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### Viewing cable 06ABUDHABI1401, SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
06ABUDHABI1401 | 2006-04-10 14:02 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001401

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN

    STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, INR/NESA, AND S/CT - H. CRUMPTON
    NSC FOR FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN ZARATE, MIKE TAYLOR, NICOLE
    SHAMPAINE, NIK RAMCHAND, ELLIOTT ABRAMS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016
    TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP KPAL AE IZ IR
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
    COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO THE UAE

    REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243
         ¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565
         ¶C. ABU DHABI 409
         ¶D. ABU DHABI 779
         ¶E. ABU DHABI 1228
         ¶F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)
         ¶G. ABU DHABI 176
         ¶H. ABU DHABI 605
         ¶I. USDEL 00007
         ¶J. ABU DHABI 1123
         ¶K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)

    Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
    you to the UAE on April 23.  In the aftermath of the
    controversy of the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O, your
    assurances to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin
    Zayed (MbZ), your host for the visit, that the USG values the
    UAE as an ally and friend will be well received.  While you
    should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation,
    you should take advantage of your luncheon with MbZ and his
    brother, State Security Director Sheikh Hazza, to push the
    UAE on several areas of interest to the USG:
    counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq,
    and ideological extremism (each is covered in the
    scenesetter).  The UAE remains a committed partner in the
    global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc
    approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem
    for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
    transnational basis.  In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
    the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
    Committee (JTFCC), but the discussions were not as detailed
    or as robust as the U.S. delegation anticipated.  Treasury
    U/S Levey will return to the UAE to hold a second meeting
    April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charities.

    ¶2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
    serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
    reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and
    compromise their extensive trading relationship.  At the same
    time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the
    UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of
    the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  As tensions escalate
    between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
    growing increasingly nervous.  The UAE leadership--which has
    told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization--plans
    to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
    to the Palestinian people.  The UAE has taken an active role
    in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
    process and it continues to condemn the sectarian violence
    that is preventing stabilization of the country.  In the face
    of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE
    leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist
    extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil.  End Summary.

    Counterterrorism Efforts
    ------------------------

    ¶3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
    UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
    reducing its vulnerability (ref A).  The UAE considers
    homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
    prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
    focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
    and procuring equipment.  The UAE has also aggressively tried
    to prevent the radicalization of UAE nationals and Arab/South
    Asian expatriates.  UAE officials publicly and strongly
    condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has
    been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the
    mosques, and the UAE ministry of Education has modernized the
    Islamic studies curriculum in its schools.

    ¶4. (S) The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with
    evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not
    approach the problem from a transnational manner.  The UAE's
    immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
    them.  UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
    the problem goes or whether there is an international network
    involved.  Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
    is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
    specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead
    information found in the possession of individuals in their
    custody with each other or with the U.S. Government.  These
    tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
    ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
    planned attacks.  The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
    solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
    address the nature and scope of the problem.  The UAEG must
    be willing to take action against Emirati nationals, it must
    investigate fully, and it must share information with other
    Gulf countries and with the USG.

    ¶5. (S) The only way to generate significant change in the UAE
    on the issue of counterterrorism is to convince the senior
    leadership that it needs to continue to display political
    will and commitment in tackling the terror challenge with a
    transnational approach.  MbZ is the person most able to
    elicit this type of change.  Embassy recommends you have a
    frank and forthright discussion during your meeting with MbZ
    and his younger brother, Hazza, to encourage this type of
    change.  Although you should commend them for the UAE's CT
    efforts and cooperation, you should also encourage them to be
    personally involved in developing a more effective and fully
    cooperative counterterrorism posture.

    Counterterrorism Finance
    ------------------------

    ¶6. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
    financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
    financing (ref B).  Although the UAE now has a strong legal
    framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
    It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
    prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
    cash courier, and charity laws and regulations.  To date,
    investigation and prosecution has been weak.  In an effort to
    increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the
    first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
    Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
    January 24, 2005 (ref C).  The UAE team had representatives
    from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
    Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice.  However, no one
    participated from Dubai.  In order for the JTFCC to be an
    effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
    and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
    participate.  Embassy is coordinating a second meeting April
    30 that will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶7. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating
    tensions between Iran and the international community.  The
    UAE feels vulnerable--as evidenced by the fact that its
    leaders frequently note that Iran is "very near" the UAE.
    Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
    is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
    the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
    encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
    Iranian proliferation activities.  Although the UAEG is
    worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
    decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
    neighbor.  The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
    January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
    of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs.  None of
    those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction.
    In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
    take action (refs F and G).  The Director of Dubai's State
    Security Organization explained during the 11 February
    U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
    decision to not inspect the containers had been a political
    decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
    (ref H).  In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had
    been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
    Abbas.

    ¶8. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, MbZ has
    expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran.
    MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed
    bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the
    need to counter Iran's growing influence in the region and
    its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any
    sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the
    Iranian people (ref I).  MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he
    did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
    proceeding with any plans against Iran (ref E).  "Whoever is
    interested in getting on board ship should be encouraged," he
    said.  "I don't think it's logical or smart to wait for
    everyone to get involved so we can sail. ... If another GCC
    member believes it's not right, that's his choice."  In the
    Arab region, MbZ specifically identified Bahrain and Jordan
    as two countries that also view Iran as a threat and that are
    "capable to work with us."  He told A/S Welch that the UAE
    would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran
    and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran.
    In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid,
    MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of
    urgency.  He was strongly in favor of taking action against
    Iran and its president sooner rather than later.  "I believe
    this guy is going to take us to war. ... It's a matter of
    time," MbZ warned, adding that action against Iran and
    President Ahmedinejad should be taken this year or next year.
     MbZ said he was unwilling to wait much longer.  "Personally,
    I cannot risk it with a guy like Ahmedinejad.  He is young
    and aggressive."

    ¶9. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
    Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
    the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
    should not be considered a guarantee.  Hazza assessed that
    Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
    terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
    financial support to Hamas.  He added that the relationship
    between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
    also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
    influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world.  MbZ also
    expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
    was supporting Hamas.  During your meeting, you should
    explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
    United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
    isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash.  You
    should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
    with the USG on interdiction requests.  This meeting will be
    a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with
    Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) on April
    8, where Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for Iran
    (septel).  (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for
    U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should
    come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
    something without involving the UAE, please do so."  End
    Note.)

    Palestinian Territories/Hamas
    -----------------------------

    ¶10. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
    terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
    unless they denounce violence (refs D and E).  However, after
    Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
    March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
    Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
    Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
    that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
    assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
    MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
    come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
    Meshaal."  MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
    Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
    Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
    "going to the right people."  UAE Vice President and Prime
    Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of
    optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas,
    "with some pressure," would understand the need to respect
    the will of the international community.

    ¶11. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant
    financial assistance to the Palestinian people.  Typically,
    the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
    charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
    UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
    Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
    2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries.  In the wake of the Hamas
    electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
    their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
    (including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
    that was announced last year).

    ¶12. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
    Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
    negative side to the Hamas election win.  On the negative
    side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
    their violent agenda.  On the positive side, Hazza noted the
    fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
    international community.  He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
    posed by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Hazza also asked A/S Welch
    how the USG would react to those countries that did support
    the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
    U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
    A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
    that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
    renounced violence and accepted Israel.  A/S Welch also told
    Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
    Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
    government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
    accountability.  MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
    "official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
    Kuwait, and Qatar.  MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
    in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.

    Iraq
    ----

    ¶13. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues
    to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
    other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
    Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom).  The UAE has also
    been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
    process.  It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
    figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
    consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
    about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq.  The UAE has
    publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
    in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
    al-Askariya Shrine.  MbZ and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
    expressed their concerns about Iran's interference in Iraq's
    internal affairs to Secretary Rice during her visit to Abu
    Dhabi February 23.  MbZ further told General Abizaid that
    discontent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari was
    creating volunteers for al-Qaida.  He pledged the UAE's
    support to the fight against al-Qaida.  In his meeting with
    A/S Welch, MbZ advocated using the Arabic language media to
    tell Iraqis the truth about how many of their own people are
    dying at the hands of the insurgents.  If Iraqis were to see
    the figures, he opined, they would conclude that support of
    the insurgency is "not worth it."

    Ideological Extremism
    ---------------------

    ¶14. (S) MbZ and his brothers continue to be outspoken on the
    issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the
    region.  MbZ underscored for A/S Welch the UAE's preferred
    approach of denying extremists a foothold rather than
    allowing them to play a role in the political process.
    Although he warns of the dangers of free elections in
    countries with a well-organized Muslim Brotherhood presence,
    he tells USG guests that the UAE will go ahead with
    elections.  The Emirati leadership has told us that they will
    not allow Islamists to participate in elections.  (Note: The
    UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal
    National Council would be elected while half would continue
    to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
    Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
    Gulf states in terms of democratization.  End Note.)  MbZ
    also sees extremist ideology threatening the educational
    system, where he and his brothers are spending considerable
    resources to modernize the curriculum and the teaching corps.
    SISON

`