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### Viewing cable 09STATE120288, U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NEXT

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE120288 | 2009-11-21 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXRO4858
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHMR RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHC #0288/01 3250135
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 210127Z NOV 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO IAEA MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 120288

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
    TAGS: PREL IR
    SUBJECT: U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NEXT
    STEPS

    Classified by NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman
    for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraphs
    3-5.

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶2.  (C) Iran's continued reluctance to cooperate with
    international efforts to build confidence and
    transparency in its nuclear program will be of
    increasing concern to U.S. diplomacy in the weeks ahead.
    Of particular note is Iran's apparent refusal to date to
    agree to an IAEA proposal for Iran to exchange a
    significant portion of its stockpiled low-enriched
    uranium (LEU) for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor
    (TRR), and the IAEA report of November 16 indicating
    serious unresolved questions about Iran's nuclear
    intentions.  Department requests posts to draw on the
    attached narrative in explaining and securing support
    for recent U.S. and P5+1 efforts to engage Iran on its
    nuclear program, particularly in the lead-up to the IAEA
    Board of Governors meeting on November 26.  End Summary.

    OBJECTIVES
    ----------

    ¶3.  (C) FOR ALL POSTS (except Moscow, Paris, Beijing,
    London and Berlin):  Please draw on narrative beginning
    in paragraph 7, and hard questions and answers in
    paragraph 12 to brief host governments on:

    -- Persistent U.S. efforts to engage Iran throughout
    2009;

    -- Iran's disappointing follow-up to its commitments
    with P5+1 in Geneva on October 1;

    -- Details of the TRR proposal and the
    flexibility the U.S., Russia, France and the IAEA, have
    demonstrated to deal with Iranian concerns; and

    -- Key findings and implications of the IAEA Director
    General's November 16 report on Iran; and

    Posts should also begin laying the foundation for
    possible future action in response to Iran's non-
    cooperation, including at the IAEA (BoG) meeting on 26
    November and prudent preparation in the event of a
    decision to pursue increased pressure on Iran.

    ¶4.  (C) SPECIAL REQUEST FOR MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIJING,
    LONDON, AND BERLIN:  Please inform host government that
    we are delivering this message to IAEA members,
    consistent with consultations among Political Directors
    in the P5+1 process.  Posts may share the general tenor
    of our message but do not need to deploy the points
    themselves with host governments.

    ¶5.  (C) Posts should not leave any part of this message
    in writing with host governments.

    DEADLINE
    --------

    ¶6.  (U) Posts should report the results of their efforts
    by November 25. Elisa Catalano (NEA/FO, 202-647-9533,
    CatalanoE@state.sgov.gov) and Richard Nephew (ISN/RA,
    202-647-7680, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) are the
    Department's POCs for this activity.

    BACKGROUND
    ----------

    ¶7.  (SBU) Since the 1 October 2009 meeting of the P5+1
    Political Directors and representatives from Iran, the
    United States has been working closely with its partners
    to fulfill the commitments reached in Geneva and engage
    with Iran to build international confidence in the
    peaceful nature of its nuclear program.  In particular,
    we have focused on supporting the IAEA's proposal for
    refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),
    facilitating the IAEA's inspection of the previously
    clandestine uranium enrichment plant at Qom, and
    pressing for a follow-on meeting between P5+1 Political
    Directors and Iranian representatives explicitly on

    STATE 00120288  002 OF 008

    Iran's nuclear program.

    ¶8.  (C) The results since October 1 have been
    disappointing.  It increasingly appears that Iran will
    decline the IAEA's proposal on TRR, though a definitive
    answer remains outstanding.  In the lead-up to the IAEA
    Board of Governors (BOG) meeting on November 26, Iran
    may try to blame the apparent failure of the TRR
    agreement on intrusive and inflexible demands by western
    powers, rather than its own reluctance or inability to
    reach agreement on the IAEA proposal which responded to
    Iran's request for assistance and was created on the
    basis of Iran's own commitments made in Geneva.
    Although Iran granted IAEA access to Qom, Iran did not
    cooperate with all of the IAEA's requests for access to
    information and personnel and there remain serious
    questions about Iran's intentions for the facility.
    Finally, Iran so far has refused a further meeting with
    the P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program.  The United
    States is now discussing with its P5+1 and other
    partners potential next steps, including how to handle
    these issues at the next meeting of the IAEA BOG.

    ¶9. (SBU) IAEA Director General (DG) ElBaradei released
    his latest report on Iran on November 16.  The report
    makes clear Iran's continuing lack of transparency and
    cooperation with the IAEA on its nuclear program,
    including in assessing a possible military dimension to
    its program.  As expected, the uranium enrichment
    facility at Qom (also known as the Fordow site) was a
    central element of the report, and the IAEA states that
    Iran's previous failure to declare the facility is
    "inconsistent" with its obligations under its Safeguards
    Agreement. The IAEA's report highlights that revelation
    of the Qom facility raises concerns of additional
    clandestine nuclear sites in Iran and has asked Iran to
    confirm that there are no other undeclared nuclear
    facilities; Iran has yet to respond to this IAEA
    request.  Iran continues to defy UNSC resolutions and
    IAEA BOG resolutions calling on it to adopt the
    Additional Protocol and to provide the access necessary
    for the IAEA to provide assurance as to the absence of
    additional undeclared nuclear activities.

    ¶10.  (C) The P5+1 "dual track" policy towards Iran
    includes both engagement and pressure if Iran does not
    engage constructively.  President Obama, Secretary
    Clinton, and others have identified the end of the year
    as a key period for assessing Iran's responsiveness.  If
    Iran continues to refuse to take meaningful steps to
    meet its international obligations, the international
    community must be prepared to take strong collective
    action on the pressure track.

    KEY DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES AND POLICY NARRATIVE
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶11.  (U) Posts should draw on the following key messages
    and policy narrative in briefing host governments.

    Key Messages
    ------------

    -- We, in coordination with our international partners,
    have demonstrated our willingness to engage
    constructively and respectfully with Iran to address
    long-standing international concerns over its nuclear
    program.  Our approach has clearly and consistently been
    based on the P5+1's dual track strategy.

    -- Iran so far has failed to accept a very good and
    balanced IAEA proposal to facilitate the refueling of
    the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) which would have
    fulfilled an Iranian request, addressed a humanitarian
    need of the Iranian people, and served as a confidence-
    building step to create an opportunity for further
    progress.

    -- We look forward to close consultations on how best to
    persuade Iran to engage constructively as we approach
    the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting on November 26 and
    beyond.

    Policy Narrative
    ----------------

    -- Since President Obama took office, he has made clear
    the willingness of the United States to engage with Iran
    and to seek a new relationship based on mutual respect.

    -- He has authorized the United States' full
    participation in diplomatic discussions between the five
    permanent members of the Security Council and Germany

    STATE 00120288  003 OF 008

    and Iran without pre-conditions.

    -- The United States has stated its support for Iran's
    full right to a civilian nuclear program within IAEA
    guidelines, provided Iran meets it international
    obligations and carries out its responsibilities within
    the NPT framework.

    -- As a way to build confidence, the United States, with
    Russia and France, has also supported the IAEA's
    proposal to positively respond to Iran's request for
    nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), in
    spite of Iran's continuing violation of UNSC resolutions
    and noncompliance with IAEA requirements on its nuclear
    program.

    -- However, almost one year into the Obama
    administration, Iran has not taken practical, concrete
    steps that would begin to create confidence in its
    nuclear intentions.  Iran:

    o       Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC
    requirements that it suspend such operations;
    o       Revealed it had been building a secret uranium
    enrichment facility at a military base near Qom,
    in violation of its safeguards agreement ;
    o       Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA in
    addressing the full range of IAEA questions about
    the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program;
    o       Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel the
    TRR; and
    o       Since meeting with representatives of the five
    permanent members of the Security Council and
    Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all
    subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to
    discuss its nuclear program.

    -- Iran's failure to take advantage of these numerous
    opportunities raises serious questions about the
    intentions of its nuclear program that deserve urgent
    international attention.  We look to work closely with
    your government in the run-up to IAEA Board of Governors
    meeting on November 26 and beyond to develop an
    appropriate international response.

    Tehran Research Reactor
    -----------------------

    -- The IAEA, Russia, France and the United States
    cooperated closely and flexibly to find a way to
    positively respond to Iran's request for fuel for the
    Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) so that it could keep
    running to meet humanitarian medical needs beyond 2010.

    -- The TRR refueling proposal offers Iran the
    opportunity to convert its stockpile of low enriched
    uranium (LEU) into higher-enriched fuel with the help of
    Russia and France.  The proposal's elements are simple:

    o       Iran would transfer a portion of its LEU
    necessary for fuel production in one batch to
    IAEA custody outside of Iran before the end of
    the year;
    o       Russia would further enrich the LEU to meet fuel
    requirements; and
    o       France would fabricate the fuel assemblies and
    return them to Iran before Iran's fuel supplies
    are depleted before the end of the year.

    -- In addition the United States expressed a commitment
    to work with the IAEA to improve safety and control
    features at the TRR.

    -- The U.S., France and Russia took great risks in
    supporting the deal, especially in light of Iran's
    continuing violation of successive UNSC resolutions and
    IAEA requirements, including its secret construction of
    a uranium enrichment facility near Qom, and its
    continuing enrichment operations.

    -- We did so because the arrangement would begin to
    build confidence and would give Iran and the
    international community more time to reach a
    comprehensive negotiated solution to Iran's nuclear
    program, while fulfilling Iran's humanitarian needs.

    -- When Iran expressed concern about the reliability of
    the proposal, the United States and its partners
    expressed to the IAEA a willingness to address Iran's
    concerns, including through:

    o       a U.S. offer to formally join the deal as a
    signatory;

    STATE 00120288  004 OF 008

    o       a readiness of the five permanent members of the
    Security Council and Germany to guarantee the
    deal through a political statement of support;
    o       a willingness to help secure finance for the
    movement of the LEU and fuel;
    o       an openness to move the LEU to any number of
    locations outside of Iran; and
    o       a willingness to support the IAEA's holding
    material equivalent to the fuel in escrow in a
    third country as a guarantee for Iran of the
    fuel's ultimate delivery.

    -- After reaching an agreement in principle in the deal
    following talks with the E3+3 in Geneva on October 1,
    and following further technical discussions at the IAEA
    October 19-21, Iran has so far failed to accept the
    deal.

    -- This raises a question about Iran's intentions.  If
    Iran is enriching uranium to meet its civilian reactor
    fuel needs, why would it not accept an international
    offer (with significant guarantees) to provide its LEU
    for fuel to power the TRR to meet its humanitarian
    needs, particularly when it does not have the capability
    to produce the fuel on its own?

    -- This question is troubling in the context of Iran's
    continued enrichment activities in defiance of UNSC
    resolutions; its secret construction of an enrichment
    facility on a military base near Qom; its refusal to
    cooperate with the IAEA in answering questions about the
    peaceful nature of its nuclear program; and its refusal
    to meet with the five permanent members of the Security
    Council.

    P5+1
    ----

    -- Together with our P5+1 partners, the United States
    informed Iranian representatives in Geneva on October 1
    of our willingness to discuss any items of concern to
    Iran - both bilaterally and multilaterally - in addition
    to our concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

    -- On October 1, Iran's representatives committed to
    meet again before the end of the month based on an
    agenda that included Iran's nuclear program.  Since that
    time, however, the Iranian government has refused all
    invitations to meet if its nuclear program would be on
    the agenda.

    -- Iran's continued refusal to engage on its nuclear
    program with the P5+1 deepens our concerns about Iran's
    intentions for its nuclear program.

    The IAEA Director General's Report on Iran
    ------------------------------------------

    -- The IAEA report makes clear that Iran has failed to
    cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA.  Key
    aspects of the report include:

    ---- Iran's new centrifuge facility at Qom - built in
    violation of Iran's UNSC obligations and not declared to
    the IAEA as required - has been inspected, but its
    purpose and origin remain unknown.  And, Iran has not
    yet cooperated with all of the IAEA's requests for
    access to information and personnel.  Iran's failure to
    provide the IAEA with early design information regarding
    the Qom facility has been deemed "inconsistent with its
    obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
    Safeguards Agreement" by the IAEA.  Furthermore, the
    relatively small size of the facility at Qom is
    inconsistent with Iran's assertion that it is to provide
    fuel for Iran's civilian reactors, raising questions
    about the planned use of the Qom facility.

    ---- The Agency noted that Iran's failure to declare the
    Qom facility also "reduces the level of confidence in
    the absence of other nuclear facilities under
    construction and gives rise to questions about whether
    there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran that had
    not been declared to the Agency."

    ---- These concerns have been compounded by the
    continued pace of Iranian enrichment and steadfast
    refusal to abide by the UNSC's legal requirement that
    Iran suspend all such work.  Instead, Iran continues to
    produce low enriched uranium and estimated its stockpile
    at 1763 kilograms at the end of October.
    Notwithstanding a reduction in the number of enriching
    centrifuges by approximately 600 since August 2009, this
    is roughly a similar rate of production as Iran has

    STATE 00120288  005 OF 008

    achieved for the past year.

    ---- Iran continues to install and test additional
    centrifuges, with more than 1,000 new centrifuges added
    since August 2009.

    ---- The IAEA has discovered a previously unknown cache
    of heavy water in storage at Esfahan, and has requested
    Iran to explain its origin.  It is important to note
    that UN Security Council resolutions include a ban on
    supplying Iran with heavy water.

    ---- It also asked Iran to provide further information
    describing an analytical laboratory that Iran says it
    plans to install underground at Esfahan.

    ---- There has been no progress made in addressing
    issues associated with Iran's efforts to develop a
    nuclear warhead, despite a year having passed since the
    last such conversation and many open questions that
    surround this work.

    -- If Iran wishes to begin to resolve international
    concerns, it should comply with its international
    obligations, cooperate fully with the IAEA, grant the
    access requested (such as to individuals and workshops
    associated with past weaponization efforts, and to
    individuals responsible for managing Qom), and answer
    the questions it has been asked.  Iran has created this
    confidence deficit and it is up to Iran to restore the
    international community's trust.

    Next Steps
    ----------

    -- The United States and its partners believe that the
    troubling questions surrounding Iran's nuclear program
    deserve the full and urgent attention of the
    international community.

    -- We look forward to working with your government to
    promote the active involvement of the IAEA and the
    international community in addressing these unresolved
    questions.

    -- We will be in touch with you in the days ahead to
    share ideas on how to approach the issue at the IAEA
    Board of Governors meeting that will begin on November
    ¶26.

    -- Beyond the Board of Governors meeting, we would also
    like to intensify our consultations on next appropriate
    steps in the international community based on the dual
    track policy (engagement and pressure) to persuade Iran
    to bring its nuclear program into full compliance with
    its international obligations.

    HARD QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
    --------------------------

    ¶12. (U) We have also compiled the following questions
    and answers to draw from should Posts require them:

    On The TRR Proposal
    -------------------

    -- Why must Iran surrender all of its LEU in one batch,
    and why must it be before the end of the year?

    o       The TRR proposal was developed both to supply
    Iran with the fuel required for the continued
    operation of the reactor, and also as a measure
    to build confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions
    and its seriousness to negotiate with the E3+3.
    o       By agreeing to the transfer of 1200 kilograms of
    LEU (enough to equal the last fuel supply
    agreement Iran signed for the reactor with
    Argentina in the early 1990s), we aimed to lessen
    international concerns that Iran was attempting
    to create a stockpile of uranium to contribute to
    an eventual breakout from the NPT.  This would
    consequently allow more time for negotiations
    with the E3+3 on the broader nuclear file.
    o       The transfer by the end of the year is needed to
    ensure that Iran receives the fuel required for
    the reactor before December 2010, when the
    reactor will run out and be forced to shut down.

    -- What risk does the LEU stored in Iran pose to the
    international community?  Isn't it under full IAEA
    monitoring?

    o       Yes, this LEU is currently under IAEA safeguards.

    STATE 00120288  006 OF 008

    o       However, given Iran's long history of IAEA
    safeguards violations and NPT noncompliance, the
    international community cannot trust that Iran
    will not interfere with IAEA monitoring or
    withdraw from IAEA safeguards or the NPT
    altogether.
    o       This project will remove an immediate source of
    concern and establish some confidence in Iran's
    peaceful intent and willingness to comply with
    its obligations.

    -- How can Iran be sure it will ever receive the fuel
    assemblies for the TRR in the current international
    environment, in which many openly seek to diminish
    Iran's nuclear capacity?

    o       We and our E3+3 partners have each made political
    commitments at the highest levels to the
    fulfillment of this project.  Should Iran agree
    to it, Iran will receive the fuel required.
    o       All participants in this project are taking
    risks.  Iran stands in violation of the NPT, its
    IAEA safeguards agreement, and three Chapter VII
    UNSC resolutions.  This project offers Iran an
    opportunity to establish confidence in its
    peaceful intentions, a confidence that has eroded
    due to Iran's continued non-compliance.

    -- Can Iran simply purchase the fuel from an
    international supplier, as some have advocated in Iran?
    o       The UN Security Council resolutions do permit
    Iran to Iran can purchase low-enriched fuel from
    an international supplier if it wishes.
    o       However, we are confident Iran would not find a
    willing supplier given the concerns surrounding
    its nuclear program and its continued defiance of
    the international community.
    o       Outside of the context of the IAEA proposal
    before Iran, we would oppose such a deal.

    -- How would the E3+3 respond if Iran announced it had
    "no choice" but to make its own fuel for the TRR?
    o       Under three UN Security Council resolutions, Iran
    is required to suspend all uranium enrichment-
    related activities.  We have offered Iran a way
    to secure the necessary TRR fuel without further
    violating these obligations.  Enrichment
    activities to produce its own fuel for the TRR
    would be a violation of current UNSCRs.
    o       Further, Iran is not currently able to produce
    the fuel. Reconfiguration of Iranian centrifuges
    to produce the required enrichment level (19.75%)
    would cause serious international concern and
    could permit Iran to produce a stockpile of even
    greater enriched uranium than it has currently
    (Iran's current enrichment level is 3.5%).  This
    would increase the risk of a near-term Iranian
    breakout from the NPT and sprint to producing
    nuclear weapons.

    On Demands to Suspend Enrichment
    --------------------------------

    -- Iran suspended enrichment once before in response to
    international demands, and received no benefit.  Why
    should Iran trust the international community now?

    o       Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and other
    activities in the past was intended to support a
    diplomatic process.  Unfortunately, Iran
    terminated that diplomatic process in August 2005
    by abandoning suspension.
    o       However, prior to that point, Iran's temporary
    suspension avoided its being reported to the UN
    Security Council and the sanctions that would
    have likely come along with that report.
    o       The requirement of suspension imposed by the UNSC
    in resolution 1737 is intended to restore that
    diplomatic process and to lead to a final
    resolution of international concerns with Iran's
    nuclear program.
    o       This was codified in UNSCR 1737 when the UNSC
    stated its intention to suspend implementation of
    the measures adopted by the UNSC if Iran returned
    to negotiations through suspension of its nuclear
    and related activities.
    o       Trust is in short supply on both sides.  It is
    for that reason that we have offered Iran several
    opportunities for reciprocal, confidence-building
    steps (e.g., "freeze for freeze" and the TRR
    proposal).

    -- What about recent reports indicating the Iranian

    STATE 00120288  007 OF 008

    enrichment program has not grown. What is the
    significance of this stagnation?

    o       Iran has slowed or scaled back the enrichment
    program several times since the project became
    public in 2002.
    o       There are many possible explanations for the
    stagnation of the Iranian enrichment program,
    including technical issues with the centrifuges
    and general system maintenance.
    o       Regardless of Iran's lack of progress in its
    enrichment program, it continues to enrich and
    stockpile LEU. This activity in violation of
    three United Nations Security Council resolutions
    calling for full suspension of its nuclear and
    enrichment related activities, and increases the
    risk of a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT
    and sprint to producing nuclear weapons.

    Israel's Nuclear Program
    ------------------------

    -- Why is there not equal attention to Israel's nuclear
    status?  Does it not also destabilize the region?
    o       The United States has long supported universal
    adherence to the NPT treaty and  continues to
    believe that all states that have not done so
    should join the Treaty and accept the full-scope
    IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear
    activities.
    o       It is extremely difficult, however, to make this
    case to a non-NPT state when its neighbors are in
    violation of their own NPT obligations, and when
    the international community has not demonstrated
    the political will necessary to enforce
    compliance.
    o       Iran's failure to comply with its NPT and IAEA
    obligations bears out these concerns and
    undermines attempts to secure universal adherence
    to the NPT.  It became a party to the treaty and
    proceeded to violate its obligations under it for
    over twenty years, presenting a fundamental
    threat to the entire nonproliferation regime.
    o       Returning regional states to full compliance with
    their NPT obligations would be an important step
    toward NPT adherence by all states in the region.
    An Iranian nuclear weapons capability also serves
    as a destabilizing factor in the region, possibly
    triggering proliferation across the Gulf in
    response to a mounting threat posed by Iran.  Not
    only does this undermine the entire nuclear
    nonproliferation regime, but risks further
    instability in the region.

    Qom Facility
    ------------

    -- How can you say that the Qom facility was secret,
    when it was Iran that announced its existence and
    invited IAEA inspectors to visit?

    o       Iran was required to declare the existence of
    this facility to the IAEA the moment the decision
    was made to construct it, not several years into
    its construction.  This is a requirement of
    Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement (contained in
    Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's
    Safeguards Agreement).
    o       This code was modified after revelations
    surrounding Iraq's nuclear program were made in
    the early 1990s.
    o       Iran was the last state to agree to the revised
    code, but it did so in March 2003.  Iran
    attempted to revert to the early form of the code
    (which requires notification only 180 days prior
    to the introduction of nuclear to the facility)
    in March 2007.  The IAEA consistently has
    rejected that Iran has the legal ability to make
    such a change.
    o       We also believe that Iran made the decision to
    declare the facility not to conform to its legal
    obligations, but because it had become aware that
    the secrecy of the facility had been compromised.

    -- Iran claims it needs such a hardened facility as
    Fordu because for years both the US and Israel have
    threatened to bomb its nuclear sites. Is it not
    surprising Iran would try to keep its location a secret
    to have an emergency back-up facility?

    O Iran's own failure to meet its obligations for
    transparency and IAEA monitoring of sensitive
    nuclear installations is the cause for the

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    international community's concerns that
    surrounding its nuclear program.
    o       Iran's decision to construct yet another
    clandestine site only deepens these concerns.

    P5+1
    ----

    -- Why should Iran discuss its nuclear program with the
    self-appointed P5+1?  Isn't the IAEA the proper place
    for Iran to engage on its nuclear program with the
    international community?

    O  We welcome Iran's engagement with the IAEA.  But
    despite its rhetoric, Iran has not engaged with
    the IAEA.  Iran has refused for several years to
    answer the IAEA's questions (even before the IAEA
    reported Iran to the UNSC for its myriad
    violations of its international obligations).
    o       The E3+3 mechanism evolved as a means to
    negotiate a solution precisely because Iran was
    refusing to engage with the IAEA on the concerns
    regarding Iran's nuclear program.
    CLINTON

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