands a good chance of
    becoming Germany's next foreign minister, a position he has
    been preparing for since 2002.  If Westerwelle becomes
    Foreign Minister, we can expect tough love diplomacy from
    someone who prides himself in being our "close" friend, but
    who in reality remains skeptical about the U.S. and its
    foreign policy objectives.  Westerwelle will be a friend, but
    he will not hesitate to criticize us if vital German
    interests are at stake or being challenged.  Westerwelle's
    prickliness toward the United States would likely be
    neutralized by the long-sought attention from Washington he
    would receive if he becomes foreign minister.  Germany's
    foreign policy elite will continue to view him with
    skepticism.  The factor that assuages some of this concern,
    however, is that no one expects him to be able to match
    Chancellor Merkel if he does become Foreign Minister, and
    policy experts tell us that foreign policy influence is
    likely to shift even further to the Chancellery.  END COMMENT.

    BIO NOTES
    ---------

    ¶12.  (U) Dr. Guido Westerwelle was born on December 27, 1961
    in Bad Honnef (near Bonn) to Dr. Heinrich and Erika
    Westerwelle.  Family members note that Westerwelle inherited
    the unbridled, aggressive temperament of his father and the
    calculated, deliberate, and hesitant cleverness of his
    mother.  His parents divorced when he was 8 years old, which
    according to Westerwelle himself, left a scar on his
    educational and physical development.  After the divorce,
    Westerwelle was raised by his father -- a lawyer -- and he
    maintained a close relationship with his mother, also a
    career lawyer, who lived nearby.  Stefan and Henrik, Guido's
    half brothers, one from each of his parents' previous
    relationships, were older and soon left the house to live on
    their own.  Westerwelle grew up with his younger brother Kai;
    they were very similar and both were considered active
    extroverts who enjoyed debates.  Westerwelle enjoys horses
    and to this day he is an avid equestrian.

    ¶13.  (SBU) Westerwelle is openly gay.  He has said that this
    was not a problem at home since he was raised to be
    self-confident and his family was very liberal.  In addition,
    Bonn, where Westerwelle went to university was a liberal
    town.  Westerwelle officially came out rather quietly in the
    political world in 2005 at Merkel's 50th birthday party when
    he brought his partner, Michael Mronz, a sports manager, to
    the party.  Mronz is currently a steering board member of the
    2009 Berlin World Track and Field World Championships.
    Ironically, Westerwelle is conservative on gay rights.  He is
    keen to protect the special status of marriages and families
    under German law.  He opposes adoption by same sex couples
    but says that he wishes he could have children.

    ¶14.  (U) Westerwelle developed an early taste for politics,
    being the editor of his high school newspaper.  He caused a
    school controversy when he named teachers who he felt did not
    respect students who had transferred into the secondary high
    school system from the grammar school system.  As a result of
    his story, many teachers developed a dislike for Westerwelle.
     He further developed his political thinking when he attended
    an event with Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Otto Graf Lambsdorff
    during the 1980 parliamentary elections.  It was at that time
    that he decided to join the FDP and form an FDP youth group
    in Bonn.  Westerwelle eventually became a lawyer but his
    younger brother Kai once said he had the impression that
    being a lawyer was never his brother's real goal.  His
    understanding of the media and their use for his own
    political purposes is envied by many politicians.  He takes a
    pro-active approach to overseeing his party's media
    operations.  In front of the camera, Westerwelle comes across
    as serious, sharp, and calculating, and almost comical at
    times with what is perceived as a very exaggerated presence.
    In person, people say Westerwelle is very gallant, funny, and
    sarcastic.

    BERLIN 00001162  004 OF 004

    ¶15.  (U)  In his free time, Westerwelle enjoys attending
    concerts and reading.  He enjoys running, beach volleyball,
    sailing, horseback riding, and mountain biking.  He collects
    paintings from New Leipzig School artists such as Neo Rauch
    and Tim Eitel and is a fond collector of works by Norbert
    Bisky and Joerg Immendorff.  He enjoys vacationing in Italy
    and Spain.
    Murphy

`