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### Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI744, UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD) JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ABUDHABI744 | 2009-07-22 10:10 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    VZCZCXRO6352
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHAD #0744/01 2031011
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 221011Z JUL 09 ZDK CTG RUEHDO #3763
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2753
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0485
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1746
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0922
    RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0676
    RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0428
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0654
    RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 1587
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0104
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000744

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA

    E.O. 12958: 07/21/2019
    TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
    QA, AE

    SUBJECT: UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD) JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND
    COS DIALOGUE

    ABU DHABI 00000744  001.2 OF 004

    CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B
    AND D.

    Summary
    -------

    ¶1.  (S/NF) In a July 20 plenary session of the GSD with a large UAE
    delegation, accompanied by a smaller session with the UAE Chief of
    Staff, the immediate focus was largely on Iran.  Participants
    reiterated the good defense cooperation that the U.S. and UAE enjoy,
    while noting the need to improve coordination further to deal with
    real and urgent threats in the region. In this regard, the  UAE put
    the threat of Iran's potential reaction to a "likely" Israeli attack
    on its nuclear program at the center of scenarios to be considered.
    Other issues, to include Yemen, counter-proliferation, Pakistan, the
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and extremism were also addressed, but
    even these were often seen through the prism of Iranian intentions.

    ¶2.  (S/NF) This message begins with the Chief of Staff's urgent plea
    on "munitions" to deal with an unpredictable Iran, followed by a
    synopsis of GSD plenary proceedings.  A list of UAE participants is
    included at para 20.  End summary.

    Chief of Staff Presses for Munitions:
    Urgent about Iran's unpredictability
    ------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (S/NF) In a brief session with principals only, Chief of Staff
    Hamad Thani al-Romaithi (who also participated in the MbZ dinner and
    was on his way to Lebanon later July 20) said the UAE cannot act
    alone in the region and needs coherent plans -- especially to deal
    with the unique threat of Iran.  How to deter Iran without provoking
    it is a challenge.  Ambassador al-Otaiba emphasized how the proximity
    of the UAE to Iran magnifies the threat perception; the CoS said UAE
    military planning had to consider worst-case scenarios.

    ¶4.  (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said the USG did not disagree with the UAE
    evaluation of Iran's objectives, but that we need to work to prevent
    them from achieving those objectives.  Diplomacy is only one tool.
    The USG wants to help provide the UAE with defensive capabilities and
    our troop presence here should help act as a deterrent to Iran.  We
    don't want to signal that we will give up on diplomacy, yet in
    parallel to that effort we intend to keep the pressure on Iran.  We
    appreciate the candor of our defense engagement with the UAE.  We are
    dealing with an unpredictable foe and need to take all precautions.

    ¶5.  (S/NF) The CoS said Iran will remain a threat in any case, as its
    objectives are constant.  He added that if the Israelis strike, Iran
    may lash out at the UAE and around the Gulf -- one can conceive of
    many possible scenarios from missile strikes to attacks on isolated
    islands to the exploitation of 130,000 Iranians living in the UAE.
    The UAE therefore seeks ongoing support from the region's "main
    actor," the U.S., and desires close defense coordination.  The UAE's
    friends in the GCC, on the other hand, are not always realistic in
    their approach to Iran, he said, citing Arab misinterpretation of
    "brotherly" Iraqi intentions with regards to Kuwait back in 1990.

    ¶6.  (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said that our message to Iran is that threats
    against our allies will not go unanswered.  We need to be prepared in
    case deterrence does not work, with the realization that with or
    without nuclear weapons Iran seeks to be a dominant power in the
    region.  This is a very interconnected region, asserted the CoS.  "If
    I was in the Israelis' shoes, I would attack, to reduce the nuclear
    threat."  The first reaction may be that the Iranians launch missiles
    against targets in Israel and then the Gulf, he added.  Air Chief
    Sweidan added that the UAE needs munitions on a tighter timeline than
    previously assumed -- with urgent needs in 2010, 11, and 12.  He said
    the UAE Armed Forces could receive munitions from the U.S. inventory
    and then replenish them later (he supplied the same list of
    requirements as was relayed some months ago, noting that they had
    only received a "political" answer to that inquiry thus far).

    ABU DHABI 00000744  002 OF 004

    ¶7.  (S/NF) The CoS was appreciative of Patriot deployments, progress
    on command and control systems, and movement toward more effective
    shared early warning, but lamented that other pieces of the air
    defense puzzle require immediate attention.  Ambassador al-Otaiba
    reiterated the need to "borrow from U.S. inventories" to meet urgent
    timelines.  A/S Vershbow said we were leaning far forward for the UAE
    on THAAD, for example, and would continue to look into opportunities
    to assist, including filling gaps before UAE-purchased systems were
    delivered.

    ¶8.  (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of close defense coordination,
    the CoS noted that in the event of an attack the UAE may have no time
    to react.  Taking the fight to Iran may require "passing over U.S.
    aircraft carriers," for example, so we need to be in lock-step at all
    phases of preparation and operation.

    Introductory remarks
    --------------------

    ¶9.  (C) The Plenary session of the U.S.-UAE Gulf Security Dialogue
    (GSD) convened July 20 at the Armed Forces Officers' Club, with newly
    promoted Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih
    al-Kaabi stating that the "small but significant" Gulf region makes a
    large contribution to global peace and development and seeks enhanced
    cooperation with the U.S.  He cited UAE troops in Afghanistan, U.S.
    use of UAE bases, a robust intelligence exchange, strong
    counter-terror efforts, and improved border control as evidence that
    the UAE shares common goals with the U.S.  Citing the "high
    importance" of strong relations among GCC members, he thanked the
    U.S. for its role in the defense relationship and wanted to learn
    more about U.S. strategies vis-a-vis Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
    Palestine.

    ¶10.  (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow, leading the U.S.
    team along with Assistant State of State for Political-Military
    AffairsShapiro, expressed confidence in the strength and future of
    the bilateral relationship, anchored by common strategic interests.
    Recounting shared priorities, he noted that the GSD was being taken
    to a new level as we seek strategic synergy in facing real threats
    like Iran -- which we are obligated to defend against.  He called for
    a more multi-lateral approach to counter-proliferation and cited the
    need to prepare missile defenses.  He lauded the UAE decision to host
    LEADING EDGE 2009 and cited the 123 agreement with the U.S. as the
    high standard on civil nuclear cooperation.  The responsible drawdown
    of U.S. troops in Iraq also calls for continued UAE support, he
    emphasized, as Iraq seeks to assume responsibility for its own
    security and integrate into the region.  The UAE's advanced fighter
    squadron, growing air defense net, participation in RED FLAG, and
    leadership of CTF 152 are all indications of a maturing defense
    capability.

    ¶11.  (C)  A/S Shapiro emphasized the USG desire to ensure regional
    stability, counter extremism, curb WMD proliferation, and tackle the
    inter-related challenges of the region holistically.  He focused on
    the threat from Iran, stressing that the USG was attempting a
    diplomatic solution -- if possible -- and would proceed in
    consultation with our friends in the region.  Recounting the basic
    components of our Iraq policy, he also highlighted the need to
    strengthen the institutions of government in Lebanon and build
    capacity within the Palestinian Authority.

    UAE offers threat analysis: all Iran
    ------------------------------------

    ¶12.  (S) The UAE's presentation of the primary regional threat
    assessed that Iran's leadership "genuinely believes that it has
    emerged victorious from its clash with the U.S.," with gains made in
    Iraq, an expanding "Shi'a tide" in the region, an ongoing nuclear
    program, missile modernization, and continued provocation of
    resistance in Gaza.  While Israel was able to neutralize to some
    degree threats on its flanks in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/9),

    ABU DHABI 00000744  003 OF 004

    Iran's main goals of regional influence were not inhibited.  The UAE
    assessment continued that Israel may act on its perception that only
    "extreme" (and unlikely) UNSC action or unilateral Israeli military
    action can slow Iran's nuclear goals.  As Iran continues to reject a
    political solution, the UAE must prepare for the fallout should
    Israel act on its fears.  With that, the briefer introduced a slide
    on Iran's capabilities, with missile sites in the south of Iran and
    concentric circles showing their likely range all covering UAE
    territory.

    ¶13.  (S) Iranian promotion of "Shi'ism," coupled with sleeper cells
    in the region, magnify the threat articulated by the UAE.  If
    attacked, it may seek to obstruct shipping in the Gulf and control
    (more) islands over which it does not have legitimate sovereignty.
    Working in alliance with al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi'a, Iran
    is poised to do damage of an unpredictable nature if/when provoked.
    In sum, Iran continued as the traditional focus of the threat
    briefing offered by the UAE at GSD sessions.  Other regional concerns
    noted in lesser detail included Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
    the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and piracy.

    Strategic Cooperation
    ---------------------

    ¶14.  (C) In further briefings, the UAE team highlighted good
    operational cooperation with the U.S. and offered a review of the
    maturing Critical National Infrastructure Agency (CNIA) which is
    taking charge of security on land, along the coast, and off shore --
    with an initial focus on Abu Dhabi but an intent to serve as a
    federal agency.  The U.S. Coast Guard and NYPD were cited as partners
    in the growing CNIA mission, with a U.S. promise of first-time
    "Nuclear Security Training" in the near future.

    ¶15.  (S) The UAE delegation received  a draft "UAE National Defense
    Strategy and U.S.-UAE Comprehensive Defense Strategy" document
    outlining key priorities in the defense relationship (a document
    proposed by UAE Ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba).  Without
    immediate comment on the substance of the USG draft, al-Kaabi said
    the UAE would reply via embassy channels and looked forward to
    continuing the dialogue.

    Q&A on Iran, Yemen
    ------------------

    ¶16.  (C) When the floor was open to general discussion, two topics
    dominated:  Iran and Yemen.  The UAE asked whether the USG had any
    new information since the December 2007 NIE regarding Iran's nuclear
    weaponization program; the U.S. team noted that a new estimate was in
    progress but it was premature to comment.  The DMI representative
    also noted that Iran exploits crises for its own advantage, making
    the defusing of crises like Palestine and Lebanon imperative if we
    are to keep Iran in check.  In the case of Palestine, he added
    optimistically, it is time to "cut to the chase" and deal with final
    status issues; Lebanon is also ripe for progress, he suggested,
    without a drawn out process.

    ¶17.  (S) On Yemen, the UAE said it shared a U.S. concern that a
    "failed state" could emerge on the Arabian Peninsula, with terrorist
    partners and Iranian influence further poisoning the mix.  A
    collapsed Yemen "gives us Afghanistan," said Commander of the Air
    Force and Air Defense Major General Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi, and
    then it presents a long-term threat to the region.  He said the UAE
    was coordinating economic development support for Yemen while also
    trying to assist with political reconciliation.  He noted the dangers
    of "another Somalia."  ASD Vershbow hoped the UAE could help secure a
    unified GCC approach to Yemen, as time is running out on the
    seccession question and Yemen cannot afford a "two front" war with
    both seccesionists and the Al-Houthi insurgency.  In a brief
    discussion of Pakistan, all agreed that Islamabad needs to focus
    resources to fight insurgency rather than obsessing with India as its
    potential military foe.

    ABU DHABI 00000744  004 OF 004

    Positive Conclusions
    --------------------

    ¶18.  (C) Enhanced U.S.-UAE cooperation to counter troublesome
    financial flows and cash smuggling -- solidified during a recent
    visit by Treasury Secretary Geithner -- was noted by the Charge as
    another area of productive engagement.  Both sides also put in very
    positive words about the role of the Air Warfare Center which has
    become a proud center of excellence for the region.

    ¶19.  (S) In closing, al-Kaabi raised Iran yet again, noting that its
    leadership is not likely to change fundamentally and therefore the
    threat is likely to continue.  He looked forward to ongoing
    discussion of the defense strategy discussed earlier as we continue
    to pursue a common vision.

    ¶20.  (SBU) UAE delegation:

    --- Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih al-Kaabi, Deputy Chief of
    Staff
    --- Staff Major General (Pilot) Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi,
    Commander of Air Force and Air Defense
    --- Staff Colonel Abdullah Saeed al-Hamoodi, Intelligence and
    Military Security
    --- Lt. Colonel (Dr.) Albadr Shareef al-Shatri, Intelligence and
    Military Security
    --- Staff Brigadier General Khalfan al-Kaabi, Ground Forces
    --- Staff Colonel (Pilot) Salim Saeed, Ground Forces
    --- Staff Lt. Colonel Abdullah al-Yamahi, Directorate of Joint
    Operations
    --- Brigadier General (Dr.) Humaid Ali al-Kitbi, Purchasing
    Directorate
    --- Staff Colonel Saeed Rashid al-Shihi, CNIA
    --- Staff Brigadier General Mohamed Murad al-Baloushi, Air Forces
    --- Colonel (Engineer) Ahmad Sultan, Air Forces
    --- Staff Lt. Colonel Engineer Jamal Mohamed al-Ameri, Air Forces
    --- Major Juma Sultan, Air Forces
    --- Staff Major (Pilot) Ali Saleh, Air Forces
    --- Major (Pilot) Abdullah Sultan al-Mazroui, GSD secretariat for
    plenary

    ¶21.  (U) The GSD traveling party approved this message .

    GREENE

`