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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09BERLIN1197, WESTERWELLE'S SURGE CLINCHES BLACK-YELLOW IN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BERLIN1197 | 2009-09-28 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO5783
    PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #1197/01 2711128
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 281128Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5317
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001197

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/CE, INR (KEETON)
    NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019
    TAGS: GM PGOV PREL
    SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE'S SURGE CLINCHES BLACK-YELLOW IN
    GERMANY; MERKEL GAINS SECOND TERM

    REF: A. BERLIN 1188
         ¶B. BERLIN 1186
         ¶C. BERLIN 1176
         ¶D. BERLIN 1167
         ¶E. BERLIN 1162
         ¶F. BERLIN 1138
         ¶G. BERLIN 1179

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.  (C) Chancellor Merkel achieved her goal of a solid
    parliamentary majority for her Christian Democratic Union
    (CDU) with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social
    Union (CSU), and the pro-business Free Democratic Party
    (FDP), but will have to contend with a self-confident FDP
    that is likely to seek major concessions in terms of policy
    and personnel.  Nonetheless, the CDU/CSU's 33.8 percent
    showing was its lowest since 1949, while the FDP's 14.6
    percent was its strongest in the history of the Federal
    Republic.  The SPD crashed, while the Left Party and Greens
    were able to score their highest results ever, with the Left
    Party surpassing the Greens overall and overtaking the SPD in
    the eastern German states by a wide margin.  Merkel hopes
    that coalition negotiations with the FDP will be "quick and
    decisive," while FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle -- widely
    expected to be the next foreign minister -- has emphasized
    his intention to press for the party's goals of a fundamental
    tax reform, more emphasis on education, and stronger
    protection of civil liberties.   Merkel and Westerwelle
    already met privately election night (September 27) and
    coalition negotiations should begin soon, most likely with
    the goal of having a formal agreement with the selection of a
    cabinet by the time the Bundestag convenes a month from now.
    End Summary.

    OVERALL TREND: MAJOR PARTIES IN DECLINE
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (U) The results show the decline of the major parties --
    particularly the SPD -- and the strengthening of a five-party
    system.  Preliminary results give CDU/CSU 33.8 percent
    (versus 35.2 percent in 2005); the FDP 14.6 percent (9.8);
    the SPD 23.0 (34.3); the Left Party 11.9 (8.7), and the
    Greens 10.7 (8.1).  The decline in the CDU/CSU percentage is
    due particularly to the CSU's losses in Bavaria, where the
    party suffered its worst Bundestag result ever at 42.6
    percent, down from 49.2 percent in 2005, but it still won all
    45 of its constituencies.  These preliminary results give the
    CDU 24 "surplus mandates" because of the high number of
    constituency seats it won despite its low 33.8 percent second
    vote showing (see REFTEL G).

    ¶3.  (U) The new coalition should end up with control of both
    the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (Upper Council).  Based on
    the preliminary official results, the CDU/CSU will have 239
    seats in the Bundestag (up from 226), which along with the 93
    FDP Bundestag seats (previously 61) would give the new
    government a solid majority.  The SPD will have 146 seats in
    the Bundestag (down from 222), the Left Party 76 (versus 54)
    and the Greens 68 (versus 51).  The Schleswig Holstein
    election on September 27 also appears to have given the CDU
    and FDP a parliamentary majority in that state.  With CDU-FDP
    governments there and in Saxony, where the two parties won a
    majority on August 30, the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will
    soon have a majority in the Bundesrat and should be able to
    gain its approval of future coalition legislation.

    ¶4.  (C) Chancellor Merkel and her CDU/CSU Union are somewhat
    disappointed by their party's results, but are publicly
    emphasizing that the CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition has met its
    demise and will be replaced by a center-right coalition
    composed of the CDU/CSU and FDP.  "We achieved something
    fantastic," said Chancellor Merkel, now facing a second
    four-year term.  "We achieved a stable majority in Germany
    for a new government...We can party tonight, but there is a
    lot of work waiting for us."  An uncharacteristically
    emotional Merkel -- clearly relieved by her victory --
    promised to be the "Chancellor of all Germans" -- old and
    young, entrepreneurs and workers -- and said the CDU/CSU
    would be sufficiently dominant in the new coalition to
    prevail "in questions that affect social balance."

    ¶5.  (C) Despite her huge personal popularity, however, Merkel
    led her CDU/CSU Union to its second poorest result in
    history, leaving her vulnerable to future backstabbing within

    BERLIN 00001197  002 OF 003

    her party.  Merkel -- while happy to be rid of the Grand
    Coalition with the SPD -- now faces the challenging task of
    entering a coalition with a party that could prove to be more
    difficult to manage than the SPD.  Merkel will start talks
    with the FDP within days.  It could, however, take up to the
    end of October for the parties to forge the policy
    compromises and work out the distribution of cabinet posts
    necessary to seal a coalition deal.

    FDP: THE REAL WINNER
    --------------------

    ¶6.  (C) The FDP will return to government after eleven years
    in opposition, having achieved its best election results in
    the party's history.  Its leader, FDP Party Chairman Guido
    Westerwelle, will most likely become Germany's next foreign
    minister (see REFTEL E).  At the FDP election celebration,
    Westerwelle told his party faithful that "We want to be part
    of the government.  But this means responsibility, and we are
    ready to take on this responsibility." Westerwelle said his
    party would work to ensure that Germany gets a "fair tax
    system and better educational opportunities" and that civil
    rights would once again be respected. The FDP will be in a
    very powerful position to demand a larger number of cabinet
    seats in a new German government. They are likely to expect
    to get at least the equivalent of what they have had in the
    past:  the foreign office, either justice or perhaps interior
    (which they led from 1969-82), economics or possibly finance,
    and at least one other ministry (in the past they have had
    education and economic cooperation (i.e. development).
    However, the FDP will find it difficult to negotiate a
    coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU over the coming weeks,
    especially in the areas of tax cuts (see REFTEL F) and civil
    rights, including data privacy (see REFTEL D).

    SPD: HARD ROAD AHEAD
    --------------------

    ¶7.  (C) It would be hard to exaggerate the dimension of the
    SPD defeat.  The party fell more than 11 points to its worst
    result in the post-war period.  Its share of the eastern
    German vote was 19 percent, behind both the CDU and Left
    Party, and the FDP came within striking distance of the SPD
    in some western German states, including Bavaria, where the
    SPD's 17 percent was just ahead of the FDP's 15 percent.  The
    SPD election-night party was like a funeral, and Steinmeier
    and SPD party chairman Muentefering appeared grim-faced to
    announce that Steinmeier would be the Bundestag caucus
    chairman and thus unofficial leader of the opposition to the
    new black-yellow government.  Muentefering did not, as many
    expected, announce his resignation but it is likely to come
    by the time of the next party conference in mid-November.

    ¶8.  (C) Exit polls show that the SPD lost more than a million
    votes to former supporters who simply stayed home and
    additional voters to the Left Party and Greens, and that the
    public still blames it for the changes in unemployment
    insurance and the retirement age enacted during the Schroeder
    government and as part of the grand coalition.  The SPD, with
    only four minister-presidents and a shrunken parliamentary
    caucus, will have to decide how to profile itself against its
    two fellow leftist opposition parties, and the party left is
    likely to press for coalitions with the Left and Greens at
    the state level.

    LEFT OVERTAKES GREENS
    ---------------------

    ¶9.  (C) The Left Party -- under Oskar Lafontaine's and Gregor
    Gysi's leadership -- can also claim electoral victory with
    their party's best showing ever in a parliamentary election.
    Having won 11.9 per cent of the total vote and 20 direct
    mandates -- the largest number ever for one of the smaller
    parties -- it will be difficult for Germany's other parties,
    especially the SPD, to ignore The Left's steady rise in
    popularity in east and west Germany (see REFTEL B).  The
    party successfully stole the SPD's thunder and was partially
    responsible for the SPD's poorest showing ever in German
    election history.  The Left Party can now concentrate on
    achieving the ultimate prize in German politics in 2013: a
    governing coalition with the SPD and the Greens.  Berlin SPD
    Governing Mayor Klaus Wowereit has already said that this
    year's election must be the last one in which the SPD
    excludes the possibility of cooperation with the Left, and he
    and other left-wingers in the SPD will likely fight to bring
    the two parties closer together.

    GREENS: HOW TO STAY RELEVANT?

    BERLIN 00001197  003 OF 003

    -----------------------------

    ¶10.  (C) The Greens may have celebrated their first double
    digit showing (10.7 per cent) in a parliamentary election,
    but the party was unsuccessful in preventing a black-yellow
    coalition or becoming the third strongest party in the
    Bundestag (see REFTEL A).  Party Co-Chairman Cem Oezdemir --
    who failed to win his direct mandate and was too low on the
    party list to win a seat in the Bundestag -- said that the
    Greens would establish themselves as a "think tank for social
    issues and for Germany as a whole."  The SPD's disastrous
    electoral result will remind the Greens that they may need to
    reach out to the CDU if they are to remain a relevant
    political power.  For the foreseeable future, Oezdemir hinted
    that his party would concentrate on achieving good results at
    future state elections and plotting their return to power in
    ¶2013.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11.  (C) Chancellor Merkel's main campaign objective -- to
    attract centrist support by out-positioning the SPD as the
    best protector of Germany's social welfare state -- was
    successful, although her CDU/CSU union suffered losses,
    primarily because of the CSU.  She will now have to find a
    way to balance this promise with FDP demands for greater
    reforms while dealing with the likely struggles between a
    strengthened FDP and a CSU that is concerned about its
    continued decline.  The parties will now enter complex
    coalition negotiations with pressure to complete them by the
    time that the new Bundestag convenes in late October, these
    talks have the potential to be very contentious.  Merkel will
    want to stamp her authority on the coalition agreement, while
    Westerwelle will be a tough bargaining partner for Merkel as
    he aims to extract the maximum amount of policy and personnel
    concessions from the CDU/CSU.  Finally, as a weakened SPD
    moves into the opposition, it can be expected that it will
    seek to continue the public debate on the major campaign
    issues and begin to rebuild itself, a process that could
    include its strong re-positioning to the left.

    ¶12.  (C)  What does a CDU/CSU-FDP victory mean for the United
    States?  On a practical level, Germany will have a new
    foreign minister, most likely Guido Westerwelle, who has
    enjoyed a difficult relationship with the United States
    during his time spent in opposition (see REFTEL D).
    Westerwelle will face a steep learning curve at the MFA, but
    we should not expect him to play second fiddle to Chancellor
    Merkel.  The foreign and security policy rivalry between the
    MFA and Chancellery during the Bush Administration will not
    disappear.  Indeed, they may be enhanced with Westerwelle's
    attempt to profile and make an international name for himself
    as quickly as possible, making it difficult for us to
    identify who is in the lead on any given issue.  Chancellor
    Merkel and Westerwelle will be competing for attention; the
    latter's flamboyant and outgoing style may give him a leg up
    but Chancellor Merkel will be keen to assert her primacy in
    international affairs, especially on economic and EU matters.
     She has more government and foreign policy experience that
    will come in handy in this future duel, and in an age of
    international summitry, the Chancellor rather than the
    Foreign Minister calls the shots.  We should not
    underestimate her desire to carve out a political legacy for
    herself, especially in the international arena, and her
    record of strong cooperation with Washington suggests that
    her dominance is likely to have a net benefit for US
    interests.

    ¶13.  (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulates General
    Duesseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich.
    Murphy

`