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### Viewing cable 09STATE14577, ACTION REQUEST: RUSSIA S-300 MISSILE TO IRAN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE14577 | 2009-02-18 00:12 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0012
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #4577 0490046
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O P 180030Z FEB 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000
    INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0000

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 014577

    SIPDIS
    SECRET/NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL RS BA KU AE EG JO IS IR
    SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: RUSSIA S-300 MISSILE TO IRAN

    REF: MOSCOW 357

    Classified By: NEA Acting A/S Jeffrey Feltman: Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request for Posts in Abu Dhabi,
    Amman, Cairo, Kuwait City, Manama, and Riyadh.  Please see
    para 7.

    Summary and Background
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Posts are requested to raise with appropriate
    government officials our concerns about Russian plans to
    transfer the S-300 long-range air-defense system to Iran.
    Washington would like these governments to immediately and
    directly raise this issue  with their Russian counterparts
    arguing that such a transfer could significantly enhance
    Iran's air defense capability; increase regional instability;
    and reward Iran at a time when Iran is undermining security
    with its nuclear pursuits and support for terrorism.

    ¶3.  (S//NF) Over the past few years, the Russian Government
    has told the USG that, while it has a contract to supply the
    S-300 air-defense system to Iran, the transfer would not be
    completed until Iran complied with its international nuclear
    obligations.  USG suspicions were piqued during a February 12
    meeting when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov brushed off U/S
    Burns concerns over such a transfer, but did not reiterate
    Russia,s year-long position that the S-300 transfer depends
    on Iranian behavior.  The Iranian Defense Minister is
    currently in Moscow for talks with Russia on the delivery of
    the S-300.  Initial press reports quote Rosoboronexport
    officials as saying there has been no progress in the talks
    to expedite delivery of the system.  Russian news media also
    speculates that Russia will not deliver the S-300 to Iran for
    fear of upsetting discussions with the new US administration.
     Despite the denials in the press, we are concerned by the
    technical preparations for delivery of the S-300, which are
    complete or nearing completion.  It appears that there is a
    need for action now to prevent a senior-level political
    decision to allow the delivery to go foward.

    ¶4. (C) Though Russia states that the S-300 is "defensive" in
    nature, the mobile system could be used to support offensive
    operations.  S-300s located on Iranian territory would have
    the range to engage targets well beyond Iran,s borders into
    Persian Gulf and Iraqi airspace, threatening U.S. and
    regional partners.

    ¶5. (SBU) UNSCR 1747, passed on March 24, 2007, urged all
    states to exercise "vigilance and restraint in the supply,
    sale or transfer" of a broad range of conventional weapons as
    defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
    Conventional Arms to Iran.  While the S-300 does not
    technically meet the definition within the UN Register for
    any of the categories of items listed in paragraph 6 of UNSCR
    1747, transfers of this type of system to Iran seriously
    undercut the primary objective of UNSCR 1747 to further press
    Iran to comply with the UNSCR 1737 requirement to suspend its
    proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate
    fully with the IAEA.

    ¶6.  (C) We have selected action addressee posts to engage the
    GOR because we maintain strong bilateral relationships and
    share common security interests, but also because we believe
    these governments have potential leverage with Russia.  In
    particular,  Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have
    increased their political-military cooperation with Russia.
    These countries can legitimately make the point to Moscow
    that they cannot have a close political-military partnership
    with Russia, while Russia strengthens the hand of Iran,
    arguably the greatest threat to each of these nation's
    security.

    Suggested Talking Points
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶7.  (SBU) Posts are requested to approach appropriate host
    government officials regarding the possible transfer of the
    S-300 air-defense system from Russia to Iran.   Post should
    draw from the following talking points.

    --In the spirit of our bilateral cooperation, we request your
    government,s support in urging Russia to not transfer a
    highly sophisticated air defense system to Iran.

    --In 2005 Russia signed a contract to sell the modern
    long-range S-300 air defense missile system to Iran.

    -- In 2006, after it was exposed that Iran was not in
    compliance with its international nuclear obligations, Russia
    assured us, it would not complete the transfer until Iran
    changed course.

    --Despite these assurances, we are concerned that Russia is
    in a position to deliver the S-300 to Iran as soon as a
    political decision is taken.

    --Moreover, when we raised our concerns in recent
    senior-level conversations with Russian officials, we were
    not reassured by the Russian response.

    --We request that you use your influence with Russia to
    sharpen their decision against a transfer at this time.

    --Though Russia has categorized the S-300 as defensive in
    nature, it is a mobile system that can easily used to support
    offensive operations.

    --The most modern variant of the S-300, high-performance
    surface-to-air missile system would greatly improve Iran,s
    ability to defend large regions of its airspace up to 200 km
    beyond its borders.

    --With Iran in non-compliance of its international nuclear
    obligations and continued meddling in regional affairs, this
    is not the time for Russia to engage in arms sales with
    Tehran.

    -- We are also concerned about the implications of the
    transfer of an air defense system to Iran.  Such transfers
    would undercut the broad objective of UNSCR 1747 to increase
    pressure on Iran to suspend its proliferation sensitive
    nuclear activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA by
    denying arms transfers to Iran.

    --(If appropriate)  We believe you have particular leverage
    given your expanded military cooperation with Russia.  You
    can legitimately argue that Moscow cannot be true partners in
    the political-military realm while simultaneously
    strengthening Iran, which is arguably the greatest threat to
    your nation,s security.

    End Talking Points
    CLINTON

`