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### Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT248, TURKMENISTAN: TURKISH AMBASSADOR CONCERNED ABOUT

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ASHGABAT248 | 2009-02-24 04:04 | SECRET | Embassy Ashgabat

`

    VZCZCXRO0500
    PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
    RUEHPW RUEHROV
    DE RUEHAH #0248 0550457
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 240457Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2339
    INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
    RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4850
    RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0085
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3094
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000248

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND NEA/IR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019
    TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM RS TX
    SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: TURKISH AMBASSADOR CONCERNED ABOUT
    POTENTIAL SHIPMENTS OF URANIUM TO IRAN

    Classified By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4(B), (D), (E) and (F).

    ¶1. (C) The Turkmen Government announced earlier this month
    that President Berdimuhamedov had signed a decree allowing
    the state chemical concern "Turkmenkhimiya" to enter into a
    contract with Ekomet-S of Russia for the transfer and burial
    of radioactive waste.  The waste was reportedly produced at
    the Hazar chemical plant and at the Balkanabat iodine plant.

    ¶2. (S) In a meeting with the Charge on February 17, Turkish
    Ambassador Huseyin Bichakli raised concerns about reports
    that Turkmenistan and Russia plan to resume uranium
    production in Turkmenistan.  He said that he had learned from
    sources that a Russian military delegation had visited
    Turkmenistan in early January and visited the site of a
    former "uranium" plant at Kizilkaya in Balkan Province.  The
    plant operated during the Soviet era.  He said that the
    delegation was also briefed on the planned North-South
    railroad line from Russia to Iran, which includes a 700 km
    stretch through Turkmenistan.  Ambassador Bichakli said there
    were rumors that the railroad would be used to transport
    uranium processed at the currently inactive Turkmen uranium
    plant to Iran.

    ¶3. (S) COMMENT: Ambassador Bichakli did not provide his
    sources, but noted that for Turkmenistan to collaborate with
    Russia to transport processed uranium to Iran, particularly
    in a surreptitious manner, is inconsistent with its policy of
    neutrality.  Post will report any further information on this
    issue.  END COMMENT.
    MILES

`