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### Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA540, STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES IRAN, SYRIA, AND

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09UNVIEVIENNA540 | 2009-12-02 17:05 | SECRET | UNVIE

`

    VZCZCXRO5630
    RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHUNV #0540/01 3361717
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 021717Z DEC 09
    FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0355
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 UNVIE VIENNA 000540

    SIPDIS

    FOR P, T, H, ISN, S/SANAC, IO, NEA, SCA, EAP
    H PLS PASS STAFFDEL AS APPROPRIATE
    DOE FOR S2 AND NA-20
    NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, RYU, TALWAR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
    TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC IR SY KN IN
    SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES IRAN, SYRIA, AND
    MULTILATERAL VIENNA'S FRUSTRATING NAM DYNAMIC

    REF: EMBASSY VIENNA 1450

    Classified By: Mark Scheland, Counselor for Nuclear Policy; reasons 1.4
     (b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (S) Summary: HFAC staffers Richard Kessler and David Fite
    received from IAEA Secretariat November 10 information on the
    Iran case that tracked with the tone of the subsequent
    Director General's reporting on Iran to the Board of
    Governors.  The STAFFDEL heard that contact with Iran over
    "possible military dimensions" of the nuclear program was at
    an "absolute stalemate."  According to Safeguards regional
    division director Herman Nackaerts, IAEA inspectors' first
    visit to the enrichment facility under construction near Qom
    had run predictably but without extraordinary responsiveness
    on Iran's part; the Secretariat was still trying to
    understand the motivation to build the plant as now designed.
     Nackaerts described the frustrating limitations of Iran's
    cooperation with the Agency, and the STAFFDEL deduced that
    Iranian officials held back because they were uncertain about
    what lines of inquiry the IAEA was best equipped to exploit.
    Questioning then-DG ElBaradei's remark to media that the
    Agency had found "nothing to worry about" in Qom, STAFFDEL
    asked if the Secretariat would report on how it judged the
    plant did or did not fit into Iran's publicly explained
    nuclear program.  Nackaerts expressed appreciation for the
    precision and usefulness of U.S.-supplied information in the
    Qom case and generally.

    ¶2.  (C) Summary contd.: On Syria, Nackaerts said the
    Secretariat had told Damascus its first explanation for the
    presence of anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron
    Source Reactor was not credible.  Further, the Secretariat
    still could not yet present the case for how what was being
    built at Dair Alzour fit in as "part of a Syrian program or
    part of someone else's program."  On DPRK, IAEA/EXPO's Tariq
    Rauf said the IAEA, when it could, would ultimately have to
    "go back to the early 1990s" to reconstruct accountancy of
    plutonium and could not accept a "political" compromise
    setting material "off to the side."  To get to a finding of
    "no diversion" would take several years and extensive
    resources and forensics.

    ¶3.  (SBU) Contd.:  Treating Technical Cooperation, the
    STAFFDEL received the same briefing on the Safeguards
    Department's project review process and internal database
    that was provided to a GAO review team in 2008.  IAEA
    External Relations Director Rauf asserted, "We are not a
    denial organization."   STAFFDEL related how segments of the
    GAO report had reduced Congressional confidence in the
    efficiency of TC.  U.S. national labs were afforded too
    little time to review projects for our national
    decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk.
    Secretariat also described hindrances it faces in having UN
    and national development officials recognize and integrate
    nuclear applications.

    ¶4.  (SBU) Contd.:  The STAFFDEL also engaged P5-plus-1 heads
    of mission over lunch on the means to draw or impel Iran to
    open up on its nuclear program and on dynamics in Vienna
    between blocs of Member States.  End Summary.

    Fordow/Qom and Iran PMD: Frustration,
    but Good Support from the U.S.
    -------------------------------------

    ¶5.  (U) House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Majority Staff
    Director Richard Kessler and Professional Staff Member David
    Fite (STAFFDEL) spent ninety minutes with IAEA staff on
    November 10.  Principal issues were safeguards verification
    in Iran and Syria, the screening of IAEA Technical
    Cooperation (TC) projects for proliferation risk, and TC
    Department efforts to improve project design and integration
    into national and UN development activities.  STAFFDEL
    affirmed to Secretariat officials that the HFAC under
    Chairman Berman: was strongly supportive of the IAEA; put
    emphasis on counter-proliferation issues in countries of
    concern (indeed, was weighing legislation to impose further
    U.S. sanctions on Iran); had advocated an increase in NADR
    funding for extrabudgetary contributions to the IAEA,
    including for the Safeguards Analytical laboratory; and,
    supported "getting the U.S. up to date" on payment of its
    assessments to the IAEA's regular budget.  Following the
    meeting at the IAEA, STAFFDEL consulted Ambassador and
    Mission staff and had a working lunch with P5-plus-1 heads of
    mission focused on Iran and the dynamics of multilateral

    UNVIE VIEN 00000540  002 OF 005

    diplomacy in Vienna.  STAFFDEL's UNVIE program followed a day
    of consultations with Austrian officials (reftel).

    ¶6.  (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B (AOR
    Mideast, South Asia, parts of Europe, the Americas, and all
    nuclear weapons states) Director Herman Nackaerts briefed
    STAFFDEL on the inspection he had led a few weeks before to
    the recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom
    in Iran.  Nackaerts said Iranian officials had been open to
    allowing inspectors access.  The Secretariat was still trying
    to understand, he said, why Iran would build this facility,
    scaled as it was for 3000 centrifuges in contrast to the much
    large Natanz facility.  It was positive, Nackaerts pointed
    out, that Fordow was now under safeguards.  He noted that the
    IAEA had "at least two" safeguards inspectors at work in Iran
    "every day of the year" and would henceforth plan to visit
    Fordow regularly.  Asked how "complete" the plant was or when
    it would be operational, Nackaerts said, "The information we
    got from Member States proved to be very precise" on this
    point.  Asked about permission to take samples at Fordow,
    Nackaerts replied that Iranian officials had permitted the
    inspectors to perform the same safeguards procedures they
    typically undertook at Natanz.

    ¶7.  (S) STAFFDEL asked if the Agency enjoyed full access to
    the Arak IR-40 plant.  Nackaerts related there had been no
    access for a 12-month period but normal access in August and
    October 2009.  However, the Iranians "claim they cannot go
    back on the decision of their parliament, and hence grant the
    IAEA a "visit" but do not call it Design Information
    Verification.  On possible military dimensions (PMD),
    Nackaerts said the Secretariat's approach was to follow lines
    of inquiry that could involve use of nuclear material, for
    example, the documents treating uranium metal or green salt.
    The Iranians, he said in a tone conveying his skepticism,
    asserted the uranium metal document was "mistakenly" included
    in a packet of information they received from the AQ Khan
    network but was nothing Iran had asked for or used.  The
    "green salt" documentation Iran dismissed as a forgery.
    Indeed, Nackaerts went on, Iran replied basically on the form
    of documents, not on their substance.  The Secretariat had
    not been "impressed" by the 117-page rejoinder Iran had
    provided to the initial presentation of PMD documentation.
    It had told Iran the information hung together too much for
    it all to have bee fabricated and asked that, if some of the
    documentation were "doctored," Iranian officials should show
    the Secretariat "where the truth ends."  Since August 2008,
    (when Ahmadinejad personally shut off Nackaerts's previously
    approved visit to workshops indicated in the documentation),
    Nackaerts concluded, there remained a high-level decision not
    to cooperate.  STAFFDEL member Fite took from this that the
    Iranians were holding back "because they don't know where any
    opening will lead."  Nackaerts agreed, saying they knew that
    every question they answered would bring another question.

    ¶8.  (S) Fite alluded to then-DG ElBaradei's remarks of a few
    days before in U.S. media to the effect that the inspectors
    had found "nothing to worry about" in Fordow.  Acknowledging
    the practical meaning of this remark -- that there were no
    centrifuges or nuclear material present -- Fite nevertheless
    regretted the headline and asked if the DG's formal report to
    Board members (Note: subsequently released as GOV/2009/74,
    deresticted by the Board November 27, and available to the
    public at www.iaea.org) would deal with how Qom fits or does
    not fit into Iran's explained nuclear program.  Nackaerts
    replied, "We will identify the issues we're working."  He
    went on that understanding the timeline of Fordow's
    development was hindered by Iran's practice never to involve
    people who really know the facts or the government's
    intentions in discussion with the Agency.  The officials with
    whom inspectors meet clearly are "steered" by unseen
    observers, who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during
    meetings.  Iran recorded the meetings, he added, but did not
    permit the IAEA to do so.  Further, the Secretariat never
    received original design documents, but ones produced for the
    Secretariat that were technically true to the facilities they
    found upon inspection.  Against this Iranian practice,
    Nackaerts added, the Secretariat received very precise
    information from Member States that helped inspectors decide
    what to ask about.  The organization of this information was
    good and, while the Agency was satisfied, it had inquired if
    more information could be shared with the Agency, "not
    necessarily for release to Iran," he said.

    Syria Stalemate

    UNVIE VIEN 00000540  003 OF 005

    ---------------

    ¶9.  (SBU) The Syria case, Nackaerts said, was starting to
    look like Iran in that the government provided "good
    cooperation" on some areas but presented a "stalemate" on
    others.  The Secretariat challenged Syria's proposed
    explanation for the presence of uranium at Dair Alzour/Al
    Kibar (i.e., that Israeli depleted uranium munitions could be
    the source), but the inquiry was at a roadblock.  Syrian
    officials had been told their first explanation for
    anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
    (MNSR) was not credible, and the Agency had inquired what
    nuclear material Syria could have had that was not previously
    declared.  Overall, the IAEA still "did not understand"
    (meaning, it could not yet present the solid case for) how
    Dair Alzour fit in as part of a Syrian nuclear program "or
    part of someone else's program."

    Return to DPRK?
    Safeguards in India?
    --------------------

    ¶10.  (SBU) Asked how quickly IAEA inspectors could resume
    work in North Korea if re-admitted by the government, Tariq
    Rauf of IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordination
    (EXPO) observed that the last resumption had taken a week
    (for technical set-up, re-activation of cameras, etc.).
    Safeguards Operations A division had a program set out for
    what steps to undertake "under circumstances the DPRK may let
    us back in."  Rauf continued that the Agency would to go back
    to the early 1990s' plutonium revelation to reconstruct
    material accountancy.  When most recently in the DPRK, the
    IAEA had been monitoring facility shutdown processes but not
    implementing NPT safeguards on DPRK material.  The Agency
    could "not accept" political compromises that would set some
    nuclear material "off to the side".  Then-DG ElBaradei had
    called for implementation of the Additional Protocol in DPRK,
    but even if Pyongyang cooperated fully it would take several
    years and much in the way of resources and forensics to be
    able to get to a finding of "no diversion."

    ¶11.  (SBU) Asked about progress toward safeguards
    implementation in India, Rauf confirmed the GOI had submitted
    a "formal list" of facilities that was not a document the
    Agency would characterize as a formal declaration under its
    safeguards agreement.  India was under no mandatory timeline
    to make its declaration as it was not an NPT signatory.
    (Comment: Rauf's characterization was flat wrong.  Mission
    had learned from the Safeguards Department three weeks before
    this meeting that India had officially "notified" two new
    facilities (Raps 5 and 6) under its 2008 safeguards
    agreement, that surveillance systems had been installed, and
    the facilities were under safeguards.  End Comment.)

    Scrutinizing and Promoting
    IAEA Technical Cooperation
    --------------------------

    ¶12.  (U) Renaud Chatelus of the Safeguards Division of
    Information Management (SGIM) acquainted STAFFDEL with IAEA
    screening of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for their
    potential to afford access to sensitive technologies.
    Grounded in a 1979 Agency Information Circular, INFCIRC/267,
    the practice is to focus on projects related to enrichment,
    heavy water production, reprocessing of spent fuel, and
    plutonium or mixed oxide fuel.  Chatelus said SGIM reviewed
    projects submitted, project approved, individual procurement
    actions, and overall implementation of projects.  Reviews are
    conducted completely in-house, he said in reply to a
    question.  Using the same PowerPoint slides that were
    presented to a GAO review team in 2008, Chatelus illustrated
    with screen shots from the Agency's staff access-only
    database the system of flagging projects for: compliance with
    INFCIRC 267, compliance with INFCIRC 540 (Additional
    Protocol), transfer of "sensitive items" on the Nuclear
    Suppliers Group or dual-use lists, general interest, or
    possible relation to a safeguarded facility.  In subsequent
    discussion of the impact of screening and Member States'
    sense of entitlement to TC, EXPO's Tariq Rauf affirmed, "We
    are not a denial organization."

    ¶13.  (U) STAFFDEL member Fite observed that segments of the
    GAO report treating transfers to state sponsors of terrorism
    as well as on program management had reduced Congressional
    confidence about TC.  Fite said he had approached
    Appropriations staff about using a supplemental funding bill

    UNVIE VIEN 00000540  004 OF 005

    to resolve slow U.S. payment of assessments and do more for
    the Agency, but was rebuffed because the GAO report on TC had
    "poisoned the waters."  Apart from political objections to
    certain TC recipients benefitting from U.S. funding, he
    added, a persisting "Achilles heel" was that U.S. national
    labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our
    national decision-making on their merit and proliferation
    risk.  TC Department representative Johannes Seybold replied
    that the Agency aimed to provide Member States six weeks time
    for review, but was also at the mercy of requesting states
    providing the relevant project information.  Just the
    compendium of project titles and short descriptions became a
    very thick document in each biennial cycle, Seybold went on,
    and the Agency was "struggling" with some Member States'
    national policies to be able to go beyond this level of
    transparency.

    ¶14.  (U) STAFFDEL's meeting with Secretariat officials
    concluded in an exchange with Seybold, TC's section head for
    strategy and partnerships, about the IAEA's awkward position
    in development efforts coordinated by the UN or by developing
    countries' national institutions.  Seybold laid out the
    following.  The IAEA's cooperation with TC recipient states
    occurs through National Liaison Officers, generally in the
    atomic energy commission or government ministry responsible
    for nuclear power or radiological sources.  Generally,
    neither the IAEA nor the corresponding national entity is a
    participant in UN development team or host government
    deliberations about development in the recipient country.
    Two-thirds of TC projects address development issues for
    which the IAEA is not the responsible lead agency in the UN
    system, e.g., water quality and availability, food security,
    climate.  In many cases, national authorities and the UN team
    responsible for these areas in a given country lack awareness
    of IAEA capabilities, and/or they maintain a distance from
    things "nuclear."  Seybold related Agency efforts to
    integrate with these authorities through the UNDAF (UN
    Development Assistance Framework) process and other
    partnering efforts.  STAFFDEL expressed encouragement for
    bringing nuclear applications to greater impact in the
    development field.

    P5-plus-1 Ambassadors Regret Iranian Paralysis
    on TRR; Depict Grim Dynamic with G-77/NAM
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶15.  (C) STAFFDEL was the guests of honor at lunch hosted by
    the Ambassador with his counterparts from China, Germany,
    Russia, and the UK and the French Charge d'Affaires.  Kessler
    and Fite laid out HFAC's interest and Chairman Berman's
    supportive posture toward the Agency, as they had for
    Secretariat staff.  Opening discussion of Iran, UK Ambassador
    Simon Smith said the Iranian answer on the ElBaradei-brokered
    deal on refueling the Tehran research reactor (TRR) "had to
    be 'yes' or 'no,' not waffling" as it had been.  German
    Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking posited that the U.S.
    Administration had confounded Iranian internal processes and
    the latest EU3 proposal had "cornered" Iran.  Agreeing that
    Iran faced an imperative between "yes" and "no," Luedeking
    observed, "they can't answer."  HFAC Staff Director Kessler
    noted the committee had tried to follow up a Larijani
    approach conveyed one year before for a meeting with Chairman
    Berman, but found that the Iranians backed off.

    ¶16.  (C) Russian Ambassador Alexander Zmeyevskiy asserted
    that confidentiality was a major concern for Iran.  He noted
    its TRR counter-proposals, either to keep its LEU on its
    territory under IAEA safeguards until released in exchange
    for fuel rods, or to swap outgoing LEU piecemeal for incoming
    fuel assemblies.  Moving beyond the TRR issue, UK Ambassador
    said he was severely disappointed that Member States had been
    unable to "apply consequences for the breaking of rules" of
    the organization.  We needed to convince some other Member
    States, he continued, that tolerating rule breaking as on Qom
    and Code 3.1 (of the Subsidiary Arrangement of Iran's
    Safeguards Agreement) risked bringing the organization into
    discredit.  STAFFDEL member Fite asked if Iran's Arab
    neighbors were among the problem interlocutors in Vienna; he
    asserted that officials of Arabian Peninsula countries told
    the Congress they see Iran as an "existential threat."  While
    they may seek the cover of international signals or sanctions
    imposed by others, they say they do want action against Iran.

    ¶17.  (C) Segueing from Iran to DPRK, Chinese Ambassador Hu
    Xiaodi said the main difference between the cases was that
    progress with DPRK had been achieved when the North Koreans

    UNVIE VIEN 00000540  005 OF 005

    wanted something specific, whereas he (Hu) had never heard
    Iranian officials say that they wanted a settlement, or that
    they wanted anything specific.  Although we did not at
    present know "how" to reach a deal with Iran, Hu concluded,
    we were not in the worst situation, in which Iran explicitly
    does want something -- nuclear weapons.  Asked if he
    genuinely thought the DPRK would give up its weapons program
    for aid, Hu said "hope" (as opposed to "think.")   Ambassador
    Davies seriously questioned that Pyongyang would give up a
    weapons capability in exchange for a significant material
    improvement in our relations, as the government would likely
    calculate it had been its possession of weapons that won the
    concessions.

    ¶18.  (SBU) Ambassador turned the discussion to the dynamic
    between groups of Member States, as illustrated in the
    ongoing discussion of a Technical Cooperation project to
    advance IAEA use of "results based management."  The German
    Ambassador observed that NAM positions on many issues were
    characterized by "myths" and they were clearly being dictated
    by Iran and Egypt.  Ambassador Davies asked if the dynamic
    was further charged by states beginning to suspect that the
    U.S. seriously intends to strengthen the Agency in all its
    functions -- with the uncertain shifts in practice and
    distribution of resources and clout that could mean.
    STAFFDEL lead Kessler said the Congressional perception was
    one of a "lightning change" from the last Administration to
    the present one in U.S. approaches to the IAEA, to
    development assistance globally, and to multilateralism.
    German Ambassador agreed and said this was a complication for
    NAM states that know they are the immobile ones now.  Yet, TC
    was a "sacred cow" and the NAM's impulse was to reject
    "illegitimate intrusion" into its distribution.

    ¶19.  (SBU) French Charge Philippe Merlin discouraged STAFFDEL
    from expecting diplomatic gains, say in the NPT review,
    through greater generosity on IAEA peaceful use programs.
    "TC is the price we pay," he said, for developing countries'
    acquiescence toward the safeguards regime, the thing we
    really want.  Fite asked if a reasoned discussion with
    development officials in capitals about making TC deliver
    more impact could translate into different instructions to
    the obstreperous missions in Vienna.  German Ambassador took
    the view that any effort to change TC would be seen in
    capitals as "per se bad."  It was more advisable to advocate
    to NAM states what their own interests in the safeguards
    regime were.  UK Ambassador agreed there were no points to be
    scored by asking NAM capitals about TC effectiveness; he
    added that the UK Government "doesn't give two hoots" about
    TC, given the small funding level (from the UK Energy
    Ministry) in comparison to Britain's official development
    assistance.  TC was, also in the UK view, the price we pay
    for the IAEA we want.

    ¶20.  (U) STAFFDEL did not review this report.

    DAVIES

`