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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV654, ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES FOCUS ON

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV654 | 2009-03-19 14:02 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTV #0654/01 0781437
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 191437Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1038
    INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 5175
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5680
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0150
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3724
    RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0904
    RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0651
    RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0930
    RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0001
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2225
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1690
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000654

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
    TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG IR IS
    SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES FOCUS ON
    IRAN, PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON

    REF: TEL AVIV 605

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    ¶1.  (S) Summary.  MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle
    East Yacov Hadas provided PolCouns March 16 with an overview
    of Israel's relations with several of the Gulf states.  Hadas
    described Israel's relations with the Gulf as a function of
    the Gulf Arabs' fear of Iran, but also as due to the Arabs'
    belief in Israeli influence in Washington.  Fleshing out some
    of the points he had made earlier to NEA Acting A/S Feltman
    (reftel), Hadas described Qatar's shift toward the radical
    camp in the region as a "game" linked to Qatari rivalry with
    Saudi Arabia.  Hadas believes Qatar is feeling pressure from
    Israel, Egypt and the Saudis, adding that he has been invited
    to visit Doha for talks about how to resume normal
    Qatari-Israeli ties.  Hadas noted that while the Omanis are
    generally correct in their dealings with Israel, they appear
    not to recognize the seriousness of the threat from Iran.  He
    said that while the UAE is increasingly hostile to Iran, it
    remains unclear how far they are willing to go in terms of
    increasing financial pressures on Tehran.  Hadas said the
    Gulf Arabs feel that the U.S. does not listen to them and
    therefore sometimes try to pass messages through Israel.
    While he agreed that progress on the Palestinian track would
    make it easier for the Gulf states to be open about their
    ties to Israel, he cautioned that the Gulf states use the
    peace process as an "excuse not to take action" against Iran
    or in support of the PA.  End Summary.

    ¶2.  (C) PolCouns called on Deputy Director General for the
    Middle East Yacov Hadas March 16 to follow up on Hadas' March
    4 discussion with Acting A/S Feltman of Israeli-Gulf
    relations.  Beginning with Qatar, Hadas said there were signs
    that various pressures on the Qataris were starting to have
    an effect.  Hadas noted that Qatar could only get its
    humanitarian relief supplies into Gaza through Israel.
    Qatari diplomats assigned to their Gaza consulate also had to
    cross through Israel since Egypt would not allow them to
    enter Gaza from Rafah.  For now, the Israelis are not
    allowing either Qatari assistance or personnel to cross into
    Gaza.  Hadas noted that he had been invited to visit Doha to
    discuss reopening the Israeli trade office, which he saw as a
    positive sign.  He added that the Qataris needed to
    understand that they could not expect to restore cooperative
    relations with Israel without agreeing to reopen the trade
    office.

    ¶3.  (S) While Hadas was critical of the Qataris' treatment of
    Israel since the Gaza operation, he stressed that he thought
    Qatar's policies were not a matter of a shift in ideology
    toward the radical camp, but linked to their rivalry with the
    Saudis and, by extension, with Egypt.  In private settings,
    Hadas noted that the Qatari leadership harbored "no
    illusions" about Iran.  Prince Hamad had told the Israelis in
    October 2006 that he believed Iran was determined to develop
    a nuclear bomb no matter the cost.  According to Hadas, Hamad
    complained at the time that he felt the U.S. would not listen
    to him and tended to believe what it heard from Iran.

    ¶4.  (S) Hadas reiterated the point he had made to Feltman
    regarding Oman, calling the Omanis the "most problematic" of
    the Gulf states in terms of their view of Iran.  With regard
    to Omani contacts with Israel, Hadas said they were
    "correct," but the Omanis never fulfilled their commitment to
    open an Israeli office in Muscat.  He said Oman has "its own
    definition" of what poses a threat to the Gulf, partly due to
    Oman's geographical location.  He did not think Oman would be
    willing to join the rest of the GCC against Iran.

    ¶5.  (S) Hadas agreed that the UAE was increasingly hostile to
    Iran, but there remained a question as to how far they were
    prepared to go.  The UAE has extensive trade and financial
    relations with Iran, including money laundering, and it was
    unclear whether they were ready to use these relations as
    leverage.  Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdallah has developed
    good personal relations with Foreign Minister Livni, but the
    Emiratis are "not ready to do publicly what they say in
    private."  (Note:  It was clear from Hadas' remarks that
    Israel's channel to Saudi Arabia does not run through the
    Foreign Ministry.)

    ¶6.  (S) Hadas said the Gulf Arabs believe in Israel's role
    because of their perception of Israel's close relationship
    with the U.S. but also due to their sense that they can count
    on Israel against Iran.  "They believe Israel can work
    magic," Hadas commented.  When considering a trilateral
    U.S.-Israel-GCC partnership, Hadas suggested we bear in mind
    that Iran's nuclear program is the primary source of concern
    to the U.S. and Israel, while the Gulf Arabs also worry about
    Iran for a host of historic and sectarian reasons.

    ¶7.  (C) PolCouns noted that Arabs say that progress on the
    Palestinian track would make it easier for them to publicly
    engage Israel.  Hadas countered that while peace with the
    Palestinians is an Israeli interest and important in its own
    right, it should not be the sum total of Israel's relations
    with the Arab World.  Arab League Secretary General Amre
    Moussa had invented the "never-ending hurdle race" in which
    Israel could never do enough to deserve a positive response.
    The Israeli-Palestinian track should not serve as an excuse
    for the Gulf to avoid action, whether against Iran or through
    practical steps to support the Palestinian Authority.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
    ********************************************* ********************
    CUNNINGHAM

`