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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2502, 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV2502 | 2009-11-18 14:02 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO1504
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #2502/01 3221434
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 181434Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4262
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002502

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG IR SA LE IS
    SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)

    Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary:  As part of the 40th Joint Political Military
    Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security
    issues in the Near East region.  GOI officials expressed
    support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but
    doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian
    behavior -- Iran will use the engagement process as an
    opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
    Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew
    Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not "open
    ended"; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event
    engagement does not prove successful.  GOI interlocutors
    continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the
    Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated
    U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah.  A/S
    Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans
    to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the
    near future.  In a continuation from the JPMG Executive
    Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms
    transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies
    of Israel.  GOI officials expressed frustration over the
    Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons
    learned regarding confronting terrorists in
    civilian-populated areas.  GOI officials noted improved
    counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers
    to Gaza via the Sinai.  However, they argued that Egypt can
    and should do more to prevent the flow of arms.  U.S.
    delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
    expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen.
    This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the
    JPMG.  End summary.

    ¶2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:

    -- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director
    General
    -- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
    Chief
    -- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
    Attache to the United States
    -- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
    -- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
    -- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
    -- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
    -- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

    Main U.S. Participants:

    -- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
    Political-Military Affairs
    -- James Hursch, Director, DTSA
    -- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense
    -- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
    -- Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA
    -- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
    and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
    -- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
    Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
    -- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
    -- Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy
    -- Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL

    Plenary
    -------

    ¶3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the
    plenary, stating this was "perhaps the most important JPMG to
    date."  He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and
    expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop
    Iran.  Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will "impact the
    stability of the world," Buchris said.  A/S Shapiro described
    this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in
    the political-military dialogue between the United States and
    Israel.  He said the United States wants to "re-energize" the
    JPMG, with the goal to "bring back strategic elements" into
    the discussion.  A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of
    mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a
    strategic overview.  He began with Iran, reciting President
    Obama's statement made during a visit to Israel prior to
    becoming president that the United States would not tolerate
    a nuclear Iran.  Gilad said Israel concurs, and described
    current dialogue with Iran as the "most sensitive stage" and
    Iran's "last chance."  He said Iran remains determined to

    TEL AVIV 00002502  002 OF 004

    reach the "nuclear option," which he described as
    "intolerable."  He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad
    opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran "only needs one bomb for
    Israel," implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel
    regardless of its leadership.

    ¶5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares
    Israel's concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
    program.  He said that the United States is beginning with
    engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher
    measures should engagement fail.  A/S Shapiro stressed that
    engagement was not "open ended" -- the United States needs to
    see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks.
    He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not
    respond to engagement, then the United States will move
    toward stronger steps such as sanctions.  DASD Kahl
    reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to "run
    out the clock," and noted that engagement also serves to
    build international consensus on sanctions.  MFA Deputy
    Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the
    United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans
    on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.

    ¶6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands
    that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue
    to "play for time" and avoid sanctions while pursuing its
    strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability.
    From Mossad's perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran
    will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so
    that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological
    capability to build a nuclear weapon -- essentially reducing
    the question of weaponizing to a political decision.  Mossad
    said Iran's main crisis is in the political sphere -- the
    current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but
    does not face significant risk as its security apparatus
    remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic
    leader.  The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down
    the domestic political environment -- Khamenei realizes the
    frustration demonstrated following the elections has not
    disappeared.  BG Smith asked if Khamenei's death might change
    the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to
    suggest a change in Khamenei's health, while those
    surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.

    ¶7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional
    hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and
    Hizballah as force multipliers.  In that respect, Iran is
    very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to
    its proxies.  Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort
    to split Syria from Iran's influence, and is working hard to
    deepen its relationship with Syria as a result.  DASD Kahl
    argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent
    years.  He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent
    Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a
    weaker Iran.  DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility
    in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the
    Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the
    region and in Europe.

    Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
    -----------------------

    ¶8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by "Hizballahstan" and
    "Hamastan," noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran
    cooperation has strengthened.  He noted that rockets from
    Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while
    ballistic missiles -- although not new -- remain Israel's
    most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to
    target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon
    Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political
    deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah's growing military
    capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4)
    Lebanon's susceptibility to outside influences, including
    Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.  He recommended improved
    US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views.
     Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
    deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance,
    and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling.
    Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican
    Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and
    UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending
    Gen. Graziano's tour for an additional six months.

    ¶9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI's desire for
    specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to
    invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future
    for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and
    support.  He cited the need to provide an alternative to
    Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as
    a counterweight.  DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation

    TEL AVIV 00002502  003 OF 004

    with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF's current weakness.
     He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on
    hold since there is still no Lebanese government.  Kahl also
    argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus
    depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United
    States and the return of the Golan Heights.  Arad argued that
    more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling.
    Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon
    without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense
    of Hizballah if attacked by Israel -- thus, a strengthened
    LAF hurts Israel.

    QME
    ---

    ¶10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad
    suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a "codename" for
    potential threats against Israel.  Israel currently enjoys
    peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
    United Arab Emirates -- but the future is uncertain, and each
    of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued.
    U.S. weapons -- "the best in the world" -- level the playing
    field by reducing the need for training -- and could
    ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said.  A/S
    Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency -- while
    there may be differences between Israel and the United States
    in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that
    there are no surprises, he said.

    Peace Process
    -------------

    ¶11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a
    "pillar" of Israeli security.  He quoted PM Netanyahu and
    President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to
    peace.  Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of
    negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian
    leadership.  He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza
    despite Israeli warnings.  Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal
    with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation
    efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA
    having failed.  That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security
    and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to
    improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described
    Palestinian security forces as the "good guys."  NEA/IPA
    Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell
    continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation
    efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.

    Goldstone Report
    ----------------

    ¶12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel's immediate neighbors within
    the context of the Goldstone Report.  He said Israel has
    checked "all the details" of the report, and have concluded
    that the report's accusations are "baseless."  Buchris said
    the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to
    protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone
    calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the
    effort to prevent civilian casualties -- "no other country
    has taken such steps," Buchris argued.  A/S Shapiro
    highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report's referral
    to the UN Security Council, noting the report's biased
    mandate.

    ¶13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas
    violated the ceasefire or "tahdiya," which many Israelis felt
    was "humiliating" and left Defense Minister Barak open to
    criticism.  Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a
    success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF
    showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want
    to re-occupy Gaza.  DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives
    and lessons learned on strategic communication to more
    effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas.
    NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar
    noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and
    asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional
    efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect
    any further damage from the report.

    Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
    -----------------------

    ¶14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab
    neighbors -- including specifically Egypt -- for supporting
    the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process.
    Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation
    with Jordan, he said.  Gilad argued that Egypt could stop
    smuggling into Gaza "completely," and questioned whether
    Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results.  Gilad

    TEL AVIV 00002502  004 OF 004

    stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on
    counter-smuggling.  Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that
    Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military
    confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military
    officers visit Israel.

    ¶15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to
    strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism,
    peacekeeping and civil defense efforts.  He said the United
    States is working with Egypt to improve regional security
    efforts, such as counter-smuggling.  Regarding the Gulf
    States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to
    improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while
    bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council
    (GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat.  Finally, he noted
    U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following
    the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF's participation.  A/S
    Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the
    message that Turkey must improve its relationship with
    Israel.

    ¶16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the
    counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel).  He
    cited the importance of working with Israel's neighbors --
    including especially Egypt and Turkey -- to prevent Iranian
    weapons from entering Gaza.  Maggi said more pressure should
    be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude -- and
    possibly further action from the EU.  He said tracking cash
    flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were
    important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation
    and momentum.  Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national
    security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels
    since the beginning of 2009.

    ¶17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political
    sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and
    humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border
    crossings.  Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits
    on commercial goods through the border crossings.  Goldberger
    asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the
    GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers -- goods such as
    cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military
    applications.  He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative
    business for all involved, including the Egyptian government,
    and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase
    arrests and incarcerations.  Goldberger mentioned U.S.
    economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai.  He
    noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms
    transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence;
    additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure
    greater cooperation.  Bar raised prosecuting shipping
    companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro
    said he would take that back to Washington for further
    consideration.

    Iraq/Yemen
    ----------

    ¶18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000
    U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000
    soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop
    withdrawal by the end of 2011.  He noted the U.S. goal of
    establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a
    sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq.  A/S Shapiro and
    DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi
    military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition
    the military to a force that can defend its borders, and
    align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.

    ¶19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al
    Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen.  He
    said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from
    heading toward an "Afghanistan-type scenario" with general
    lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces.  BG Smith noted
    that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
    fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa.  He said Egypt is
    actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in
    Sudan -- this should be encouraged and expanded.

    ¶20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.

    CUNNINGHAM

`