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### Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1111, FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE AND IRAN WITH

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09MOSCOW1111 | 2009-04-29 13:01 | SECRET | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXRO2069
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
    RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMO #1111/01 1191349
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 291349Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3092
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 001111

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KACT IR RS
    SUBJECT: FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE AND IRAN WITH
    CODEL LEVIN

    Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary.  Foreign Minister Lavrov told visiting Codel
    Levin April 15 that arms control issues were Russia's top
    priority.  Noting that Moscow was waiting for concrete
    proposals, including specific language, from the U.S. on a
    post-START treaty agreement, Lavrov said he recognized that
    the U.S. would not want to address the link between offensive
    and defensive weapons in the post-START negotiations, but it
    would be important to have such a dialogue in the future.
    Russia was interested in developing a joint missile defense
    system (MD) with the U.S., but we should start "from
    scratch," with joint threat assessments, determination of
    necessary resources, and best location for MD assets.  Lavrov
    rejected a quid pro quo in which the U.S. would discontinue
    its MD plans for eastern Europe in exchange for Russia
    pressuring Iran to end its nuclear weapons program,
    emphasizing that each issue should be considered separately.
    He acknowledged that Moscow was concerned about Iran's
    longer-range missile development and said Russia would be
    prepared to undertake a "dual-track" approach towards Iran's
    nuclear program; offering incentives to Tehran, but keeping
    in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework.  He
    reconfirmed that Moscow had suspended the sale of S-300's to
    Iran "for the moment."  In a follow-on meeting, DFM Sergey
    Ryabkov stressed that while Russia was interested in working
    with the U.S. on MD, it would be difficult for Russia to join
    a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland and the Czech
    Republic, and urged that if the U.S. intended to pursue sites
    in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
    diminish the effect on Russian capabilities.  Ryabkov
    emphasized that "no one can deliver Iran to the U.S., except
    the U.S. itself," and argued that, while the S-300 sale was
    "frozen," the "less Moscow heard from Washington about it,
    the better."  End summary.

    ¶2. (C) In a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in
    Moscow April 15, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee, Carl Levin (D-MI), together with SASC members Bill
    Nelson (D-FL) and Susan Collins (R-ME) emphasized that they
    were united in their hope that the U.S. and Russia could
    strengthen their cooperation to address common challenges.
    Noting the Senate's Constitutional role in ratifying treaties
    and providing advice and recommendations on foreign policy
    issues to the President, Senator Levin raised missile defense
    (MD) as an issue that had divided the two countries, but
    should unite them.  He suggested that if Russia and the U.S,
    could work together on MD, it would send a powerful message
    to those who might threaten us, including to Iran.

    ¶3. (C) FM Lavrov welcomed the Senators' visit, and noted that
    it was timely, coming two weeks after the first meeting
    between Presidents Obama and Medvedev.  He highlighted the
    important role "Parliaments" play in building constructive
    relationships and expressed the hope that the U.S. and Russia
    could overcome the "inertia" that had characterized the
    relationship in the past.

    Arms Control, NPT
    -----------------

    ¶4. (C) Lavrov said that arms control issues were Russia's top
    priority.  The U.S.-Russia agenda was positive, even though
    we had differences.  Moscow hoped the U.S. Administration
    would submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for
    ratification, and would reconsider sending the "123"
    Agreement to the Hill.  He welcomed President Obama's remarks
    supporting nuclear weapons reductions, saying that such
    reductions were not just a matter of security for the U.S.
    and Russia, but carried a political message that would be
    important for the 2010 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
    (NPT).  While characterizing the elimination of nuclear
    weapons as "a noble goal," Lavrov said it was not "an
    immediate project."  We needed to have some clear proposals,
    which would give others a clear idea of the way forward.  He
    suggested that the next stage after the post-START
    negotiations should consider how to engage others, such as
    the UK, in discussions of further reductions, as well as
    looking at tactical nuclear weapons.

    ¶5. (C) There was "a lot to do" on non-proliferation issues,
    Lavrov said, including Iran and North Korea.  Pakistan was a
    concern, and we should think about engaging them as well as
    India and Israel.  The U.S. and Russia had cooperated to

    MOSCOW 00001111  002 OF 005

    address the danger of non-state actors acquiring nuclear
    material though programs such as the Global Initiative to
    Combat Nuclear Terrorism and UN Security Council Resolution
    ¶1540.  The U.S. and Russia should also look at ways to
    strengthen the NPT regime, including how to universalize the
    Additional Protocol.  We should also work on issues like fuel
    supply, the Nuclear Fuel Center Russia had started, and
    programs like the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

    Post-START
    ----------

    ¶6. (C) Lavrov expressed appreciation for the Senate's
    confirmation of Rose Gottemoeller as A/S for VCI, noting that
    the U.S. and Russia had a lot of work to do to achieve a
    follow-on agreement to the START Treaty.  The issue would be
    discussed at the meeting between DVBR Director Anatoliy
    Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller in Rome on April 24, as well as
    in his meeting with the Secretary in Washington in May.  The
    teams would report to the Presidents in July, and hope to
    reach a framework agreement by the end of the year.  He said
    that while the Presidents in their statement April 1 had
    endorsed reductions below the Moscow Treaty limits and had
    agreed to use many of the verification procedures of the
    START Treaty, Moscow was waiting for more concrete proposals
    from the U.S., including specific language.

    ¶7. (C) Lavrov highlighted the April 1 Joint Statement's
    reference to the link between offensive and defensive
    weapons, saying that the balance between the two that had
    existed in the Soviet Union had been thrown off kilter when
    the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty.  He stressed that he
    recognized this did not mean the U.S. would support
    addressing the linkage during the post-START negotiations,
    but it was important to have a discussion on it at some point
    in the future.

    Missile Defense and Iran
    ------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Senator Levin said the SASC was interested in
    exploring the possibility of U.S. and Russia working together
    on MD.  The U.S. was focused on the threat from Iran, but he
    recognized that Russia may have a broader perspective.
    However, we were both opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, which
    would be able to put pressure on other countries in the
    region.  The U.S. also perceived the possibility of an
    Iranian long-range missile as a threat.  He noted that press
    reports indicated that Medvedev had told Henry Kissinger and
    the Hart-Hagel Commission that he was concerned that the
    Iranian nuclear program was more of a threat than Russia had
    previously believed.  (Lavrov emphatically corrected this,
    saying Medvedev had expressed concern about Iran's missile
    launch).  Noting that the U.S. had made commitments to Poland
    and the Czech Republic, Senator Levin said the U.S. would
    need to consider how to keep those commitments and include
    Europe in a common MD program with Russia.

    ¶9. (C) Agreeing that MD should unite the U.S. and Russia,
    rather than divide us, Lavrov said Russia was interested in
    developing a MD system with the U.S., but the U.S. proposals
    for an MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic ("3rd
    Site"), disrupted the balance between the U.S. and Russia's
    nuclear potential.  He stressed that then-President Putin's
    Kennebunkport proposal for a cooperative MD effort using
    Russian resources, joint analyses and determinations of the
    threat, and data exchange centers, was still on the table.
    He welcomed President Obama's statement that if the Iran
    nuclear issue were resolved satisfactorily, there would be
    less need for the 3rd Site, but took care to emphasize that
    Russia did not support a quid pro quo between Russia helping
    to get Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and the U.S.
    discontinuing its deployment in eastern Europe.  These two
    issues should be dealt with separately, on their own merits,
    Lavrov stressed.

    ¶10. (C) Noting that the Congressional Budget Office had
    presented three alternatives on the MD project, Lavrov said
    this showed there were issues with the proposal.  Hastening
    to add that Russia did not endorse any of the three
    alternatives, Lavrov commended the Administration's intent to
    review them, noting this was the difference with the new
    Administration: it was willing to listen and take the time to
    analyze the alternatives, instead of saying "this is what

    MOSCOW 00001111  003 OF 005

    must be done; everyone must say yes sir."

    ¶11. (C) In response to Senator's Levin question why Russia
    was not more concerned about Iran's missile capabilities,
    since Russia was closer to Iran, Lavrov said Moscow was "not
    complacent; we are closer."  But whenever Russian negotiators
    had protested to the U.S. side that the proposed radar could
    cover Russia up to the Urals and the interceptors could reach
    Russian territory, the U.S. response had simply been that the
    system "was not aimed at Russia."  As Medvedev and Putin had
    said, "when there is something risky on the ground, you need
    to take it into account."  Russia had warned it would need to
    take countermeasures if the 3rd site was deployed, and that
    it would put missiles in Kaliningrad.  Noting that Moscow
    would announce soon just how much it had withdrawn from
    Kaliningrad, Lavrov said he hoped the U.S. and Russia could
    find common ground on MD.

    ¶12. (C) Lavrov cautioned that Russia did not perceive Iran in
    the same way as the U.S.  Iran for Russia was "much more than
    a country which might cause concern in the international
    community."  Russia opposed Iran getting a nuclear weapon,
    because Russia did not want any more "members of the nuclear
    club," but Iran and Russia were historical and traditional
    partners and neighbors, with a "rich bilateral agenda."
    Lavrov said he was certain Iran wanted to have a full nuclear
    fuel cycle and would negotiate from that basis.  It was
    unfortunate that the U.S. had not accepted the proposals a
    few years before when Iran only had 32 centrifuges; now they
    had over 5,000.  Nonetheless, Russia wanted Iran to cooperate
    fully with the IAEA and implement, and eventually ratify, the
    Additional Protocol.  As agreed to in the E3-plus-3
    statement, Russia wanted Iran to prove the peaceful nature of
    its nuclear program, in a verifiable way.

    ¶13. (C) Lavrov commended the new U.S. approach to Iran,
    welcoming President Obama's readiness for the U.S. to engage
    "fully" in talks with Iran.  Willingness to discuss "all" the
    issues was a welcome step, and one which Russia had been
    advocating for several years, Lavrov said.  Iran wielded a
    lot of influence in the region, including on Afghanistan,
    Iraq, Hizbollah, Hamas, Gaza, etc.  Iran had long been
    concerned about Israel, and saw Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons
    competitor.  Putin had asked Ahmadinejad during a meeting in
    Tehran a few years before why he made such anti-Israeli
    statements, but Ahmadinejad had not responded, only saying
    that Iran was "not doing anything in the nuclear sphere
    different from Brazil."  Putin had replied that Brazil was
    not in the Middle East.  While Iran wanted to dominate the
    region and the Islamic world, which was of concern to Arab
    governments, the U.S. should realize that the "Arab Street"
    considers Iranian leaders to be heroes.

    ¶14. (C) Noting that Russia was watching events in Iran
    closely, Lavrov said Moscow would be prepared to undertake
    the "dual-track approach," first offering incentives to Iran,
    but keeping in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework.
    The Administration's new approach "give us a much better
    chance than we had in the past.  We will do everything we can
    to make it work," Lavrov said.

    ¶15. (C) Senator Nelson said he was encouraged by the FM's
    remarks, noting that it might be possible to consider
    cooperating on use of Russia's radars at Gabala and Armavir.
    He said he hoped Lavrov was right that Iran would be deterred
    from building a nuclear weapon, but he was skeptical.  The
    best deterrence might be for the U.S. and Russia to cooperate
    on MD.

    S-300 Sales
    -----------

    ¶16. (S) Senator Levin said that Russia had taken a practical
    and pragmatic step with the suspension of the sale of S-300
    missiles to Iran, Senator Levin said.  This helped make
    Israel less nervous, and sent a message to Iran that the U.S.
    and Russia were working more closely together on Iran issues.
     Lavrov acknowledged that Russia was not supplying the system
    "for the moment," but reiterated the usual mantra that
    Russia's S-300 contract with Iran did not violate any
    international or national laws or arms control regimes, and
    that the S-300's were a defensive system only.  He added that
    nothing Russia had sold Iran had been used against anyone,
    whereas U.S. weapons provided to Georgia had been used

    MOSCOW 00001111  004 OF 005

    against Russian soldiers.  This did not mean the U.S. did not
    have the right to sell weapons to Georgia, but Moscow did not
    want a repeat of the August 2008 conflict.  Overall, he said,
    the Iranians had legitimate security concerns.  They had been
    attacked more than once by their neighbors, and saw
    Pakistan's nuclear status as "competition for regional
    leadership."

    ¶17. (S) In a follow-on meeting with DFM Ryabkov, Senator
    Levin asked whether Iran believed the S-300 sale was canceled
    or just suspended.  Ryabkov replied that a contract existed,
    and it was impossible to break a contract without
    consequences.  He repeated that Moscow had taken U.S. and
    Israeli concerns into account, and at present Russia was not
    providing any components of the system to Teheran.  Thus, it
    was "obvious the degree to which Iran was dissatisfied with
    this," he said.  But, the contract was not canceled, it was
    merely "frozen," Ryabkov stressed.  He argued that "the less
    we hear from Washington about this, the better."

    Afghanistan/Pakistan
    --------------------

    ¶18. (C) Senator Collins expressed appreciation for Russia's
    allowing transit of non-lethal equipment to ISAF in
    Afghanistan, and asked how the U.S. and Russia could work
    together to counter terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    Lavrov said Pakistan was a place were "a lot of problems
    start for Afghanistan," and questioned the term "moderate
    Taliban."  He said the people on the UNSCR 1267 Committee
    list should be "blacklisted for as long as possible," but for
    anyone else, as long as they renounced terrorism, cooperated
    with the Kabul government, and refrained from extremist
    activity, it would be all right to deal with them.

    Ryabkov Meeting
    ---------------

    ¶19. (C) In a follow-up meeting with DFM Ryabkov immediately
    afterwards, Ryabkov cited the non-paper Lavrov had given the
    Secretary in the Hague on March 31, and said there was
    already a good basis to cooperate with the U.S. on MD.
    Progress had been made in the NATO Russia Council on theater
    missile defense, and Moscow believed there was more that
    could be done there.  But he reiterated Lavrov's position
    that bilateral discussions would need to start from scratch.
    He disagreed with Senator Levin's statement that the system
    could not have a significant impact on Russia's nuclear
    capabilities.  He noted that Russia was more concerned about
    the radar than the interceptor sites, because the former
    could see the location of Russia's strategic forces, but even
    with the interceptors, nobody could predict what would be at
    those sites in 10 years' time.  In response to Senator's
    Levin's asking whether the deployments couldn't be limited by
    an agreement, Ryabkov acknowledged that was a possibility,
    but stressed that the radar could still be used with other
    U.S. MD assets.  The sites in Poland and the Czech Republic
    were part of a global MD architecture, which, when linked
    together, could almost "knock Russia out."

    ¶20. (C) Ryabkov stressed that while the U.S. and Russia were
    not adversaries now, "intentions could change," whereas
    "capabilities" were much harder to change.  He noted that the
    countries in eastern Europe saw the 3rd site as more of a
    geo-political issue, bringing them closer to the West, than
    as a response to a potential threat from Iran.  "We are not
    in a zero-sum game and we do not want to use your possibly
    legitimate security concern as a geo-political pawn," Ryabkov
    argued.  Noting a link to the post-START negotiations,
    Ryabkov said the greater the reductions in number of warheads
    each side could possess, the more strategically important MD
    became.  He added that it would be politically difficult for
    Russia to join a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland
    and the Czech Republic.  If the U.S. intended to pursue sites
    in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
    diminish the effect on Russian capabilities.

    ¶21. (C) In response to Senator Levin's question whether it
    would be possible to develop a joint radar system with
    Russian radars at Gabala, Armavir, and Moscow, connected to
    U.S. AEGIS and THAAD systems, Ryabkov responded that he had
    not considered such an idea before and would need to think
    about it.  Such a system, he noted, would become strategic,
    and would lack the X-band capability of the radar proposed

    MOSCOW 00001111  005 OF 005

    for the Czech Republic, since all the systems cited were
    early-warning radars only, but it could be an option.

    ¶22. (C) Ryabkov said Russia hoped it would be possible to
    have a "meaningful dialogue" with Iran, and noted that
    President Obama's remarks had had a strong impact in Teheran
    and the Arab world.  But it was still difficult to predict
    how Teheran would react.  He characterized the P5-plus 1
    (E3-plus-3) statement as "very promising," but claimed
    experience showed Iran would not make concessions under
    pressure.  He emphasized that it was "very clear that no one
    can deliver Iran to the U.S., except the U.S. itself."

    Civilian Space Cooperation
    --------------------------

    ¶23. (C) In response to Senator Nelson's question about
    prospects for increased civilian space cooperation and what
    would happen when the U.S. was fully dependent on the Soyuz
    spacecraft to reach the International Space Station, Ryabkov
    said he saw no difficulty with meeting the U.S.'s needs, and
    said we should both be forward-leaning.  He noted that
    RosCosmos had suggested to NASA that Russia cooperate on
    development of the U.S.'s new spacecraft, but the idea had
    not been pursued.  Ryabkov proposed we discuss the issue
    further with RosCosmos and said Moscow favored closer
    cooperation with the U.S. and Europe in this area.  While it
    was not linked to MD, the more progress we could make on MD,
    the better able we would be to move forward on other issues.

    ¶24. (U) Codel Levin did not clear this cable.
    BEYRLE

`