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### Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS179, PRESIDENT ASAD AND CODEL CARDIN DISCUSS A NUCLEAR

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09DAMASCUS179 | 2009-03-10 10:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Damascus

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    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHDM #0179/01 0691040
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 101040Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6078
    INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5717
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1010
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5090
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3843
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2339
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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    C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000179

    H PASS
    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IR, NEA/IPA
    NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
    TAGS: PHUM IAEA KPAL PGOV PREL PTER IR IS IZ TU SY
    SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ASAD AND CODEL CARDIN DISCUSS A NUCLEAR
    IRAN, PEACE PROCESS, TERRORISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and
     (d)

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Cardin, in a February 18 meeting with
    President Bashar al-Asad, FM Muallim, Presidential Advisor
    for Political and Media Affairs Shaaban, and Ambassador to
    the U.S. Mustafa conveyed U.S. concerns regarding Iran's
    pursuit of a nuclear weapon, Syrian human rights abuses, the
    Israel-Syria peace process, upcoming Lebanese elections, and
    Syrian support for terrorism.  Senator Cardin encouraged the
    SARG to address these issues in order to lay the groundwork
    for a more productive future dialogue.  Asad argued Syria
    essentially shared the same position as the U.S. on the
    majority of these issues, but Syria's approach toward solving
    these problems was clearly different.  Asad said the U.S.
    needed to look at the larger regional political picture, as
    Syria did, if it truly wanted to find satisfactory
    resolutions.  On Iran, Asad maintained IAEA monitoring would
    ensure Iran's pursuit of nuclear power for civilian purposes
    only.  Regarding human rights, Asad stated Syria was making
    progress, but the CODEL needed to understand this issue in
    the larger context of Israel's aggression in Gaza, the
    suffering of Palestinian refugees, and terrorist attacks on
    Syria.  Asad rejected the notion that Syria facilitated the
    transit of foreign fighters into Iraq, pointedly asking the
    CODEL what interest would he have in doing so?  The upcoming
    elections in Lebanon, Asad surmised, would not change the
    composition of the government dramatically nor Syria's
    determination to continue the process of establishing a full
    diplomatic presence in Beirut.  On future Israel-Syria peace
    negotiations, Asad was more vague.  He offered no specifics
    on re-opening talks, but expressed Syria's desire for the
    process to continue with U.S. involvement.  Finally, in
    response to the CODEL's repeated concerns about Syrian
    support for Hamas and Hizballah, Asad remarked that these
    were democratically elected organizations in the Palestinian
    Authority and Lebanon; dealing with them was simply part of
    the reality of politics in the Middle East.  END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------
    The Opening Gambit: Human Rights
    --------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Following a warm exchange of pleasantries in which
    Senator Cardin thanked Asad for sending Imad Mustafa to the
    U.S. as Syria's Ambassador ("He's in our offices so much
    we've thought of charging him rent!"), Senator Cardin noted
    the CODEL had come to Syria for two major reasons: (1) As a
    fact-finding mission with an eye toward reinvigorating the
    Syria-Israel peace process; and (2) to learn more about the
    Iraqi refugee situation.  Senator Cardin added "there are new
    opportunities . . . The U.S. has a new president who wants to
    work" with countries in the region.  Regarding Syria, he
    said, "there are areas of major concern," one of them being
    Syria's human rights record.  Senator Cardin told Asad he
    could give specific examples of citizens jailed for their
    political views.  Asad responded, "we are a country in
    process of reform.  We aren't perfect.  You are talking about
    12 people out of 20 million.  It's a process. We are moving
    forward, not fast, but methodically." (NOTE: Asad's mention
    of "12 people" refers to the 12 members of the Damascus
    Declaration National Council convicted in October 2008 and
    sentenced to two and a half years in prison. END NOTE).

    ¶3. (C) Asad admitted Syria had very strong security laws, but
    argued they were necessary to protect the nation.  The
    members of the Damascus Declaration had been convicted for
    their "contact with an individual in Lebanon who had invited
    the U.S. to attack Syria.  This is against our law."  Senator
    Cardin replied he realized this was a domestic issue; he was
    not asking Syria to be exactly like the U.S., but Syria
    should nonetheless adhere to widely accepted international
    standards.  Senator Cardin argued that "when the U.S. is
    challenged, you see it on the front page of the newspaper"
    and that such challenges were an important part of a national
    dialogue.  "You do not see this (freedom of expression)
    anywhere in the region," Asad chuckled in reply, "let's talk
    about Saudi Arabia."

    ¶4. (C) Widening the human rights conversation beyond the
    scope of Syrian prisoners of conscience, Asad admonished the
    CODEL for focusing on 12 individuals without taking into
    account half a million Palestinian refugees in Syria alone,
    and the continued suffering of people in Gaza.  "Human
    rights," Asad philosophized, "is related to the whole
    upgrading of society.  This will produce new laws."  In a
    final bid to put the subject of human rights to rest, Asad
    stated he was a popular president and that if he were working
    against his people, he would not enjoy such popularity.
    "Don't worry about human rights, we're moving forward," he
    said.

    ¶5. (C) Turning to conflict and reform in the region, Asad
    observed many societies in the region (including Syria) were
    experiencing a shift in political alignment to the right.  As
    a result, the process of political reform had become
    increasingly difficult.  Asad warned that countries, like
    Lebanon and Algeria, which had strived for rapid reform in
    the past, had only set the stage for more conflict.  In the
    case of Algeria during the 1980s, Islamists had tried to use
    a sudden political opening to gain power and this had sparked
    a conflict lasting twenty years.  Similarly, Asad continued,
    Lebanon's reform process and the May 29 elections had been
    the cause of the subsequent sectarian violence.  Asad
    contended the real issues were "peace and fighting
    terrorism."

    -------------------------------
    The Middle Game: A Nuclear Iran
    -------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Senator Whitehouse raised Iran, agreeing with Senator
    Cardin's assessment of the new political terrain and
    asserting: "We have a moment of opportunity for new
    policies." Whitehouse cautioned Asad that it was also "a time
    for choices."  The manner in which the U.S. would proceed
    depended on "honest, sustained cooperation in the region," he
    said.  The senator emphasized the time-frame for this
    cooperation was quite short.  The one thing that could bring
    it to a premature close would be Iran's development of
    nuclear weapons. "If Iran insists," Senator Whitehorse
    stated, "it will create an atmosphere challenging for
    negotiations."

    ¶7. (C) Asad swiftly responded, "we're not convinced Iran is
    developing nuclear weapons."  He argued Iran could not use a
    nuclear weapon as a deterrent because nobody believed Iran
    would actually use it against Israel.  Asad noted an Iranian
    nuclear strike against Israel would result in massive
    Palestinian casualties, which Iran would never risk.

    ¶8. (C) Second, he continued, the IAEA had reported no
    evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran existed.
    Arguing Syria and the U.S. were actually closer than they
    realized on these issues, Asad said Syria adamantly opposed
    any "weapons of mass destruction" in the Middle East.  But as
    signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
    Weapons (NPT) both Iran and Syria had the right to pursue
    nuclear power for civilian purposes.  Asad asserted demands
    for Iran to "stop" its nuclear program were unproductive and
    a violation of its rights under the NPT.  Instead, he said,
    "the argument should be about how to monitor their program,"
    as outlined in the NPT.  "Without this monitoring," Asad
    warned, "there will be confrontation, and it will be
    difficult for the whole region."  Asad leaned slightly
    forward and said: "Let's work together on this point."

    ¶9. (C) Senator Whitehorse replied, "I hope monitoring is
    enough," noting the difficulty of such a project in a closed
    society such as Iran.  Asad responded an international system
    for monitoring was in place and should be followed.  Senator
    Cardin interjected, "we believe Iran's goals are the opposite
    of what you describe.  We think they want to change the
    equation" (of power in the region).  Asad asked the CODEL to
    put aside this point of view and focus on monitoring. Senator
    Cardin said, "we agree on monitoring, but we think Iran

    should give up its nuclear ambitions."  Asad reiterated
    monitoring was the best institutional way to control Iran's
    nuclear program.  Senator Wicker challenged Asad's assertion
    Iran was not seeking to develop nuclear weapons and that
    monitoring alone would work. Asad replied his impression was
    that Iran's program was for peacful purposes with the caveat
    "we have no evidence as we are not in Iran."  Senator Wicker
    advised Asad the international community assessed otherwise;
    the question now was what the appropriate response to Iran
    should be.  "Everyone wants to avoid a military reaction," he
    noted, "but it was the clear view of the former
    administration and is the clear view of the current
    administration that something will have to be done."  Asad
    observed "you have my impression.  Everything you mention is
    guessing.  Monitoring will make everything clear."

    ¶10. (C) Representative Moore argued that while monitoring was
    a mechanism appropriate to "nation states," it would not be
    effective in controlling Iran's military proxies, Hamas and
    Hizballah.  She stated both Syria and Iran provided financial
    support to the two groups and there was no way to rule out
    categorically the possibility that Iran might provide nuclear
    material to Hizballah.  "The ability of the international
    community to monitor Iran on NPT is understood.  It's the
    role of the proxies that is the problem," she said.  Asad
    replied, "if you don't trust the mechanisms of the NPT, let's
    cancel it."  He maintained these proxies "would go away" if
    there was a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement.  He
    asked who had created these proxies?  "We didn't and Iran
    didn't.  How were they created?  By conflict because Lebanon
    was occupied by Israel.  It's normal to have resistance.
    This is the reality we have to deal with."

    --------------------------
    Testing The Flank: Lebanon
    --------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Senator Wicker asked Asad to give his prognosis for
    the upcoming Lebanese elections, the prospect of Syria
    sending an ambassador, and whether Hizballah would disarm.
    In a tone of resigned pessimism, Asad replied that the
    Lebanese elections would not make much of a difference.  In
    Lebanon, he explained, any party can get a "veto third."
    Asad maintained the key issue was whether the Lebanese would
    vote along political lines or sectarian lines.  If the latter
    occurred, then Shi'as would elect Shi'as, Christians would
    elect Christians, and so on, which would result in conflict.
    "If you don't have consensus, you will have civil war.  This
    is how it has always been in Lebanon," he said.  Conflict in
    Lebanon would preclude normal relations between the two
    countries.

    ¶12. (C) On the subject of a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon,
    Asad characterized the delayed appointment as being part of a
    deliberate political process.  Asad pointed out Syria had
    opened an embassy and staffed it, actions they would not have
    taken if they did not fully intend to send an ambassador.
    Asad argued an appointment like this was a political step
    requiring the proper timing.  He added "we know who and when,
    but we're not going to announce it today."  Senator Wicker
    deftly rejoined "we could make news!" eliciting laughter from
    everyone, including Asad.

    ¶13. (C) Regarding the disarmament of Hizballah, Asad argued
    "Hizballah has no specific interest in Israel besides
    securing Lebanon's borders and preventing threats to
    Lebanon's integrity, like Israel's daily violations of
    Lebanese airspace."  Asad noted Hizballah was the most
    powerful political party in Lebanon, was democratically
    elected, and if peace in the region were to be achieved, "the
    small things" with Hizballah and Hamas would disappear.
    "Let's talk about the peace.  This is the big picture that
    will solve everything."  Asad likened the U.S.'s approach to
    Hizballah to trying to patch an old suit when a new suit was
    needed.  Senator Cardin countered that peace would very
    likely go forward if Syria would stop the arms flow to
    Hizballah.  The senator noted many countries thought Syria
    was concerned about possible repercussions with Iran if it

    were to take the initiative on stopping arms to Hizballah.
    Asad responded Syria had been in negotiations with Israel
    with no concern for Iran's opinion.  He told the story of how
    Iranian President Ahmedinejad called him just before the
    Annapolis conference and implored him not to send anyone,
    that it was a "bad meeting," but that they sent a
    representative anyway. "I told him I know it (Annapolis) is
    just a photo op.  But I am sending someone anyway.  We do
    what we think is good for our interests; it's not dependent
    on Iran," he contended.

    ------------------------------
    A New Tempo: The Peace Process
    ------------------------------

    ¶14. (S) Senator Tom Udall asked what message Asad wanted the
    CODEL to deliver to the new administration. Asad replied he
    saw two key common interests between Syria and the U.S.:
    peace in the region and combating terrorism.  Asad argued
    Syria had been at the forefront of fighting terrorism ever
    since it put down the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982.  He claimed
    that in the mid-1980s, Syria had sent a delegation to Europe
    to articulate the need for a coalition to fight terrorism,
    but nobody had listened.  Asad said Syria wanted to know when
    the U.S. would adopt a new approach toward terrorism, adding
    that "it's not a question of how much you can destroy, but
    how much dialogue you can make."  The Europeans, Asad
    continued, knew more about the region than the U.S. and he
    urged the CODEL to turn to them for guidance.  Asad stated
    the U.S. and Syria shared a common interest on "70 percent"
    of the issues at hand, the difference was all in "point of
    view, principles, culture, and approach."  Keen to press the
    topic of engagement, Asad attempted to refute the idea that a
    new dialogue would only make Syria stronger: "No, you make
    yourselves stronger because you have interests in the region."

    ¶15. (C) Agreeing that dialogue was crucial and an essential
    component of the Helsinki Commission, Senator Cardin advised
    Asad that if he were serious about engagement, he would expel
    Hamas leaders from Syria.  Asad replied, "What if Hamas
    supported peace?"  Senator Cardin explained Hamas was a
    symbol--it launched rockets into non-military areas and this
    was the definition of terrorism.  Asad replied Hamas was an
    uninvited guest; it was really the very Muslim Brotherhood
    organization Syria had combatted through the 1980s.  "If you
    want me to be effective and active, I have to have a
    relationship with all parties.  Hamas is Muslim Brotherhood,
    but we have to deal with the reality of their presence."
    Senator Cardin pointed out not expelling Hamas sent a signal
    to the international community that Iran, given its support
    for Hamas, might be making the decisions in Damascus.

    --------------------------------
    En Passant: The DCS, ACC and ALC
    --------------------------------

    ¶16.  (C) When confronted with Senator Cardin's observation
    that the SARG's closure of the Damascus Community School
    (DCS), the American Culture Center (ACC), and the American
    Language Center (ALC) had hurt Syrians more than Americans,
    Asad assured the CODEL that this was merely a public
    relations gesture on his part.  "We were attacked by the U.S.
    army," Asad replied, "Seven civilians were killed.  I had two
    choices: fight the U.S. army or do something symbolic.  It's
    something temporary. You'll open it next year."  Senator
    Cardin told Asad he understood "symbolic gestures, but not
    when they hurt your own people."

    ------------------------------
    The End Game: Foreign Fighters
    ------------------------------

    ¶17. (C) "What interest does Syria have in letting foreign
    fighters go to Iraq?" Asad pointedly asked in response to
    Representative McIntyre's question about why Syria had not
    done more to monitor and staunch the flow of transiting
    fighters across the Syria-Iraq border.  Asad continued: "Can
    you stop the immigration of Mexicans into the U.S.? No. All

    borders are porous.  There is no army on the border; you
    don't have soldiers on the border.  Do your homework.  My job
    is to protect my people, not your soldiers.  We have
    terrorists.  Two months ago there was a car bomb in Syria and
    that car came from Iraq." (NOTE: We assume Asad is referring
    to the September 27, 2008 car bomb attack against a SARG
    military facility, though Syrian Military Intelligence has
    reportedly stopped several cars rigged with explosives since
    then. END NOTE).  Asad noted that the lack of cooperation
    with military forces in Iraq contributed to the problem.
    With Turkey, he said, the border was more complicated and the
    terrain worse, but because Syria enjoyed better cooperation
    it was less porous.

    ¶18. (C) Asad recounted how when (then NEA A/S) William Burns
    and representatives from the Army and CIA came to Damascus,
    "we said we were ready to cooperate.  We took the delegation
    to the border, then after they left we waited for a proposal,
    but nothing came of it. They didn't want to cooperate."  Asad
    added Syria lacked the financial and technical means, such as
    night-vision goggles, to tighten its control of the area.
    Asad then said, somewhat contradicting himself, that 80
    percent of controlling the border was about controlling the
    country. Representative McIntyre asked, "but are you willing
    to monitor (the border)?"  The president demurred, "this is a
    different problem," at which point Ambassador Mustafa
    interjected with "I will brief you on the details."

    ¶19. (C) The three main objectives Asad felt the U.S. and
    Syria should work on were (1) Eliminating WMD in the region;
    (2) pursuing a shared interest in a stable Iraq; and (3)
    working for peace and combating terrorism.  Asad re-affirmed
    that Syria was not an enemy of the U.S., "I have saved
    American lives." In 2002, Asad explained, he passed
    information to the King of Bahrain about an imminent attack
    on American citizens.  Ambassador Mustafa added that then
    Secretary of State Colin Powell had sent the Syrian
    government a letter expressing his gratitude for its
    assistance.  If the U.S. wished for similar coordination in
    the future, Syria could not begin security cooperation
    without concomitant political cooperation, Asad stated.

    ¶20. (C) COMMENT: Beginning with the visit of President Carter
    last December, President Asad's exposure to U.S. politicians
    has steadily increased.  This encounter was a good example of
    how Asad has been able to hone his responses to U.S.
    accusations that Syria is a bad actor in the region.  At no
    point in the conversation did Asad ask about the appointment
    of a U.S. ambassador to Syria or economic sanctions, which
    suggests to us that he is doing everything possible to avoid
    the appearance of being the supplicant, despite the Syrian
    press's heavy focus on Syria's desire to see an end to
    sanctions and the appointment of a U.S. ambassador.

    ¶21. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We have heard anecdotally that
    Asad was not pleased with the tenor or substance of his
    meeting with the CODEL.  The SARG is reportedly interpreting
    the group's position on Iran, Iraq, Hizballah, and human
    rights to be a continuation of, rather than a departure from,
    the previous Administration's policy toward Syria.  We note
    that the CODEL's discussion with Asad was frank but cordial.
    Senator Cardin and the CODEL members aired U.S. policy
    concerns publicly from their perspective as elected
    legislators in press remarks, framed in the context of their
    desire to explore whether cooperation with Syria is viable.
    The Syrian press and many of our interlocutors have come to
    view re-engagement with the U.S. as a fait accompli, as
    something long-overdue and very much owed to Syria.  Asad's
    displeasure with the CODEL may be his first recognition that
    U.S.-Syria bilateral relations will require more on his end
    than originally anticipated. END COMMENT.

    -------------
    Participants
    -------------

    ¶22. (SBU) U.S.A.:
    Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)

    Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
    Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS)
    Senator Tom Udall (D-NM)
    Representative Mike McIntyre (D-NC)
    Representative Gwen Moore (D-WI)
    Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly
    Mr. Fred Turner, Chief of Staff, CSCE
    Mr. Alex Johnson, PSM, CSCE
    Ms. Shelly Han, PSM, CSCE
    Mr. Eric Pelofsky, PSM, SIC
    Notetaker Anthony Deaton

    Syrian Arab Republic:
    President Bashar al-Asad
    Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim
    Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs Dr.
    Bouthaina Shaaban
    Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustafa
    Unidentified female notetaker
    Unidentified male palace staffer

    ¶23. (U) Senator Cardin did not have a chance to clear this
    report as of March 10.
    CONNELLY

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