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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09ANKARA1472, SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ANKARA1472 | 2009-10-13 08:08 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAK #1472/01 2860830
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 130830Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0267
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0936

` `

    S E C R E T ANKARA 001472

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    OSD FOR ASD VERSHBOW FROM AMBASSADOR JEFFREY

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
    TAGS: PREL PARM PTER TU
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER:  YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY

    Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (S) Sandy, Glad you'll be able to visit Turkey at this key
    time. Your short visit will give you an opportunity to engage
    with key Turkish leaders on, first and foremost in their
    minds, missile defense.  The Turks are keen to learn more
    about U.S. plans, in particular what role the U.S.
    wants/expects Turkey and others in Europe to play.  The
    Turkish General Staff (TGS) will be interested in our ideas
    for HLDG reform, even if they may be slow to accept them.

    ¶2. (S) You know how broad our agenda is with Turkey.  As you
    will have a short time in country, I suggest you focus on a
    few key issues.

    Be sure to raise:
    ------------------
    - Missile Defense, with emphasis on how the U.S. will look to
    several Allies - not just Turkey - for help (para 3)
    - Repeat our commitment to our intel and other support for
    strikes against the PKK (para 5-6)
    - Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan
    (para 13)
    - Float the idea of HLDG reform and ensure Guner knows we
    expect him in Washington (para 4)
    - Press for a realistic assessment of Turkey's view of the
    threat assessment from Iran (para 10)

    Watch Out For:
    ---------------
    - Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras
    11-12)
    - Conflation of Turkey's exploration of air defense
    capabilities with our Missile Defense needs (para 3)

    Missile Defense
    ----------------

    ¶3. (S) The Turks will appreciate your update on U.S. missile
    defense plans and in particular will expect you to have
    specific ideas on how Turkey would contribute to the PAA.
    While the top-level bureaucrats with whom you will meet will
    understand the rationale for the PAA and will be ready to
    explore ways Turkey can help, the political environment for a
    request to base assets in Turkey is mixed, and Turkey's
    perception of the Iranian threat to its territory differs
    from ours.  The GOT continues to tread a fine line in
    managing its strong relationship with the U.S. and its ties
    with both the Islamic world and Russia.  The government must
    be able to demonstrate that any missile defense program is
    not specifically anti-Iran, nor blatantly pro-Israel.

    ¶4. (S) Likewise, it will want to ensure that Russia is not
    opposed to Turkey's role.  Also important will be clarity on
    the degree to which this system is a NATO one, under NATO
    Command and Control (C2).  The PAA would presumably
    complement Turkey's effort to establish a domestic missile
    defense capability that would protect Turkey's major
    population centers.  The PAC-3 has been offered in response
    to Turkey's air defense tender and you should highlight the
    system's ability to be interoperable with any future NATO
    command and control architecture.

    HLDG
    -----

    ¶5. (C) You will need to outline U.S. views to streamline and
    alter the current HLDG format to make it into a more
    substantive discussion.  The Turks are shy to stray from the
    status quo; you should emphasize why we feel this change is
    necessary while underscoring that it is vitally important the
    DCHOD Guner attend the upcoming HLDG in December, when
    decisions about future dialogues will be agreed upon.  (We
    have learned that the new position of TGS number three, a
    four-star slot held by General Balanli (with a focus on
    hardware), might get the nod for the HLDG representative.
    We've told Guner it should be his.)  You should also be
    prepared for the Turkish General Staff to raise the Shared
    Defense Vision document, as they await a response to their
    latest proposed text.

    PKK
    ----

    ¶6. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
    have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
    military action alone.  Although the government's Democratic
    (i.e., Kurdish) Initiative is not yet fully developed, the
    government has increased social and economic support to
    ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey, has dramatically broadened
    the rights of Kurds to use their own language, and increased
    educational opportunities as well.  It is our view that the
    TGS military success against the PKK, supported by our
    intelligence--sharing operation, has given the civilians the
    political space to explore this "opening."  Turkish military
    operations against the PKK continue, however, and on  October
    6 Parliament extended the government's mandate to conduct
    cross-border operations against the PKK in Iraq for another
    year.

    ¶7. (C)  Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence
    was a turning point for the bilateral relationship, and
    President Obama's declaration before the Turkish Parliament
    of our continuing commitment to support Turkey's fight
    against the PKK was warmly welcomed.  This cooperation has
    helped to improve our bilateral relationship across the
    board.  Turkey's military leaders value this intelligence and
    the advice our military leaders give them.  Our work has made
    it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a
    safe haven.  Turkish causalities are still occurring,
    however, and an increasing proportion are from IEDs.  Due to
    pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and the Turkish
    General Staff (TGS) to "finish off" the PKK this year, the
    government wants and has requested direct U.S. kinetic action
    against the PKK; we have refused this request to date due to
    our own rules of engagement.  The GOT has also requested the
    sale of armed MQ-9/Reaper UAVs, which will be a challenge to
    fulfill (see para 10).

    Northern Iraq
    --------------

    ¶8. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the
    political  unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has
    become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities
    of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the
    Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)).  Turkey's policy remains
    focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the
    KRG is expanding.  This outreach is reinforced by the
    continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in
    the KRG's healthy economy.  It is also tied to turkey's new
    opening to its own Kurds, by far the biggest and most
    controversial domestic political issue here.

    ¶9. (S) The U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks
    continue regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in
    Erbil, established to share counter-PKK intelligence was
    established over the summer.  The Turks remain shy to share
    data; they are not convinced that they can trust
    Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information concerning
    operations secret.  Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
    direction.  Turkish military officials have become more
    strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action
    against the PKK.

    U.S. Drawdown through Turkey
    -----------------------------

    ¶10. (S) Habur Gate and the Incirlik Cargo Hub -- vital to our
    sustainment operations -- could be helpful in our drawdown if
    other options prove too difficult.  Minister of National
    Defense Vedci Gonul suggested to Secretary Gates in June that
    Turkey was ready to agree to the increased use of Incirlik
    for this purpose.  Using the surface route from Habur Gate to
    Mediterranean ports (Iskenderun, Mersin) is also worth
    exploring, and we may be able to involve Turkish commercial
    shippers in support of the Northern Distribution Network.  We
    caution that the rough terrain, security environment, and the
    cantankerous nature of the Turkish government bureaucracy
    will challenge any U.S. operation.  Nevertheless, we are
    evaluating these options in cooperation with CENTCOM and
    EUCOM partners.

    Iran
    ------

    ¶11. (C) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and
    international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is
    hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part
    due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a
    trade route to Central Asian markets.  PM Erdogan himself is
    a particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position.  Turkey
    believes international pressure against Iran only helps to
    strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners.  However, it
    continues to press Iran quietly to accept the P5 plus 1
    offer.  The GOT is a strong partner in our non-proliferation
    efforts, with several significant results.  Politically,
    Turkey will try to position itself on Iran between wherever
    we are and where Russia is.  In a pinch or if pressed, the
    Turks will slant to us.

    UAVs and Attack Helicopters
    ----------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own
    UAV capability.  The administration has made clear at high
    levels that we support this goal, and Turkey has pending
    request to acquire armed Reaper UAVs.  Ultimate approval for
    armed Reapers is complicated due to MTCR obligations and Hill
    concerns.  However, even if those could be overcome, the
    delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
    leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
    intelligence support until they can replace it.  We have not
    made this commitment to date.

    ¶13. (C) Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to
    a severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed
    for its fight against the PKK  Turkey has looked to us to
    help them bridge the capability gap, asking to purchase
    additional AH-1W Super Cobra aircraft.  These aircraft are in
    short supply in our own inventory, but Secretary Gates and
    VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to support with request
    within a few years (four each in 2011, 2012, and 2013).  The
    Turks took this as an affirmative, and recently started
    pressing for delivery in 2010 instead of 2011.

    Afghanistan/Pakistan
    ----------------------

    ¶14. (C) Turkey has commanded ISAF twice since its inception
    and will take command of RC-Capital this November. Turkey
    leads PRT Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan in
    early 2010.  Turkey has sponsored the "Ankara Process"
    dialogue, one of several efforts to encourage constructive
    communications between Kabul and Islamabad and is a leading
    participant in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan.  Turkey
    pledged significant aid to both countries:  USD 200 million
    to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan.  Because of
    its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as
    Foreign Minister Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is
    well disposed to act as an agent of the international
    community's goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Constraining
    Turkey's potential is a lack of resources.  Our conversations
    with Turkish interlocutors have helped us identify several
    areas in which Turkey can be of particular help:  education
    and health, military training and support, economics,
    counter-narcotics, and trilateral engagement.  (Note:  Turkey
    will not support any CT operations in Afghanistan.  They do
    not believe there is a NATO/ISAF mandate to engage in these
    operations, and they additionally have national caveats
    preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT
    operations.  The GOT also believes that ISAF should not/not
    be engaged in the counter-narcotics fight, believing that
    foreign fighters who engage in this fight just produces
    antipathy against foreign forces in the local population.  I
    do, however, believe the GOT are willing to engage the
    training of Afghan security forces.)

    Caucasus
    --------

    ¶15. (C) Turkey seeks to develop itself as a regional power
    and recognizes that the Caucasus region, stymied in its
    growth by frozen conflicts, could turn to Turkey for develop.
     The signing of the Protocol document in Zurich on October 10
    was a landmark for the region, and should serve as a starting
    point for establishing bilateral relations and, ultimately,
    the opening of its closed border.  Nevertheless, future
    relations will still be heavily linked to the 1915 "genocide"
    issue and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
    between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Turkey consistently warns
    that any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as
    "genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and
    the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship --
    including political, military, and commercial aspects --
    would be unavoidable.

    Political Environment
    ----------------------

    ¶16. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
    (AK) Party is squarely in the driver's seat, but fears an
    erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
    parties.  Civilian-military relations remain complex.  Chief
    of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with
    PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's
    secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists
    (represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds.
    Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug
    has seemingly learned to live.  Alleged past military
    involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate
    generation of internal chaos remains political theme number
    one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their
    respective underlings.

    Israel
    -------

    ¶17. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
    Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
    is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to
    shore up his domestic right political flank at the expense of
    this relationship.  His outburst at Davos was the first in a
    series of events the results of which we and his staff have
    sought to contain.  The latest of these was Exercise
    Anatolian Eagle.  Erdogan canceled Israel's participation
    hours before the exercise was to begin.  With an Israeli
    strike - across Turkish airspace - against targets in Iran a
    possibility, Erdogan decided he could not afford the
    political risk of being accused of training the forces which
    would carry out such a raid.  Through some remarkable work
    with Allies and with the inter-agency, we engineered a public
    "postponement" of the international portion of the exercise,
    but the relationship has begun to sour.

    JEFFREY

               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

`