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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 08BERLIN122, WELCOME TO BERLIN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08BERLIN122 | 2008-01-29 16:04 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRL #0122/01 0291625
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 291625Z JAN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0334
    INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T BERLIN 000122

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
    SUBJECT: WELCOME TO BERLIN

    Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
    AND (D)

    ------------------------------------------
    Electoral Fever Puts Pressure on Coalition
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶1. (C) NSA Hadley:  Mission Germany looks forward to
    welcoming you to Berlin January 31 to February 1.  Germany is
    currently consumed by the aftermath of bitterly fought state
    elections that took place on January 27 in Hesse and Lower
    Saxony.  They are being seen as barometers for next year's
    nationwide vote.  Although the conservative Christian
    Democrats (CDU) won comfortably in Lower Saxony, the CDU
    suffered a major setback in Hesse, where CDU
    Minister-President Roland Koch ran a divisive election
    campaign that took his party from a commanding lead in early
    polls to a virtual tie with the Social Democratic party
    (SPD).  The country is also digesting the significance of the
    unexpected political gains by the (neo-Communist) Left Party
    and its entry into both Hesse and Lower Saxony parliaments.
    Over the next several weeks, state and national politicians
    will evaluate coalition options, none of which appear to
    please any of the major parties.  The CDU's poor showing in
    Hesse could energize its competitors and lead to further
    domestic partisanship, thereby complicating Chancellor Angela
    Merkel's goal of solidifying the political center in advance
    of the 2009 national elections.  On the other hand, the
    success of CDU Minister-President Christian Wulff's
    relatively low-key, centrist re-election campaign in Lower
    Saxony has been seen as a vindication of Merkel's domestic
    political strategy.

    ¶2. (C) The outcome of these two state elections, and that of
    the February 24 Hamburg elections, will likely reverberate in
    the day-to-day functioning of the CDU-SPD coalition.
    Already, Merkel's conservatives and Foreign Minister
    Frank-Walter Steinmeier's Social Democrats resemble the
    proverbial couple that hated each other but stayed together
    for the sake of the children:  the lack of any other viable
    coalition options is what sustains the partnership between
    the CDU/CSU and the SPD at this point.  On key priorities
    like Afghanistan and Kosovo (and on certain aspects of Iran),
    the gap between Merkel and Steinmeier is not so wide, and
    cooperation with the U.S. has not been harmed by domestic
    politics.  Differences are becoming more evident on some
    foreign policy issues however:  Steinmeier's January 17
    meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Muallem, over strong
    opposition from the Chancellery, is just the latest example.
    Increasingly, Christoph Heusgen and the Chancellery's small
    staff are being blindsided by the Foreign Ministry on policy
    matters that are significant but outside the spotlight.
    Overall, we can expect Merkel's government to be more
    hamstrung by partisan and interagency rivalries between now
    and the fall of 2009 than was the case in its first two years
    in office.

    ------------------------------------
    Steinmeier's Evolving Political Role
    ------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Steinmeier, who came to office with a reputation as a
    technocrat, is increasingly a political rival to the
    Chancellor.  Like most of his predecessors, he has benefited
    from the visibility conferred on the Foreign Minister.  He
    has become the most popular SPD politician in Germany and the
    second most popular overall, trailing only Merkel.  He
    recently was named Vice Chancellor, was elected as one of
    three national deputy chairmen of the SPD, and announced he
    will run for a federal parliament seat in 2009.  Steinmeier
    is regarded, both within the SPD and among the general
    public, as an attractive possible chancellor candidate in
    2009, should SPD Chairman Kurt Beck stumble.

    ¶4. (C) With Steinmeier's evolution from technocrat to
    political leader, he must cultivate much greater
    rank-and-file support within the SPD.  This is a particular
    challenge for him, because on domestic issues he is seen as
    relatively conservative.  He was a key architect of Gerhard
    Schroeder's economic reforms and stood by with a studied
    detachment as Kurt Beck and the SPD's left wing began to roll
    them back last fall.  This is all the more reason for
    Steinmeier to seek out foreign policy issues like arms
    control and disarmament on which he can strike chords that
    resonate with SPD voters (regardless of the shortcomings we
    find in these ideas).  Similarly, in policy toward Russia,
    the former Soviet republics, and the Middle East, Steinmeier
    misses no opportunity to evoke the legacy of Willy Brandt,
    elevating dialog and economic engagement above open
    expression of disagreement as tools of diplomacy.

    ¶5. (C) These internal factors amplify the tendency of
    Steinmeier and his Foreign Office to pursue initiatives not
    in harmony with the Chancellor's instincts or policy
    preferences.  Germany has a weak foreign policy coordination
    process and the German constitution grants broad autonomy to
    ministers.  Therefore, the ability of the Chancellor and her
    staff to rein in the Foreign Office is limited.  A result is
    that Germany does not always speak with a single, clear voice.

    ---------------------------------------------
    IRAN: Importance of International Cooperation
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶6. (S) Although Merkel and the Chancellery have more
    consistently toed our common firm line on Iran, both the
    Chancellery and the Foreign Office are firmly committed to
    securing a third UNSCR sanctions resolution as a basis for
    more biting EU autonomous measures.  MFA officials called the
    January 22 P5 1 Ministerial a success in demonstrating unity
    among the members, both by producing a new UNSC resolution
    text and by showing a unified strategic approach in dealing
    with Iran.  MFA officials have told us in private that EU
    autonomous sanctions would not be discussed at the January
    28-29 GAERC.  In conversations prior to January 22, German
    officials have emphasized the importance of the broadest
    possible international coalition, and thus highly value
    efforts to keep all members of the P5-plus-1 on board,
    deploying this argument when approached about either
    unilateral or EU autonomous measures.  However, they point to
    pressures from their business community (as well as from the
    Finance and Economics Ministries) as constraints on adopting
    stronger unilateral action against the Iranian regime.
    Privately, senior officials in the Chancellery and Foreign
    Office have expressed frustration that the NIE has
    complicated international diplomatic efforts.  On December 4,
    FM Steinmeier said the NIE on Iran offered the chance "inject
    new momentum" into the nuclear negotiations and called on all
    sides not to squander this opportunity.  Merkel said publicly
    on January 15 that the NIE had slowed the momentum behind
    further UN sanctions; she simultaneously underscored the
    seriousness of Iran's nuclear activities and the need for
    international solidarity.

    ----------------------------------------
    AFGHANISTAN: Need for Broader Deployment
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Encouraging greater German involvement in Afghanistan
    is a key priority of Mission Germany; we have made some
    progress, but the Germans remain very reluctant about
    deploying combat forces outside of the North.  In advance of
    the April NATO Summit, Germany will increase its involvement
    in the training of the Afghan National Army and will probably
    agree to take over responsibility for the 150-man quick
    reaction force (QRF) in the north.  We should welcome the QRF
    decision, because it would represent the first German ISAF
    contingent deployable on short notice (including possibly in
    exceptional and temporary circumstances outside the north),
    which would be a qualitatively new and significant step
    toward greater involvement in kinetic operations.  Secretary
    Gates' recent written request to Defense Minister Jung to
    deploy German Special Operations Forces (SOF) under ISAF in
    the south of Afghanistan is likely to be very controversial
    here, but may prove acceptable in the end if, in return, we
    were to offer Germany the option of ending its current offer
    of SOF for OEF.  Moving the German SOF commitment from OEF to
    ISAF would also have the benefit of allowing us to shift the
    considerable diplomatic resources and attention we devoted
    last fall to getting the German OEF mandate renewed to
    activities that may yield more practical benefits, such as
    pressing Germany to increase its contributions to ISAF.

    ¶8. (C) We should encourage greater German leadership in the
    EUPOL effort to train Afghanistan's civilian police force.
    EUPOL is led by German Juergen Scholz, and Germany
    contributes more police trainers than any other EU country,
    but the program has been slow to start and the planned
    ceiling of 195 EU police trainers is inadequate for the job.
    Furthermore, activities are not currently planned at the
    district level where the need is greatest.  Germany should be
    urged to accelerate the deployment of EU trainers to
    Afghanistan, increase the number of trainers, and broaden the
    geographic range of activities.

    ------------------------
    RUSSIA: Split Approaches
    ------------------------

    ¶9. (C) There are significant differences between the
    Chancellery and the Foreign Office on Russia, which invites
    Russian wedge-driving.  Merkel has never shied away from
    plain talk about disturbing trends inside Russia.  Steinmeier
    was the first foreign visitor to get a meeting with
    presidential candidate Medvedev after his nomination (a
    meeting with President Putin was thrown in as well).  Lately,
    the combination of Russian CFE suspension, backsliding on
    democracy, and intransigence on Kosovo has pushed even some
    in the SPD to offer criticism.  Still, the Foreign Ministry
    will likely continue to seek an unhelpful bridging role with
    Russia, in particular on CFE and other matters related to
    arms control.  The Chancellery can help constrain these
    impulses, but we will also need to keep up pressure among the
    Quad partners as well as from other key allies (e.g. Turkey
    and Norway) to make clear that German unilateral initiatives
    put transatlantic solidarity at risk.

    -------------------------
    KOSOVO: Close Cooperation
    -------------------------

    ¶10. (C) We discern very little daylight between the
    Chancellor and Steinmeier on Kosovo, and there is keen
    interest in working closely with the U.S. to resolve status
    and seal the EU's leadership role.  While the Bundestag will
    engage in intensive debate following an anticipated
    coordinated declaration of independence, we expect the
    multiparty consensus in favor of independence and the KFOR
    and ESDP missions to hold.

    -------------------------------------
    COUNTERTERRORISM: Building on Success
    -------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Your visit comes at a time when U.S.-German bilateral
    cooperation on security issues is as close as it has ever
    been.  The successful cooperation surrounding the
    September 4 arrests of three individuals planning large-scale
    attacks and the upcoming conclusion of a new bilateral
    agreement on fingerprint, DNA and other data sharing are the
    latest evidence of this trend.  Furthermore, no German senior
    official pushes as hard, or argues so publicly, for closer
    bilateral cooperation on security issues as Interior Minister
    Wolfgang Schaeuble.  Should the opportunity arise, you should
    inform German officials that we are eager to build on our
    successful record of counterterrorism cooperation and explore
    how we might work together to address threats such as
    European residents who seek terrorist training at overseas
    camps and become jihadists in Iraq or Afghanistan.

    ----------------------------
    ECONOMICS: Commitment to TEC
    ----------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Merkel highly values the U.S.-EU Transatlantic
    Economic Council (TEC) -- a centerpiece of her 2007 EU
    presidency -- aimed at reducing regulatory barriers to
    transatlantic trade and investment.  She is concerned,
    however, about maintaining the momentum in the TEC and fears
    that the European Commission and future EU presidencies
    (including France) may lose enthusiasm for the project.
    German officials also worry that a changing U.S.
    Administration could derail what they regard as a highly
    successful new transatlantic economic instrument; we should
    emphasize our continued commitment to the TEC, and encourage
    the Germans to maintain a leading role in it.  The German
    economy is expected to grow at only 1.7 percent this year.
    Previous higher estimates were lowered due to rising oil
    prices, the strength of the Euro, slower U.S. growth, and
    continuing turmoil in financial markets.  German economists
    and business leaders are also worried about the possibility
    of a national minimum wage as well as increased labor union
    demands for wage increases, both of which could affect the
    economy adversely.  Merkel plans to highlight employment
    gains -- as opposed to minimum wages -- as the focus of her
    economic plan looking ahead to the 2009 national elections.

    -----------------------------------
    CLIMATE CHANGE: Aggressive Measures
    -----------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the rest of Germany's political
    leadership remain serious about pursuing aggressive
    international measures to meet the challenges of global
    warming.  Merkel has made climate change a priority of her
    Chancellorship and enjoys the overwhelming domestic support
    on this.  Merkel's support for mandatory, targeted global
    limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an international
    cap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that only
    drastic, concerted efforts on the part of the international
    community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human
    contribution to global warming.  If anything, Steinmeier
    supports tougher standards.  While the Germans have been
    willing to consider alternative solutions, such as new
    technologies for clean coal and renewables, fundamental
    differences in our approaches to the issue of climate change
    remain, and could lead to more public disagreement in the
    future.  For example, while Germany will send a delegation to
    the January 30 Major Economies Meeting (MEM), the German
    Government remains skeptical about the value that the Major
    Economies Process (MEP) adds to the UNFCCC track. The Germans
    are particularly concerned about the need to avoid
    duplication of effort in the various other climate
    change-related forums, including the UNFCCC and the G-8.
    TIMKEN JR

`