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### Viewing cable 09DOHA728, QATAR,S PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN: "THEY LIE TO US;

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09DOHA728 | 2009-12-20 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Doha

`

    VZCZCXYZ0036
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHDO #0728/01 3541214
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 201214Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
    TO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9582
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

` `

    S E C R E T DOHA 000728

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
    TAGS: ENRG PREL TRGY EPET QA
    SUBJECT: QATAR,S PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN: "THEY LIE TO US;
    WE LIE TO THEM."

    Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

    -- Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman and Ambassador met
    December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani
    (HBJ) to discuss energy research and development, critical
    infrastructure protection, and Iran.

    -- HBJ indicated Qatar,s interest in a bilateral critical
    infrastructure protection partnership.

    -- The PM was skeptical about the plausibility of Iranian
    acceptance of a nuclear compromise, saying he would be
    shocked if Iran abided by a deal to ship Low-Enriched Uranium
    (LEU) out of Iran.

    -- The best way to deal with the Iranians, he said, is to get
    them to dictate the terms of any such deal. The U.S. and its
    partners should strive to get the Iranians to put the details
    in writing, including timetables for implementation.

    -- HBJ characterized Qatar,s relationship with Iran as one
    in which "they lie to us, and we lie to them."

    -- According to HBJ, the GOQ tells Iran that it should
    "listen to the West,s proposal or there will be military
    action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the
    middle of next year."

    End Key Points.

    ¶1. (C) Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman and
    Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin
    Jassim Al Thani. Also present on the American side was State
    Department Coordinator for International Energy Affairs,
    David Goldwyn.  DepSec Poneman thanked the Prime Minister for
    the meeting and expressed his hope that the U.S. and Qatar
    could strengthen their bilateral and investment ties.

    --------------------------------------
    (C) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
    --------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary extended USG appreciation to the
    Prime Minister for Qatar,s support for the victims of
    Hurricane Katrina. The PM observed in response that "We might
    have our own Katrina," an apparent reference to security
    concerns arising from Qatar,s relationship with Iran. Deputy
    Secretary offered U.S. help to Qatar in protecting its
    critical infrastructure and in addressing its broader
    security concerns. Expressing interest in critical
    infrastructure protection, HBJ said he would talk to the
    Ministries of Energy and Interior on how best to take
    advantage of U.S. assistance.

    ---------------------------------
    SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT
    ---------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised science and technology
    investment, noting DoE interest in partnering with the GOQ on
    energy-related research and development projects. As an
    example of possible cooperation, DepSec Poneman cited
    computer simulation, emphasizing that the DOE national
    laboratories are international leaders in the field.

    ¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary reported that DoE had recently
    invested in a nanotechnology program and cited this as
    another possible area of cooperation, telling the PM there
    are additional opportunities for GOQ partnerships with
    private labs. Shaykh Hamad immediately expressed strong
    interest in nanotechnology, and asked the DepSec to provide
    him with a paper on that subject. The DepSec agreed, and
    added that he would be pleased to host Shaykh Hamad at the
    Sandia nanotechnology facility or another national lab.

    ¶5. (C) Turning to genomics and solar technology as they
    relate to food production and Qatar,s National Food Security
    Program, Shaykh Hamad told the Deputy Secretary that he
    supported research in those fields, but expressed his opinion
    that Qatar,s investment in food and solar technology must be
    done on a commercial basis.

    --------------------------
    (S) IRAN,S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
    ---------------------------

    ¶6. (S) DepSec Poneman asked HBJ for his views on Iran,s
    nuclear program. The Deputy Secretary noted that the USG had
    entered into recent discussions with Iran not out of naivet,
    but as an effort to address a humanitarian concern (the need
    for medical isotopes) while also attempting to remove a

    meaningful amount of special nuclear material. Even though
    the effort had not to date resulted in Iranian agreement, it
    had borne fruit in the form of Russian and Chinese support
    for the most recent resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors
    in Vienna. The PM expressed his skepticism that the West
    would be able to reach a deal with Iran,s leaders, saying
    "I,d be surprised and shocked if the Iranians do a deal. You
    always think you have a deal with them and then you don,t."
    He continued, "The EU, Chirac, and Solana...they all thought
    they had a deal... Solana said two weeks; I advised him it
    would take two years."

    ¶7. (S) Asked for his advice on how best to approach the
    Iranians, HBJ said it is imperative that the Iranians commit
    to draft any deal, including a timetable. He reiterated that
    it is important to "make them tell you (what they will do).
    Otherwise they will say 'yes, but...' and the 'but' will be
    worse than a 'no.'" The Deputy Secretary countered that,
    "They don,t want to make a proposal." To which HBJ
    responded, "You don,t understand. Even Mousavi can,t make a
    deal!" Poneman pressed the issue, saying the U.S. would not
    be offering a better deal than what is currently on the
    table. The Prime Minster said, "I know, but this is the way
    they are."

    ¶8. (S) Referring to the current proposal on the Tehran
    Research Reactor (TRR), Deputy Secretary Poneman stressed:
    "This is a fleeting opportunity. If they don,t take this
    deal, what comes next is worse." The PM noted that the
    Iranians frequently press the Qataris to have dialogue on
    their shared natural gas field and attempt to expand the
    dialogue to include other subjects.  HBJ said that the
    Qataris "are always throwing cold water on their ideas."

    ¶9. (S) On Qatar,s close ties with Iran, the PM added that he
    knows the U.S. becomes upset at times by what it hears about
    the Qatar/Iran relationship. However he characterized the
    relationship as one in which "They lie to us, and we lie to
    them." Poneman replied by underscoring that "It would be
    helpful if everywhere they went, they (the Iranians) heard
    the same thing."  The PM said for Qatar,s part, he  had told
    Iran that it should "listen to the West, s proposal or there
    will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the
    Israelis by the middle of next year." Poneman observed that
    the Russians had pressed the Iranians hard during the Vienna
    negotiations, reinforcing the view that Iranian failure to
    accept the Tehran Research Reactor deal would lead back to
    the UN Security Council.  The PM asked if the U.S. believes
    the Russians were in agreement with the U.S. on the
    possibility of harsher measures. Poneman replied that, for
    now, the Russians appear to be holding a similar line to the
    USG on the TRR deal and we remain in close contact with
    Moscow.

    ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSec Poneman at
    Department of Energy.
    LeBaron

`