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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2482, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV2482 | 2009-11-16 08:08 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTV #2482/01 3200855
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 160855Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4213
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WSHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002482

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NEA FOR A/S FELTMAN; NSC FO DAN SHAPIRO; OSD FOR USD-P
    FLOURNOY
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG SY IR SA LE TU
    IS
    SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
    SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

    This is a re-transmission of USDAO TEL AVIV 3188.

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 1 and 2, Assistant Secretary of
    Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
    Alexander Vershbow, met with a number of senior Israeli
    defense officials in Israel including: Ministry of Defense
    (MOD) Director General (DG) Pinchas Buchris; Head of MOD
    Political Military Bureau Amos Gilad; Assistant Chief of
    Defense Major General (MG) Benny Gantz; and Head of MOD
    Intelligence Analysis Production Brigadier General Yossi
    Baidatz.  The Israelis expressed positive views on continued
    U.S.-Israel cooperation particularly on Israel's Qualitative
    Military Edge (QME) and the ongoing Juniper Cobra missile
    defense exercise.  Israeli officials explained that they were
    going through an unprecedented period of calm due to the
    deterrent effect of Operation CAST LEAD, but that below the
    surface were a number of significant dangers.  They continued
    to emphasize that Iran represents the greatest strategic
    threat to the region, both its nuclear program and its "axis"
    with Syria, Hezbollah, and HAMAS.  They also expressed
    skepticism about Palestinian President Abbas's future, given
    his weakened position as a result of his handling of the
    Goldstone Report and his inability to get the full settlement
    freeze he had pushed for; they questioned his ability to
    restart peace negotiations.  Israeli officials were concerned
    about the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relationship and
    discussed threats emanating from both Syria and Lebanon. END
    SUMMARY

    -------------------
    Bilateral Relations
    -------------------

    ¶2. (S) ASD Vershbow's trip to Israel came as a number of
    high-level Israeli and American officials were meeting on key
    issues.  On October 31, Secretary of State Clinton arrived in
    Jerusalem for talks on the peace process with Prime Minister
    Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minster
    Lieberman.  In addition, EUCOM Commander Admiral Stavridis
    arrived in Israel on November 1 to observe the Juniper
    Cobra-10 ballistic missile defense exercise.  The ASD's visit
    also came in the wake of recent high-level discussions on
    Israel's QME in Washington, and the October 21 meeting of the
    Joint Politico-Military Group in Tel Aviv.

    ¶3. (S) On QME, ASD Vershbow asked for Israel's assessment of
    recent discussions, and across the board, Israeli officials
    expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts on this front and voiced
    optimism on the steps moving forward.  Amos Gilad
    acknowledged the sometimes difficult position the U.S. finds
    itself in given its global interests, and conceded that
    Israel's security focus is so narrow that its QME concerns
    often clash with broader American security interests in the
    region.  Israeli officials acknowledged the impressive nature
    of the QME dialogue mechanisms recently established, but
    stated that the results of the process are what truly matter.
     MG Benny Gantz defined successful QME relations as "the
    effective process plus the right mitigations."  While not
    explicitly saying it, Gantz seemed to acknowledge that Israel
    does not expect that all QME decisions will break in its
    favor, but that Israel only expects a fair and equitable
    process that incorporates "intimate dialogue."  DG Buchris
    thanked Versbhow for the recent success of the JPMG and said
    he looks forward to convening the first meeting of the agreed
    upon working groups by the end of November.  Vershbow stated
    that the technical working group discussions would be
    launched soon, and that he was looking forward to future
    Israeli participation on this issue.

    ------------------------
    Iran Remains Top of Mind
    ------------------------

    ¶4. (S) Israeli officials continue to uniformly emphasize that
    Iran's nuclear program and regional hegemonic ambitions are
    the greatest strategic threats to Israel.  They view Iran as
    the center of a radical axis that includes Syria, Hezbollah
    and HAMAS.

    ¶5. (S//NF) Israel continues to offer a worst-case assessment
    of the Iranian nuclear program, emphasizing that the window
    for stopping the program (by military means if necessary) is

    rapidly closing.  General Baidatz argued that it would take
    Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half
    years to build an arsenal of three weapons.  By 2012 Iran
    would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal
    within six months.  (COMMENT:  It is unclear if the Israelis
    firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to
    raise greater urgency from the United States).  Amos Gilad
    explained his view of the repercussions of an Iranian nuclear
    capability stating that it would give Iran a free hand in
    supporting "HAMAStan" in Gaza and "Hezbollahstan" in Lebanon.
     Gilad also argued that Saudi Arabia would definitely react
    to a nuclear Iran by obtaining a weapon (with Pakistani
    assistance) and Egypt would almost certainly follow.  He was
    less sure about whether Turkey would respond by pursuing a
    nuclear weapon. Regardless, the security situation in the
    region surrounding Israel would be dramatically altered
    should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

    ¶6. (S//NF) ASD Vershbow queried various Israeli officials
    about their view of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
    proposal and Iran's recent equivocation on the agreement.
    Israeli officials uniformly expressed support for the
    agreement but made clear that by itself it was not
    sufficient.  They stated that it was only one stop on the way
    to containing the Iranian nuclear program and that it must be
    followed by a freeze-for-freeze agreement and eventually the
    full suspension of uranium enrichment, as well as the end of
    work on the newly disclosed site at Qom.  They warned that
    the TRR agreement by itself could serve as a major victory
    for Iran if it legitimized in the world's eyes Iran's right
    to enrich uranium on its own soil.  None of the Israeli
    officials expressed surprise about Iran's apparent reversal
    on the TRR agreement, as they viewed this as typical Iranian
    negotiating style and part of an Iranian strategy of delay.
    Amos Gilad stated that Iran would never agree to anything
    that contradicted its overall strategic goal of achieving a
    nuclear weapons capability.

    ¶7. (S) When queried about how the U.S. views the Iranian
    response, ASD Vershbow explained that the United States was
    still seeking greater clarity on what was the real Iranian
    bottom line.  We may need time to ascertain whether Iran's
    response was in fact a serious walk-back or whether it would
    be willing to abide by the initial TRR agreement that had
    been agreed to in principle in Geneva on October 1.  However,
    he also emphasized that American patience is not unlimited
    and that if the TRR agreement did collapse, the U.S. would
    likely begin pursuing the pressure track.

    ¶8. (S//NF) Israel was also highly concerned about Iran's
    support for proxies, with General Baidatz emphasizing that
    there are multiple bases in Iran where IRGC, Quds Force,
    Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives
    all train together and share knowledge.  MG Gantz also
    emphasized Iran's role as a weapons supplier to Syria and
    that Syria actively facilitated arms transfers to Hezbollah.
    He expressed concern about Iranian shipments of weapons via
    Sudan to Egypt and into Gaza.  On the Russian delay in
    delivery of the S-300 (SA-20) to Iran, Gilad voiced
    satisfaction with the train of events, acknowledging Prime
    Minister Netanyahu's "secret" visit to Moscow and President
    Obama's engagement with Medvedev had both played a role.
    Gilad was worried about Russian readiness to support tough
    sanctions on Iran.  ASD Vershbow said the Russians' signals
    on sanctions were mixed, but they seemed genuinely concerned
    about recent Iranian missile tests and the revelation of the
    Qom facility.

    -------------------
    West Bank and Gaza
    -------------------

    ¶9. (S) Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the
    subject of the Palestinian political situation.  It was
    widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened
    political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour
    assessment of Abbas's future.  In one exchange, Amos Gilad
    stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically
    past the year 2011.  Gilad further stated that Abbas is
    facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian
    Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that
    this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas
    considerably.  The Israelis said the perception in the Arab
    world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take

    difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk
    away from him.  ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that
    could be taken to bolster Abbas.  Gilad responded by stating
    that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed
    immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties
    need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues --
    specifically on the security sector front.  Gilad expressed
    optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing
    improvements in the security and economic spheres, and
    further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
    footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for
    advancing the relationship.  Gilad closed, however, on a
    sourer note by stating that the Government of Israel has
    little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team.

    ¶10. (S) ASD Vershbow transitioned off the political
    discussion to focus on the Palestinian Authority Security
    Force (PASF).  Specifically, Vershbow highlighted the concern
    that Palestinian forces were seen as lacking real authority,
    and therefore asked for steps that could be taken to give the
    PASF more visible control of security.  Israeli officials
    responded by citing the decreased number of direct- action
    incursions, checkpoints and patrols, and seemingly drew a
    correlation between reduced IDF activity and increased PASF
    authority (COMMENT:  Despite Israeli assurances, U.S. and
    Palestinian officials continue to highlight the corrosive
    effect of regular Israeli incursions).  MG Gantz cited
    Palestinian security sector reform as a major accomplishment,
    stating that on-the-ground coordination between the PASF and
    IDF units has improved dramatically. Despite these positive
    developments though, Israeli officials repeatedly underscored
    the importance of retaining the right to disrupt terrorist
    operations in the West Bank and Gaza.  Additionally, they
    stated that if Israel allowed a weak and untrained security
    force to take over in the West Bank in the short term, the
    result will be deterioration of the Israel-Jordan
    relationship over the long term.  The prospect of poor
    Israeli-Jordanian relations, according to Amos Gilad, is
    unacceptable, and would result in the loss of "strategic
    depth" for Israel.

    ¶11. (S) ASD Vershbow urged his Israeli counterparts not to
    soley focus on the short-term "here and now," but rathr to
    envision the possible benefits that a strongand viable West
    Bank could have for Israel's secrity situation in the
    future.  Vershbow used thi point to springboard to the issue
    of HAMAS and aza, asking whether success in the West Bank
    coud serve as a "magnet" and help solve the Gaza problem.
    He asked if Israel had made any headway in tems of an
    information operations campaign to better communicate with
    the people of Gaza.  Israeli officials offered very little in
    the way of a communications strategy or long-term vision for
    the territories, but reinforced Israel's core belief that
    HAMAS has only sinister motives, and that any attempt Fatah
    might make to improve its standing in Gaza would only be met
    with HAMAS opposition.  General Baidatz articulated Israel's
    concern by highlighting recent intelligence that HAMAS is
    trying to acquire from Iran (and potentially test-fired the
    previous weekend) the 60 km-range Fajr-5 rocket that could
    reach Tel Aviv.  These actions, according to Baidatz and
    other officials, make any discussion of Palestinian
    reconciliation both premature and unrealistic.  Ambassador
    Vershbow sought further clarification on this point, querying
    Israeli officials over the level of public support for HAMAS.
     Specifically, the ASD asked if there was any way to
    undermine support for HAMAS vis-a-vis the peace process.
    Amos Gilad responded simply by saying that one of Israel's
    biggest concerns is the atmosphere created by disjointed
    peace talks.  Specifically, Gilad stated that political
    promises of peace, unification, and reconciliation --
    concepts that are never realized -- are only resulting in a
    climate of uncertainty that is unhealthy.  On this matter,
    Gilad mentioned that Egypt's role in pushing reconciliation
    is not helpful and often counterproductive, but that he
    expects Egypt to continue floating the idea at future
    junctures.

    ¶12. (C) In bringing up the Goldstone Report, DG Buchris
    emphasized that the Government of Israel took extraordinary
    steps to mitigate civilian casualties, despite HAMAS's
    deliberate use of civilians as human shields.  He stated that
    the IDF made over 300,000 phone calls to alert civilians
    before bombing legitimate military targets.  He also compared
    Israeli operations in Gaza to U.S. operations in Iraq and

    Afghanistan and stated that Israel would do whatever was
    necessary to protect its population.  In response, ASD
    Vershbow recalled U.S. support for Israel in handling of the
    Goldstone report, and offered to share U.S. experience in
    investigating incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as the GOI
    considered whether to conduct an additional investigation.

    --------------------
    Anxiety Over Turkey
    --------------------

    ¶13. (S) Israeli officials also expressed growing anxiety over
    the Turkey-Israel relationship after the Turkish cancellation
    of Israel's participation in the ANATOLIAN EAGLE joint
    exercise.  They expressed their belief that the strategic
    relationship with Turkey is critical, but that PM Erdogan's
    views have increasingly penetrated into the military and have
    been part of the reason for the deterioration in relations as
    Turkey looks East rather than West.  Gilad believes this is
    understandable as Turkey's EU accession prospects look
    increasingly doubtful, and they must balance their relations
    with both regions to succeed.

    ¶14. (S) Baidatz stated that the Turks have an agenda to
    contain any Kurdish influence in Iraq and that to achieve it
    they need to improve their relations with Iran and Syria.  In
    his view, the worst possible outcome would be a new
    Turkey-Iran-Syria-Iraq axis in the Middle East.  Gilad also
    noted that Turkey wanted to improve its relationships with
    Iran and asserted that it had made some very aggressive plans
    recently to support HAMAS.  However, he had a less
    pessimistic view than Baidatz, stating that Turkey had played
    a positive role in Iraq and that generally the Turks' agenda
    was for a stable Iraq that would be commercially beneficial
    to Turkey.  Gilad stated that he was skeptical of any
    political rapprochement between Israel and Turkey in the near
    term, but that Israel would continue to foster the
    military-to-military relationship because of its strategic
    importance.

    ¶15. (C) Gilad also queried ASD Vershbow about what Israel
    might do to improve its relationship with Turkey.  Vershbow
    explained that Turkey wants to be influential in the region
    and that if it jeopardizes its relationship with Israel, it
    will undermine its status and its leverage as an evenhanded
    mediator.  He also commented that Erdogan's ideological views
    may lead him to focus on Turkey's Islamic neighbors, but he
    is also a realist who will not want to jeopardize Turkey's
    ties to the U.S. or NATO.  The U.S. and Israel should be
    patient with Turkey and stay engaged, encouraging the Turks
    to play a constructive role in the region.  He stated that at
    the upcoming bilateral defense talks between the U.S. and
    Turkey in December, he and Under Secretary Flournoy would
    emphasize the need to improve Israel-Turkey relations.

    ----------------------------
    Quiet on the Northern Border
    ----------------------------

    ¶16. (S) Israeli officials remain pleased with the "quiet"
    nature of its northern border -- something they attribute to
    the deterrent effect Israel has built up following OPERATION
    CAST LEAD and the 2006 war in Lebano.  However, according to
    Israeli officials, it i a foregone conclusion that strong
    cooperation eists between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
    and ezbollah.  The level of cooperation far exceeds wht
    many assume is simply the day-to-day problem of corruption
    within the ranks.  On the contrary, Israel believes that
    LAF/Hezbollah cooperation is a matter of national policy.
    Amos Gilad attributed this dynamic to elements of
    nationalism, stating that Lebanese government and military
    officials choose not to confront Hezbollah out of patriotic
    zeal.  Moreover, according to Gilad, any information shared
    with the United Nations Interim Force-Lebanon (UNIFIL) goes
    directly to Hezbollah by way of the LAF.

    ¶17. (S) Israeli officials have major concerns over
    developments within Hezbollah -- specifically, its
    relationship with Syria and Iran.  General Baidatz spoke of
    this relationship and drew attention to the existing supply
    of Fateh-110 long-range missile that Iran sent to Syria.
    Israeli officials believe these missiles are destined for
    Hezbollah.  According to Baidatz and others, if the delivery
    were to occur, this would significantly alter Israel's

    calculus.  Under such a scenario, the looming question for
    Israeli policymakers then becomes: "to strike or not to
    strike."

    -----------------
    Optimism on Syria
    -----------------

    ¶18. (S) General Baidatz offered an Israeli intelligence
    assessment that if Syria were able to achieve peace with
    security and obtain greater U.S. involvement, it may pull
    away from Iran's orbit.  He explained that President Assad
    used his "negative assets," namely Hezbollah and HAMAS, to
    make himself relevant and that ultimately Assad wants it all:
     the Golan Heights; peace with Israel; better relations with
    the U.S.; a strong relationship with Iran; and a continued
    relationship with Hezbollah.  Ultimately, Gen Baidatz
    asserted that if Assad had to choose one thing, it would
    likely be peace with Israel.  ASD Vershbow asked if Hezbollah
    could be sustained without Syrian support.  Baidatz
    acknowledged the difficulty in answering this question, but
    stated his belief that it would be a gradual process before
    Hezbollah could completely wean itself from the Syrian
    support apparatus and that, ultimately, both Hezbollah's and
    Iran's flexibility would be significantly reduced.

    -------------------------------
    Mil-to-Mil Relations with Egypt
    -------------------------------

    ¶19. (C) Amos Gilad commented that he would like to see a
    complete peace with Egypt, but noted there was very little in
    the way of Egyptian-Israeli military relations and that Egypt
    continued to train its military for war with Israel.  Gilad
    stated that Egypt was not likely to attack Israel and did not
    represent a short-term threat, but that at the very least it
    was necessary to have modest contact between Egyptian and
    Israeli officers.  He expressed frustration by describing
    Egypt and Israel's "frozen peace" and that neither side knows
    anything about the other.  He noted that the last high-level
    military visit for Egypt was in 1991.

    ¶20. (S//NF) Israeli officials agreed that Egypt's
    counter-smuggling efforts have improved, particularly since
    Operation CAST LEAD in January.  However, they stated that
    gaps still exist and that Egypt needs to focus its efforts on
    stopping Bedouin smuggling in the Sinai.  Gilad said he was
    disillusioned with the technical monitoring solution; tunnels
    continue and smuggling is increasing even with U.S.
    assistance along borders with Egypt.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------------
    Iron Dome and Juniper Cobra - Strengthening the Relationship
    --------------------------------------------- ---------------

    ¶21. (S) On Iron Dome, DG Buchris (Assisted by retired General
    Nagel) briefed ASD Vershbow on the latest developments,
    stating that Iron Dome is planned to have an initial
    operating capability by the spring of 2010, and that
    technological advancements have made the system much more
    viable defending against short range rocket attacks from Gaza
    or Southern Lebanon.  Buchris also emphasized the need for
    additional USG support to help fund additional production of
    Iron Dome to protect the civilian population in both the
    North and the South.  Buchris also noted progress on the
    upper- and medium-tier ballistic missile defense systems
    (Arrow-3 and David's Sling, respectively).  In an earlier
    meeting, MG Gantz quantified the importance of fielding
    adequate missile defense systems by citing critical Israeli
    infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport and the Ashkelon
    electricity plant.  Suffering the loss or damage of places
    such as these, according to Gantz, would be a major blow to
    Israel and, therefore, every effort to
    stand up a capable missile and rocket defense shield should
    be taken.

    ¶22. (S) After Gantz highlighted three areas of focus for the
    IDF (deterring conventional threats, responding nimbly to
    asymmetric threats, and developing an integrated missile
    defense system), ASD Vershbow asked for Gantz's initial
    impression of the Juniper Cobra-10 exercise.  Gantz stressed
    the importance of this exercise, and stated that so far it
    had been a success.  ASD Vershbow stated that the timing of
    Juniper Cobra was somewhat fortuitous, given the recent

    developments with Iran.  On the larger issue of missile
    defense, ASD Vershbow stressed U.S. efforts to try and
    persuade Russia to become more involved in missile defense
    cooperation, but stated that Russia's realization that the
    new U.S. missile defense approach in Europe is more effective
    than the previous one is causing the Russian leadership to
    ask many questions about the system.

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶23. (S) All of ASD Vershbow's interlocutors carried a
    consistent message emphasizing that:  Iran remains Israel's
    greatest threat; recent events have weakened President Abbas;
    the PASF have performed well in the West Bank; and the
    relative calm on all Israel's borders does not obscure the
    fact that Israeli intelligence is seeing significant activity
    and planning by Iranian surrogates, namely HAMAS and
    Hezbollah, with facilitation from Syria.  These threats
    suggest that Israel must remain vigilant and prepared for the
    calm to end one day.

    ¶24. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.
    CUNNINGHAM

`