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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1688, PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV1688 | 2009-07-30 10:10 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTV #1688/01 2111023
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 301023Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2842
    INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6300
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0889
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5784
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4385
    RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 6619
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2806
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2478
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001688

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR SA LE IS
    SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL

    REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary:  Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
    Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on
    July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli
    political-military relationship, and to discuss among other
    issues Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME).  GOI
    interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to
    review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress,
    and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on
    potential arms transfers to Arab countries.  In that respect,
    the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on
    August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential
    F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia.  GOI officials continued to
    express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to
    Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss
    U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese
    Armed Forces.  GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns
    over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any
    policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher
    sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to
    other "options on the table."  Other issues raised by GOI
    officials included the Peace Process, Israel's export control
    system, and potential Israeli exports to China.  Both sides
    agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint
    Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November
    in Israel. End summary.

    ¶2. (SBU)  On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director
    General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos
    Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu,
    and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5
    Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann.  At
    the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General
    Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by
    Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and
    Export Control Director Roey Gilad.  A/S Shapiro also
    participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited
    Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.

    U.S.-Israeli Relationship
    -------------------------

    ¶3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the
    U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the
    significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in
    his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the
    Political-Military Affairs Bureau.  GOI interlocutors
    appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this
    important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.  MOD DG
    Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in
    the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting
    the number of misunderstandings in the future.

    Qualitative Military Edge
    -------------------------

    ¶4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining
    Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME).  They said that
    Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate
    Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and
    prefers such sales originate from the United States instead
    of other countries like Russia or China.  However, Israel
    continues to stress the importance of identifying potential
    risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for
    this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the
    official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S.
    arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).

    ¶5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in
    reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress.
     A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an
    assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not
    releasable to the GOI.  He referenced previous points made to
    the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and
    welcomed any comments the GOI might have -- although such
    comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the
    report is already overdue.  Israeli interlocutors appreciated
    the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it
    was difficult to comment on the report's results without
    reviewing its content or intelligence assessment.  In that
    respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the
    QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.

    ¶6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that
    moderate Arab countries could in the future become
    adversaries -- and that this should be taken into account in
    the QME process.  During a roundtable discussion led by the
    MFA's Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar,
    the MFA's Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs
    on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the
    argument that these countries could become future foes.
    Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession
    concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  Bar argued that a
    perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and
    Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel
    moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a
    fixture in the region.

    ¶7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos
    Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President
    Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was
    ready to assume command.  Gilad said the Egyptian military
    led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and
    exercise as if "Israel was its only enemy."  He added that
    there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women
    are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel
    "is too thin, too superficial."  On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said
    that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief
    priority is the survival of the regime.

    ¶8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer
    non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential
    transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including
    the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System,
    and AESA radar.  Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a
    working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an
    Israeli technical team accompany BG Heymann to Washington (in
    town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss
    the issue further.  Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was
    not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on
    the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.

    Lebanon
    -------

    ¶9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to
    the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the
    opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the
    LAF.  A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections
    represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and
    its Iranian sponsors.  The need to build up Lebanese
    institutions, including the army, was now more important than
    ever, he argued.  A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far
    demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems
    transferred to Lebanon.

    ¶10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon
    were positive, but countered that Hizballah's influence
    remains strong.  He argued that items such as the Cessna
    Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack
    sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential
    for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border.  Amos Gilad
    said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel.
    However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was
    certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict
    with Hizballah.

    ¶11. (S) Analysts from the MFA's Center for Policy Research
    argued there has been no dramatic change in the political
    arena despite the March 14 coalition's significant victory in
    the elections.  They said the fragile political situation in
    Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an
    unofficial veto over policy.  Long term prospects will be
    tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah's desire for a
    reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination.  MFA Policy
    Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces
    tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a
    Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border.  MFA
    DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from
    investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing
    by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese
    and Hizballah flags.  He said French and Italian delegations
    had praised the GOI's restraint in these cases.

    ¶12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be
    the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community
    against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered
    that the results were indicative of several factors,
    including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable
    opposition camp.  They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah
    might be a bit chastened following the elections, as
    suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try
    and undermine the March 14 coalition.

    ¶13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG Heymann also
    acknowledged the positive results of the elections.  However,
    he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the
    Shi'ites in Lebanon.  He agreed that moderates and the LAF
    must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about
    ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF.  He also
    said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt
    smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.

    ¶14. (S) BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation
    measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an
    "accidental engagement" by the IAF.  Overall, he was
    skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said
    the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation
    regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with
    respect to the LAF.  Heymann suggested further talks to
    coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in
    Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request.  A/S Shapiro
    offered to take that back to Washington for review.  If it
    proved too difficult on short notice to bring together
    interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF,
    A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political
    Military Group talks later in the fall.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶15. (S) Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI's
    primary focus.  Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear
    to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran.  In
    separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel's
    preeminent priority is to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons
    program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race
    across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt
    pursue similar programs in response.  Gilad was skeptical

    that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to
    "establish a new empire" and pointing to Iranian support for
    Hizballah and "Hamastan." Buchris added that the United
    States' desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by
    tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of
    time; MFA DG Gal concurred.  Alluding to a potential military
    strike, Buchris said "all options must remain on the table,"
    and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was
    ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it
    may be.

    ¶16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was
    unacceptable to the United States.  He referenced Secretary
    Clinton's July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on
    Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran
    -- but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite.  A/S
    Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to
    engage will only help bolster international support for
    increased sanctions.  He also pointed to the uncertain
    situation following the Iranian elections -- it was unclear
    at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our
    offer of engagement.  That said, he repeated that the
    engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United
    States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later
    this fall.

    ¶17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the
    Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat --
    we should take advantage of this commonality, he said.
    During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors
    expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the
    Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated
    for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear
    and asymmetrical, posed by Iran.  A/S Shapiro agreed that
    assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel's QME,
    but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well
    as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West.  It also
    helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie
    with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.

    ¶18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special
    envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not
    believe Iran was a priority.  A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris
    that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary
    Clinton are intensely focused on Iran.  The fact that Tehran
    has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special
    envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S
    Shapiro said -- in any case, much of the discussion will be
    behind the scenes.

    ¶19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary
    Clinton's trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States
    would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab
    countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear
    weapon.  Buchris argued that such a statement already
    conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran.  MFA Deputy
    Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised
    the Secretary's Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that
    the Secretary's comments did not indicate a new policy
    approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran's
    nuclear weapons ambitions -- not as a concession -- and that
    journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of
    the statement than was intended.

    ¶20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia's potential sale of the
    S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian
    interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran,
    and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the
    system would not be delivered for political reasons.
    However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this
    political calculation should the United States continue to
    pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech
    Republic.  He speculated that the Iranians would continue to
    put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue
    alternative Chinese systems.  He said the Russians appear
    committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
    but he personally had doubts about their intelligence
    capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the
    Syrian nuclear project.

    Peace Process
    -------------

    ¶21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority
    was doing a "good job" in the West Bank, noting respect for
    Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control
    of security -- giving them the chance to succeed was
    important, Buchris said.  He also commended the work of
    United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training
    the PASF.  That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be
    difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah.
    Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled -- Amos
    Gilad said both sides are "more interested in swallowing one
    another" than negotiating.  Behind the scenes discussions
    with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have
    not helped the situation, Buchris said.  A/S Shapiro deferred
    to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell's efforts, but noted
    Secretary Clinton's point that a stronger PA will offer an
    alternative to Hamas.  He also stressed Secretary Clinton's
    remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will
    not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet
    principles.

    Export Control
    --------------

    ¶22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief
    Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an
    improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for
    improvement.  He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli
    export controls, including enhanced legislation,
    cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and
    increased industry outreach and training.  He noted 780
    registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing
    licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219
    returned without action.  MFA Export Control Director Roey
    Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on
    export licenses, and explained the system's dispute
    resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on
    a particular case.

    ¶23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI
    continues to seek assistance in closing export control
    loopholes, including brokering.  Pincu noted that brokering
    had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that
    accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered
    in to force.  Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany,
    the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws,
    and planned to raise it during the annual defense export
    control working group to be held in Washington in October.
    Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to
    Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering
    issues.

    China
    -----

    ¶24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated
    that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national
    interests with respect to exports to China.  He noted,
    however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007
    a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated
    end users in China.  Gilad questioned whether the same
    exemptions might be possible for Israel.  As it currently
    stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the
    bilateral statement of understanding with the United States.
    While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any
    requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to
    obtain approval.  By that time, Gilad said, China has often
    found the item through another supplier.  Moreover, the
    Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day
    turn-around on all export license requests -- which is not
    possible, given the length of time required to obtain an
    answer from the United States.  A/S Shapiro offered to raise
    the issue in Washington.

    JPMG
    ----

    ¶25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint
    Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the
    Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November.
    GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the
    calendar and propose dates.

    ¶26.  (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
    ********************************************* ********************
    CUNNINGHAM

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