Currently released so far... 220 / 251,287

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/11
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE AU AR AF AORC AJ ASEC AM
BH BA BY BU
CASC CF CH COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV CVIS
EG ECON EINV ETTC EFIN ENRG ETRD EFIS EXTERNAL EPET EAID EUN ELAB ECUN EU EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GR GM GOI GE GG GA
HO
IR IZ IS INRB IN IRAJ IQ IAEA IT
JO JA
KPAL KNNP KU KWBG KJUS KG KSPR KDEM KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KCRM KHLS KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KPKO KUNR KTIA KWMN
LE LY
MASS MK MNUC MCAP MARR MOPS MU MAR MTCRE MY ML MR MPOS MOPPS
NATO NG
OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA OPDC
PREL PARM PGOV PTER PINR PHUM PINS PBIO PA PBTS PREF PROP PK PECON POLITICAL PARTIES PM PEPR
QA
RS RW RU
SA SY SM SU SCUL SNAR SOCI SENV SYR SP SG SO SF
TU TI TX Terrorism TRGY TFH01 TC TSPA
UZ UE UK US UNESCO UNSC UP UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 10RPODUBAI15, IRAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: 'FROM CRISIS TO STALEMATE' (2/3)

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others.
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10RPODUBAI15.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10RPODUBAI15 | 2010-01-13 13:01 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Iran RPO Dubai

`

    VZCZCXRO6831
    OO RUEHBC RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHDIR #0015/01 0131312
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 131312Z JAN 10
    FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0044
    INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
    RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 RPO DUBAI 000015

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/13
    TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
    SUBJECT: IRAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: 'FROM CRISIS TO STALEMATE' (2/3)

    CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  At this point the Green Path Opposition (GPO) is
    more of a persistent problem for the regime than an existential
    threat, and it is unrealistic to assume that the GPO will be able
    to effect any 'regime change' in the short-term.  Iran's ruling
    regime is likely to continue seeing increased violence and
    suppression as its most effective tool, including in the build-up
    to mid- February anniversary of the Revolution and the opposition's
    next planned protests.   However it is unlikely be able to
    eliminate the GPO, which will continue trying to co-opt public
    holidays to stage anti-regime protests and also try to increase
    divisions among regime elite.  Although subsets of the GPO are
    radicalizing, there is no reason to assume that GPO elements
    seeking to fundamentally change the system represent most Iranians.
    The GPO does not mirror the widespread an varied opposition that
    overturned the Shah thirty years ago, and the standoff now is
    increasingly becoming a stalemate that (inter alia) imperils the
    IRIG's ability to engage with the West.  Until a new homeostasis is
    reached in Iran's political ruling class, progress on issues of
    bilateral importance will be even more difficult than usual.  END
    SUMMARY.

    ¶2.  (U) NOTE: This is the second in a series of cables examining
    the Iranian opposition since the June 12 Presidential election,
    what might happen in the short-term, and what the most effective
    levers of US policy have been so far and what combination may have
    the most impact in the coming months.

    ON THIS SIDE: REGIME

    -----------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Iran's current leadership sees the GPO with its periodic
    street demonstrations more as a persistent problem than as an
    existential threat. Ideology and personal experience have taught
    regime hard-liners to equate compromise under pressure with
    weakness. Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) himself is said to believe
    that the Shah's fatal mistake, and the reason the Revolution
    succeeded, was because the Shah 'retreated,' in addition to
    believing that the USSR's fall was due to the same reasons. As
    such, the regime can be expected to remain committed to using force
    and repression against the GPO as necessary to both incapacitate
    its first- and second-tier leadership (primarily through detention)
    and its rank and file (through detention and violence, to include
    deadly force).

    ¶4. (C) Opposition activists have told IRPO that at least part of
    the regime strategy is a pre-emptive 'rolling round-up' of not just
    active GPO elements but also sympathizers. Thus in addition to
    those it identifies as participating in GPO activities, the regime
    goes after reformist reporters, feminists, human rights advocates,
    labor organizers, ageing 'National Front' sympathizers, 'Second of
    Khordad' Khatami-era reformists who are not active in the GPO
    movement. According to some foreign-based GPO leaders, informed
    estimates indicate approximately 2,000 people have been thus far
    detained.

    ¶5. (C) Indications are that the regime is laying the groundwork for
    using even more violence, to include the broader use of lethal
    force at the popular level if necessary. This could include
    executions of those found guilty of 'warring against God,' a term
    which the regime is prone to define somewhat expansively. And while
    there is certainly a limit to the regime's willingness to use
    violence against its own people, there are no indications that it
    is anywhere near it. One former IRGC officer told an Iranwatcher
    that the IRGC wants to avoid killing more than a 'few dozen'
    protestors in any one location on any one day, partially to avoid
    associations with 'Black Friday' -September 8, 1978 - when mass
    fatalities in a demonstration turned many against the Shah).  The
    Ashura-day murder of Mousavi's nephew, in addition to the January 7
    incident where security officials seemed to have coordinated shots
    being fired at a car carrying Karrubi indicate a regime intent to

    DUBAI 00000015  002 OF 006

    calibrate its level of violence to intimidate the opposition and
    its leadership.

    ¶6. (C) The media press environment is also expected to become far
    more restrictive, with one prominent reformist newsman telling IRPO
    that he expects all reformist papers to be shut down in the
    short-term. The regime continues to block 'subversive' websites,
    while also stepping up it jamming of satellite broadcasts from both
    VOA and BBC.

    ¶7. (C) In addition to its familiar tools of force and repression,
    the regime also occasionally feints toward reconciliation, issuing
    statements counseling moderation and offering up an occasional
    scapegoat, such as the recent Majlis report blaming former Tehran
    Prosecutor General Mortazavi for the detainee deaths at the
    Kahrizak detention center.  In the public thrust and parry over
    post-June 12 events one regime voice conspicuous by its absence has
    been that of President Ahmadinejad, who has largely kept silent.
    This strategy has drawn criticism by some fellow hard-liners, who
    fault him for his unwillingness to publicly endorse harsh measures
    against the GPO.

    ¶8. (C)  According to GPO expatriate leaders and other sources, the
    ruling regime can be seen as composed of three groups, with
    Khamenei still exercising control:

    - relative moderates, such as Ali Larijani and Ahmad Tavakolli in
    the Majlis, and Asghar Hejazi, former Foreign Minister Velayati and
    former Majlis Speaker Nateq-Nuri all in the Supreme Leader's
    office. This group seeks to have SLK cease his active support of
    Ahmadinejad so that he can be removed by the Majlis;

    -hardliners, such as IRGC Intelligence Head Hossein Taeb,
    Khameneni's son Mojtaba, Basij Commander BG Mohammad Reza Naqdi,
    Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, and Ahmadinejad and his own crowd. This
    group seeks increased use of force, to include lethal force, on the
    GPO and its leaders;

    -  a middle way 'swing' group, composed of SLK himself, his two
    sons Mostafa and Maysam, and some intelligence officials. This
    group seeks a middle course between the two above, favoring
    imprisoning, beating but not mass killing of protestors, and house
    arrest and intimidation but not arrest and/or execution of GPO
    leaders.

    ON THIS SIDE: GPO

    -------------------------

    ¶9. (C) Going forward, the GPO seems committed to using public
    holidays as a show of strength and support, with the next big GPO
    planned demonstration being the anniversary of the Revolution's
    victory on  February 11 (22 Bahman). According to at least one
    prominent GPO activist based abroad, the GPO leadership has a
    three-part strategy:

    - (1)  Maintaining GPO unity while also 'growing' and training its
    numbers, expanding both geographically and in its constituent
    class/demographic/ethnic elements. Public street gatherings on key
    dates are one way of showing solidarity, as are slogans from
    rooftops, work slowdowns, and other non-violent 'political
    actions.' It will also seek to expand its use of 'blitz'
    demonstrations, i.e. rapid assembly and dispersal of protestors, in

    DUBAI 00000015  003 OF 006

    addition to university demonstrations and other forms of protest.
    In this regard it seeks to strengthen links with Iran's labor
    force, many of whom have a tradition of striking over non-payment
    of wages.  (NOTE: The GPO's diffuse structure, and constant regime
    pressure, will make implementing better organization and training
    difficult in the short-term).

    - (2) Creating divisions within the ruling elite, by 'peeling off'
    the moderates around Khamenei. Mousavi's recent statement in which
    he tacitly accepted the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad government
    was a step in this direction. Second of Khordad 'theoretician' Said
    Hajjarian used to speak of the tactic of 'pressure from below,
    negotiations from above' as the reformist strategy, and at least
    some GPO strategists hope that elite pressure from moderate
    conservatives dismayed at ongoing popular protests will seek to
    convince SLK to cease his active support of Ahmadinejad, at which
    point he will be subject to possibly politically fatal attacks from
    the Majlis due to (inter alia) his financial mismanagement.  These
    GPO strategists, who curiously also see regime compromise as a sign
    of weakness, see Supreme Leader Khamenei's 'throwing Ahmadinejad
    under the bus' as the first step to ultimately bringing down
    Supreme Leader Khamenei himself

    - (3) Continuing non-violent efforts to 'paralyze' the government,
    largely through boycotts of IRGC affiliated companies, through work
    slowdowns, and ultimately through strikes.  Some within the GPO see
    the December 27 Ashura demonstrations as equivalent to the 17
    Shahrivar demonstrations during the Revolution, after which the
    people slowly 'lost their fear' of the Shah's machinery of
    repression.  However, even the most optimistic GPO leaders
    acknowledge the movement needs significantly more organization and
    training before it is able to engage in larger anti-regime
    activities (NOTE: Another advantage of a non-violent strategy is
    that such non-violent protests are technically authorized by
    Article 27 of the Constitution.  As such, any move to anti-regime
    violence would represent not just an escalation in the likely
    overall level of violence, but a move from inter-Constitutional to
    extra-Constitutional opposition).

    ¶10. (C) This 3-part strategy, as articulated by a GPO leader based
    abroad, in many respects depends on the willingness of the mass
    movement of the GPO for support; whether it has been embraced by
    the popular elements of the GPO opposition is unclear.
    Furthermore, the increasing radicalization of popular elements
    within the GPO potentially undermines this strategy and at the very
    least makes near-term predictions less reliable.  An opposition
    that increasingly responds to regime violence with its own violence
    gives the regime greater license to increase repression even
    further, creating an unpredictable cycle of violence coupled with
    greater disillusionment with the regime.

    ¶11. (C) MEDIA AND CYBERSPACE: The regime and GPO clash not just in
    the streets but also in cyberspace, and the GPO can be expected to
    expand its efforts to create a virtual space in which it can
    disseminate information to Iranians inside Iran.  It continues to
    spend significant energies on circumventing Iranian attempts to
    monitor, control and block Internet access in Iran, and is
    exploring the possibility of providing satellite high-speed
    internet access, although funding is the main barrier.  In
    conventional media, expatriate GPO activists have told IRPO that
    while in the short-term GPO is forced to rely on satellite TV such
    as VOA and BBC to get oppositionist news into Iran, it is seeking
    to create its own news fora, to include its own satellite
    television broadcast.

    NO 2ND REVOLUTION

    -----------------------------

    DUBAI 00000015  004 OF 006

    ¶12. (C)  No one knows or can know what will happen next.  While
    Iran is not North Korea, since June 12 and the subsequent crackdown
    it has become harder to follow significant events there, both at
    the popular and elite level. Foreign media presence has been
    severely curtailed and domestic media is increasingly censored. And
    Iran's hardline intelligence-security cabal's 'soft overthrow'
    fixation has reduced the number and type of Iranians willing to
    talk frankly to the press (and to Iranwatchers) about domestic
    events.

    ¶13.  (C) Against that backdrop one must note the 'selective
    perception' bias that tends to over-emphasize the GPO's potency.
    Some pro-GPO bias stems from their being the (relative) 'good guys'
    in this drama, to the extent that their agenda encompasses
    principles dear to Western democracies.  Additionally, Western
    media's Iran contacts tend to be pro-reformist, with Western press
    quoting pro-GPO activists and analysts almost exclusively. Also USG
    officials' interactions with Iranians tend to be largely limited to
    Iranians willing and able to talk with us, with a disproportionate
    number of them being those seeking USG assistance in helping fight
    the regime. Finally and in many ways most importantly 'if it bleeds
    it leads,' so there are no 'Youtube' uploads on demonstration days
    of the millions of ordinary Iranians who are going about their
    business.

    ¶14. (C) In this regard, many IRPO interlocutors comment that for
    most in Tehran, life is going on as normal, with no sensation of
    living in 'a police state' (except on the key dates targeted by the
    GPO, and only then for people in specific areas where clashes
    occur).   In other words, it seems that the vast majority of
    Iranians, though more critical of the government to greater or
    lesser degrees, are continuing to live their lives as normal.
    There is no reason to assume that those 'radical' GPO elements
    seeking to fundamentally change the system represent most Iranians.
    At most, it appears that many and possibly most Iranians want a
    peaceful reform of the system as opposed to another revolution with
    an uncertain outcome.

    ¶15. (C) Having stipulated that no one can assert with confidence
    what will happen in Iran's domestic situation over the next year,
    it does seem that, as expatriate Iranian oppositionist Ibrahim
    Nabavi has written, Iran is moving 'from crisis to stalemate.'  The
    clash between Iran's government hardliners and the GPO is unlikely
    to end decisively to the benefit of either side within the
    short-term, and it is quite improbable  that in the short-term the
    GPO will in some decisive way 'defeat' the Khamenei regime and
    change Iran's theocracy into a secular republic.

    ¶16.  (C) In terms of the significant metrics by which can judge the
    course of future events, some of the ones significant both in
    1977-79 and now include the following:

    - Numbers: The numbers of protestors willing to take to the streets
    now is an order of magnitude smaller than in 78-79.

    - Classes: the GPO as currently constituted doesn't seem to have a
    significant ethnic or labor component, and doesn't seem to have
    'broken out' of Tehran in a significant way to other major urban
    centers, though we recognize that our awareness of developments
    outside of Tehran is likely to be more limited.

    - Anti-Gov't Activities: Unlike 1979, there have been no paralyzing
    strikes, bazaar closings, military defections, or signs of the
    government ceasing to function. Whereas the bazaar merchants in
    1979 had the inclination and money to fund striking workers
    deprived of pay, the there seems to be no such GPO 'deep pockets.'
    Indeed both elements of the 'bazaar-mosque' alliance that were in

    DUBAI 00000015  005 OF 006

    many ways the backbone of the 1979 Revolution are singularly absent
    in today's opposition, as each has been largely co-opted by the
    government.  There have been no indications that Rafsanjani and the
    Servants of Construction or Qalibaf's Tehran Municipality are
    currently a significant GPO funding source.  On a far more limited
    scale, expatriate 'Second of Khordad' Reformist elements within the
    Iranian Diaspora are leading efforts to create a fund for the
    support of detainee families.

    - Elite Defection/Emigration: Those hardliners who constitute and
    support the regime are very likely to remain committed to the fight
    against the GPO, since they know they would have no role in any new
    order and would also have nowhere else to go.  However for the GPO,
    many reformists and oppositionists dissatisfied with Iran's plight
    would rather quit then fight, as shown by the ongoing brain drain,
    to include increased exodus of political activists.  Anecdotal
    information shows that many of larger numbers of affluent and
    educated Iranians who can be presumed to be oppose the hardliners
    are taking their families and fortunes abroad.

    ¶17. (C) Although much GPO animus has transferred from Ahmadinejad
    to SLK, it can be assumed that at least part of the movement's
    support would fade were Ahmadinejad to be replaced by someone less
    controversial and better equipped to successfully govern. Although
    SLK has shown that he prefers suppression to compromise, at some
    point pressure at the elite level might persuade him to abandon or
    marginalize Ahmadinejad.  Granted, the subsequent Presidential
    election could provide another spark for future protests, but the
    point here is that at both at the popular and elite level, at least
    some oppositionist fervor is still fixated on Ahmadinejad, and
    would presumably dissipate with his dismissal.

    STALEMATE TO CONTINUE

    ----------------------------------

    ¶18. (C) The IRIG's decision-making process, multi-polar and messy
    even before this turmoil, has been further strained by the battle
    between the regime and the GPO as well as by the animosity toward
    Ahmadinejad from within the regime.  For example, domestic
    political opposition torpedoed Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's ability
    to sell the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor agreement.  Subsidy
    reform, the most important piece of domestic legislation in years,
    was passed only after a protracted political cage fight between
    Ahmadinejad and the Majlis.   Amid the IRIG-GPO stalemate and the
    accompanying factionalization in the conservative 'Principalist'
    camp, Iran will be hard pressed achieve consensus and move forward
    on issues relevant to the USG.

    ¶19. (C) As one US-based IRPO contact noted, only one thing is
    certain, namely uncertainty over how the contest will play out.  It
    is clear neither regime leaders nor opposition figures are
    convinced of the path ahead and they are constantly recalibrating
    and shifting positions.  Moreover, he added, there is hesitancy on
    the part of all actors to move decisively.  He noted that this was
    visible in the regime's unwillingness to use the full force of its
    repressive capabilities to crack down on the opposition once and
    for all.

    ¶20. (C) COMMENT: The GPO is not Poland's Solidarity, and Tehran
    2010 isn't Tehran 1978.  In other words, it is quite unlikely that
    the current Iranian system of government will significantly change
    in the short-term, and if there were any significant change, it is
    more likely to be towards a more authoritarian regime than to be
    towards a more democratic one.   However, having posited why the
    GPO is unlikely to effect fundamental short-term changes in Iran's
    ruling system, it is equally true to say that it is unlikely to go
    away. What makes the preceding important for the USG is the fact
    that Iran's current domestic strife is a political 'black hole'

    DUBAI 00000015  006 OF 006

    that swallows all other issues, both domestic and foreign, such
    that until a new homeostasis is reached in Iran's political ruling
    class, progress on issues of bilateral importance will be even more
    difficult than usual.  END COMMENT.
    EYRE

`