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### Viewing cable 08STATE134490, S) LETTER FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08STATE134490 | 2008-12-24 21:09 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #4490 3592211
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 242158Z DEC 08
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE 0000

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 134490

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
    TAGS: ETTC MASS OPDC PARM PREL AM
    SUBJECT: (S) LETTER FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
    REGARDING 2003 ARMENIAN ARMS PROCUREMENT FOR IRAN

    REFS: A. YEREVAN 657, B. State 97802

    Classified By: EUR/FO DAS Garber, Reasons 1.4 (b),
    (c), and (d).

    ¶1.  (U) Please deliver the following letter from Deputy Secretary
    Negroponte.  There will be no signed original.  Embassy should also
    propose discussions with the Government of Armenia in coming weeks.
    Suggested dates and team composition will be provided septel.
    Embassy Yerevan is requested to report response.

    ¶2.  (Secret/Rel Armenia) Begin Letter:

    Dear Mr. President:

            We value our positive relationship with your government,
    as we explore a range of shared interests, especially an agreement
    on Nagorno Karabakh and normalization of Armenia's relations with
    Turkey.  At the same time, we are dismayed by a serious  and,
    indeed, deadly - arms re-export case.

            Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary Fried, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Bryza, and Ambassador Yovanovitch have raised with you our
    deep concerns about Armenia's transfer of arms to Iran which
    resulted in the death and injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
    Notwithstanding the close relationship between our countries,
    neither the Administration nor the U.S. Congress can overlook this
    case.  By law, the transfer of these weapons requires us to consider
    whether there is a basis for the imposition of U.S. sanctions.  If
    sanctions are imposed, penalties could include the cutoff of U.S.
    assistance and certain export restrictions.

            To avoid such sanctions, it is essential that you present
    compelling evidence that your government is now in partnership with
    us to ensure such transfers do not occur in the future.

            To convince the United States that this will not happen again,
    we seek a written agreement from Armenia, memorializing its intent
    to implement measures that will prevent Armenia from becoming a
    source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups involved with
    terrorism and/or weapons proliferation.  Such measures include:

    -- Reform the Armenian Export Control Commission so its members are
    full time employees who exclusively work on export controls;

    -- Establish, at each point of entry into Armenia, Armenian teams
    dedicated to detecting and interdicting dual-use commodities and
    other contraband;

    -- Periodically accept unannounced visits by U.S. experts to assess
    the work of the teams;

    -- Harmonize Armenia's export control legislation with that of the
    EU;

    -- Update and make public Armenian export control lists,
    incorporating the control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement,
    Missile Technology Control Regime, and other international control
    regimes;

    -- Ensure that Armenian-based brokers do not facilitate arms related
    transfers; and

    -- Consult with the United States on transfers to countries that are
    not member states of NATO or the EU, or participating states of the
    Wassenaar Arrangement.

            We are prepared to send a team as early as possible in the New
    Year to discuss this proposal further.  It is my hope that we can
    work together to forge a positive outcome which provides your
    government the opportunity to strengthen Armenia's export controls
    and for my government to assist you in this effort.

    Sincerely,
    John D. Negroponte

    End text of letter.

    ¶3.  (S) Background:  In 2003, Armenia facilitated Iran's purchase of
    rockets and machine guns.  In 2007, some of these weapons were
    recovered from two Shia militant attacks in which a United States
    soldier was killed and six others were injured in Iraq.  The
    Secretary discussed our concerns with President Sargsian on the
    margins of the UN General Assembly, but he denied any transfer
    occurred.  The direct role of high-level Armenian officials and the
    link of the weapons to an attack on U.S. forces make this case
    unique and highly troubling.  These transfers may provide a basis
    for sanctions pursuant to U.S. legal authorities.  We propose a
    series of steps that Armenia will need to take to prevent future
    transfers, which will be weighed in the consideration of sanctions.
    We hope to use the threat of sanctions as a tool to generate
    Armenian responsiveness so that we will not be forced to impose
    sanctions measures.

    ¶4.  (S) The Deputy Secretary is writing to President Sargsian and
    indicating that a team will be sent to Armenia to seek written
    agreement that Armenia will take steps to ensure that it does not
    become a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of
    concern.  The team will also present additional information that
    will make clear why the United States is convinced that the
    transfers happened and make it unreasonable for Sargsian to continue
    his denials.  We anticipate that the team will travel to Yerevan in
    the coming weeks, to provide sufficient time for the incoming
    Administration to be briefed on the situation.

    ¶5.  (S) Objective:  Our objective is to prevent Armenia from
    becoming a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of
    concern, without derailing a possible Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
    Embassy Yerevan should seek to convey the seriousness with which the
    United States views this issue and emphasize that the transfer of
    arms to Iran and subsequently to terrorists in Iraq, in particular
    transfers that resulted in the death of an American serviceman,
    cannot be overlooked by the United States.

    ¶6.  (U) Please contact EUR/PRA Matt Hardiman and ISN/CATR Margaret
    Mitchell with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case
    and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN and EUR.
    RICE

`