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### Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2280, APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07TELAVIV2280 | 2007-07-26 13:01 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO3230
    PP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #2280/01 2071352
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 261352Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2487
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002280

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
    TAGS: PTER PREL KNNP KWBG EFIN IR IS
    SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH
    MOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN

    Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/D).

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the
    President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC),
    met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a general
    discussion of regional security threats.  On the Iranian
    nuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic about
    the effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
    resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites.  On most
    other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticism
    regarding any near-term solutions.  Dagan believes that the
    Syrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and argued
    for a concerted international effort to enforce UNSC
    resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from
    Iranian influence.  In Dagan's personal opinion, present
    attempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister Salam
    Fayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with the
    Palestinians is required.  Dagan and Townsend surveyed
    political developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf,
    and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand the
    challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------
    Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran
    --------------------------------------

    ¶2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting
    with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctions
    against Iran.  Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747
    caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact on
    the Iranian elite and financial community.  The resolutions
    had been particularly successful through their indirect
    consequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranian
    businesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from being
    connected with Iran.  Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USG
    cooperation on this front, and added that domestic economic
    problems were creating additional pressure on the regime.

    ¶3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the
    Iranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" that
    they have mastered the uranium enrichment process.  The
    reality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and they
    are paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for something
    they have yet to achieve.  Dagan noted growing antipathy in
    Russia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said the
    Iranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them of
    supporting terrorism against the United States.  In Dagan's
    view, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranian
    leadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), but
    there is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a
    retaliatory position against the West and others favoring new
    policies of moderation.  Recognizing the growing strength of
    the moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers of
    President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to target
    supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf
    States all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the job
    for them."  Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state of
    affairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chief
    accused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "very
    negative role."  He also pointed to the recent visit of the
    Saudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first and
    turning point for relations between the two countries.
    Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense of
    urgency on the political front.  Dagan characterized Qatar as
    "a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoying
    everyone."  In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides --
    Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and
    some degree of independence.  "I think you should remove your
    bases from there...seriously," said Dagan.  "They have
    confidence only because of the U.S. presence."  Dagan
    predicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the next
    cause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders
    (specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic steps
    to shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personally
    responsible for its provocations.

    ----------------------------
    Syria Taking Dangerous Risks
    ----------------------------

    TEL AVIV 00002280  002 OF 003

    ¶5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an
    Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level of
    readiness.  Despite the fact that Israel has no intention of
    attacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliate
    over even the smallest incident, which could lead to quick
    escalation.  Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliance
    with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad views
    these policies as both "successful and just."  There is a
    tendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran,
    said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakening
    Hizballah.  Dagan argued that the opposite is true:  by
    enforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts to
    disarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the
    glue that binds Iran and Syria.  Enforcing the resolutions
    would put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being tried
    for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
    above all else.  The advantage of such an approach, continued
    Dagan, is that the legal ground is already in place for
    action by the UNSC.  This credible threat could sufficiently
    frighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural allies
    in the Arab League.

    ---------------------------------------------
    Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed
    his personal opinion that after more than a decade of trying
    to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians,
    "nothing will be achieved."  Only Israeli military operations
    against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding
    control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah
    would fall within one month and Abbas would join his
    "mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar.  Offering what he
    believed to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6
    billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since
    ¶1994.  "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more
    people to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan.  Although he
    expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that
    the Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base.  Fatah as a
    party would have to completely reorganize itself in order to
    regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have
    turned once again to the "old guard."  The Mossad Chief
    suggested that a completely new approach was required, but
    did not provide Townsend any additional details.

    --------------------------------------
    Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns
    --------------------------------------

    ¶7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour
    of the region, comparing notes on countries critical to
    combating terrorism.  Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled by
    radical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal as
    his biggest nightmare.  Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad"
    groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once in
    possession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do not
    care about the well being of states or their image in the
    media.  "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf in
    power," said Dagan.  In North Africa, Dagan contended that
    Qaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on the
    right track.  Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said
    Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats and
    runs foreign policy based on his emotions.  The only reason
    Qaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was
    that he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regime
    change.  Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as more
    serious, with the south of the country becoming increasingly
    dangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radical
    Islamic forces.  Morocco is coping better with these issues
    "in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to take
    little interest in governing.  In Turkey, Dagan said that
    Islamists there are not of the same cloth as others in the
    region, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking down
    the secular character of the state and could become more
    radical over time.  Dagan argued that if the Turkish military
    received more direct support from the United States, it would
    be better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************

    TEL AVIV 00002280  003 OF 003

    CRETZ

`