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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 06BAKU1835, GOAJ INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT USG POLICY

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
06BAKU1835 | 2006-12-20 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baku

`

    VZCZCXRO9720
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHKB #1835/01 3540807
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 200807Z DEC 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2003
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001835

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2016
    TAGS: PGOV PINR PBTS PREL MARR IRAJ
    SUBJECT: GOAJ INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT USG POLICY
    TOWARD IRAN - ACTION REQUEST

    REF: A. BAKU 1761

         ¶B. BAKU 1819
         ¶C. BAKU 1700

    BAKU 00001835  001.2 OF 003

    Classified By: Charge Jason P. Hyland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  President Aliyev stated to the Ambassador
    that the USG and international community's policy towards
    Iran has "failed," that Iran is "confident, comfortable, and
    unconstrained," that he "does not understand USG policy on
    Iran" and, consequently, Azerbaijan's policy must be to
    "minimize potential risks" to Azerbaijan.  Aliyev also said
    that Iranian President Ahmadinejad has affirmed that he has
    "burned his bridges" on the nuclear issue and warned Aliyev
    directly that Iran will "attack from where it is attacked."
    President Aliyev believes it is "always possible Iran will do
    something against us."  President Aliyev's foreign policy
    advisor and the Foreign Minister have voiced similar
    concerns; the Foreign Minister has again told the Ambassador
    that Iran is planning various scenarios in response to
    heightened tensions or military action, which the GOAJ
    believes will include a provocation against Azerbaijani
    interests on the Caspian, where the international legal
    framework remains unclear.  A recent anti-Azerbaijani
    editorial which appeared in the Iranian newspaper Jomhouri
    Eslami (reported incorrectly in the Azerbaijani press as
    having been written by Supreme Leader Khamenei) appears to be
    driving much of the GOAJ's concerns.  In sum, the GOAJ at the
    most senior levels has communicated to us in stark terms
    their concern about the implications for Azerbaijani security
    of the current situation in Iran, and their desire to better
    understand USG policy to address it - and its implications.
    This will impact our ability to work with the GOAJ on a range
    of issues; we need to address their concern.  End Summary.

    ------------------------
    President Aliyev on Iran
    ------------------------

    ¶2.  (C) In a 23 November one-on-one meeting with the
    Ambassador, President Aliyev raised in stark terms his view
    that USG and the international community's policy on Iran has
    "failed" and that Iran is "confident, comfortable, and
    unconstrained."  Aliyev said that he "does not understand USG
    policy" in response to this situation, adding that
    Ahmadinejad has affirmed he has "burned his bridges" on the
    nuclear issue and warned Aliyev directly that Iran will
    "attack from where it is attacked."  Aliyev said he believes
    it is "always possible Iran will do something against us"
    (ref a) and Azerbaijan's policy must be to minimize potential
    risks to itself.  Also as reported earlier, Aliyev's Foreign
    Policy Advisor (ref b) and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov have
    voiced similar concerns.  In a December 14 one-on-one
    meeting, Foreign Minister told the Ambassador again that Iran
    is planning various scenarios to respond to heightened
    tensions or military action, which Azerbaijan believes will
    include a provocation against Azerbaijani interests on the
    Caspian, where the international legal framework remains
    unclear.

    ------------------------------------
    Foreign Minister Mammadyarov on Iran
    ------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (C) In a December 14 one-on-one meeting with the
    Ambassador, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov said that recent
    Iranian activities (the fueling of demonstrations in Nardaran
    with respect to the anti-Islam article published in Sanat,
    recent demonstrations in front of the Azerbaijani Consulate
    General and Embassy - ref c) are intended to "send a message
    to us that they won't wait" while Azerbaijan moves towards
    NATO and the US, and on a possible resolution of the Nagorno
    Karabakh conflict.  He pointed to a recent statement by
    Supreme Leader Khamenei that "Azerbaijan should not feel
    comfortable with respect to NATO," saying Iran is "watching
    our policy in this area very carefully."  In addition, he
    said Iran "doesn't want us to make a move towards conflict
    resolution because they know the conflict is the only serious
    problem" facing Azerbaijan, and that if continued it keeps
    Azerbaijan off base and under pressure.  He also said that
    Russia's and Iran's positions on this are very close.

    ¶4.  (C) Mammadyarov repeated what he had told the Ambassador
    some months ago, that the Iranians are developing different
    "scenarios" for how they will react if the US or Israel

    BAKU 00001835  002.2 OF 003

    increase the pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue.
    Mammadyarov feels that Azerbaijan is a "target" for Iran if
    there is the possibility of military action against Iran,
    which Iran "definitely" sees as being on the table.  The GOAJ
    thinks that a provocation of some kind on the Caspian will be
    Iran's likely approach because whatever overt step Iran
    takes, it will want to be within the framework of
    international law, Mammadyarov said.  There is no agreement
    on Caspian delimitation, the international legal framework is
    murky and "that is where Azerbaijan is vulnerable."  However,
    Mammadyarov also said that Azerbaijan believes Iran is
    preparing scenarios for responses with respect to Lebanon,
    Iraq and "even in Syria."  Iran is "afraid of the Taliban"
    and hence slow to consider any steps in Afghanistan.  Iran
    may also create difficulties with respect to its land border
    with Nakhchivan (stopping buses, for example), with the aim
    of turning the population against the GOAJ and provoking
    "social problems" in Nakhchivan like those in Georgia.
    According to Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan is planning to build a
    railroad from Nakhchivan through Igdir, Turkey, as the next
    stage of the Kars-Alkhakhalaki-Tbilisi railroad in order to
    keep Nakhchivan from being cut off by Iran this way.

    ¶5.  (C) Mammadyarov feels that Iran does not want Azerbaijan
    to make a move on N-K resolution because the withdrawal of
    Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territory will make
    Azerbaijan stronger in the region.  Mammadyarov believes that
    Iran does not want Azerbaijan, as a secular Muslim country,
    to succeed as a model.  Poverty in the ethnic Azeri provinces
    in the north of Iran is "like the middle ages" and as people
    travel back and forth from Azerbaijan to Iran the contrast is
    evident.  Mammadyarov argued that it is in Iran's national
    interest to see the conflict continue, and, hence, the
    Iranian government is exerting increased pressure at any sign
    of steps towards a resolution.

    ¶6.  (C)  Speaking to the role of religion, Mammadyarov
    asserted that Islam in Azerbaijan is more a matter of
    "tradition" than ideology. Iran started playing with religion
    with the Sanat article and in Nardaran, hoping for a
    "uprising" from the people.  When this did not succeed,
    Mammadyarov said that Iran's next step was the demonstrations
    at the Azerbaijani Embassy and Consulate General (ref b).  He
    argued that Iran's aim is to portray the Government of
    Azerbaijan as bad Muslims, poor followers of Islam.
    Azerbaijan is going to continue its westward orientation,
    cooperation with NATO and the US but "without rhetoric to the
    public," Mammadyarov said.  In Brussels, President Aliyev
    made clear that Azerbaijan will "continue and deepen our
    cooperation with NATO," moving to the second phase of its
    Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).  Mammadyarov said
    that President Aliyev believes greater cooperation with NATO
    and a greater NATO presence and involvement in the region
    will bring predictability and stability.  He said Aliyev was
    "very happy" with paragraph 43 of the Riga Summit statement;
    its language on regional conflicts was a "clear message to
    everyone north, south, east and west of Azerbaijan;" and, it
    helps him push back on those of his advisors who question
    what Azerbaijan gains from cooperation with NATO.

    --------------------------------------------- -------------
    Supreme Leader Khamenei's Alleged Anti-Azerbaijan Comments
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶7.  (C) A recent anti-Azerbaijani article which appeared in
    Jomhouri Eslami, a conservative Tehran daily, appears to have
    played a key role in raising concerns about Iran within
    senior GOAJ circles.  The Azerbaijani press (to include the
    opposition newspaper Azadliq) quoted Supreme Leader Khamenei
    as having made numerous threats against Azerbaijan, even
    claiming Azerbaijan to be part of Iran, characterizing it as
    "Northern Iran" (a pointed dig at Azerbaijanis who refer to
    Azeri-populated areas of Azerbaijan as "Southern
    Azerbaijan").  In fact, the Jomhouri Eslami article widely
    disseminated in the Azerbaijani press was an editorial piece,
    not an article either written by or quoting the Supreme
    Leader.  While critical of the Azerbaijani government
    (focusing on issues such as the Sanat article and closer ties
    with the US), the original editorial did not threaten
    Azerbaijan in as dire terms as suggested by the Azerbaijani
    media with reported quotes such as "we would like to remind
    politicians in Azerbaijan that the IRI has adequate power to
    realize the historic will of the people."

    -------

    BAKU 00001835  003.2 OF 003

    Comment
    -------

    ¶8.  (C) Given the complex relations between Azerbaijan and
    Iran, heated accusations in the press - and even overt
    threats by Iran - are not uncommon.  The most recent
    bilateral spat occurred in March 2006, when Iran accused the
    GOAJ of supporting regime change by hosting in Baku a world
    congress of Azerbaijanis (including "Southern Azerbaijanis"
    who roundly criticized the IRI during the conference).
    However, President Aliyev's and Foreign Minister
    Mammadyarov's recent statements to the Ambassador reveal
    increasing levels of GOAJ concern about Iranian intentions
    and USG policy toward Iran.  Embassy contacts have also noted
    that the level of Iranian rhetoric is sharper than in the
    past (although their views likely are based on the somewhat
    erroneous Azerbaijani press coverage of Iranian editorials).
    The GOAJ at the most senior levels has communicated to us its
    in stark terms concern about implications for Azerbaijani
    security of the current situation in Iran, and their desire
    to better understand USG policy to address it - and its
    implications.  This will impact our ability to work with the
    GOAJ on a range of issues; we need to address their concern.
    We also note that the GOAJ has regular and broad contacts
    with Iranian officials and Aliyev and his key advisors, if
    engaged in regular dialogue, can provide us useful insights
    on Iranian officials and intentions as seen from Baku.  The
    Department's guidance on how to respond to Aliyev's concerns
    is requested.
    HYLAND

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