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### Viewing cable 10ANKARA251, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'S MEETINGS WITH TURKISH

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10ANKARA251 | 2010-02-16 11:11 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXYZ0004
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAK #0251/01 0471120
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 161120Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2130
    INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 1572
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0191
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7716
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4315

` `

    S E C R E T ANKARA 000251

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020
    TAGS: PARM PREL PTER TU
    SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'S MEETINGS WITH TURKISH
    MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND CHIEF OF THE TURKISH
    GENERAL STAFF, FEBRUARY 6, 2010

    Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
    (SecDef) met with Turkish Minister of National Defense Mehmet
    Vecdi Gonul (MND Gonul) and the Chief of the Turkish Genral
    Staff General Ilker Basbug (Gen Basbug) in separate meetings
    during his bilateral visit to Ankara on February 6, 2010.
    SecDef thanked Gonul and Basbug for Turkey's valuable
    contributions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Gonul stressed
    Turkey's important role in Afghanistan as a Muslim country in
    the Alliance and Basbug hailed continuing U.S. and Turkish
    support to Afghan National Security Force training and
    assistance to the Pakistani Armed Forces.  SecDef and Gonul
    discussed the importance of a Turkish role in European
    Missile Defense.  On combating the PKK in Turkey, SecDef
    agreed with Basbug that the key to further progress is
    greater Iraqi cooperation with Turkey. SecDef highlighted to
    Gonul opportunities to increase military capability and gain
    economic benefits through choosing Sikorsky helicopters or
    Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 systems in ongoing tenders.

    ----------------------
    Bilateral Relationship
    ----------------------

    ¶2. (C) MND Gonul stressed the importance of the SecDef's
    visit, noting that it built on the Prime Minister's December
    meeting in Washington with President Obama in December.
    SecDef agreed on the importance of the bilateral
    relationship, and recalled that Turkish-American solidarity
    extended from the Korean War through the present in
    Afghanistan.  SecDef said he believed that Turkey was
    undervalued as an Ally by many Europeans.

    -----------
    Afghanistan
    -----------

    ¶3. (S/NF) In both meetings SecDef conveyed U.S. appreciation
    for Turkey's contributions to Afghanistan -- including
    providing troops, OMLTs, POMLTs, a PRT, commanding
    RC-Capital, providing access through the Incirlik air base,
    and allowing the transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan
    through Turkish air space.  Regarding Turkey's contributions
    to ISAF, GEN Basbug said that "we are trying to do our best"
    with the PRT in Wardak province and command of RC-Capital.
    He observed that the hardest aspect of the fight against the
    Taliban was differentiating between the real Taliban and
    those that merely helped or supported the Taliban or even
    indigenous forces not aligned with the Taliban.  However,
    Basbug was hopeful that Allies could win over some of those
    who were sympathetic to the Taliban through a reintegration
    strategy.

    ¶4. (S/NF) Gonul emphasized that Turkey had a "special
    connection" with the people of Afghanistan due to common
    Islamic roots.  Turkey's involvement in ISAF offered a way of
    refuting insurgents' attempts to use Islam as ideological
    justification for their efforts.  SecDef agreed that having
    Muslim soldiers participate in ISAF drives home the fact that
    the fight in Afghanistan is not against Islam but rather
    against terrorists who "pervert Islam."

    ¶5. (S/NF) Basbug was upbeat about prospects for success in
    Afghanistan, noting that the positive tone of GEN
    McChrystal's brief at the NATO CHODs conference had inspired
    more optimism among his colleagues than had his original
    September brief on his assessment.  SecDef said he agreed
    with McChrystal's latest assessment that the situation was
    serious but no longer deteriorating, but warned that no one
    should exaggerate how well things were going.  At the
    Istanbul Ministerial as well, he said, there had clearly been
    a change in mood among the Ministers present.  Significantly,
    Defense Minister Wardak had told him that for the first time
    he had begun to hope for a successful outcome in Afghanistan.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Basbug described the terrorist attacks in Kabul on
    January 18th as serious, but said that the ANSF response
    ultimately offered an "outstanding" example of how to manage
    a very complex operation.  Nine terrorists were killed and
    two were captured, and the terrorists did not ultimately
    achieve their objectives.  Describing post-attack operations
    as "a cause for optimism," Basbug said that the Afghan forces
    involved showed they were motivated, well disciplined, and
    well prepared for the fight.  Basbug then reviewed Turkey's
    plans for training the ANA and the ANP, stressing that the

    priority was to provide unit training both in Turkey and in
    Afghanistan.  So far, he said, Turkey had trained three
    Afghan companies and would open a training center in Kabul to
    do battalion-level training soon.

    --------
    Pakistan
    --------

    ¶7.  (S/NF) Basbug also raised Pakistan, recalling his October
    visit at the invitation of General Kayani.  During his visit
    to Swat province he had witnessed a hundred-fold improvement
    in security since his previous visit, citing the return of
    civilian populations to the region as a clear success for
    Pakistani forces.  Sec Def agreed, observing that the degree
    of success by Pakistani forces ran counter to all of our
    intelligence predictions.

    ¶8. (S/NF) Basbug highlighted the TGF's support for Pakistan's
    armed forces - especially on logistics and maintenance of
    equipment, including spare parts for their Air Force.  He
    said that although overall relationships with Pakistan were
    sometimes difficult, cooperation remained solid at the
    military level.

    ----------------
    Counterterrorism
    ----------------

    ¶9.  (S/NF) Basbug raised the issue of Turkey's protracted
    fight against the PKK, highlighting progress over the past
    year due to the elimination of key leaders, divisions within
    PKK ranks, and dwindling morale of PKK fighters.  This
    progress, Basbug said, was the result of increased
    U.S.-Turkish cooperation since the end of 2007, including
    intelligence sharing, provision of ISR support, and use U.S.
    UAV assets in Northern Iraq.  Basbug concluded by requesting
    additional support from the United States government, Iraqi
    government, and KRG.  Drawing a parallel to U.S. actions in
    the cross-border region of Pakistan, Basbug said that in
    order to continue to eliminate the PKK threat, Turkey needs
    more support from all stakeholders to pursue the top PKK
    leadership.

    ¶10.  (S/NF) Addressing Turkey's outstanding Reaper UAV
    requests, SecDef reaffirmed to Basbug that the U.S. is
    committed to the sale of Reapers to Turkey, but offered the
    caveat that the sale would first have to be approved by
    Congress.  SecDef added that the Pentagon is also looking at
    additional reconnaissance capabilities in addition to the
    Predators currently flown by the U.S.  The U.S. he said, is
    considering some UAVs with shorter dwell times, which have
    proven to be effective in Iraq.  Regarding current UAV
    support -- which already provides an average of 16-17 hours
    of coverage daily -- SecDef said that Gen Odierno will look
    at ways to surge up to 24-hour coverage when necessary, e.g.
    for operations involving high-value targets.

    ¶11. (S/NF) SecDef emphasized that Turkey's dialogue with KRG
    was very important.  In his meeting the previous week with
    KRG President Barzani, SecDef said he pressed him once again
    to work with the PKK to persuade them to abandon violence.
    Basbug agreed and said Turkey's dialogue with the KRG was
    particularly important as a measure to persuade the KRG to
    take a more proactive approach to the PKK.

    ¶12. (S/NF) Basbug expressed concern about the U.S. drawdown
    of forces from Iraq, lamenting that while Turkey has been
    successful in reducing the PKK threat, it will be difficult
    to finish off the threat after U.S forces leave.  He
    concluded that Turkey would need to "finish the problem"
    before the U.S. drawdown was complete.

    ------------------------
    Missile Defense and Iran
    ------------------------

    ¶13. (S/NF) MND Gonul said he considered the new US Phased
    Adaptive approach better than the previous Administration's
    approach, since the previous system did not cover Turkey.
    SecDef agreed, noting that the Polish and Romanian agreement
    to host SM-3 missiles.  He further emphasized that without a
    radar based in Turkey, significant areas in the eastern part
    of the country would not be covered by the system.

    ¶14. (S/NF) Gonul told SecDef that discussions about the radar
    were ongoing within the Turkish government and inquired about

    what alternate sites the U.S. was considering.  SecDef
    responded that other countries in Southeast Europe might be
    interested in hosting the radar, but reiterated that Turkey
    was the optimal site.  SecDef explained that one of the
    reasons why he had embraced the new administration's approach
    was that it provided protection for Allies and troops earlier
    than the previous program without reducing protection of the
    U.S.

    ¶15. (S/NF) Turning to Iran, Gonul cited the enrichment
    program and acknowledged that Ankara is "concerned about the
    Iranian threat," but said that the international community
    does not yet have evidence that there is a weapons program.
    Gonul said that even though Turkey does not expect an attack
    from Iran, the threat from Iran to Turkey's European allies
    would make an air defense capability important. (Comment: His
    acknowledgement of an Iranian threat to Europe diverges from
    previous Turkish statements underplaying such a threat.)  He
    repeated that the system would be designed to defend all of
    Europe, and not solely Turkey.

    ¶16. (S/NF) SecDef counseled that if Iran goes forward with a
    nuclear weapons program, other states in the region were
    likely to proliferate as well.  Additionally, there was a
    good chance Israelis would at some point decide that military
    action was necessary.  As Turkey would inevitably be unable
    to sit out on any conflict in the region, it is important to
    be prepared militarily and Ankara should not hesitate to
    acquire defensive systems, even as the international
    community works to stop Iran's efforts.

    --------------------
    Acquisition Advocacy
    --------------------

    ¶17. (C//NF) During his meeting with Gonul, SecDef advised
    that Turkey had opportunities to increase its military
    capabilities while gaining economic benefits by selecting
    U.S. companies in currently open tenders.  First, Sikorsky,
    was prepared to guarantee that for every helicopter produced
    in Turkey and bought by Turkey, Sikorsky would produce a
    second helicopter in Turkey for export.  SecDef explained
    that in addition to providing modern equipment for Turkey,
    this offer would provide hundreds of millions of dollars in
    export revenue.  Gonul replied that Sikorsky had told him
    Turkey was the largest consumer of Sikorsky helicopters after
    the U.S. and that Turkey already was buying 70 Sea Hawk
    helicopters (as well as 14 heavy lift helos (CH-47s) from
    Boeing).  The tender for the new project had been running for
    two years and the short list included Sikorsky and an Italian
    company.  Gonul believes Sikorsky has a good chance to win.

    ¶18. (C/NF) A second opportunity involves the co-production of
    Raytheon PAC-3 Patriot systems.  Demand for these systems in
    the Gulf States could potentially yield hundreds of millions
    of dollars in export revenue.  SecDef stressed that "nothing
    can compete with the PAC-3 when it comes to capabilities."
    These opportunities are a chance for Turkey to earn revenue
    while simultaneously enhancing capabilities and creating
    jobs.

    ¶19.  (C/NF) Gonul said this competition right now was between
    the U.S., Russia and China, but noted that French MoD Morin
    had indicated in Istanbul that the French would also make a
    bid including co-production arrangements.  Gonul observed
    that as this was an expensive project and he had limited
    familiarity with the PAC-3: he needed to be careful to make
    the right choice. SecDef pointed out that the Raytheon
    package would be easier to integrate with the command and
    control of the U.S. and others using the same system.

    --------------------
    Joint Strike Fighter
    --------------------

    ¶20. (C) Gonul said Turkey was pleased to be part of the joint
    Strike Fighter (JSF) program and noted his belief that it was
    important for Turkey to have maintenance facilities in
    Turkey.  SD remarked that because the program was recently
    restructured, cost estimates were now realistic.  SecDef
    noted he had directed the JSF program manager to put
    additional funding in the FY2011 and FY2012 budget for JSF.
    However, because of contractor delays, the timeline had
    slipped about a year.  In conclusion, Gonul raised Turkey's
    F-16 modernization program and expressed concern that new
    upgrades precluded Turkish access to computer systems and
    software modification previously allowed.  Turkish Under

    Secretary for Industry Bayar told SecDef he would pursue this
    issue in greater detail with Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition Ash Carter.

    ¶21. (U) SecDef has cleared this cable.  Drafted by OSD staff.
    Jeffrey

               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

`