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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09MUNICH328, GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN: IS THE CSU THE WEAKEST LINK

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09MUNICH328 | 2009-12-22 14:02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Munich

`

    VZCZCXRO2941
    OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHMZ #0328/01 3561442
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 221442Z DEC 09
    FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5006
    INFO RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0320
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000328

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR S/SRAP

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
    TAGS: PGOV EUN GM AF
    SUBJECT: GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN: IS THE CSU THE WEAKEST LINK
    IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY?

    REF: A. BERLIN 1601
         ¶B. MUNICH 324

    Classified By: Consul General Conrad Tribble for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
    )

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.   (C) Support within Chancellor Merkel,s partner
    Christian Social Union (CSU) for sending more German troops
    to Afghanistan is not a sure thing.  CSU chief and Bavarian
    Minister President  Seehofer, rattled German policy makers
    nationwide when he told Bild on December 7 that he had
    "little sympathy" for increasing the number of German
    soldiers sent to Afghanistan and that "someone would have to
    convince him of a clear alternative" and "any further German
    engagement had to be linked to a clear exit strategy."  CSU
    insiders privately regretted Seehofer's remarks, but the CSU
    General Secretary told us that it reflected realistic
    thinking.  Edmund Stoiber (ex-CSU chairman and ex-Minister
    President) acknowledged December 10 that the CSU was not
    automatically a firm U.S. ally on this question but said he
    expected all federal coalition parties to "live up to their
    responsibility" and take the right decision following the
    January 28 Afghanistan conference.  However, if he is wrong
    and there are significant defectors in either the CSU or the
    FDP, it will be difficult for even supportive SPD and Green
    parliamentarians to vote in favor of the revised mandate.
    End Summary.

    SEEHOFER MIGHT ECHO POPULAR CONCERNS
    ------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (C) Echoing concerns expressed privately by some
    Consulate contacts, many commentators reacted badly to the
    December 7 timing of Seehofer's skeptical Afghanistan
    remarks.  They accused him of populist posturing while
    Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, also CSU, was
    under intense political pressure for the Kunduz tanker
    bombing, Ambassador Holbrooke was in Germany to receive the
    Augsburg University Peace Prize, and President Obama was
    heading to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. However,
    others acknowledged that Seehofer reflected "proper concerns"
    and that Germany "needed to deliberate as carefully as the
    U.S. had done before committing new troops."  State
    Chancellery and Ministry officials, including the State
    Secretary for Federal and European Issues, told the Consul
    General in a private meeting on December 8 they were
    "embarrassed by Seehofer's remarks" and suggested he had
    reacted "like a populist" to recent opinion polls that showed
    69 percent of Germans opposed sending more German soldiers to
    Afghanistan.  (NOTE: Another recent poll reported that 69
    percent favored immediate withdrawal.)  A CSU contact called
    us that same morning from party headquarters to express his
    frustration over Seehofer who had "once again not consulted
    anybody before giving his two cents."  In contrast to this,
    CSU Secretary General Alexander Dobrindt told CG Tribble on
    December 8 that Seehofer's statement was by no means new but
    reflected "common CSU thinking."  Seehofer had "said this
    many times before," he insisted, without producing proof.

    AFGHAN ENTANGLEMENTS SPOOK THE CSU
    ----------------------------------

    ¶3.  (C) The CSU and Bavaria have a well-documented aversion
    to sensitive engagements in Afghanistan.  The CSU has refused
    to accept any of the 17 Uighurs to be released from
    Guantanamo, even though Munich is home to an estimated 500
    Uighurs, the largest Uigher community in Germany.  Bavaria
    resisted for over a year all entreaties to send police
    trainers to Afghanistan; the  first Bavarian police trainers
    just left in November after a change of heart by the Interior
    Minister.  CSU Bundestag deputy Peter Gauweiler, together
    with his CDU colleague Willy Wimmer, appealed to the Federal
    Constitutional Court in March 2007 to rule against German
    Tornado reconnaissance aircraft "assisting the U.S. in a
    mission in Afghanistan that was violating international law."
    In October 2008, Gauweiler again voted against German ISAF

    MUNICH 00000328  002 OF 002

    engagement.  While Gauweiler is generally seen as an outsider
    within the CSU party caucus, he may have some secret
    followers.  Another CSU Bundestag deputy, Thomas Silberhorn,
    said in October that the debate on Afghanistan "should not be
    limited to discussing more and more foreign soldiers but
    rather appealing on Afghanistan's own responsibility."

    CHANCELLOR NEEDS TO WORK HARDER TO CONVINCE THE PUBLIC
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶4.  (C) On December 10, Ambassador Murphy called on Edmund
    Stoiber, Bavarian Minister President from 1993 to 2007 and
    CSU party chairman from 1999 to 2007.  Stoiber praised the
    new U.S. Administration and President Obama's "courageous and
    honest" speeches in West Point and Oslo.  He reminded the
    Ambassador how German engagement in and responsibility for
    two world wars had "left marks of deep trauma on the German
    people."  The largest demonstrations ever, he recalled,
    occurred in the fifties when over one million Germans
    protested German rearmament.  The decision to support the
    NATO two-track decision in the early 1990,s even led to the
    resignation of Helmut Schmidt, one of Germany's most popular
    chancellors.  Stoiber said he did not expect any new insights
    from the January 28 London Afghanistan conference, but he
    expressed the hope that all parties of the federal government
    coalition would live up to their responsibilities.  In order
    to get broad CSU support, the leadership had to develop a
    realistic exit strategy as President Obama had showed the way
    with his 2011 target for the United States.  Stoiber said he
    had much confidence in Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu
    Guttenberg (CSU) who was politically well-connected, an
    expert on foreign policy, and sensitive for what had to be
    done.  However, he called on Chancellor Merkel to start a
    "public relations initiative" aimed at explaining to the
    German public why these operations were so vital for German
    security interests.  At the same time, Stoiber predicted the
    SPD and Greens would "return to their anti-war propaganda."
    Leaders like Gerhard Schroeder and Joschka Fischer had left
    the political scene, and ex-Foreign Minister Steinmeier was
    about to get marginalized in the new SPD.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶5. (C) At the Consulate in Munich, we heard unprompted,
    mostly negative, reactions from CSU leadership and working
    level operatives around Seehofer to his skeptical remarks
    concerning Germany's Afghanistan troop levels.  However,  it
    is clear that the CSU is on the fence and remains to be
    convinced about the need or wisdom of sending additional
    troops,  especially combat troops as opposed to troops sent
    to train the Afghan National Army or to provide force
    protection for police mentoring teams.  He may be accurately
    reflecting the opinion of a skeptical German public that
    "wants to take its time, just like the United States'
    President did."  Embassy Berlin observes that unanimous or
    near unanimous support from the CSU is critical to Chancellor
    Merkel's goal of obtaining a broad majority in the Bundestag
    for a revised ISAF mandate after the London Conference.  If
    there are significant defectors in either the CSU or the FDP,
    where there is also significant skepticism about a troop
    increase, it will be difficult for even supportive SPD and
    Green parliamentarians to vote in favor of the revised
    mandate.

    ¶6.  (U)  ConGen Munich and Embassy Berlin coordinated this
    cable.
    TRIBBLE

`