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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2757, U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 1-2 VISIT TO ISRAEL

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV2757 | 2009-12-22 09:09 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTV #2757/01 3560922
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 220922Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4677
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7022
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 5131
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2106
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0162
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9552

` `

    S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002757

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2019
    TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP EG IR
    SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 1-2 VISIT TO ISRAEL

    Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary:  Under Secretary for Arms Control and
    International Security Ellen Tauscher visited Israel December
    1-2.  U/S Tauscher focused her visit on setting the stage for
    a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
    Conference (RevCon) in May 2010.  She consulted with GOI
    interlocutors on potential strategy in addressing Egyptian
    insistence on pushing for the establishment of a nuclear
    weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, as a way to
    divert attention from Iran to Israel.  U/S Tauscher
    reiterated that the United States will not take any action to
    compromise Israel's security and would consult closely with
    Israel -- which GOI officials greatly appreciated.
    Nevertheless, U/S Tauscher said the United States is
    interested in exploring possible small steps involving Israel
    to address some of Egypt's NWFZ concerns regarding the lack
    of implementation of the 1995 resolution.  GOI officials for
    the most part were critical of these tactics, questioning why
    Israel should be portrayed as part of the problem.  They
    recommended a more direct approach to President Mubarak --
    thereby circumventing the Egyptian MFA -- in which Egypt is
    reminded that Iran is the regional nuclear threat.  Other
    topics discussed include President Obama's arms control and
    nonproliferation agenda, the P5 1 process and Iran's nuclear
    program, the FMCT and CTBT, Jordan's plans for a nuclear
    reactor, and Israel's qualitative military edge (QME).  End
    summary.

    ¶2. (SBU) U/S Tauscher met with National Security Advisor Uzi
    Arad on December 1.  Arad was accompanied by NSC Senior
    Advisor and Nuclear Security Summit Sherpa Gil Reich.  In a
    separate meeting on December 1, U/S Tauscher met with MFA
    Director General Yossi Gal, Deputy Director General for North
    America Baruch Bina, and Deputy Director General for
    Strategic Affairs Alon Bar.  U.S. participants for the Arad
    and Gal meetings included Political Counselor Marc Sievers, T
    Senior Advisor James Timbie, NSC's Adam Scheinman, and
    political military officer Jason Grubb.  U/S Tauscher met for
    dinner with Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and MFA
    senior officials on December 1, including IAEC Director
    General Saul Chorev, Deputy Director General David Danieli,
    and Director for Policy and Arms Control Merav Zefary-Odiz,
    as well as MFA DDG Bar and Director for Arms Control Rodica
    Radian-Gordon.  On December 2, U/S Tauscher met for breakfast
    with MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad; U.S. attendees
    included Charge D'Affaires Luis Moreno, Timbie, Scheinman,
    and Grubb.

    Arms Control/Nonproliferation Agenda
    ------------------------------------

    ¶3. (S) In various meetings with GOI interlocutors, U/S
    Tauscher outlined an ambitious arms control and
    nonproliferation agenda, beginning with the President's
    Prague speech, and including other priorities such as a
    follow-on to START, CTBT ratification, the upcoming NPT
    Review Conference, and negotiating the FMCT.  She noted that
    negotiations with Moscow on START were slow to develop in
    part due to delayed confirmations and Russian wariness.  But
    U/S Tauscher expected a START follow-on -- including a strong
    verification regime -- soon.

    ¶4. (S) National Security Advisor Arad described President
    Obama's arms control and nonproliferation agenda as "daunting
    and challenging."  He reaffirmed that the GOI will
    participate in the April 2010 Nuclear Security summit in
    Washington, noting that PM Netanyahu planned to attend the
    summit as discussed between President Obama and PM Netanyahu
    during their recent one-on-one meeting in Washington.  GOI
    Nuclear Summit Sherpa Gil Reich noted, however, that the
    Holocaust memorial day in Israel might be a potential
    scheduling conflict with the summit.  Arad expressed
    appreciation for the summit, noting that if the initiative
    had been pursued ten years previously, perhaps proliferation
    cases such as AQ Khan might have been prevented or at least
    controlled.  He wished the United States success negotiating
    with the Russians on START.

    ¶5. (S) Due to the U.S. administration's prioritization of
    arms control and nonproliferation, Arad also noted that the
    GOI had recently reconvened a high level committee on these
    issues comprised of GOI officials and experts from outside
    the government.  He noted that the committee had been formed
    during President George Herbert Walker Bush's administration
    to analyze treaties such as the CWC and CTBT, but stopped
    meeting in 2007.  U/S Tauscher expressed interest in meeting
    with the group during her next visit to Israel; Arad took the
    request on board.

    Egypt and the NPT
    -----------------

    ¶6. (S) On the NPT, U/S Tauscher reiterated the importance of
    a successful Review Conference -- including hopefully a
    consensus resolution.  She raised U.S. concerns over
    potential Egyptian actions at the RevCon, based on previous
    decades of behavior and "10-15 year-old talking points."  U/S
    Tauscher said the United States is not "naive" with respect
    to Egypt; nevertheless, the United States must make a
    sincere, good faith effort to create the conditions for a
    positive RevCon -- this might include small steps with Israel
    to address some of Egypt's desire to demonstrate progress in
    implementation of the 1995 resolution on a region free of
    weapons of mass destruction.

    ¶7. (S) That said, U/S Tauscher reiterated that the United
    States would consult and coordinate with Israel, and would
    take no action that might compromise Israel's security.  She
    noted that the United States would like to elevate the NPT
    RevCon issue to President Mubarak at an appropriate time, and
    expressed interest in developing an alternate communication
    track to Mubarak to circumvent the MFA, potentially through
    Egyptian Intelligence Minister LTG Suleiman.  U/S Tauscher
    said her message to Cairo will be "very tough," and that
    Egyptian obstructionist behavior linking Israel to Iran's
    nuclear program is not helping Egypt.

    ¶8. (S) Arad said relations with Egypt were "relatively good,"
    describing continued dialogue between PM Netanyahu and
    President Mubarak, and strong channels of communication at
    other levels.  In many respects, he said Israel's relations
    with Egypt are almost as good as during PM Rabin's time.
    Arad said Egypt and Israel do not see "eye-to-eye" on some
    issues such as Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, but
    otherwise relations are strong.

    ¶9. (S) Arad described the Egyptian MFA, however, as a
    "nagging problem" in the relationship, particularly regarding
    the Middle East NWFZ issue, and noted Cairo's refusal to talk
    to FM Lieberman.  Other GOI officials expressed exasperation
    over Egyptian motivations on the NWFZ; Reich raised Egyptian
    behavior at the latest IAEA General Conference, as well as
    Cairo's negative reaction to the IAEA Board of Governor's
    recent statement on Iran.  Arad said Israel has supported a
    regional NWFZ as far back as 1992, provided Israel enjoyed
    peaceful relations with its neighbors.  He said the GOI has
    spoken frankly with Cairo, noting that such behavior is not
    helpful, and is misdirecting focus away from Iran.

    ¶10. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad said Egypt
    understands that Iran is the real threat to the region,
    noting that a nuclear weapon-armed Iran is a redline for
    Cairo.  He averred that Egypt does not accept that Iran will
    become a superpower, but remains afraid of its own domestic
    political situation post-Mubarak.  Gilad expressed succession
    concerns, noting that Mubarak is "approaching the past more
    quickly than the future."  He added that Mubarak does not
    have confidence in Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit.

    ¶11. (S) MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
    Alon Bar outlined repeated attempts by the GOI to engage with
    the Egyptian MFA, but to no avail. He described Egyptian
    actions linking Israel to Iran's nuclear program in the IAEA
    as "not encouraging," and questioned how to convince Egypt to
    drop this "obsession" over the NWFZ.  Israel Atomic Energy
    Commission (IAEC) Director General Saul Chorev and Arms
    Control Director Merav Zefary-Odiz speculated that Egypt
    feels challenged by Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear
    weapons, and includes Israel in any public attack on Tehran
    in order to give Cairo coverage from regional criticism.  Bar
    argued that the Egyptian MFA raises Israel's nuclear program
    as a "wedge issue" in order to prevent better relations
    between Israel and others in the region.  IAEC Deputy
    Director General David Danieli concurred, noting that Egypt
    can use the nuclear issue to put Israel "in a corner" while
    benefiting from positive relations between the two countries.

    ¶12. (S) Zefary-Odiz also reviewed her participation in an
    International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
    Disarmament conference in September 2009 in Cairo.  She
    described the conference as "very confrontational," and that
    it was clear Israel was targeted by Egyptian interlocutors.
    Zefary-Odiz acknowledged that the GOI had anticipated such
    behavior, and contemplated skipping the conference.  She
    noted that Egyptian officials also lambasted Iranian
    participants, but were always careful to include Israel and
    Iran in the same sentence.

    ¶13. (S) Arad said the GOI will take their cue from U.S.
    "heavy-lifting": if there is a small step -- "not a
    concession," he stressed -- that Israel could take to help
    facilitate, then the GOI would consider it.  He noted that
    the GOI wanted to see a "reversal of trends" from Egypt
    regarding Iran's nuclear program -- after all, it is in
    Egypt's interest to do so.  He said Israel continues to have
    reservations regarding the NPT -- following nuclear pursuits
    by Libya, Syria, and Iran, it is clear to the GOI that the
    NPT is not sufficient and must be strengthened.  The goal of
    the NPT, he stressed, should not be to "prevent the next
    Iran, but to stop Iran in order to prevent the next Iran"
    from occurring.

    ¶14. (S) Chorev speculated that Egypt will aim to ruin the
    RevCon.  Bar said the Egyptians have not been held
    accountable for past bad behavior at the NPT RevCon -- "they
    have never paid the price."  He noted that Cairo knows the
    importance the United States attaches to a successful RevCon,
    and therefore will try to leverage a "high price" in order
    not to ruin it.  He noted similar tactics with regard to
    Egypt's counter-smuggling efforts along the border with Gaza.

    ¶15. (S) Timbie outlined several small steps that might
    address Egyptian concerns and demonstrate progress in
    implementation of the 1995 resolution and the Middle East
    NWFZ: an IAEA forum on the experience of other regional
    NWFZs; a special coordinator or rappateur on 1995 resolution
    implementation; a statement from the United States, United
    Kingdom and Russia reiterating the importance of the 1995
    resolution; and exploring text with Israel and Egypt on
    universality and compliance.

    ¶16. (S) Gilad questioned these steps from a
    "tactical/strategic" context, and suggested this was not a
    tactical matter.  He argued against creating the impression
    that Israel was the problem.  Instead, Gilad recommended a
    strategic, traditional approach -- concessions will only be
    used by Egypt as leverage.  He suggested the United States
    remind Egypt of its special relationship based on U.S.
    support, and reaffirm that Iran is the "bad guy."  Gilad said
    Egypt should also be reminded that most countries in the
    region agree with the NWFZ concept in principle; the Egyptian
    MFA's insistence on an immediate NWFZ neither fits the
    current political reality nor makes sense as it diverts focus
    from Iranian intransigence.  He noted that Egypt listens to
    the United States; it is therefore important to speak clearly
    and directly when taking the issue to Mubarak.

    ¶17. (S) Chorev and Zefary-Odiz argued these steps had been
    tried in the past -- and had failed.  Danieli questioned why
    Israel should take any steps at all.  Based on experience at
    the IAEA and the UN First Committee on Disarmament and
    International Security, he said "nothing satisfies Egypt" as
    Cairo "pockets every concession" and demands more -- "it's a
    slippery slope."  Danieli said Israel will not "play by
    Egypt's rules."  Bar concurred, noting that Egypt will "raise
    the bar," and begin negotiations with these small steps as
    the baseline -- he was skeptical such steps would prove
    helpful.

    ¶18. (S) Arad characterized these steps as "talking endlessly"
    -- that is "not progress," he said.  He was uncomfortable
    discussing Israel NPT compliance, especially as Israel is not
    a party to the treaty.  He also raised concerns regarding the
    definition of the Middle East NWFZ -- did it also include
    Pakistan, India and Iran, for example?  Arad said such
    questions should be posed to Cairo -- if Egypt is willing to
    include Pakistan in its definition of a Middle East NWFZ,
    then we can take that as a signal that Cairo is ready for a
    serious conversation on the matter.

    ¶19. (S) Zefary-Odiz argued that the NPT as a "global
    solution" is not appropriate in the current political
    realities of the Middle East.  Due to the region's prior
    track record of NPT non-compliance, she said a gradual,
    step-by-step process employing confidence building measures
    be used to improve relations between neighbors.  NPT partner
    obligations should be enhanced, not reduced, she said.
    Zefary-Odiz noted that only after peaceful relations are
    established can arms control measures be pursued, starting
    with conventional weapons and later focusing on
    chemical/biological/nuclear arms.  She said that Egypt and
    other Arab states de-link comprehensive peace from arms
    control measures -- Israel views these elements as
    inseparable and sequential.

    ¶20. (S) On a related note, Chorev asked if Israel should
    attend the RevCon as an observer.  U/S Tauscher and Timbie
    replied that the decision was ultimately the GOI's to make,
    but offered to raise the issue in Washington .  Chorev noted
    that Israel would be careful not to "make any noise," and
    could play a positive, consultative role.  On the other hand,
    Danieli acknowledged the argument that as a non-party,
    perhaps it was not appropriate for Israel to attend.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶21. (S) U/S Tauscher said the United States was very
    concerned about the recently announced Iranian plans to build
    ten additional uranium enrichment facilities.  She reiterated
    the two track strategy of persuasion and pressure, and noted
    that the time for persuasion is "waning."  U/S Tauscher said
    the United States has "created the coalition" it had hoped
    for, and was happy to see the recent IAEA BOG's resolution
    transferred to the UNSC.

    ¶22. (S) U/S Tauscher noted that the United States was working
    hard through the P5 1 process to encourage Russian and
    Chinese cooperation to counter continued Iranian
    intransigence and inflammatory rhetoric -- Russia and China
    are "lynch pins," she said.  She noted that Russia had worked
    closely with the United States on the Tehran Research Reactor
    (TRR) proposal, which Moscow considered an "elegant
    solution," -- but Iran had not agreed.  Keeping Russia
    engaged, U/S Tauscher explained, also means Chinese
    cooperation.

    ¶23. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad described
    recent Russian cooperation on Iran as encouraging, but
    expressed reservations that Russia would join in any
    sanctions against Iran.  He explained that Moscow has raised
    the provision of sophisticated Israeli unmanned aerial
    vehicle (UAV) technology in exchange for canceling the S-300
    sale to Tehran.  Gilad said that Russian interlocutors had
    acknowledged development gaps in their UAV platform, and is
    prepared to pay USD one billion for Israeli UAV technology.
    He reiterated that Israel will not provide its latest UAV
    technology, arguing that such technology would likely end up
    in the hands of the Chinese.

    ¶24. (S) Arad said the GOI appreciated the United States'
    efforts regarding Iran, noting how hard the United States has
    worked to build an alliance.  He pointed to the recent IAEA
    Board of Governor's resolution as a successful example of
    U.S. efforts.  Regarding the Qom facility, Arad said the GOI
    was not surprised by Tehran's "chutzpah."  He described a
    high degree of alertness in Israel, and added that the GOI
    studies daily Iranian posturing and boastful announcements in
    an attempt to discern Iranian intentions.  Arad commented
    that the trends are bad, as Iran continues to accumulate low
    enriched uranium.

    ¶25. (S) MFA DG Gal said there was not much difference in the
    national intelligence estimations (U.S., UK, France, and
    Russia) regarding Iran.  He said the GOI takes "very
    seriously" Iranian plans for ten new enrichment facilities --
    "time is of the essence," and "now is the time to implement
    crippling sanctions," he added.  Gal likened the case for
    enhanced sanctions to prescribed antibiotics from a doctor --
    one must take the full course of antibiotics for the
    prescribed period of time, or they will not work.

    ¶26. (S) Turning to his crystal ball, Gilad was not sure
    Tehran had decided it wants a nuclear weapon -- but is
    "determined" to obtain the option to build one.  He
    acknowledged that the engagement strategy is a good idea --
    "as long as you understand that it will not work."  Gilad
    said it should be clear by February 2010 that engagement as a
    option has failed -- the imposition of "crippling sanctions"
    for the February/March/April timeframe is crucial.  He said
    Russian cooperation will be the key, and the current Russian
    cooperative mind-set cannot necessarily be counted on in
    several weeks time.  By June of next year, Gilad said it
    should be clear whether sanctions have worked.  However,
    given Tehran's clandestine nuclear program (e.g., Qom), he
    said it will not be clear when Iran has reached the "point of
    no return" -- he doubted Iran will choose to let it overtly
    known that it has produced a nuclear weapon.

    FMCT and CTBT
    -------------

    ¶27. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised the FMCT's future in the
    Conference on Disarmament.  U/S Tauscher acknowledged
    frustration with Pakistan, and noted that while Washington
    places a high priority on the FMCT, other efforts like a
    START follow-on and the CTBT will come first.  Timbie added
    that it will take some time to negotiate an FMCT.

    ¶28. (S) Chorev asked about the current prospects for CTBT
    ratification in the Senate.  U/S Tauscher noted that the
    START follow-on was a higher priority, and said the Senate
    will likely focus on the Law of the Sea treaty before turning
    its attention to the CTBT.  She pointed to mid-term
    Congressional elections in 2010, and explained that focusing
    on the CTBT in 2011 might be more prudent given the
    controversy associated with the treaty.  U/S Tauscher
    explained the necessity of making the case for the CTBT, and
    hoped to build political momentum in favor of the treaty
    through the release of the Nuclear Posture Review, a new
    national intelligence estimate, and the handover on the
    stockpile stewardship program.

    ¶29. (S) Chorev asked that the United States consult with the
    GOI on the CTBT, where he said Israel could be "more flexible
    than the FMCT."  U/S Tauscher asked if the GOI might be
    willing to make affirmative statements in support of the
    CTBT; Chorev made no promises, but suspected such a statement
    might be possible -- especially if it would help with Senate
    ratification.

    ¶30. (S) Chorev described the FMCT as "very difficult" for
    Israel.  Scheinman confirmed that negotiations would be based
    on the 2006 draft FMCT text, with an added verification
    regime that is being worked on -- he described the
    verification regime's definitions as "critical" in that
    regard.  Danieli questioned the FMCT's added value, arguing
    that it would have little impact.  He asked who was the
    FMCT's real target -- India, Pakistan or even Israel?

    Jordanian Nuclear Reactor
    -------------------------

    ¶31. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised Jordanian plans to build a
    nuclear reactor.  He said the GOI has decided not to oppose
    the reactor, and have offered the Jordanians Israeli
    expertise on where best to build it.  Chorev said the IAEC
    formed a steering committee with its Jordanian counterpart
    comprised of three working groups focusing on safety,
    geological surveys, and water issues.  Chorev said the
    steering committee first met in Amman in June 2009, and is
    waiting to convene again.  Danieli stressed that the GOI does
    not want to hamper the Jordanian nuclear plans, but added
    that Israel has concerns about border issues and security
    associated with the reactor.  Timbie said the United States
    is pushing Jordan to sign a 123 Agreement along the same
    lines as the recent agreement signed with UAE, only stronger.
     Zefary-Odiz noted that Egypt is putting tremendous pressure
    on Jordan not to accept a 123 Agreement.

    QME
    ---

    ¶32. (S) U/S Tauscher reiterated the United States' strong
    commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), and
    expressed appreciation for the GOI's willingness to work with
    us through the newly created QME working groups.  Both MOD
    Pol-Mil Chief Gilad and MFA DDG Bar commended the newly
    created QME working groups, and asked they be scheduled to
    convene as soon as possible.

    ¶33. (U) T has cleared this cable.

    CUNNINGHAM

`