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### Viewing cable 10RPODUBAI13, IRAN'S GREEN PARTY OPPOSITION: ITS BIRTH AND EVOLUTION (1/3)

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10RPODUBAI13 | 2010-01-12 14:02 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Iran RPO Dubai

`

    VZCZCXRO5785
    OO RUEHBC RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHDIR #0013/01 0121439
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 121438Z JAN 10
    FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0038
    INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
    RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 RPO DUBAI 000013

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/12
    TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
    SUBJECT: IRAN'S GREEN PARTY OPPOSITION: ITS BIRTH AND EVOLUTION (1/3)

    CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iran's Green Path Opposition (GPO) came into being
    as a result of the fixed June 12 Presidential election. What
    started as a movement to annul the election now gives shelter both
    to those seeking the full set of rights guaranteed them by Islamic
    Iran's Constitution and others seeking a new system altogether.
    Although the numbers of those publicly willing to march under its
    banner have decreased in the face of regime brutality, its current
    core group, mostly college-age urban youth, have shown no sign of
    giving up the fight.   But like the regime that seeks to crush it,
    the GPO is not monolithic and there is a clear gulf between the
    opposition's elite leadership and the popular movement protesting
    in the streets.  Remaining outside the umbrella of the GPO is an
    array of unsatisfied groups whose willingness to join the GPO is
    unclear.  These groups clearly oppose President Ahmadinejad but do
    not yet seek, as do many GPO elements, to overturn the entire
    system. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) NOTE: This is the first in a series of three cables
    examining the Iranian Opposition since the June 12 Presidential
    election, what might happen in the short-term, and what the most
    effective levers of US policy have been so far and what combination
    may have the most impact in the coming months.

    ¶I. BIRTH OF THE GPO

    ---------------------------

    ¶3. (C) ELECTION BUILD-UP AND ORIGINS OF THE GREEN PATH OPPOSITION:
    Iran's current unrest began in June 2009, when Iran's lackluster
    Presidential campaign became energized by a (first-time) series of
    televised debates among the four Presidential candidates:  former
    Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (reformist), former Speaker
    Mehdi Karrubi (reformist), Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen
    Rezai (moderate conservative) and President Ahmadinejad (hard-line
    conservative).  President Ahmadinejad's accusations that former
    Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami were 'plotting' against his
    government and, along with Mousavi and other reformists, sought to
    undermine the Revolution and to enrich themselves, galvanized
    ordinary Iranians.  Incivility and accusations at odds with
    obligatory Persian politesse  left many observers with the
    impression (discomforting for some, energizing for others) that the
    elections might actually be more of a true contest than past
    elections, and that Ahmadinejad might actually be vulnerable to an
    upset.

    ¶4. (C) These Presidential debates sparked popular interest in the
    election, and in the last week or so before the June 12 vote
    reformist candidate Mousavi, with active and behind-the-scenes
    support from Khatami and Rafsanjani, increasingly gained momentum,
    with his supporters for the first time beginning to speak publicly
    of a 'Green Movement.' Part of his support were young, first-time
    voters; part were revitalized older 'Second of Khordad' reformists
    who had turned out in record number to support Khatami in 1997 and
    2001, but who had subsequently sourced on politics due to Khatami's
    inability to effect change.  Another large group of first-time
    voters were from the ranks of the "Khamoush" ('silent') - ie,
    Iranians who had never voted but who were inspired by prospects for
    positive change and had hope that this election would be genuine.
    Mousavi may have even drawn some support for older and more
    conservative voters who remembered his steady stewardship of Iran's
    economy during his stint as Prime Minister during the 1980's
    Iran-Iraq War.

    ¶5. (C) ELECTION DAY: IRIG elections have never been 'free and
    fair,' but until June 2009 most electoral machinations consisted
    primarily of the conservative Guardian Council screening out
    ideologically undesirable candidates, plus vote manipulation at
    relatively low levels, including using the Basij to 'get out the
    vote.'  Conventional wisdom going into June 12 was that a high
    turnout -- representing energized young and urban voters -- would
    favor Mousavi, who would need a few million vote 'cushion' in order

    DUBAI 00000013  002 OF 006

    to either win outright or to get into a subsequent two-man runoff
    with Ahmadinejad.  While we don't know nor might not ever know the
    real June 12 vote count, it is clear that the turnout was at record
    high levels and that there was systematic vote count fraud (if in
    fact the votes were even counted) to ensure that Ahmadinejad 'won
    big' in the first round.

    ¶6. (C) Why the fix? In retrospect, many of the reasons seem clear.
    Part of the answer could relate to SLK's desire to have unified
    control over the three branches of government to strengthen Iran's
    hand, and his hand personally, in expected upcoming negotiations
    with the West and the US over nuclear issues.  More certainly, part
    of the answer is that after the 1997-2005 Khatami Presidency,
    Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) was determined to prevent any
    reformist, especially his former political opponent Mousavi, from
    heading the Executive Branch.  SLK considers Rafsanjani his most
    serious rival, and is also intimidated by Khatami's popularity.
    Therefore, that both Rafsanjani and Khatami supported Mousavi may
    have led SLK to conclude that a Mousavi victory would consolidate
    power in the hands of those bitter rivals and leave him
    unacceptably vulnerable to marginalization.  And part of the answer
    relates to the increasingly powerful IRGC hardline faction that had
    supported Ahmadinejad (AN) in 2005, whose support AN strengthened
    over the subsequent four years by using government funds and
    patronage to increase this faction's power and wealth. As such,
    this hardline IRGC faction, composed mostly of high-level officers
    with a shared intelligence-security background, wanted 'four more
    years,' despite mixed support for AN from within the IRGC ranks.
    Anecdotal information indicates that this hardline faction had
    convinced SLK that the election could be fixed with minimal
    backlash.

    ¶7. (C) They were wrong, as shown by the unprecedented sight of
    millions of ordinary Iranians pouring into the streets chanting
    'where is my vote.' On June 19, SLK abandoned his carefully
    cultivated pretense of non-partisanship and took the first steps
    down the long road of post-election suppression when he lauded the
    'epic' June 12 vote and told those disputing the results to stop
    protesting and fall in line or face the consequences.  In response,
    what started as the pre-election 'Green Movement' slowly began
    changing into the 'Green Path of Hope' Opposition (GPO), as
    reformist leaders Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami signaled that they
    would not stand down.

    ¶8. (C) REGIME RESPONSE:  Regime reaction to ongoing post-election
    GPO activity was swift, conducted at both the popular and elite
    level:

    - At the elite level the regime began a widespread intimidation
    campaign to include Stalinesque show trials, rounding up not only
    'all the usual suspects' (i.e. first-tier reformists, primarily
    those associated with Khatami's 'Second of Khordad' movement), but
    also their family members, in addition to second-tier reformists,
    political and human rights activists, and reporters.  Many if not
    most of these detained, to include those arrests that garnered the
    most publicity in the West, played no significant role in either
    promoting  Mousavi's candidacy or in engendering post-election
    protests.  However anecdotal evidence indicates there have been
    extensive arrests of younger, lesser-known activists more active in
    the GPO.   Within the regime, SLK acted quickly to bring into line
    as many key power brokers as possible, including traditional
    conservatives like Majlis Speaker Larijani, former IRGC commander
    (and defeated Presidential candidate) Mohsen Rezai, and Tehran
    Mayor Qalibaf - all of whom oppose Ahmadinejad and would have been
    happy to see him go, but whose loyalty to the System and to the
    Leader trumped concerns they may have had about the extent of the
    voting fraud.

    - At the popular level the regime increasingly resorted to force on
    those public holidays when GPO supporters took to the streets. The
    following were the key dates on which the GPO took to the streets:

    DUBAI 00000013  003 OF 006

    -- 20 June 2009:  The day after SLK's gauntlet-throwing Friday
    Prayer speech saw several hundred thousand Iranians march in Tehran
    to protest, and also witnessed the first significant use of regime
    force against protestors.  The killing of one young marcher, Neda
    Agha Soltani, captured on video, focused global attention on the
    protests and gave the GPO a tragic but iconic image of martyrdom to
    wield against the regime.

       -- June 28, 2009 (7th of Tir): The first time the GPO used the
    cover of an officially sanctioned ceremony to rally against the
    government.  GPO supporters, led by a key Mousavi aide, caught
    security forces off guard by taking over an annual ceremony to mark
    the 1981 bombing that killed several leaders of the Revolution.

       -- July 17, 2009: The first and only time since June 12 when
    former President Rafsanjani, in many ways the main target of
    hardline regime animus, was allowed to give the Tehran Friday
    Prayer sermon.  Rafsanjani's much anticipated speech, in which he
    did not acquiesce to the official election results, energized
    opposition supporters and led to street clashes.

       -- September 18, 2009 (Ghods Day): The government-orchestrated
    event to demonstrate solidarity with Palestinians was co-opted by
    hundreds of thousands of GPO supporters flaunting green and
    chanting anti-government slogans.  Ghods Day was the zenith of the
    GPO's ability to bring significant number to the streets, and the
    last time when security forces by and large eschewed violence;

       -- November 4, 2009 (US Embassy Takeover Anniversary): The GPO
    hoped to replicate Ghods Day during the first large-scale protest
    since university campuses reopened. Increasingly ominous warnings
    from the security forces and revelations of detainee abuse resulted
    in smaller GPO turnout, and more violent clashes than previously;

       -- December 27, 2009 (Ashura and 7th Mourning Day for Grand
    Ayatollah Montazeri): Ashura witnessed the most violent clashes
    since June 20, with at least nine killed.  Violent clashes also
    took place in major cities outside of Tehran.

    II. WHERE WE ARE NOW

    ----------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) WHAT IS THE OPPOSITION: Up to now the GPO's most significant
    tool of resistance is popular turnout in the form of peaceful
    marching and civil disobedience on those holidays when the regime
    cannot prevent people taking to the streets. However, ongoing
    regime violence against protesters has decreased GPO turnout, from
    the millions of June 15 to a smaller committed core of (at most)
    hundreds of thousands. Much if not most of them are young,
    college-age Iranians, and understandably the vast majority of
    opposition turnout appears to have been in Tehran, although other
    major urban centers have also seen sporadic unrest. Although the
    number of GPO'ers willing to take to the streets has decreased from
    the days immediately following the June election, those remaining
    on the streets seem to have radicalized, with at least some
    opposition animus from AN to SLK: the new emblematic chant is no
    longer 'where is my vote' but 'death to the dictator (i.e. SLK).'
    At the elite level, not only are Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami the
    focus on hardline regime pressure, but former President Rafsanjani
    is under ongoing attack by these same forces.

    DUBAI 00000013  004 OF 006

    ¶10. (C) The GPO has a strong 'brand' - green, freedom, peace signs,
    silent marches, stolen election and martyrs like Neda Agha Soltani.
    But like the regime that seeks to crush it, the GPO is not
    monolithic. To characterize the GPO's active core as now primarily
    (but not exclusively) university students and university-age youth
    in a country so demographically young (for example, approximately
    one quarter of the population is in its twenties) is not to
    belittle its potential.  Outside of the active GPO core group there
    is a larger, relatively passive group, whose support now mostly
    manifests in the anonymous shouts of 'God is Great' from night-time
    North Tehran rooftops or who scrawl or stamp anti-regime slogans on
    ten thousand Toman currency notes. Presumably many of them have
    fled the field due to fear of regime reprisal but might be drawn
    back into the fray if the prospects of a GPO victory, however
    defined, became more real to them than the prospect of blows from a
    Basiji baton.

    ¶11. (C) OTHER OPPOSITIONS: Stepping back, it is wrong to assume
    that the GPO is the logical equivalent of 'the Iranian opposition,'
    and indeed it is more accurate to speak of many different Iranian
    oppositions, each with different constituents and goals, to include
    the following:

    - BUREAUCRACY: AN has effected vast bureaucratic top-down Executive
    branch personnel changes, ignoring the technocratic cadre that was
    the recruitment pool for the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies.
    Given his preference for ideology over expertise ('mota'hed' versus
    'motakhasses'), he has staffed his government largely from within
    the current and former IRGC ranks.  Many of these former ministers,
    deputy ministers, office heads and other senior bureaucrats have
    not been pleased with their professional fates.  At lower
    government levels, there is anecdotal evidence of widespread
    disgruntlement with if not opposition to AN.

    -MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE: AN and his hardline IRGC backers have
    extensively purged the Intelligence Ministry on the grounds of
    partisan loyalty, creating a significant cadre of disgruntled
    former Intelligence Ministry officials. Similarly, there is
    evidence of at least some IRGC opposition, both within the rank and
    file and also the upper ranks, at SLK's handling of the election
    and post-election events.

    - INDUSTRIALISTS: AN's massive economic mismanagement and the
    ongoing economic power grab of 'IRGC Incorporated' has engendered
    much ill will among Iran's affluent and influential industrial
    leaders.

    - RAFSANJANI/CLERGY: Rafsanjani's institutional power is minimal,
    but as part of his strategy he seeks to retain/expand his support
    within Iran's clerical class, although this class itself is
    increasingly impotent and dependent on government favor .  As one
    element of the regime's efforts to limit the pro-GPO clergy's
    influence, it has taken steps in recent weeks to challenge the
    religious titles and credentials of at least one top-level
    reformist cleric ("Grand Ayatollah").  This move will not likely
    endear the regime to many if not most Iranian traditional
    seminarians who take matters of religious credentials, learning,
    and hierarchy very seriously, especially given SLK's own lack of
    qualifications for his religious title.

    - 'MODERATE' PRINCIPLISTS: Within the ruling conservative
    'Principlist' ('Osulgarayan') grouping there is a significant
    faction opposing AN, though still quite loyal to SLK and the
    concept of 'Supreme Jurisconsulate.' One of this faction's leaders
    is Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, with the Majlis as a whole in an
    ongoing battle with AN's increasingly 'imperial' Executive Branch.
    Other major Principlist opponents are Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher
    Qalibaf and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai.

    DUBAI 00000013  005 OF 006

    GPO LEADERSHIP- STREET

    ---------------------------------

    ¶12.  (C) The GPO has promulgated a new mode of oppositionist
    organization for Iran.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that GPO
    leaders, especially Mousavi, have from the start favored a
    horizontal, diffuse, decentralized GPO structure as opposed to a
    more hierarchical one.   Indeed, part of the GPO's resilience stems
    from this defuse and decentralized nature, frustrating a regime
    that has come to rely on the two-step of identifying and
    decapitating leadership as its main tool for extinguishing dissent.
    In this regard communication technologies such as the Internet and
    SMS technology have been a significant 'force multiplier,' with
    virtual space in many ways playing the same 'information-center'
    role now that the networks of mosques played in the 1979
    Revolution.  GPO leaders Karrubi, Mousavi and Khatami play a role
    both symbolic and also operational, with anecdotal evidence
    indicating that they are playing at least a limited role in
    coordinating with if not leading the GPO masses.   Additionally,
    for the first time since the Revolution elements of the Iranian
    Diaspora seem to be playing a role within events in Iran,
    coordinating with GPO leadership elements inside the country.

    ¶13. (C) Distance between the titular GPO leadership and the street
    may yield tactical advantages, though it also reflects a gulf
    between the leadership and the popular opposition. Mousavi,
    Karrubi, and Khatami are longstanding fixtures of the Islamic
    Republic, making them ill suited to lead a radicalizing movement
    calling for the overthrow of that system.  Certainly they retain
    support from the broader opposition, but many, and particularly the
    more radicalized elements, do not look to Mousavi et al for
    leadership.  In particular, IRPO contacts in their 20s and 30s
    discount the notion that anyone previously associated with 'the
    Nezam' ('the System') could accurately represent their interests
    and aspirations.  The regime, however, has proved particularly
    effective at neutralizing emerging leaders from the post-Revolution
    generations.

    ¶14. (C) Within the GPO there is no consensus on its goals. What
    started as a movement merely to annul the election results now
    gives shelter both to those seeking the full set of rights
    guaranteed them by Islamic Iran's Constitution and others seeking a
    new system of governance altogether.   Much like the ambiguity in
    its leadership, the unspecified nature of its goals allow it to
    have a 'bigger tent.'  Mousavi's recent five point declaration
    calling for restoring press freedom, creating a fair and
    transparent election law, freeing all political prisoners, and
    recognizing the peoples' right to gather and to form political
    associations and parties, was however an attempt by the GPO
    leaderships to to begin to delimit the scope of their ambitions.

    ¶15. (C) Heretofore the GPO has yet to adopt any sort of an economic
    agenda or set of grievances as part of a core opposition message,
    and perhaps the absence of one partially underscores the relative
    'bourgeois' leanings of the GPO.   Anecdotal information indicates
    that unemployment and a potential spike in inflation (expected with
    the recent decision to end subsidies) increasingly concern a large
    number of Iranians.  IRPO contacts and Iranian press reporting also
    indicate another spike in labor unrest, due to the parlous state of
    Iran's factories and their inability to pay their workers on time.
    One would think that a message that capitalizes on these economic
    concerns juxtaposed against President Ahmadinejad's (and by
    extension the Revolution's) economic mismanagement and continued
    corruption would attract a wide spectrum of socio-economic groups
    to a more broad-based GPO.  However, for whatever reason, in
    contemporary Iran it has been political and not economic themes
    that have been more effective in mobilizing the Iranian people, and
    economic concerns on their own have rarely drawn large protests in
    Iran's thirty-year post-revolutionary history.

    DUBAI 00000013  006 OF 006

    ¶16. (U) COMMENT:  The June 12 election and its subsequent
    protests/crackdown was a tectonic shift in Iranian domestic
    politics.  At the elite level it destroyed Khamenei's non-partisan
    veneer, placing him securely in the center of a no holds-barred
    political fray.  It also redefined the sets of insider ('khodi')
    and outsider ('qeyr-e khodi') so that not only were Second of
    Khordad Reformists on the outs, but so was former President Hashemi
    Rafsanjani and those aligned with him.  In this regard, at the
    elite level the central dynamic in many ways can be seen as Supreme
    Leader Khamenei, AN and the hard-line intelligence-security IRGC
    faction on one side and former President  Rafsanjani on the other,
    with all of Iran's political elite being pressured to openly take
    sides (NOTE: there is a substantial economic element to this
    dynamic, as in many ways Ahmadinejad's ascension to power coincides
    with attempts by a new cohort elite, largely composed of hardline
    IRGC 'intelligence-security' elements, to secure positions of
    wealth and influence formerly occupied by Rafsanjani loyalists).
    Certainly many hardline regime elements see Rafsanjani and his
    eldest son Mehdi as the 'head' to the GPO 'body,' and assume that
    if Rafsanjani were neutralized then the GPO's threat potential
    would be far less.

    ¶17.  (C) COMMENT (CONT): According to IRPO contacts close to the
    Rafsanjani circle, Rafsanjani is still unsuccessfully seeking to
    persuade Supreme Leader Khamenei that AN and his crowd are a far
    greater threat to the Islamic Republic than any threat that
    Khamenei might feel from Rafsanjani, and that SLK should withdraw
    his support for them.  For their part, the regime continues to
    pressure Rafsanjani through (inter alia) judicial and other
    pressure on his family, such that his eldest son Mehdi has fled
    abroad and cannot return.  A weakened Rafsanjani has minimal
    institutional power, given that the Expediency Council is
    subordinate to Khamenei and that the clerics in the Experts Council
    are too cowed or beholden to the government to oppose them.  As
    such, Rafsanjani keeps a low public profile while at the same time
    trying to rally elite support, to include moderate conservatives
    and influential IRGC commanders.  The regime is unlikely to more
    directly target Rafsanjani unless and until Rafsanjani were to
    become more confrontational.

    ¶18. (C) COMMENT (CONT): At the popular level, June 12 has revived a
    popular reformist movement largely quiescent after the eight
    Khatami years while also bringing large parts of  Iran's youngest
    generation into the fray.   This opposition, however, is not
    unified. The GPO now is a bifurcated movement, coupling a largely
    student-dominated mass following with a titular, elite leadership,
    and the two parts are not a cohesive whole.  This rather diffuse
    organization may be a key to its staying power and simultaneously
    an impediment to building an opposition movement that could
    challenge the viability of the current government.   Beyond the GPO
    is an array of unsatisfied groups whose willingness to join the GPO
    is unclear.  These groups clearly oppose President Ahmadinejad but
    do not yet seek, as do many GPO elements, to overturn the entire
    system.  END COMMENT.
    EYRE

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