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### Viewing cable 07BERLIN242, AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07BERLIN242 | 2007-02-06 17:05 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXYZ0015
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRL #0242 0371748
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 061748Z FEB 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6940

` `

    S E C R E T BERLIN 000242

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR S/ES-O, EUR AND L

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
    TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV GM
    SUBJECT: AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS

    REF: A. BERLIN 230

         ¶B. BERLIN 200

    Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (S/NF) In a February 6 discussion with German Deputy
    National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel, the DCM reiterated our
    strong concerns about the possible issuance of international
    arrest warrants in the al-Masri case.  The DCM noted that the
    reports in the German media of the discussion on the issue
    between the Secretary and FM Steinmeier in Washington were
    not accurate, in that the media reports suggest the USG was
    not troubled by developments in the al-Masri case.  The DCM
    emphasized that this was not the case and that issuance of
    international arrest warrants would have a negative impact on
    our bilateral relationship.  He reminded Nikel of the
    repercussions to U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in the wake
    of a similar move by Italian authorities last year.

    ¶2.  (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that our intention was not to
    threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the German
    Government weigh carefully at every step of the way the
    implications for relations with the U.S.  We of course
    recognized the independence of the German judiciary, but
    noted that a decision to issue international arrest warrants
    or extradition requests would require the concurrence of the
    German Federal Government, specifically the MFA and the
    Ministry of Justice (MOJ).  The DCM said our initial
    indications had been that the German federal authorities
    would not allow the warrants to be issued, but that
    subsequent contacts led us to believe this was not the case.

    ¶3.  (S/NF) Nikel also underscored the independence of the
    German judiciary, but confirmed that the MFA and MOJ would
    have a procedural role to play.  He said the case was subject
    to political, as well as judicial, scrutiny.  From a judicial
    standpoint, the facts are clear, and the Munich prosecutor
    has acted correctly.  Politically speaking, said Nikel,
    Germany would have to examine the implications for relations
    with the U.S.  At the same time, he noted our political
    differences about how the global war on terrorism should be
    waged, for example on the appropriateness of the Guantanamo
    facility and the alleged use of renditions.

    ¶4.  (S/NF) Nikel also cited intense pressure from the
    Bundestag and the German media.  The German federal
    Government must consider the "entire political context," said
    Nikel.  He assured the DCM that the Chancellery is well aware
    of the bilateral political implications of the case, but
    added that this case "will not be easy."  The Chancellery
    would nonetheless try to be as constructive as possible.

    ¶5.  (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that the USG would likewise
    have a difficult time in managing domestic political
    implications if international arrest warrants are issued.  He
    reiterated our concerns and expressed the hope that the
    Chancellery would keep us informed of further developments in
    the case, so as to avoid surprises.  Nikel undertook to do
    so, but reiterated that he could not, at this point "promise
    that everything will turn out well."
    TIMKEN JR

`