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### Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1593, C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
05TELAVIV1593 | 2005-03-17 14:02 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015
    TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP EU IR IS GOI EXTERNAL
    SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
    IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

    REF: STATE 26053

    Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to
    its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the "point of
    no return" for Tehran's nuclear weapons program.  The GOI
    believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as
    sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the
    EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement.
     The Israelis support a unified international front but are
    concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position.
    Despite the GOI's focus on the diplomatic track, public and
    private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes
    continues.  In weighing the military options, the GOI is
    aware of significant differences from its successful strike
    against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, including an
    uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition
    forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to
    retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed
    strategic environment.  END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------
    The Iranian Threat, "Point of No Return," and Timelines
    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran "the main threat to Israel" and
    has recently expressed concern that some states are "getting
    used to" the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons.  Other
    senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran's
    nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan
    calls an "existential threat" that alters the strategic
    balance in the region.

    ¶3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December,
    Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the
    enrichment cycle as the "point of no return" for the Iranian
    program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials.  Mossad
    Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian
    program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires
    outside assistance to complete the enrichment process.  At
    the technical level, the director for external affairs at the
    Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the
    critical step would be Iran's operation of a centrifuge
    enrichment cascade.

    ¶4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when
    they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability.  In
    February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there
    is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window
    of opportunity is closing quickly.  DefMin Mofaz cautioned
    that Iran is "less than one year away," while the head of
    research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would
    reach this point by early 2007.  Technical experts at the
    IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability
    within six months of the end of the suspension agreement.  A
    few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates
    need to be taken with caution.  The head of the MFA's
    strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from
    1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998
    at the latest.

    --------------------------------------------
    Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining
    diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and
    EU-3.  Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC
    sanctions, e.g. on Iran's airlines and trade, as noted below.
     President Katsav has said that Tehran is "very conscious of
    international opinion."  Other MFA and NSC officials point to
    the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos
    case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect
    decision-making in Tehran.

    ¶6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3
    efforts, but see no real alternative at this time.  PM Sharon
    told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to
    "play for time."  In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and
    military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are
    "too soft."  Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that
    Iran will "cheat" on any commitments it makes.  MFA staff
    told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort
    will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or
    that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against
    Iran.

    ¶7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the
    Europeans and IAEA on several issues.  First, the GOI would
    like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities
    covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each
    step.  Second, they want more robust verification measures
    and greater focus on Iran's denial of access to IAEA
    inspectors.  Third, the Israelis insist that any final
    agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that
    noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level.
    Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that
    would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the
    concrete consequences of such failure.

    ¶8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans
    to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but
    noticeable, economic impacts.  After telling the press on
    March 10 that "it would probably not be advisable to impose
    an oil embargo on Iran," PM Sharon advocated trade and flight
    restrictions.  Lower-level GOI officials said these steps
    could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe,
    limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and
    suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within
    the EU.  The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign
    affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S.
    for a "complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle
    program."  In the short term, this means a full suspension of
    all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor
    construction, and related R&D activities.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the
    Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by
    the UNSC.  PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its
    efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to
    take Iran to the UNSC.  In a meeting with a CoDel on December
    12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with
    the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including
    sanctions.  President Katsav asked the Secretary not to "wait
    for the Europeans."

    ¶10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the
    extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic
    front.  The IAEC's director for non-proliferation admitted
    that the GOI sees "little we can do" to increase pressure on
    Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement.
    The MFA's office director for the Gulf states said that
    Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities,
    such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material
    related to the Iranian program.  She said the MFA believes
    that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a
    surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on
    Israel's own nuclear activities.

    ¶11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the
    President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked
    if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran.  The deputy NSA
    for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is
    probably necessary to build international consensus for
    taking Iran to the UNSC.  At the same time, he expressed
    concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called
    the EU's habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full
    compliance.  Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also
    disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is
    re-examining its position on Hizballah.

    ------------------------------------------
    The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli
    officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible
    military options.  In public, PM Sharon has stressed the
    importance of the "political and economic" track.  During a
    recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy
    Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz
    similarly said "we don't want to go there."  In February,
    President Katsav told the Secretary that "the military option
    is not necessary -- bring the issue to the Security Council."

    ¶13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes
    usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air
    Force's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981.  In private,
    GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would
    make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission.
    A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that
    the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located
    and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the
    Iranian program.  The MFA's office director for the Gulf
    states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed
    throughout the country, with several located in built-up
    civilian areas.  The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian
    assistance in restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and said
    that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian
    casualties and endanger Moscow's cooperation.

    ¶14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets
    and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise
    additional complications.  An Israeli assault would
    necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq,
    they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation
    throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq.  MFA and
    NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit
    a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians,
    effectively freezing the peace process.

    ¶15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military
    strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and
    the IAEA.  In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran's
    ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by
    its regional surrogates.  PM Sharon has claimed that
    Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of
    reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon.  The MFA's
    office director for the Gulf states said that she believed
    that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in
    Israel and the Occupied Territories.

    ¶16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also
    creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis
    felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi
    threat.  Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian
    problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, "I do
    not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an
    Israeli problem -- it is a matter of concern for the whole
    world."

    --------------------------------------------- --
    Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but ...
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic
    channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real
    concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against
    the Iranian nuclear program.  Nevertheless, the GOI has shown
    time and again that it will act militarily if it believes
    that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most
    certainly keeping contingency plans up to date.  The Israeli
    press reported that in February PM Sharon's Security Cabinet
    had given "initial authorization" for an attack on Iran.  The
    press reports cited an unnamed "Israeli security source," who
    claimed that the USG would "authorize" an Israeli attack.
    Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations
    for any military strike.  Air defense operations would pose
    nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force
    activities preceding any attack.  Due to both the extreme
    sensitivity of the issue and the GOI's near inability to
    prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held,
    probably even from many members of PM Sharon's Cabinet.

    ¶18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its
    interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
    Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at
    the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3
    effort is on track and backed by a solid international front.
     We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position
    may move toward the EU stance.  At the same time, we should
    recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will
    understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not
    match current USG assessments.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************
    KURTZER

`