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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09MANAMA442, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW AND

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09MANAMA442 | 2009-07-26 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Manama

`

    VZCZCXRO6486
    PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHMK #0442/01 2070855
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 260855Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8828
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0116
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000442

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
    TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR AF IZ QA BA
    SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW AND
    AMBASSADOR ERELI MEET WITH KING HAMAD OF BAHRAIN

    Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 22 meeting with Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
    Alexander Vershbow, and the U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Adam
    Ereli, King Hamad of Bahrain was unwavering in his support
    for United States policies in the Gulf, welcomed any new
    requests the U.S. may need from Bahrain, voiced strong
    support for U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and said he
    was ready to play a positive role toward Israel.  However, he
    voiced strong "annoyance" at Qatari behavior, particularly
    the recent visit of Qatar's Chief of Staff of its Armed
    Forces to Iran, as well as Qatari rebuffs to Bahraini
    requests for natural gas.  END SUMMARY

    ¶2. (C) King Hamad warmly welcomed Ambassadors Vershbow and
    Ereli and began the meeting by thanking the United States for
    the staunch support we provide Bahrain.  He reminded the
    Ambassadors that Bahrain is a long-time U.S. ally, remains
    firm in its support of U.S. efforts in the Gulf, and greatly
    values our bilateral relationship that is of significant
    importance to Bahrain's interests.  He said Bahrain will do
    anything to work together with the U.S.  He was particularly
    praiseworthy of the bilateral defense relationship,
    commenting that the superb advice Bahrain's Defense Forces
    (BDF) receive from the U.S. has resulted in the BDF being one
    of the cleanest organizations in Bahrain's government.  The
    King also noted that the equipment received through the
    Foreign Military Financing (FMF) process was of high quality
    and operationally effective, and he was also proud of the
    strong relations established with U.S. 5th Fleet.

    ¶3. (C) Ambassador Vershbow thanked His Majesty for hosting
    the Military Consultative Committee that was currently
    meeting in Manama and for his country's support to U.S.
    interests.  He noted that the U.S.-Bahraini relationship was
    very strong and mutually beneficial and affirmed to the King
    that the U.S. and Bahrain shared a similar vision in the
    region despite its many challenges.

    --------------------
    Afghanistan and Iraq
    --------------------

    ¶4. (C) Turning to Afghanistan and Iraq, King Hamad said the
    upcoming deployment of Bahrain's Ministry of Interior (MoI)
    security unit to provide fixed site security in Afghanistan
    would provide great experience to MoI personnel and allows
    Bahrain to show its flag and demonstrate support for the
    Coalition.  He stated that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan
    provided a golden opportunity for the Afghan people to build
    their country's security forces as well as their education,
    medical, science and trade programs and ministries.  The King
    added that U.S. efforts should be touted more in the media.
    He quoted President Eisenhower, saying the "U.S. is
    soldiering for peace and not waging war" and he understood
    that the U.S. was not seeking to rule over Afghanistan or
    Iraq.  He is convinced that the U.S. is in both places to
    help the Afghan and Iraqi people and he was appreciative of
    our armed forces personnel performing their duties in places
    so far from home.  King Hamad noted some instability in Iraq,
    but thought overall, Iraq was on a positive slope.  ASD
    Vershbow thanked the King for his comments and said it was
    important that the world hears his, as well as similar
    explanations, of U.S. policies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

    ¶5. (C) Commenting on Bahrain's participation in coalition
    maritime operations and efforts against terrorism and piracy,
    King Hamad said he had recently told his Parliament that,
    "Ships are sailing to defend the region and why don't we join
    them?  If we don't join, we will miss an opportunity."  His
    remarks acknowledged Bahrain's past and current participation
    in Combined Task Force (CTF) 152 and its anticipated
    participation in CTF 151.

    ---------------------------------
    Annoyed and Concerned about Qatar
    ---------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) The King voiced concern about what is happening in the
    region and stated that he would like to see a stronger Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC) as a deterrent against future
    threats and to provide more security in the region.  King
    Hamad flatly stated that Bahrain is not happy with Qatar. He
    took particular exception to the recent visit to Iran by
    Qatar's Chief of Staff, MG Hamad al Attiyah.  He noted that
    during the visit, the two sides released a statement agreeing
    to joint training exercises, intelligence exchange and

    MANAMA 00000442  002 OF 002

    reciprocal visits of military staff and units.  "This is
    going too far," King Hamad fumed.  It's one thing to have
    trade and commercial exchanges, he noted, but to welcome
    Iranian military units on the territory of a GCC member state
    is "a strategic matter."  He went on to say that Iran is the
    number-one threat in the region; any country should be
    cautious about exchanging military information with Iran, and
    no GCC country should allow an Iranian military unit or
    personnel to land on its shores.  The King stated that he
    would like to show Qatar some type of unhappiness for its
    actions with Iran.

    ¶7. (C) The King said it is rumored that MG al-Attiyah may
    retire as the Qatari CHOD and perhaps this influenced his
    decision to visit Iran.  (NOTE:  In a separate meeting with
    ASD Vershbow and State P/M Assistant Secretary Shapiro,
    during their July 20-21 visit to Doha, MG al-Attiyah did
    state that his visit to Iran was long planned but perhaps
    ill-timed to coincide with recent post-election activities in
    Tehran; since it was previously planned, he had not wanted to
    cancel his visit. END NOTE.) King Hamad added that Qatar's
    behavior "is an annoyance, but it was too early to be angry
    at them."  King Hamad went on saying he "would like our
    brother in Saudi Arabia to send a note telling Qatar not to
    play like this."

    ¶8. (C) ASD Vershbow affirmed U.S. displeasure with Iranian
    behavior, particularly its nuclear program, and stated the
    U.S. would not tolerate Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons.
    He told the King we were disappointed with the timing of the
    Qatari CHOD's visit, but hoped the Qataris could persuade
    Iran to engage with the U.S. to end its nuclear program,
    rather than seeking a confrontation with the international
    community.

    -------------------------
    Plug for the Crown Prince
    -------------------------

    ¶9. (C) ASD Vershbow said he appreciated the Crown Prince's
    recent op-ed published on the Middle East which he understood
    bore the King's stamp.  He said the Crown Prince's points
    about Arab countries seizing the opportunity at hand and
    setting aside past differences to move forward on the peace
    process was right on mark.   King Hamad responded that
    Bahrain supported U.S.-led efforts to make peace and agreed
    that the Arab world needed to contribute positively to this
    effort.  Returning to Qatar, King Hamad noted that Abdul Bari
    al Atwan, the editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab daily "Al Quds
    al Arabi," had written a widely-read article critical of the
    Crown Prince's op-ed.  Qatar is a major financial backer of
    al Quds al Arabi, the King remarked, and he clearly saw the
    hand of Doha behind Abdul Bari's attack.  Continuing on this
    theme, King Hamad said there were two major issues that made
    him angry with regard to Qatar.  The first was the Iran
    issue; the second was gas.  For years, Bahrain has been
    asking to buy Qatari gas, but their response has always been
    that Qatar exports were maxed out and it was not prepared to
    enter into new supply contracts.  These rejections
    notwithstanding, the King asserted that he had recently
    learned that Qatar has inked a new supply deal with Mexico
    and will increase gas supplies to England. He was at a loss
    to understand Qatari behavior.

    ---------
    On Israel
    ---------

    ¶10. (C) Commenting on Bahraini initiatives with Israel, King
    Hamad said Bahrain continues to do its best to make Bahrain's
    position clear to Israel and the world, and expressed thanks
    for President Obama's recent detailed letter.  He was taking
    his time in drafting a similarly detailed response, and would
    share his response with Ambassador Ereli when it was ready.
    King Hamad said he looks forward to cooperating more with the
    U.S. on key regional issues and specifically referenced the
    soon to be executed moves of P-3 aircraft to Isa Air Base and
    DoD's location of its forward Near East South Asia (NESA)
    Center to Manama.  ASD Vershbow and AMB Ereli thanked the
    King for his strong support for U.S. policies and encouraged
    Bahrain to continue its constructive behavior and leadership
    in the Gulf.

    ¶11. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.
    ERELI

`