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### Viewing cable 10DAMASCUS8, CODEL GREGG'S DECEMBER 30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10DAMASCUS8 | 2010-01-04 09:09 | SECRET | Embassy Damascus

`

    VZCZCXRO0091
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHDM #0008/01 0040932
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 040932Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7183
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5896
    RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0241
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0842
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0349
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0870
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0796
    RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1003
    RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0151
    RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0265
    RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 2478
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0442
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0781

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DAMASCUS 000008

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, ELA
    NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
    PARIS FOR NOBLES
    LONDON FOR LORD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2029
    TAGS: PREL IR LE IZ SY
    SUBJECT: CODEL GREGG'S DECEMBER 30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
    ASAD

    Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 b and d.

    ¶1.  (S) Summary:  In a frank one-hour meeting with Syrian
    President Bashar al-Asad, Senators Gregg, Bayh, Specter,
    Enzi, Cornyn, and Klobuchar affirmed Washington's interest in
    better U.S.-Syrian relations and pushed Asad to take positive
    steps as well.  The senators urged Syria to move forward on
    security cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq, facilitating the
    release of three detained Americans in Iran, and re-opening
    the Damascus Community School.  Asad welcomed the prospect of
    more Congressional visits and candid exchanges, saying
    diplomacy had failed to solve the region's problems during
    the last two decades.

    --  On comprehensive peace, Asad reiterated Syria's strong
    desire to return to Turkish-facilitated indirect talks with
    Israel as a means to establish agreed terms of reference for
    direct negotiations.  Syria's relations with Iran should not
    be linked to Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations.  Syria's ties
    to Hamas, Hizballah, and other groups could be satisfactorily
    resolved only after the achievement of a comprehensive
    regional peace, Asad maintained.

    --  The U.S. and Syria should use the next several months to
    improve bilateral relations so that both sides could overcome
    mutual distrust that would hinder U.S. credibility as an
    honest broker, Asad told the senators.  Later in the
    discussion, FM Muallim argued the onus for taking the next
    positive step lay with the U.S.  Syria could not move on
    issues such as the American school or the Cultural Center
    unless Washington lifted its ban on the sale of new
    commercial aircraft to Syria.

    --   Calling Iran the region's most important country, Asad
    said the West could improve the prospects for peace by
    acknowledging Iran's NPT-protected right to enrich uranium
    under IAEA monitoring.  Asad argued the West should accept
    Iran's "reasonable" counter-offer to ship several batches of
    low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for enrichment by other
    countries, instead of insisting Iran ship all of its LEU at
    once.  Asad said he believed Iran was not interested in
    pursuing a nuclear weapon, but warned that an Israeli
    military strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure would fail
    to disable the program and would only increase Iran's
    determination.  End Summary.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    Doctor Asad:  Treat, Don't Condemn, the Illness
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶2.  (S)  A confident President Asad greeted the six visiting
    senators and accompanying staff of CODEL Gregg on December 30
    with a call for frank discussion of "the facts" rather than
    an exchange of opinions.  Only the facts, he said, would
    enable both sides to focus on the critical issues of common
    interest and lead to a process of identifying solutions to
    shared challenges.  The international community had failed
    for two decades to solve the region's problems.  Now, there
    were new challenges on top of these that required direct, not
    diplomatic, solutions.  He welcomed the delegation, saying he
    hoped for more meetings with Congressional groups.

    ¶3.  (S) Senator Specter expressed the delegation's
    condolences after the death of the President's younger
    brother Majd and recalled his numerous meetings with
    President Asad since their first meeting in 2000 at the
    funeral of former Syrian President Hafez al-Asad.  Senator
    Specter referred to his earlier discussions with Syrian
    officials about Israeli-Syrian peace talks and suggested

    DAMASCUS 00000008  002 OF 006

    Israel would benefit from peace with Syria.  The U.S.
    recognized Syria's deep and long-standing ties to Iran, but
    it also saw dangers if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.
    Stipulating that the Israeli government would have to make
    its own decisions on how to proceed in peace talks with Syria
    without U.S. pressure, Specter suggested the U.S. would
    positively view Syrian efforts to use its influence to alter
    Iranian policies.  Iranian policies currently opposed the
    achievement of peace between Syria and Israel, even as Syria
    recognized such a development would have a positive impact on
    defusing other regional tensions.

    ¶4.  (S)  Asad asserted he wanted peace with Israel, but the
    issues were complex and required an organized frame of
    reference.  Both sides might agree on the shared objective of
    peace, but they differed on preferred approaches.  Calling
    for a fact-based approach to identifying the obstacles to
    peace, Asad likened the process to how a doctor should treat
    cancer.  Condemnations and mutual recriminations might be
    self-satisfying, but the cancer still grows unless the doctor
    is able to treat the root illness.  Syria, Asad continued,
    had begun indirect peace talks with Israel in May 2008 under
    Turkish auspices.  In roughly eight months, these talks had
    achieved more than several years of direct negotiations with
    Israel in the 1990s.  The U.S. and Europeans needed to
    support the Turkish track, argued Asad.  They also should
    convince Israel that only peace will protect Israel.
    Israel's military superiority would not secure it from attack
    against missiles and other technologies.  President Obama's
    tenure might represent the last opportunity for peace, Asad
    told the senators.

    -----------------------------------------
    Asad on Necessity of Indirect Peace Talks
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶5.  (S)  Senator Gregg asked why Syria insisted on pursuing
    indirect peace talks via the Turks.  Why couldn't Syria and
    Israel move to direct talks brokered by the U.S., while Syria
    helped on issues important to the U.S., such as Hizballah,
    Hamas, and relations with Iran?  Asad replied Hamas and
    Hizballah should be a part of the peace, but not organizing
    principles for conducting peace discussions.  Syria, as
    demonstrated by then-lead negotiator Muallim's efforts in the
    1990s, had no problems with direct negotiations.  But those
    negotiations failed; failing again might foreclose future
    opportunities.  U.S. ambitions to push the peace process
    forward only resulted in spoiling the process because of the
    lack of "rules of negotiation."  Indirect talks represent the
    best way to establish terms of reference similar to those
    reached by Secretary Baker during his intense shuttle
    diplomacy in 1991.  While no one called these talks indirect
    negotiations, they functioned comparably to Syria's indirect
    talks under Turkish auspices.

    ¶6.  (S)  Syria, Asad continued, saw the indirect talks as a
    way to institutionalize the process and reach agreed terms of
    reference on which to base direct negotiations.  This basis
    was absent in the 1990s and explained why the direct
    negotiations ultimately failed.  Referring to the "elephant
    in the room," Gregg asked whether it would be possible to
    reach peace with Israel without first resolving the Iranian
    nuclear issue.  Asad cautioned against linking Iran's nuclear
    program to an Israeli-Syrian peace deal, arguing such a link
    would only complicate both sets of issues.  "Too many cooks
    spoil the meal," he said.  Later in the conversation, however
    (in the context of a request for Syrian intervention with
    Iran to free detained American hikers), Asad noted every
    person and nation was key in bilateral and regional dynamics.

    DAMASCUS 00000008  003 OF 006

     Syria had cut relations with the U.S. after the 1967
    Arab-Israeli conflict, but bilateral relations had improved
    markedly after President Nixon visited Syria in 1974 to
    discuss peace with Israel.  "That's our issue," he stressed,
    noting that the Golan track had been active under President
    Carter but then dormant through most of the 1980s and the
    early part of the current decade.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    Iraq: Political Cooperation, Then Security Cooperation
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶7.  (S)  Senator Bayh observed that many things in Syria had
    changed for the better since his 2002 visit.  Now, there were
    positive indicators that bilateral relations might be on the
    upswing as well.  One area, however, in which relations had
    not improved was intelligence cooperation.  The U.S. and
    Syria appeared to have common interests in seeing a stable
    Iraq, not dominated by Iran.  Yet, foreign extremists
    continued to travel through Syria into Iraq.  The U.S. had
    provided information regarding four named individuals to the
    Syrian government, but nothing had happened.  Perhaps now was
    a propitious moment to consider re-establishing intelligence
    ties, Bayh suggested.  Asad concurred with the idea of
    overlapping U.S.-Syrian interests in Iraq.  He noted,
    however, that the main obstacle to increased U.S.-Syrian
    security cooperation stemmed from the absence of political
    cooperation.  The U.S. possessed a "huge information
    apparatus" but lacked the ability to analyze this information
    successfully, maintained Asad.  "You're failing in the fight
    against extremism.  While we lack your intelligence
    capabilities, we succeed in fighting extremists because we
    have better analysts," he claimed, attributing the superior
    analysis to living in and understanding the region.

    ¶8. (S)  Syria, Asad explained, had refused to cooperate with
    President Bush because it did not trust him and because the
    Bush Administration had wrongfully accused Syria of
    supporting foreign fighters.  When President Obama assumed
    office, Syria tried to be positive.  Asad he had proposed to
    Special Envoy Mitchell the idea of a border security
    cooperation initiative with Iraq as a first step.  (Post
    Comment: Asad's recollection is both selective and
    inaccurate.  U.S. officials first proposed a border security
    cooperation initiative to a reluctant FM Muallim in May 2009.
     President Asad agreed to participate after meeting S/E
    Mitchell in late July 2009.)  "This was a small step for me,
    but big for you," Asad argued.  Citing the U.S. inability to
    control its long border with Mexico, Asad said the border was
    not the major challenge.  Syria's close intelligence
    cooperation with Turkey enabled both countries to prevent
    terrorists from crossing their 860-kilometer border without
    relying on a huge border security presence.  This
    intelligence cooperation enabled Syria to "suffocate"
    logistical networks critical to the movement of terrorists.
    "In the U.S., you like to shoot (terrorists).  Suffocating
    their networks is far more effective," said Asad.

    ¶9.  (S)  Asad said Syria required a positive first step prior
    to resuming intelligence cooperation, a position that Senator
    Mitchell had accepted.  Syria had succeeded in convincing
    Iraqi PM Maliki on August 18 to reverse its opposition to the
    trilateral border security initiative and was ready to
    participate.  After the August 19 bombings and Iraqi
    accusations against Syria for facilitating the terrorist
    attacks, Syria remained willing to participate in the border
    assessments.  It was the U.S., Asad insisted, that had backed
    away.  Syria had no interest in supporting extremists, who
    weren't killing Americans but rather Iraqi civilians.  "That

    DAMASCUS 00000008  004 OF 006

    hurts us," Asad claimed.  U.S. "mistakes in Iraq" had cost
    Syria and the region a great deal.  Syria had out of
    self-interest sought to deter terrorists who popped up.
    Still, despite a shared interest with the U.S. in ensuring
    Iraqi stability, Syria would not immediately jump to
    intelligence cooperation without ensuring its own interests
    would be respected.  "I won't give it (intelligence
    cooperation) to you for free," he said.  Senator Bayh replied
    that the U.S. was working to normalize relations and
    considering positive steps to take along the way.  Syria,
    Asad commented, had been clear on how to start rebuilding
    relations.  "We didn't say no," he said, "but we have to
    build from an absence of trust."

    ----------------------------------------
    Asad:  Door Open to Iranian Nuclear Deal
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶10.  (S)  Senator Cornyn commented the most dire threat to
    regional peace stemmed from Iran's nuclear aspirations.
    Syrian interests could well suffer if there were a conflict
    between Israel and Iran and possibly others.  Asad replied no
    one could predict the course of a conflict; therefore, it was
    better to avoid one.  The Bush Administration took a
    political approach to Iran instead of dealing with the
    nuclear issue in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
     Under the NPT, Iran enjoys the right to enrich uranium,
    provided there is IAEA monitoring.  Instead of trying to stop
    Iran's program, the international emphasis should shift to
    ensuring proper monitoring.  Iran had accepted the principle
    of enriching uranium outside of its borders.  Now the
    challenge was how to meet Iran's concern that shipping all of
    its LEU at once would risk not receiving any in return.  Asad
    claimed Iran sought only to enrich its uranium to 20 percent,
    well bellow the 95 percent threshold necessary for
    weapons-grade material.  If the international community
    agreed to divide Iran's shipments into four or five parts,
    Iran would be flexible, Asad argued.  In the meantime, Israel
    had to forget about attacking Iran.  Such a move would only
    encourage Iran to follow the path of India, Pakistan, and
    others in seeking a nuclear weapon.  Syria opposed this
    outcome, but viewed the only solution was to recognize Iran's
    rights and demonstrate flexibility in foreign enrichment,
    Asad said.

    ¶11.  (S)  Later in the conversation, Senator Specter argued
    Iran appeared to be blocking a deal.  Asad claimed Iranian
    diplomacy was now more flexible because the government was
    stronger and more confident after the 2009 elections.  Noting
    he had shared this assessment with French President Sarkozy,
    Asad said he judged Iran to be looking for cooperative signs.
     Iran represented the most important country in the region,
    Asad assessed, ranking Turkey second and Syria third.  The
    U.S. had troops in Afghanistan and needed better relations
    with Iran.  Specter agreed the enrichment issue could be
    solved; Russia had offered to enrich Iranian uranium several
    years ago, subject to international monitoring.  Iran had
    answered yes, replied Asad, but the issue was how to proceed.
     Iran's desire to divide the uranium shipments represented
    the only difference: if the West agreed, the issue would be
    solved.  There was an open door; if the nuclear issue could
    be solved, the peace process would proceed more easily.  But
    if conflict erupted, the regional context would become
    extremely complicated.

    ------------------------------------
    Discussion of Detained Amcits in Iran
    -------------------------------------

    DAMASCUS 00000008  005 OF 006

    ¶12.  (S)  Senator Klobuchar commented that she had supported
    Barak Obama because of his promise to advance a new approach
    to international relations.  While there were no easy
    solutions in the region, the U.S. and Syria appeared to have
    overlapping interests in avoiding war and in ensuring a
    strong and stable Iraq.  From the U.S. perspective, Syria
    might demonstrate as a goodwill gesture its interest in
    better relations by helping obtain the release of three
    American citizens -- Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer and Sarah
    Shourd -- who apparrently crossed into Iran while hiking in
    northeastern Iraq.  Swiss officials had visited them, but
    they were isolated and the U.S. lacked information on their
    whereabouts and any pending charges.

    ¶13.  (S)  Asad replied he was unfamiliar with their case and
    requested that the Embassy send more information.  Senator
    Specter interjected later in the conversation that the
    Embassy had delivered a letter to the MFA that week from the
    Secretary.  Specter added he had personally raised the matter
    in Washington with Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa.  The U.S.
    would view positively Syrian efforts to secure the three
    Americans' release, Specter said, comparing the case to the
    Iranian detention of UK sailors whom Syria helped to free.
    "We'll try our best," replied Asad, saying it would be
    necessary to ask about the legal aspects of the case.
    Specter clarified there had been no charges filed.  It had
    started as a trespassing case, but U.S.-Iranian relations
    were so poor it was impossible to resolve.

    --------------------------------------------- ---
    Re-Opening DCS:  Syria Awaiting U.S. Steps First
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶13.  (S)  Senator Klobuchar and Senator Enzi argued Syria
    might demonstrate good will by re-opening the Damascus
    Community School (DCS), whose closure had hurt not just
    American students, but also many foreigners and Syrians.
    Senator Enzi said his committee's purview on education
    created a personal interest in seeing the DCS re-opened; the
    school's closure represented a step away from moving towards
    positive relations.  Asad replied he wanted to open Syria to
    the rest of the world.  In September 2008, for example, the
    French Embassy opened a new international school.  Asad
    explained he had ordered DCS's closure after a U.S. military
    attack on Syrian soil had killed seven innocent civilians in
    late October 2008.  "We had to respond," he argued, saying
    the school's closure "was the only step we could take" in
    response to the Bush Administration.  President Carter, Asad
    continued, had urged the reopening of DCS during his December
    2008 visit.  "I told Carter that we are ready," said Asad,
    who noted the Syrian government wanted to send positive
    signals to the Obama administration and had done so by
    re-opening the American Cultural Center (ACC).

    ¶14. (S) FM Muallim noted that only part of the American
    Language Center portion of ACC had been allowed to re-open.
    He argued that he and other Syrian officials had told State
    Department officials that steps by Syria to improve relations
    first required U.S. steps.  "We can't move without a waiver
    for Syrian Airlines," he argued, citing the threat to Syrian
    civilians posed a U.S. ban on the sale of civilian aircraft
    and spare parts.  Asad noted that a good friend who ran a
    medical laboratory was similarly unable to import U.S. lab
    technology.  The bigger issue, Asad said, was about bilateral
    relations.  Syria's intent was to re-open the DCS.  Asad said
    he trusted President Carter and supported President Obama.
    "We know he has other problems and priorities, but there must
    be U.S. steps," Asad insisted.

    DAMASCUS 00000008  006 OF 006

    ¶15.  (C)  U.S. Participants:

    CDA Charles Hunter
    Senator Judd Gregg
    Senator Evan Bayh
    Senator Arlen Specter
    Senator Michael Enzi
    Senator John Cornyn
    Senator Amy Klobuchar
    Mr. Paul Grove, Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee
    Mr. Christopher Gahan, Staff Member, Senator Gregg's Office
    Mr. Michael Pevzner, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on
    Intelligence
    Mr. Tom Sullivan, Staff Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
    Mr. Christopher Bradish, Staff Member, Senator Specter's
    Office

    ¶16.  (C)  Syrian Participants:

    President Bashar al-Asad
    Foreign Minister Walid Muallim
    Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad
    Presidential Advisor for Media and Policy Affairs Bouthaina
    Shaaban
    MFA America's Desk Director Dr. Muhammad Khafif

    ¶17.  (SBU)  Mr. Paul Grove of CODEL Gregg cleared on this
    cable.
    HUNTER

`