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### Viewing cable 10MUSCAT71, OMANI GOVERNMENT REACTS STRONGLY TO SUGGESTION OF PATRIOT

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10MUSCAT71 | 2010-02-02 14:02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Muscat

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMS #0071/01 0331443
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 021443Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1190
    INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
    RHMFISS/COMUSAFCENT SHAW AFB SC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000071

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/02
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IR MU
    SUBJECT: OMANI GOVERNMENT REACTS STRONGLY TO SUGGESTION OF PATRIOT
    OFFER

    CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Schmierer, Ambassador, Department of State,
    Embassy Muscat; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  A recent New York Time's (NYT) article describing
    Patriot missile deployment to countries in the Gulf in order to
    counter Iran, assuage Israel, and reassure our Gulf partners has
    been disquieting to the Omani Government.  There has never been an
    official USG offer of Patriots to Oman, due in large part to the
    GoO's rejection of any undertaking that might include or would
    imply the presence of Patriot missiles here.  Oman's close
    partnership with the USG, particularly through the Base Access
    Agreement (BAA), is contingent on maintaining an extremely low
    profile and continuing the Sultanate's foreign policy objective of
    carefully balancing public perception of its relationships with the
    U.S. and Iran.  Press of this sort, however unintended, makes it
    extremely difficult for Oman to maintain that balance.  End
    Summary.

    Press Articles on Missile Defense in the Gulf

    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶2. (U) A NYT article appeared on January 30 titled "U.S. Speeding
    Up Missile Defenses in Persian Gulf," which quoted General Petraeus
    as saying that Patriot missile batteries would be located in four
    gulf countries, and noted that Saudi Arabia already has Patriots.
    An unnamed military official named the countries as Qatar, the UAE,
    Bahrain and Kuwait.   The version of this article syndicated by the
    NYT news service includes the sentence "Oman, which has always been
    sensitive about perceptions that it is doing U.S. bidding, has also
    been approached, but there is no deployment of Patriots there,
    according to U.S. officials."  (Note:  That sentence does not/not
    appear in the version currently available via the NYT website, and
    it is unclear to post if it appeared in the print edition on
    January 31; the syndicated version of the article is otherwise not
    substantially different from the NYT original.  End Note).   The
    item was picked up by regional press on January 31, quoting the NYT
    article and specifically noting that "Oman has declined the offer."
    On February 2, the private English daily "Times of Oman" carried a
    front page article titled "Missile Shield: Oman denies receiving
    any offer from US."  In it, Sayyid Badr al Busaidi, Secretary
    General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), is quoted as
    saying, "the Sultanate's position on such matters is firm and that
    it does not ... enter into alliances or axis (sic) against any
    state."  He stressed that Oman "does not allow its territory to be
    used to carry out any military operations against any country in
    the region."

    Oman is not Interested

    ------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) The Embassy has no record of a formal offer of Patriot
    missiles made to Oman by the USG.  However, a number of discussions
    have occurred in which USG intent was to gauge Omani interest in
    collective missile defense capability.  Oman has consistently shown
    a lack of interest and has politely declined to engage in
    substantive discussions on "shared early warning" systems,
    "integrated air defense,"  or "collective defense."  (Note:  This
    is likely due to its assessment that Iran does not pose an imminent
    threat, its desire to not needlessly antagonize Iran, and its
    distrust of fellow GCC members, making it unwilling to share data
    within that group.  End Note.)  Further, in official
    correspondence, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) rejected an offer for
    a "Missile and Air Defence Working Group" on February 6, 2009;
    rejected further offers for an "Air and Missile Defense Shared
    Early Warning (SEW) System" on March 30, 2009, citing Oman's
    "unwillingness to commit itself to a SEW"; and on July 22, 2009
    again rejected any participation in the "Air Defense Missiles
    Advanced Warning System" project.

    Direct Omani Reaction

    -----------------------------

    ¶4. (C) The Omani Royal Office made contact with the Embassy on
    February 2 to express strong concern about the article and its
    repercussions, as that office had just received a pointed inquiry
    from the Sultan on this matter.  In a follow-up discussion embassy
    officer provided the history of discussions on the issue, of which
    the Royal Office was previously unaware, due to what was described

    as a "lack of lateral coordination within the GoO."

    ¶5. (C) Comment:  The strength of Oman's immediate reaction, and the
    level at which it transpired, is reflective of the tremendous
    seriousness with which this matter is viewed by the GoO.  It is
    likely that one of the goals of Badr's media statement was to
    protect the U.S./Omani relationship, as any belief that the U.S.
    would attempt to utilize Omani territory in this way could
    potentially cause a public backlash that would jeopardize other
    aspects of our relationship.  The deployment of Patriots to Oman,
    especially with the goal of countering the Iran threat, would run
    completely counter to Oman's publicly-stated foreign-policy
    objectives.  Although they do not find the threat imminent, Iran is
    Oman's number one strategic threat; however, the GoO fundamentally
    believes the threat can be mitigated through careful management of
    the relationship.  Therefore, the GoO works very deliberately to
    create a  public perception of balance in its relationships with
    the U.S. and Iran.  Oman's security strategy of keeping a low
    public profile in general has been threatened by the attention
    brought by the NYT article, and the GoO is working to manage the
    message for the public.  End Comment.
    Schmierer

`