Currently released so far... 220 / 251,287

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/11
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE AU AR AF AORC AJ ASEC AM
BH BA BY BU
CASC CF CH COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV CVIS
EG ECON EINV ETTC EFIN ENRG ETRD EFIS EXTERNAL EPET EAID EUN ELAB ECUN EU EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GR GM GOI GE GG GA
HO
IR IZ IS INRB IN IRAJ IQ IAEA IT
JO JA
KPAL KNNP KU KWBG KJUS KG KSPR KDEM KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KCRM KHLS KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KPKO KUNR KTIA KWMN
LE LY
MASS MK MNUC MCAP MARR MOPS MU MAR MTCRE MY ML MR MPOS MOPPS
NATO NG
OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA OPDC
PREL PARM PGOV PTER PINR PHUM PINS PBIO PA PBTS PREF PROP PK PECON POLITICAL PARTIES PM PEPR
QA
RS RW RU
SA SY SM SU SCUL SNAR SOCI SENV SYR SP SG SO SF
TU TI TX Terrorism TRGY TFH01 TC TSPA
UZ UE UK US UNESCO UNSC UP UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 10BERLIN157, DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others.
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BERLIN157.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10BERLIN157 | 2010-02-04 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO6323
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #0157/01 0351607
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 041607Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6478
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000157

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
    SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
    WITH FM WESTERWELLE ON TROOP INCREASE FOR AFGHANISTAN

    REF: A. BERLIN 138
         ¶B. BERLIN 112

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Defense Minister zu Guttenberg revealed in
    a February 3 meeting with Ambassador Murphy that coalition
    partner FM Westerwelle -- not the opposition Social
    Democratic Party (SPD) -- had been the single biggest
    obstacle
    to the government seeking a bigger increase in German
    troops for Afghanistan.  But even with the modest planned
    troop increase of 500 (with 350 more in reserve), zu
    Guttenberg said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr
    presence would allow Germany to increase the number of
    soldiers involved in the training of Afghan National Army
    (ANA) by more than 1,000.  While Westerwelle has portrayed
    his skepticism about additional troops as principled, it
    was also motivated by a desire to put zu Guttenberg "in his
    place."  While the size of the troop increase is settled,
    the length of the new ISAF mandate remains open.  The
    government is hoping to have the new mandate approved by
    the Bundestag before the end of February, with significant
    (if not majority) support from the opposition SPD and
    Greens.  END SUMMARY.

    WESTERWELLE: BIGGEST OBSTACLE

    ¶2. (C) In explaining the lower-than-expected planned
    increase in the number of German troops for Afghanistan, zu
    Guttenberg told the Ambassador that Westerwelle's opening
    position in the coalition negotiations on the new mandate
    had been "not one additional soldier."  In that context, it
    had been difficult to get agreement on any increase at
    all.  (Comment: Zu Guttenberg proposed 1,500 additional
    troops at the initial January 4 mini-cabinet meeting on
    this issue.  End Comment.)

    DOING A LOT MORE WITH A LITTLE MORE

    ¶3. (C) To help justify the need for more troops, zu
    Guttenberg said he had forced the Bundeswehr to do a
    complete review of all the existing positions in
    Afghanistan, which had confirmed that some could be
    eliminated in light of the new ISAF counterinsurgency
    strategy.  He said a restructuring of the current
    Bundeswehr presence, combined with the troop increase,
    would boost the number of soldiers involved in the training
    of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 280 to 1,400.  The
    restructuring includes turning the battalion-size quick
    reaction force based in Mazar into a "protection and
    training" battalion.  A second such battalion will be
    created in Kunduz by augmenting the existing infantry
    company there with new troops.  Zu Guttenberg reiterated
    that Germany strongly supports COMISAF's focus on
    protection of the population and partnering with the Afghan
    national security forces (ANSF), and that the German
    "trainers" (i.e., the two new maneuver battalions) will
    operate in the field with the ANSF.

    PUTTING ZU GUTTENBERG IN HIS PLACE

    ¶4. (C) While zu Guttenberg said he is avoiding public
    comment on whether the outcome of the coalition talks on
    the new mandate is a "victory" for him or Westerwelle, FDP
    Defense Policy Spokesman Elke Hoff told poloff separately
    that Westerwelle's hard line against additional troops had
    been motivated in part to "teach zu Guttenberg a lesson."
    She claimed that zu Guttenberg had been too presumptuous
    last fall in making speeches in Canada and the U.S. about
    how Germany would significantly increase its troop
    contribution to ISAF.  He might have been able to get
    agreement on a higher ceiling had he engaged
    parliamentarians first and showed "greater respect for the
    political process."

    OPEN QUESTION: LENGTH OF THE MANDATE

    ¶5. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that the cabinet would
    formally agree on the proposed new ISAF mandate February 9
    and that the first reading in the Bundestag would be
    February 10.  FM Westerwelle is scheduled to speak on
    behalf of the government in introducing the proposed
    mandate.  The government is aiming to hold the final
    Bundestag vote on the mandate -- following two weeks of
    committee hearings -- on February 26.  Zu Guttenberg was

    BERLIN 00000157  002 OF 002

    confident that a large number (if not a majority) of
    opposition politicians from the SPD and Greens would vote
    in favor of the new mandate.

    ¶6. (C) A February 2 meeting of state secretaries
    tentatively agreed that the new mandate should run, as is
    the custom, for one year, expiring in February 2011.  Zu
    Guttenberg indicated, however, that it might be preferable to
    stick to the length of the current mandate, which expires
    in December 2010.  He expressed concern that having the
    mandate lap over into early 2011 could lead to a premature
    debate on withdrawal, before the new strategy really had a
    chance to work.  (Comment: Another option under
    consideration -- and favored by some in the Chancellery --
    is a 18-month mandate, so that any debate on the future of
    the troop presence would be put off until the fall of
    ¶2011.  But the MFA objects that this would only raise the
    ire of the opposition and give them an excuse to oppose the
    mandate.  End Comment.)

    REASSURING THE GERMANS ON COMMAND OF THE NORTH

    ¶7. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that Germany very much
    welcomed the planned inflow of U.S. forces into the north,
    especially the helicopter assets, which filled a
    long-standing shortfall.  He noted, however, that many in
    Germany question whether the U.S. will be willing to accept
    continued German leadership of RC-North in view of the
    increased U.S. presence.  Ambassador Murphy assured him
    that the U.S. had no issues working for the German command in
    the North.
    Murphy

`