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### Viewing cable 09DOHA733, VISIT OF QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09DOHA733 | 2009-12-21 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Doha

`

    VZCZCXRO2630
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHDO #0733/01 3551236
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH  ZDS
    P 211236Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
    TO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9588
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RBDHDZA/COMUSNAVCENT
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000733

    C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  - ADDED NOFORN CAPITION

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
    TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG EAGR QA
    SUBJECT: VISIT OF QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON
    JANUARY 4-5

    DOHA 00000733  001.2 OF 003

    Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

    ¶1. (S) Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (who serves
    concurrently as Foreign Minister) of Qatar will visit
    Washington beginning January 4 to continue the strategic
    consultations that Qatar and the USG have pursued since June,
    when Near Eastern Affairs Assistant Secretary Feltman first
    proposed them in Doha.  As part of those consultations,
    Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud and
    Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohamad Al-Rumaihi
    visited Washington last fall.

    ¶2. (S) The Prime Minister travels to Washington with the aim
    of laying the groundwork for visits in the first half of 2010
    by Qatar's Heir Apparent and the Amir.  We believe he will be
    prepared to discuss the gaps between the USG and GOQ on
    Middle East peace and counterterrorism cooperation, as well
    as to discuss setting  the stage for joint cooperation on
    Iran, Iraq and other regional issues.

    ¶3. (S) Suggested talking points for meetings with the PM:

    -- We thank you for bringing with you to Washington a
    commitment to fund the PA.  Your decision to do so is
    extremely important to us.  We view it as a clear gesture of
    friendship to us and of a commitment to partner with us on
    Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, just as the United States and
    Qatar have partnered on Darfur.

    -- As your ally and friend, we hope we can look to you to
    increase your cooperation with us on counterterrorism.  We
    want to work particularly closely with you and enacting
    policies and programs that deter financial flows to Hamas and
    the Taliban.

    -- In this context, we applaud your work with the IMF on
    making needed legal and procedural changes to curtail
    financing to terrorists.  We are ready to help you with
    technical support and training once the IMF and Qatar have
    worked out an action plan.

    -- We especially value consultations with you on Iran.  We
    recognize your national need for a working relationship with
    Iran, given the natural gas reserves you share with Iran.
    How best do you think we can persuade Iran to give up its
    military nuclear aims without military confrontation?

    -- We understand that you are close to announcing a decision
    to open an Embassy in Baghdad, but that much depends on
    resolving the issue of Iraq's debts to Qatar.  Is there
    anything we can do to help?

    -- We encourage you to recognize an independent Kosovo, as
    Saudi Arabia and others have now done.  We certainly
    appreciate your votes in favor of Kosovo in the IMF and World
    Bank.  They are important precursors to formal recognition,
    but when will you take that final step?

    -- On Yemen, we know that President Saleh asked Qatar to stop
    its mediation between the central government and Huthi
    rebels.  Given your past involvement there, what thoughts do
    you have on bringing about stability on the Arabian
    Peninsula?

    -- We applaud Qatar's decision to make food security a
    priority, not just for itself but for the entire Arab world.
    Food security is a priority for the USG, as well, and we
    share Qatar's view that it must be addressed through a
    combination of commerce, investment, technical assistance,
    technology transfer, and direct aid.

    Addressing the Fatah-Hamas Split and Funding the PA
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶4. (S) Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim (HBJ) has told NEA A/S
    Feltman that he will come with a financial commitment to fund
    the Palestinian Authority.  This is an extremely important
    gesture by Qatar to the United States.  He will also be
    prepared to discuss with Secretary Clinton and others Qatar's
    view of Hamas, continued contacts with whose leaders it sees
    as key to bringing about a stable and enduring Middle East
    peace.  We expect HBJ to share what other steps Qatar is
    prepared to take in support of the Palestinian Authority (PA)
    and, in particular, Mahmoud Abbas, whose continued leadership

    DOHA 00000733  002.2 OF 003

    of the PA Qatar's leaders support.  HBJ is likely to bring
    with him new ideas to reconcile Hamas and Fatah.  Given
    Qatar's history of mediation efforts HBJ will no doubt
    suggest that Qatar can play a helpful role.  Qatar's
    restoration of normal operations of the Israeli Trade Office
    in Doha would also give testimony to Qatar's willingness to
    help achieve U.S. objectives, but we do not expect the
    Qataris to take this step absent some significant gesture
    from the Israelis, such as much less restricted access to
    Gaza for Qatar's humanitarian efforts.

    ¶5. (S) Qatar almost certainly will not be willing to break
    off ties or dialogue with Hamas.  If asked to do so, we think
    HBJ will explain that the Amir gave his word to both Hamas
    and Fatah that he would financially support the winner of
    democratic elections in Palestine.  Hamas won those
    elections, which the Bush Administration pressed the Amir to
    support actively.  The Amir believes that it would be
    dishonorable to isolate Hamas after he convinced its leaders
    to participate in elections that were backed by the United
    States.

    Greater Cooperation on Counterterrorism Needed
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶6. (S) It is important to make clear to HBJ that cooperation
    between the United States and Qatar on counterterrorism
    issues in general needs to be greatly improved.  Officials
    should make known USG concerns about the financial support to
    Hamas by Qatari charitable organizations and our concerns
    about the moral support Hamas receives from Yousef
    Al-Qaradawi.  It is also essential to stress that high-level
    Qatari political support is needed, if financial flows to
    terrorists are to stop.

    ¶7. (S) An International Monetary Fund (IMF) employee began
    advising Qatar's Financial Intelligence Unit in October (in a
    relationship expected to last three full years) on making the
    necessary legal and procedural changes to address the 49
    areas in which international experts have recommended changes
    to Qatar's procedures.  We assess that the FIU is serious
    about making technical changes that will enhance Qatar's
    reputation as a global financial center, but we project that,
    absent political support from the top, the IMF/Qatari
    partnership will fall short in achieving its goals.

    Need for Close Consultations on Iran
    ------------------------------------

    ¶8. (S) Qatar shares a mammoth natural gas field with Iran.
    As a result, Qatar carefully maintains with Iran a high tempo
    of top-level contacts , which have increased since the
    protests following Iranian presidential elections).  Qatar
    does this because it is convinced that such a close
    relationship with Iran is key to safeguarding trillions of
    dollars in potential wealth.  We are convinced that Qatar
    will not be dissuaded from maintaining those ties.

    ¶9. (S) That said, Qatar's leaders -- while careful not to say
    it publicly -- do not trust Iran; and Qatar does not want
    Iran to have nuclear weapons.

    ¶10. (S) Qatar's relationship with Iran is important to us
    for another reason.  Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of
    CENTCOM and allows us to use Al-Udaid Air Base for
    unrestricted air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan.  We
    pay no rent for these facilities, and the Qataris have funded
    about 60 percent of the improvements to Al-Udaid since our
    partnership on that base began.  While few, least of all
    Qatar, want a military confrontation with Iran, the USG no
    doubt would want to use these Qatari facilities in any
    kinetic operations against Iran.  Right now, we anticipate
    that Qatar would refuse to allow Qatari soil to be used to
    attack Iran, short of some sort of permanent USG security
    guarantee to Qatar, to include its offshore natural gas field
    shared with Iran.

    Finding a Way Forward on Iraq
    -----------------------------

    ¶11. (S) For several months, Qatar has expressed frustration
    with the current government of Iraq, which it views as too
    Shi'a in orientation for its liking, but appears now to be
    prepared to consider investment offsets, provided by the
    Government of Iraq, but owned by Qatar, as a means for Iraq

    DOHA 00000733  003.2 OF 003

    to repay the GOI's debt owed Qatar.  That would be an avenue
    for the resumption of a political relationship, to include an
    HBJ visit to Baghdad and the opening of a Qatari Embassy in
    Iraq.  We should encourage Qatar's outreach to Baghdad and
    also encourage Iraq's government to shore up its relations
    with Doha.

    Recognizing Kosovo
    ------------------

    ¶12. (C) MFA Assistant Minister Mohamad Al-Rumaihi told
    Ambassador December 20 that Qatar's IMF and World Bank votes
    in favor of Kosovo show Qatar's true sympathies on
    recognizing Kosovo.  The Russian President, however, has
    asked Qatar to "go slow" in announcing recognition, he said.
    Out of sensitivity to Russian concerns, Al-Rumaihi said,
    Qatar has done so.  He encouraged Secretary Clinton to ask
    HBJ about the timing of Qatar's eventual recognition, noting
    that that Qatar had been approached by organizers of a UK
    project about using its good offices with the Government of
    Kosovo to protect Kosovo's Christian heritage once Qatar
    formally recognizes its independence.

    Cool to Yemen's Approach on the Huthi
    -------------------------------------

    ¶13. (S) Having attempted to mediate between Huthi rebels in
    Yemen and the central government there (before President
    Saleh put an end to Qatar's involvement), Qatar believes the
    Huthi tribes have legitimate grievances that the central
    government must address in dialogue and negotiations.  It can
    be expected that HBJ will discourage a military approach to
    solving the Huthi problem and claim that the role of Huthi
    elements in supporting terrorism in the guise of Al-Qaida is
    overstated.

    Food Security
    -------------

    ¶14. (U) Qatar will host March 3-4, 2010 an international
    conference focused on food security in the Arab World.  IFAD
    (International Fund for Agricultural Development) is a
    co-host, as is the Islamic Development Bank.  The conference
    will have a set of ambitious goals, to include a conference
    declaration establishing a permanent secretariat to address
    the food security issues of the poorer states of the Arab
    League.  According to officials of Texas A&M's Borlaug
    Institute, this will be the first such conference on regional
    food security issues hosted by an Arab government in the 50
    years the institute has been active in the Middle East and
    North Africa.

    ¶15. (SBU) In Embassy Doha's judgment, Qatar's food security
    policies and strategies reflect the rapidly growing intent by
    the Amir and Crown Prince to make food security a key
    national priority for Qatar, not just in terms of Qatar's own
    food security needs, but in terms of the food security needs
    of the Arab region. (HBJ supports having an active food
    security policy, as long as it has a strong commercial focus.)

    ¶16. (SBU) That judgment stems from our conversations with
    Qatar government officials:

    -- While QNFSP's short-term focus is on the State of Qatar
    and building the domestic agricultural sector to diminish
    reliance on imports, the strategic goal of QNFSP is to export
    the technologies developed in Qatar to countries throughout
    the MENA region, and other areas with arid climates.

    -- Toward that end, some research results will be part of the
    public domain and available to everyone.  Some technology
    transfer to poorer MENA nations will be donor-based, through
    the activities of the offices of the State Minister for
    International Cooperation.  The third component of Qatar's
    strategic goal of exporting QNFSP technology will be more
    commercially based, and will employ public/private
    partnerships.

    LeBaron

`