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### Viewing cable 08RIYADH649, SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08RIYADH649 | 2008-04-20 08:08 | SECRET | Embassy Riyadh

`

    VZCZCXRO2648
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
    DE RUEHRH #0649/01 1110847
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 200847Z APR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8227
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0650
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I
    SATTERFIELD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2018
    TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IZ PGOV PREL MOPS SA IR
    SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI
    POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

    Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and
    General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd
    al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General
    Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd
    al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during
    their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh.  The Saudi King and senior
    Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all
    making essentially the same points.  They said that the
    Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an
    embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are
    satisfied that the security situation has improved and the
    Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all
    Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab identity, and resist Iranian
    influence.  The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility
    regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance
    for Iraq and debt forgiveness.  In a conversation with the
    Charge' on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel
    al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by
    the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and
    al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce
    changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to
    Riyadh in mid-May.  End Summary.

    Positive Signs in Iraq

    ¶2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both
    Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress
    in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in
    Iraq.  They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in
    Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the
    Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion
    away from the militias.  While Prime Minister Nuri
    al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was
    described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker
    and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls
    were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying
    Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically
    al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias,
    especially Jaysh al-Madhi.  Concurrently, these operations
    unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in
    Iraq and its broader regional ambitions.  Throughout all
    their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
    stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to
    join us in supporting Iraq.

    The Saudi Embassy Issue

    ¶3.  (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince
    Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an
    ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near
    future, citing both security and political grounds in support
    of this position.  The Foreign Minister stated that he had
    considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi
    diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi
    embassy.  However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go
    any farther."  King Abdullah confirmed this account in a
    separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General
    Petraeus.  The King asserted that the security situation in
    Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi
    ambassador there.  "He would immediately become a target for
    the terrorists and the militias," he said.

    ¶4.  (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending
    a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential
    political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to
    resist Iranian influence and subversion.  He expressed
    lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to
    resist Iran.  He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts
    about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to
    his "Iranian connections."  The Saudi monarch stated that he
    does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had
    "lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain
    actions and then failing to do so.  The King did not say
    precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have
    been.  He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules
    Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.

    ¶5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King
    did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to
    Baghdad completely.  Instead, he said that he would consider

    RIYADH 00000649  002 OF 003

    doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the
    autumn.  The conduct of these elections would indicate
    whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in
    ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the
    Shia, King Abdullah asserted.

    Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq

    ¶6.  (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential
    softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's
    problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with
    the conduct of the Iraqi government.  The King himself
    admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved
    in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that
    al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting
    extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and
    Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul.  However,
    the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would
    be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi
    behavior was lasting and sincere.  The King suggested that
    much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is
    attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi
    attitudes.

    ¶7.  (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG
    should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a
    unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different
    Iraqi sects and groups.  "You have paid a heavy price in
    blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited
    directly.  You have every right to ask this of him," Prince
    Saud al-Faisal said.

    Possible Saudi Economic Assistance

    ¶8.  (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all
    suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to
    consider the provision of economic and humanitarian
    assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker
    and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of
    assistance that the US government would like to see the
    Kingdom provide Iraq.  Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that
    this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in
    aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid
    Conference but still not delivered due to security worries.
    He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million
    in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with
    strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank
    would require.  Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi
    government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be
    in the range of $75-$300 million.

    Possible Debt Relief

    ¶9.  (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will
    come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir
    told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He
    also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to
    its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt
    relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.

    The Need to Resist Iran

    ¶10.  (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and
    Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate
    with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence
    and subversion in Iraq.  The King was particularly adamant on
    this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well.
    Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US
    to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons
    program.  "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he
    recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to
    roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority
    for the King and his government.

    ¶11.  (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called
    instead for much more severe US and international sanctions
    on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on
    bank lending.  Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing
    that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval.
     The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military
    pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.

    RIYADH 00000649  003 OF 003

    ¶12.  (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King
    on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion.  That
    said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are
    eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian
    encroachment in Iraq.  The King was impressed by Ambassador
    Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign
    Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever,
    the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new
    measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although
    further discussions will be required to make these ideas a
    reality.  End Comment.
    ¶13.  (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador
    Crocker and General Petraeus.
    GFOELLER

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