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### Viewing cable 10ABUDHABI69, UAE - SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CJCS

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10ABUDHABI69 | 2010-02-09 11:11 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAD #0069/01 0401136
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 091135Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0266
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000069

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    FROM AMBASSADOR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AE
    SUBJECT: UAE - SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CJCS

    CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambasador; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (C),
    (D)

    ¶1.  (SBU) Admiral Mullen:  we warmly welcome your visit to Abu
    Dhabi, and have requested an appointment with Abu Dhabi Crown
    Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Shaykh
    Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ), whom you last met on 9
    September 2009 in Washington.  We have also requested a meeting
    with your counterpart, Lieutenant General Hamad al-Thani
    al-Romaithi, Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces, whom you last
    met on 8 October 2009 in Washington.

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    The Relationship

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶2.  (S/NF) The UAE is one of our closest partners in the Middle
    East and one of our most useful friends worldwide.

    -- Al-Dhafra Air Force Base is the high altitude ISR hub for the
    AOR, and supports 50 percent of aerial refueling in the AOR.

    -- Ports in Dubai and Fujairah are the logistics backbone for the
    U.S. Fifth.  Jebel Ali (Dubai) is the most frequented USN liberty
    port after Norfolk.

    -- Minhad Air Base is a critical hub for Coalition/ISAF partners in
    Afghanistan, including the Australians, Dutch, Canadians, Brits and
    Kiwis.

    -- The UAE is a cash customer with FMS sales in excess of $11
    billion.  Commercial sales have an equivalent value.  An additional
    $12 billion of FMS cases are in development with approximately the
    same volume of commercial sales in the works.

    -- The UAE recently purchased nine Patriot batteries, and expects
    to move forward on the purchase of THAAD as the first non US
    customer.

    -- The UAE currently commands CJTF-152 (Arabian Gulf) and maintains
    an active exercise schedule with U.S. (Red Flag) and other
    multi-lateral partners.

    -- The UAE recently hosted an AFCENT survey team to consider U.S.
    access to Liwa (Safran) Air Base in support of contingency
    operations.

    -- Additionally, the UAE is considering hosting the Regional
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center of Excellence.

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    Iran - the Primordial Concern

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶3.  (S) The UAE leadership sees Iran as its primary external
    threat, and one that is existential in nature.  Like much of the
    international community, the UAE finds the idea of an Iran with
    nuclear weapons unacceptable and thinks this eventuality would lead
    to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.  At least as worrying to
    MbZ are Iran's aspirations for regional hegemony by support for
    terrorist proxies (Hizballah, HAMAS, possibly underground
    organizations in the Arab Gulf countries).  MbZ is skeptical that
    Iran can be convinced to end its nuclear weapons program, and is
    not convinced that the international community will adopt tough
    sanctions.  In other words, he sees the logic of war dominating the
    region, and this thinking explains his near obsessive efforts to
    build up the UAE's armed forces.

    ¶4.  (S/NF) MbZ's main message to us during his September visit was
    that we needed to be better coordinated for Iran contingencies.
    High level engagement by CENTCOM planners have helped to address
    this concern, but he believes we have made less progress in
    addressing what he sees as the slow pace of deliveries of US

    security assistance and he is still worried that he does not have
    enough equipment in place to defend his people when war with Iran
    breaks out.  (And for MbZ it is a matter of when, not if.)  We have
    repeatedly presented to his staff the various explanations for what
    he perceives as delays, but he remains unconvinced that we are
    addressing his concerns as a matter of priority.

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    Afghanistan - Pakistan:  A Solid Partner

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶5.  (S) Afghanistan:  UAE SOF has been quietly deployed as part of
    OEF since 2003, and the UAE surged its contribution in 2009 adding
    a combined arms task force.  The UAE's UAV capability has been a
    much appreciated force multiplier.  On the economic development
    side, the UAE has pledged about $300 M in assistance, and quietly
    supported the Afghan Reintegration Fund at the recent London
    Conference.  You should thank MbZ for his leadership in being the
    first Arab country to send troops to Afghanistan.

    ¶6.  (C) Pakistan:  the UAE has taken a leading role in the Friends
    of Pakistan initiative and has provided about $800 M in assistance
    in recent years.  The Al Nahyan family had a long-standing
    relationship with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and this
    has transitioned to support for her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, but
    the UAE stays in touch with all elements on the Pakistani scene,
    including Musharraf.  MbZ will be very interested in your dialogue
    with General Kayani.

    ¶7.  (S/NF) Threat finance:  we have a cooperative relationship with
    the UAE at the Federal level on addressing Taliban financing.  As
    our information has begun to flow, we have seen increasing activity
    and interest on the part of UAE authorities.  That said, the
    subject is delicate and operational aspects are best handled
    through our well established Treasury/Intelligence channel.

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    Yemen:  Increasing Concern

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶8. (S/NF) MbZ shares our concern about Yemen, and if anything, is
    more alarmed about the possibility for destabilization of Saudi
    Arabia.  He is convinced that the Iranians are involved in Yemen,
    and supporting the Houthi rebels.  When we tell him that we have no
    evidence of Iranian support, he is somewhat incredulous, suggesting
    that our focus on Al Qaeda has caused us to lose sight of the
    bigger picture of Iranian adventurism.  You should encourage him to
    provide any specific information on Iranian activities to us
    through intelligence channels.

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    Iraq:  the Bellwether for Iran

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶9.  (S) Iraq:  the UAE was the first GCC Country to cancel Saddam
    era debt and re-establish an embassy, and has generally followed a
    policy of constructive engagement with the Maliki Government.  But
    MbZ runs hot and cold on Iraq.  Sometimes he chooses to emphasize
    his supportive position; at other times he suggests that Iran has
    been the big winner in Iraq, and that Southern Iraq will be one of
    the major flashpoints in the upcoming confrontation with Iran.
    Anything you can say to reassure him about the US commitment to

    Iraqi stability will be helpful.
    OLSON

`