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### Viewing cable 10DOHA70, SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S AMIR

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10DOHA70 | 2010-02-23 10:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Doha

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHDO #0070/01 0541047
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 231047Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9699
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000070

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2020
    TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL IR QA
    SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S AMIR

    Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

    --------------
    (C) KEY POINTS
    --------------

    --  The Amir of Qatar urged the U.S. in his February 14
    meeting with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) to do everything in
    its power to find a lasting solution to the
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The Amir said the best way to
    begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.

    --  In Qatar's view, now is the time to reach out to
    Damascus.  The Syrian Government can help Arab extremists
    make tough choices, but only if the U.S., whose involvement
    is essential, demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to
    address the return of the Golan Heights and supports Turkey's
    mediation efforts between Israel and Syria.

    --  According to the Amir, Hamas will accept the 1967 border
    with Israel, but will not say it publicly so as to lose
    popular Palestinian support.

    --  The Egyptians' goal, according to the Amir, is to stay in
    the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which
    is built around brokering regional peace, for as long as
    possible.

    --  The Amir recommended that the U.S. and Qatar establish a
    small bilateral committee to discuss how to advance regional
    peace.  Qatar can help move Hamas, because Qatar does not
    "play in their internal politics."  That does not mean Qatar
    shares Hamas' ideology, stressed the Amir.

    --  On Iran, the Amir said President Ahmadinejad is strong
    because he is uncorrupted.  The Amir also advised the U.S. to
    continue ts efforts to open a dialogue with the Iranian
    ladership.

    End Key Points.

    ¶1. (C)  Senator Joh Kerry (D-MA), the Chairman of the Senate
    Foreig Relations Committee(SFRC), joined by Ambassador,P/E
    Chief, and SFRC staff member Dr. Jonah Blank met February 14
    with the Amir of Qatar, Hamad bn Khalifa Al Thani.  The
    meeting took place at Waba Palace, the residence of the
    Amir, and the Amir began the meeting by pointing out that the
    comfortable chairs on which the U.S. party was seated were
    made in Syria.

    ------------------------------
    IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIAN TRACK
    ------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) This opening led Senator Kerry to remark that he had
    held great discussions with Syria's President, Bashar
    Al-Asad, when he met him in Damascus some months ago.  The
    Amir said President Asad is committed to "big change," but
    Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri's death and complications
    resulting from Syria's alleged involvement in it had brought
    about "complications" for Asad.  The Amir added that "Bashar
    is still young and can grow."

    ¶3. (C) Senator Kerry said he took away from his visit to
    Damascus that Asad wants change.  The Amir added that the
    Syrian President also wants peace with Israel and that the
    arrival of a U.S. Ambassador in Damascus would help in this
    regard.  Senator Kerry said he had wanted a U.S. Ambassador
    in Syria a year ago, but agreed that the naming of an
    Ambassador is a positive development.

    ¶4. (C) The Amir cautioned that the Syrians will not accept
    everything the U.S. proposes, stressing that the Israeli
    occupation of the Golan Heights continues and that the return
    of this land to Syria is paramount for Damascus.  The Amir
    observed that the "Syrians have lost confidence in the U.S.
    and that the Israelis now have the upper hand in the region
    because of the support of the United States."  The Israeli
    leaders need to represent the people of Israel, who
    themselves do not trust Arabs.  The Amir said this is
    understandable and "we can't blame them" because the Israelis
    have been "under threat" for a long time.

    ¶5. (C) What has changed, continued the Amir, is that Arabs
    "for sure" now want two states -- Israel and Palestine.  When
    you consider that many in the region perceive that Hizballah
    drove Israel out of Lebanon and Hamas kicked them (at least
    initially) out "of the small piece of land called Gaza," it
    is actually surprising that the Israelis still want peace.
    The region, however, is still "far away" from peace,
    concluded the Amir.

    ¶6. (C) Senator Kerry responded that in his long experience
    with the region, it was not unusual for people to take
    positions adverse to their own interests.  Yasser Arafat went
    from living as a terrorist in Tunisia to signing an agreement
    with Israel on the White House lawn.  The transformation of
    Arafat is an example of how actors in the region need to take
    risks if we are to move forward in advancing regional peace.
    Turning the conversation back to Syria, Chairman Kerry
    pointed out that Syria's facilitation of arms to Hizballah
    and its turning a blind eye to missile upgrades in Lebanon do
    not represent risk-taking in the promotion of peace.

    ¶7. (C) The Amir pointed out that any progress toward regional
    peace had come about due to American involvement.  He implied
    that it would take U.S. intervention on the Syrian-Israeli
    track to address these issues and asked Senator Kerry what he
    would have Damascus do.

    ¶8. (C) The Chairman responded that President Asad needs to
    make a bolder move and take risks.  He observed that if the
    Syrian President wants peace and economic development for his
    country, he needs to be more statesman-like, which would in
    turn help Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu engage him.

    ¶9. (C) The Amir agreed with Senator Kerry's assessment of
    Asad's aims and said he is ready for peace, but asked if the
    Israelis are ready.  Would Israel accept to resume Turkey's
    mediation between Syria and Israel?  Would the U.S. play a
    role in advancing the Syria track?

    ¶10. (C) If we can get Abu Mazen back to the negotiating
    table, we can engage on border issues -- including Israel's
    borders with Syria, advised Senator Kerry.  Abu Mazen right
    now is not strong enough, though, to make necessary
    compromises with Israel because the Palestinian people have
    wanted him to stick to his guns on a settlement freeze and
    the Goldstone Report.  The Chairman added that Netanyahu also
    needs to compromise and work the return of the Golan Heights
    into a formula for peace.

    ¶11. (C) The Amir encouraged the U.S. to work the Golan
    Heights issue first.  He stressed that Syrians are very
    different from Iranians in "mentality," and said the Syrians
    turned to Iran for support only because they had nowhere else
    to go.  Now is the time, the Amir told Senator Kerry, to
    reach out to Damascus.

    -------------------------
    PARAMETERS FOR DISCUSSION
    -------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. is prepared to
    play a strong role in bringing about peace in the region.
    President Obama, said the Chairman, understands that he
    personally must engage and do so strongly.  The Senator told
    the Amir that in his speech to the U.S.-Islamic Forum the
    previous evening, the Senator had focused on former President
    Clinton's parameters for peace and the 2002 Arab League peace
    initiative.  Now, said the Senator, is the time to put those
    back on the table and resume talking, with the U.S. acting as
    a legitimate agent of peace.  Chairman Kerry told the Amir he
    is convinced that we can see great progress in the coming
    year by moving swiftly from proximity talks, to direct talks
    between the parties and ending with final status discussions.

    ¶13. (C) To be successful, continued Senator Kerry, we must
    begin by agreeing at the outset the amount of land each side
    (Israelis and Palestinians) will obtain in the end and use
    that understanding to draw the borders.  If both sides make
    good compromises, we can address the settlement issues in the
    context of giving something up so that the borders, when
    drawn, contain the agreed-upon amounts of land for both
    sides.  The Amir agreed with the Senator's assessment and
    complimented President Obama for being the first U.S.
    President to take on the Middle East conflict in the first
    year of his term.

    ¶14. (C) Continuing the presentation of his ideas on the
    parameters of peace between Israel and the Palestinians,
    Senator Kerry noted that one of the biggest problems for
    Israel is the potential return of 5-6 million Palestinian
    refugees.  The parties broached the return issue in
    discussions at Taba and agreed that the right of Palestinian
    return would be subject to later negotiation, pointed out the
    Chairman.  If we can proceed from that point on the right of
    return, the Senator believes there is an "artful way" to
    frame the negotiations on borders, land swaps, and Jerusalem
    as a shared capital.
    ¶15. (C) Any negotiation has its limits, added Senator Kerry,
    and we know for the Palestinians that control of Al-Aqsa
    mosque and the establishment of some kind of capital for the
    Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not negotiable.  For the
    Israelis, the Senator continued, Israel's character as a
    Jewish state is not open for negotiation.  The
    non-militarization of an eventual Palestinian state and its
    borders can nonetheless be resolved through negotiation.

    ¶16. (C) The Amir underscored that Abu Mazen needs Arab
    support to make the above happen.  Hamas "for sure," he said,
    will accept the 1967 border but will not say it publicly so
    as to lose popular Palestinian support.

    ---------------------------
    DEALING WITH THE EXTREMISTS
    ---------------------------

    ¶17. (C) Senator Kerry told the Amir he knew Qatar could help
    the U.S. but asked how we deal with those who advocate
    violence.  The Amir said the short answer is to work the
    Syrian track, which means pushing for Israel's return of the
    Golan Heights to Syria.  The Amir said return of the Golan is
    important not just to Syria but also to Hizballah and Iran.
    The U.S. must bear in mind that Misha'al, a leader of Hamas
    based in Damascus, has drawn the conclusion that the Oslo
    accords were bad for Arafat.  He lost the support of his own
    people and died living under Israeli siege.  The Syrians can
    help Misha'al and others make tough choices, but only if the
    U.S. demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address
    the Golan.  Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. would
    accept a legitimate discussion of the Golan Heights.

    ¶18. (C) What is more, said the Amir, the U.S. needs to
    support Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria.  It is
    important that the U.S. encourage Israel to understand that
    that resolving the status of the Golan Heights is very
    important to the United States.

    ¶19. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir if Hamas is under
    pressure given the circumstances in Gaza.  The Amir answered
    by saying that Hamas needs Iranian support.  He added that
    the biggest misconception in the region is that the Syrians,
    who host Hamas leaders in Damascus, go to Iran because they
    like the Iranians.  This is wrong.  Syria goes to those who
    will not shun them.

    -------------
    ROLE OF EGYPT
    -------------

    ¶20. (C) Returning to the pressure Hamas is facing, Senator
    Kerry observed that economic development in the West Bank is
    taking place, but not in Gaza.  The Palestinian
    reconciliation that would make possible developmental
    assistance in Gaza has not happened.  The Egyptians have not
    delivered, said Senator Kerry.

    ¶21. (C) The Amir said the Egyptians' goal is to stay in the
    game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is
    built around brokering Middle East peace, for as long as
    possible.  According to the Amir, Fatah and Hamas agreed on a
    memorandum of understanding, but the Egyptians wanted it
    changed.  The Amir remarked that he has a feeling he knows
    which capital (Cairo) is the source of reports that Gaza is
    under pressure.  He said the economic pressure in Gaza on
    families is not what it was.  He offered as an example that
    Qatar Charity recently offered a family in Gaza 500 USD, but
    the family declined the gift saying its members had enough to
    get by and suggested another family that was in more dire
    need of assistance.  The Amir said the notion that a family
    would turn down money is new.

    ¶22. (C) The Amir told Senator Kerry that everyone knows
    "Egypt has a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood.  Okay, we
    understand.  But Egypt should not expect the world to take
    external actions that would help it internally."

    ¶23. (C) Asked his advice for President Obama, the Amir
    recommended the establishment of a small U.S.-Qatar committee
    to discuss how to proceed.  Qatar is close to Hamas,
    emphasized the Amir, because "we don't play in their internal
    politics."  That does not mean we share their ideology or do
    not disagree with them.  "I can remember many arguments with
    them (Hamas) on the 1967 border with Israel."  The Amir noted
    that he had mediated with Hamas previously at the U.S.
    request, namely when he urged Hamas at the previous
    Administration's request to participate in Palestinian
    elections.

    ¶24. (C) Returning to the leadership of Hamas, Senator Kerry
    asked the Amir for his insights into how the leadership, with
    leaders sitting in both Gaza and Syria, makes decisions.  The
    Amir said the impression that Misha'al sits in Damascus and
    others take orders from him is wrong.  Several key players
    within Hamas are involved in decisions.  They have
    differences over policy, but "the bottom line is that they
    all want the Palestinians to take their rights from Israel."

    ----
    IRAN
    ----

    ¶25. (C) Senator Kerry observed that the international
    community is moving toward imposing additional economic
    sanctions on Iran.  Understanding and respecting that Qatar
    needs to balance its relationships with regional powers,
    including Iran, the Chairman asked the Amir for his
    perspective on where we are going on Iran.

    ¶26. (C) The Amir answered by affirming that his first
    obligation is to defend the interests of Qatar.  Due to the
    natural gas field Iran shares with Qatar, Qatar will not
    "provoke a fight" with Iran.  He added that in the history of
    the two countries, "Iran has not bothered us."  That said,
    the Amir noted that Iran is an important country in the
    Middle East.  He faulted the U.S. for "making the mistake of
    speaking up for protesters" after the disputed Iranian
    presidential elections.

    ¶27. (C) The Iranian regime is strong, continued the Amir,
    because President Ahmadinejad is uncorrupted.  "That is the
    secret to his success."  Khatami is also not corrupted, but
    as a reformer he is in a weak position.  Rafsanjani, on the
    other hand, is corrupt.

    ¶28. (C) Senator Kerry lamented that every communication the
    current Administration has attempted to the Government of
    Iran has gone back channel and been met with no response.
    There have been non-U.S. initiatives, too.  Again, no
    success.  The Chairman observed that the Iranians are scared
    to talk. The Supreme Ayatollah had met with Russian President
    Putin, but seems not inclined to meet with other political
    leaders.  Our instinct is that we need to find a way to talk
    to him.

    ¶29. (C) Your instinct is right, replied the Amir.  The U.S.
    needs to talk directly with senior Iranian officials.  The
    Amir then asked, "What if I talk to the Iranian President.
    What would you have me say?"

    ¶30. (C) Senator Kerry responded, "The U.S. seeks serious
    discussion and sought to create a new foundation for a
    relationship based on Iran's non-confrontational compliance
    with IAEA requirements and other mutual interests."  Those
    interests include dealing with drug-running, the Taliban, and
    illicit trade.  The Chairman told the Amir he feared that
    Iran still thinks it is dealing with the 1953 America that
    tried to overthrow the Iranian government.

    ¶31. (C) The Amir responded that you cannot blame them for
    having that attitude, and Senator Kerry agreed, adding that
    the U.S. has a very different posture in the post-Cold War
    world of today.  Iran has ambitions; I know this from other
    regional leaders, said the Senator.  These are the first
    words that come out of their mouths.

    ¶32. (C) Iran wants to be a "big power," agreed the Amir, but
    what sort?  He reminded Senator Kerry the U.S. should not
    forget that Iranians are Persian and the U.S. needs to
    approach them in that framework.

    ¶33. (C) Senator Kerry stressed that the U.S. "would love to
    have that dialogue."  The U.S. respects Iranian civilization
    -- talent, art, culture, etc.  It is crazy to continue on
    this collision course.  The region needs schools and jobs,
    emphasized the Chairman, not another war.  The Amir agreed
    that "demographics are a big worry."  Not just for the
    countries in the region but for the U.S. too.

    ¶34. (C) Many scientific and technological transformations are
    underway, noted the Senator, "but Iran misinterprets the road
    to being a great power and the degree to which the
    international community is concerned about Iran's acquisition
    of nuclear weapons."  We are at a "fork in the road," and
    Iran must choose between confrontation or building
    partnerships.  If the latter, we can open up new
    opportunities for cooperation in the sciences, technology,
    education, robotics, energy and other ongoing
    transformations.

    ¶35. (C) Going back to the speech he had delivered in Doha the
    previous evening, Senator Kerry told the Amir that 17 former
    U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had come out in favor
    of eliminating nuclear weapons.  Every stop closer to
    realizing that goal is a sign of progress, but "no one
    believes Iranian nukes get us closer to that goal."

    ¶36. (C) Senator Kerry reported that leaders of regional Arab
    countries tell me they want nuclear weapons if the Iranians
    have them.  The Amir responded that he did not believe they
    were serious, but are saying this to put additional pressure
    on Iran.

    ¶37. (C) The Chairman noted that the disputed Iranian
    presidential elections may have derailed U.S. efforts to have
    serious dialogue with Tehran.  The Amir agreed, offering that
    the Israelis are also using Iran's quest for nuclear weapons
    as a diversion from settling matters with the Palestinians.
    The historical backdrop of Arab-Persian relations does not
    help, the Amir added.

    --------------
    FINAL THOUGHTS
    --------------

    ¶38. (C) The Amir advised the U.S. to continue trying to open
    a dialogue with the Iranian leadership.  He also told Senator
    Kerry the U.S. needs to tell the Israelis they are causing
    the U.S. to lose the hearts and minds of Muslims.  There was
    a time, such as during the Suez Canal crisis, when the Arabs
    loved the Americans and disliked the British and French, he
    said.

    ¶39. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir how the U.S. goes about
    changing its reputation.  The Amir said first and foremost
    the U.S. must do everything in its power to find a lasting
    solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the best
    way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.

    ¶40. (C) The Chairman of the SFRC said he expects a genuine
    effort by the President this year on an agreement and
    expressed his hope that Iranian issues would not complicate
    matters.  The Amir agreed, adding that China likes the
    distraction for the U.S. as its forces fight in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.

    ¶41. (C) Senator Kerry concurred, noting that China is lending
    the U.S. money and expanding its influence at U.S. expense.
    He added that he ran against President George W. Bush saying
    the war with Iraq was the wrong war in the wrong place and
    time.

    ¶42. (C) The Amir closed the meeting by offering that based on
    30 years of experience with the Iranians, they will give you
    100 words.  Trust only one of the 100.

    ¶43. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message.

    Lebaron

`