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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 10KUWAIT88, AMBASSADOR RAISES IRANIAN NUCLEAR CONCERNS WITH

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10KUWAIT88 | 2010-02-01 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kuwait

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHKU #0088/01 0321145
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 011145Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4510
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000088

    SIPDIS

    NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020
    TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV UNSC IR KU
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES IRANIAN NUCLEAR CONCERNS WITH
    KUWAIT

    REF: A. STATE 9124
         ¶B. 09 KUWAIT 1112
         ¶C. KUWAIT 61

    Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
     d

    ¶1. (C) Ambassador, during a January 31 luncheon in honor of
    Tony Blair at the residence of Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser
    Al Sabah, pulled aside Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed
    Al Sabah and raised ref A points concerning Iran's nuclear
    program, continuing USG concerns, and our efforts to address
    Tehran's intransigence, which now require greater application
    of international pressure.  Ambassador also noted Washington
    interest in Kuwait's recent high-level diplomatic engagement
    with Iran (PM's visit in November -- ref B), Iranian
    Parliamentary Speaker Larijani's visit in January (Ref C and
    septel), and reports of a possible Amiri visit later this
    Spring, as well as efforts to expand commercial ties,
    including oil/gas deals on the continental shelf (septel) --
    and said that enhanced bilateral cooperation to align our
    strategies would be welcome.  The FM took the points on
    board, but declined to be drawn out further on Kuwait's
    strategy for dealing with Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Earlier at the same event, Ambassador raised reftel
    points with the FM's Office Director, Shaykh Dr. Ahmad Naser
    Al Sabah (Note: also the Prime Minister's son.  End Note),
    who asked whether the Iranian side had committed "in writing"
    to the Tehran reactor fuel swap, the Qom facility inspection
    and the follow-on meeting of P5 1.  Shaykh Dr. Ahmed
    suggested that the two critical issues are whether Iran's
    nuclear program is now so widespread as to be for practical
    purposes unstoppable -- and whether Tehran has or is close to
    having the actual wherewithal to construct a nuclear device.
    Ambassador replied that we are aware of at least three
    reactors, but said the issue of capability was more difficult
    to judge -- technical know-how had to be combined with all
    the various necessary physical components, and there would
    need to be a political decision to proceed.  She emphasized
    that the President's hand is still outstretched to Iran, but
    at some point Iran will have to face the consequences of its
    recalcitrance; moreover, the President was walking a
    carefully considered fine line in dealing with others who
    wished to take actions we hoped to avoid.

    ¶3. (C) Dr. Ahmad took Ambassador's point and noted that a
    year or two ago, many in Kuwait hoped a silent, targeted
    strike would take out the troublesome reactor and leave the
    region more relaxed.  He suggested that now, however, Iran
    might have multiple reactors and was so intent on achieving
    its nuclear goal that no matter what the West did, Iran would
    get the bomb, and any attempt to disrupt it militarily or
    through tough sanctions would go badly for the West.  He
    offered his analysis that "Iran is very different from Iraq;
    if the "Murshid" orders his people to do something (like
    revenge attacks across the Gulf, striking
    American interests as well as Arab), they will do it, to a
    person."

    ¶4. (C) Polcounselor separately alluded to USG concerns raised
    reftel during a January 31 meeting with MFA Asia Department
    Counselor Rashid Al-Hajri during a January read-out on
    Iranian Speaker Ali Larijani's visit last week to Kuwait (Ref
    C and septel).  Al-Hajri, in response, delivered the GoK's
    standard (and not particularly convincing) talking points on
    this issue, emphasizing the GOK's "clear and unchanging
    position" that Iran must abide by UN and IAEA safeguards on
    its nuclear program and opposes any military options in the
    Gulf.  Al-Hajri said GOK officials invariably stress these
    points in meetings with Iranian counterparts; at the same
    time, Kuwait is obliged to conduct bilateral relations on a
    variety of issues with its larger neighbor.

    ¶5. (C) Comment:  Kuwaitis at all levels are deeply worried
    about the nuclear ambitions of their much larger neighbor,
    but are unsure how to respond.  They worry that an Iran
    emboldened by a nuclear arsenal would assert greater regional
    hegemony at the expense of Kuwaiti interests, and would be
    more inclined to meddle in Kuwaiti internal affairs given the
    thirty percent of the nation that is Shi'a.  However,
    Kuwaitis are equally concerned about military pre-emption,
    which they believe would not prove decisive and would lead
    Iran to lash out at US interests in the Gulf (including US
    military facilities in Kuwait), and against those states in
    the region seen as allied with the US.  Kuwait's current
    limited engagement with Iran appears to be motivated by a
    desire to try to lower regional tensions (particularly
    between Iran and Saudi Arabia), with Kuwait able to distance

    itself from the message by emphasizing that it is speaking on
    behalf of the GCC in its capacity as GCC chair for 2010.

    ¶6. (U) Comment continued:  At the same time, Kuwait more
    parochially is seeking a way forward to secure Iranian
    agreement to tap gas reserves in the disputed continental
    shelf (Kuwait needs the gas, which it has little of
    domestically, to fuel more and cleaner power plants to meet
    growing electricity demand).  The careful balancing act
    Kuwait is playing was perhaps best exemplified during the
    visit last week of Iranian parliamentary Speaker Larijani --
    his warning that GCC states should not allow their territory
    to be used by the US to launch attacks against Iran was
    carried in most local papers on the front page, above the
    fold, with prominent coverage given below the fold to
    comprehensive coverage (including photos) of the US-Kuwait
    military exercise "Eager Mace."  Kuwait's nuanced approach
    requires careful footwork, but PM Nasser Mohammed Al Sabah,
    former dean of Tehran's diplomatic corps and self-described
    Iran expert, apparently feels confident he is up to the task
    -- and doesn't need much help from the US with the
    choreography.  End Comment.

    ********************************************* *********
    For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
    visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

    http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
    ********************************************* *********
    JONES

`