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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL440, TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, LIMITATIONS,

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ISTANBUL440 | 2009-12-04 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Istanbul

`

    VZCZCXRO7673
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHIT #0440/01 3381236
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 041236Z DEC 09
    FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9361
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000440

    SIPDIS

    LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAGHDAD
    FOR POPAL AND HUBAH; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR
    TANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2024
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON ETRD KNNP TU IR
    SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
    AND IMPLICATIONS

    REF: (A) ANKARA 1516 (EXDIS) (B) ISTANBUL 421 (C)
         ISTANBUL 290 (D) 2008 ISTANBUL 85 (E) 2008
         ISTANBUL 146 (F) ISTANBUL 425 (G) ANKARA 1704

    Classified By: ConGen Istanbul Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton; Rea
    son 1.5 (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Recent discussions with Turkish and Iranian
    think-tank, business, and political activist contacts on the
    issue of Turkey-Iran relations reveal a broad consensus that:
    (1) Turkey pursues closer relations with Iran out of desires
    for regional stability and conflict avoidance, recognition of
    Turkey as an indispensable East-West bridge; strengthening a
    long-term energy and commercial relationship; and hope that
    Turkey's approach will moderate Iranian regime behavior.  (2)
    Iran reciprocates because it sees Turkey as a hedge against
    its diplomatic isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a
    safety valve for its population.  However, (3) Turkey's
    influence over Iranian decision-making it limited; Turkey has
    never persuaded Iran to change course on an issue of
    strategic concern to the regime.  To quote one contact:
    "Iran knows Turkey is not going to walk away."  On the other
    hand, our contacts also concluded that Iranian
    decision-making responds at least tactically to multilateral
    pressure, which argues that Turkey can and should play a key
    role to play in supporting tougher approaches on Iran at the
    UNSC and IAEA.  End Summary.

    Views from Contacts on Turkey-Iran Relations
    ---------------------------------------------
    ¶2.  (C) Over the past several weeks, in conversations before
    and after President Ahmadinejad's November 8-9 visit to
    Istanbul (ref B), ConGen Istanbul's NEA Iran Watcher has
    solicited views from a wide range of Turkish and Iranian
    contacts on the issue of warming Turkey-Iran relations, what
    motivates each side, and whether Turkey's approach has led to
    a moderation of Iranian regime behavior.  Contacts with whom
    we spoke included Turkish academic experts, Turkish
    businessmen who deal with Iran, Istanbul-based journalists
    who cover Iran, several Iranian political activists now
    seeking refugee status in Turkey for fear of persecution in
    Iran, and several Tehran-based Iranian contacts who follow
    Iran's foreign policy.  Our conversations revealed an unusual
    confluence of views.

    Turkey's Motivations
    --------------------
    ¶3.  (C) According to a number of Turkish academic and
    think-tank contacts, Turkey is pursuing closer relations with
    Iran for several mutually-reinforcing reasons.  First, the
    underlying principle:  According to a Turkish university
    professor who informally advises FM Davutoglu on Middle East
    issues (ref C), Turkey's pursuit of close relations with Iran
    is a direct reflection of Davutoglu's academic philosophy and
    influential 2000 book, "Strategic Depth," in which he first
    articulated a policy of "zero problems" with Turkey's
    neighbors.  Another Istanbul-based professor told us that
    Turkey's Iran policy represents "a triumph of real-politik,"
    with Turkey's national and regional interests trumping any
    discomfort that Turkey, as a multi-ethnic, pluralistic
    democracy, might feel about the Iranian regime's harsh
    domestic authoritarianism.  This contact described Davutoglu
    as "Turkey's Kissinger."

    ¶4.  (C) Regional Stability and Conflict Avoidance:  Turkish
    contacts, and indeed even MFA interlocutors, have
    acknowledged in the recent past that Turkey sees a military
    attack against Iran's nuclear facilities as the worst
    possible outcome on the Iran issue.  Iran's acquisition of a
    nuclear weapons capability would only be the second worst
    outcome.  This hints at the depth of Turkey's anxiety about
    the dangers to regional stability, including Turkey's, of the
    unintended consequences of any further military action in the
    region, and explains Turkey's commitment at almost any cost
    to continued western diplomatic engagement with Iran.  As one
    contact explained, "After the traumatic violence in Iraq, and
    fearful that some countries still think military action is an
    option with Iran, Turkey will do anything to prevent armed
    conflict."  The GoT's approach on this score enjoys some
    public support:  Turkish public opinion also considers an
    attack against Iran as more dangerous to Turkey than Iran
    acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.  Indeed, almost a
    third of Turks polled do not consider a nuclear-armed Iran to
    be a threat, believing that Iran would never attack a fellow
    Muslim country.

    ¶5.  (C) Recognition of Turkey as Moderate Regional Leader and
    Indispensable East-West Bridge:  According to an Ankara-based

    ISTANBUL 00000440  002 OF 004

    international relations professor with ties to PM Erdogan's
    office, Turkey is also deepening ties to Iran because the
    region otherwise faces a "power vacuum."  No other regional
    state (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) has the military and
    economic power to serve as an effective counterweight to
    Iran.  Turkey fills this role with the support of regional
    states who otherwise fear a dominant Iran, including the Gulf
    States and to some degree Iran's own client, Syria.
    Moreover, he described Turkey's engagement with Iran as part
    of a wider effort to stake out a regional leadership position
    that puts Turkey "at the fulcrum" and makes it an
    indispensable partner for the west -- whether or not Turkey
    eventually joins the EU -- in dealing with the Middle East
    and Central Asia.  This contact acknowledged that this
    sometimes requires Turkey to tactically distance itself from
    the USG on several key issues, including Iran's "right" to
    enrichment and the regime's dismal human rights record.  But
    our contact underscored that "this is classic triangulation."
     Turkey's intention, he claims, is not a strategic distancing
    from the US.
    ¶6.  (C) Strengthening a long-term energy and commercial
    relationship:  Turkey does not hide the fact that its own
    growing energy security needs compel it to look to all
    available sources, including Iran, for energy.  In response,
    we have underscored that the USG supports the diversification
    of Turkish gas supplies, while cautioning that Iran has
    proven to be an unreliable partner in the past and
    reaffirming USG concern over new energy deals with Iran.
    Turkey is also actively seeking to expand trade ties with
    Iran:  Both Turkish and Iranian officials have publicly
    called for bilateral trade volume, which was $10 billion in
    2008, to reach $20 billion by 2012 -- a goal most trade
    experts say is wildly unrealistic.  Furthermore, Turkey is
    taking steps to protect and expand financial ties with Iran,
    for example by continuing to allow Iran's Bank Mellat
    (sanctioned by the USG under E.O. 13382) to operate branches
    in Istanbul and Ankara, and agreeing to conduct bilateral
    trade in Turkish Lira or Iranian Rials rather than dollars
    and Euros to avoid having to clear the payments through US or
    European banks.
    ¶7.  (C) Tying Iran into regional organizations:  As long as
    Davutoglu controls Turkish foreign policy, our Turkish
    contacts predict that Ankara will seek multiple avenues for
    bilateral and multilateral engagement with Iran, deepening
    bilateral cultural and economic ties, and working with
    regional organizations like the D-8 (ref D), the Economic
    Cooperation Organization (ref E) and the OIC to maximize
    engagement.  Indeed, Davutoglu's MFA sees regional IOs like
    these as much more useful tools for engaging Iran, and thus
    committing Iran incrementally to pursue regionally
    cooperative policies, than previous FMs did, according to
    contacts.

    Iran's Motivations
    ------------------
    ¶8.   (C) According to our Turkish and Iranian contacts, Iran
    is happy to reciprocate Turkey's interest in closer ties
    because it sees Turkey as a hedge against its diplomatic
    isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a safety valve for
    its population.  Turkey's value to Iran is felt most strongly
    in these six areas:
    --Economic:  Iran recognizes Turkey's emergence as a regional
    economic powerhouse, wants to deepen Turkey's dependence on
    its natural gas, and sees Turkish markets and bilateral
    commerce as a hedge against isolation and sanctions;
    -- Diplomatic:  Iran knows that Turkey's seats on the UNSC
    and IAEA Board give it outsized influence, and Iran benefits
    from the occasional inclination of Turkish leaders to give
    Iran's nuclear intentions, at least in public, the benefit of
    the doubt;
    -- Political:  Turkey's refusal to publicly criticize the
    regime over the conduct of June elections or its crackdown on
    peaceful protesters, as well as PM Edogan's quick recognition
    of Ahmadinejad's contested election victory, helped bolster
    Iranian regime legitimacy at a critical period when the
    regime needed it most;
    --  Cultural:  A quarter of Iran's population is ethnically
    Azeri and Turkish-speaking; Turkish TV programs and are among
    the most popular in Iran; and one million Iranians flock
    annually visa-free to Turkey as a touristic "safety valve";
    -- Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S: Iran closely
    watched the spring 2009 visits to Turkey by Secretary Clinton
    and then President Obama.  One direct result of those visits,
    according to an Iranian journalist based in Istanbul, was a
    decision by the regime to try to use Turkey's enhanced
    influence with the USG to "soften" Washington's approach to
    Iran.

    ISTANBUL 00000440  003 OF 004

    The Limits of Turkish Influence On Iran
    ---------------------------
    ¶9.  (C) Turkey's influence with Iran runs broadly, but does
    not appear to run deep.  None of our contacts had seen
    concrete evidence that Turkey has swayed Iranian leaders to
    change course on any issue of strategic interest to the
    regime where Iran had not already calculated it was in its
    interests to do so.

    ¶10. (C) An Istanbul-based professor who informally advises
    Davutoglu, and joined him in his September and October bilats
    (in Tehran and Kuala Lumpur) with Iranian FM Mottaki, claimed
    that Davutoglu's interventions helped persuade the regime to
    agree to participate in the October 1 Geneva meeting with the
    P5 1.  However, all other contacts dismissed that claim,
    noting that Iranian regime statements and press reports prior
    to Davutoglu's bilats already indicated that Iran would go to
    Geneva.

    ¶11. (C) Several weeks of intense, personal diplomacy by FM
    Davutoglu, supported by interventions form President Gul and
    PM Erdogan, have been unable to persuade Iranian
    decision-makers  to agree to a compromise deal with Turkey
    that would keep alive the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor
    (TRR) fuel swap proposal, a key test of the P5 1's efforts to
    engage Iran.

    ¶12.  (C) Our contact who advises Davutoglu also asserted that
    Turkey played a key role in persuading Iran to release
    several detainees including Greek-British journalist Iason
    Athanasiadis (jailed in Iran on June 17 and released on July
    6).  But Athanasiadis (please protect) told us that while
    Turkey offered to intervene with Iran on his case, to his
    knowledge it never did, and indeed Athanasiadis told us he
    believed it was the Ecumenical Patriarch's personal request
    to Khamenei (via letter) that probably convinced Iran to
    release him.

    ¶13.  (C) Even on issues of lesser strategic importance to
    Iran, high-level Turkish intervention does not reveal a
    record of successfully moderating Iranian policies.
    According to a Turkish businessman who deals with Iran (Ref
    F), several interventions from Turkey's Trade and Foreign
    Ministers, and even a plea from PM Erdogan in Tehran on
    October 27, have been unable to persuade Iran to lower its
    customs duties on Turkish imports, currently 45% for finished
    products. As our business contact explained, even though Iran
    depends on Turkish diplomatic support and benefits from
    Turkish gas purchases and other trade, Iran realizes it does
    not have to sacrifice any critical policy priorities in
    return, including its customs income, because "Iran knows
    Turkey is not going to walk away."

    Does Turkey Really Understand Iran Better?
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶14.  (C) Underlying Turkey's pursuit of warmer relations with
    Iran is an assumption on the part of Turkish decision-makers
    and diplomats that Turkey has correctly judged that the
    current Iranian regime will be its long-term interlocutor.
    But Turkey's belief that it understands Iranian political
    developments better than most western countries is an
    assumption strongly challenged by our Iranian contacts.
    These contacts suggest that Turkey draws its assessment of
    Iran's internal dynamics through a subjective filter, which
    values regime stability foremost, and thus Turkey's
    assessments artificially inflate evidence suggestive of
    regime stability.

    ¶15.  (C) According to two separate "Green Movement" activists
    now seeking refugee status in Turkey -- one a Mousavi
    campaign official, one the communications director of a
    reformist party that supported Mousavi -- Turkey missed an
    historic opportunity by quickly recognizing Ahmadinejad's
    victory and dismissing the Green Movement's political
    significance, either as a meaningful opposition movement or
    as the possible vanguard of a more democratic Iranian
    government.  Most Green Movement activists now see Turkey as
    fully committed to the Iranian regime's survival in the name
    of regional stability, and predict that Turkey will be "on
    the wrong side of history" if and when Iran's fractured
    regime faces systemic change at the hands of Iran's
    population.  "When the system falls and a more democratic,
    moderate, outward-looking government comes to power, we will
    all remember where Turkey stood on 22 Khordad (June 12) and
    after."
    ¶16.  (C) Turkey, like the USG, almost certainly recognizes
    that within the Iranian regime there are at least several
    factions and key players jockeying intensely for influence.

    ISTANBUL 00000440  004 OF 004

    The fact that Turkish President Gul agreed to meet former
    Iranian presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai, a Rafsanjani
    ally, in Ankara in October (despite the INTERPOL Red Notice
    issued against Rezai), and the relative frequency with which
    Turkish officials including PM Erdogan have met influential
    Majles speaker Larijani, an Ahmadinejad rival, in the past
    six months, suggest that Turkey -- like others in the west --
    wants to hedge its bets on who will emerge as the strongest
    of Iran's decision-makers, especially if Supreme Leader
    Khamenei faces future leadership challenges.  (In a telling
    anecdote related to us indirectly, when Erdogan met Khamenei
    in Tehran on October 28, Khamenei seemed to be "in a time
    capsule", asking uninformed or unrealistic questions about
    Turkish foreign policy, and passively uninterested in
    discussing the nuclear issue.)  Despite its belief that it
    knows its neighbor Iran better than most other countries do,
    according to our contacts, Turkey is just as uncertain as the
    USG and other western countries as to what exactly is
    happening behind the regime's closed doors.

    Implications
    ----------
    ¶17.  (C) If the consensus views of our contacts are accurate,
    it suggests our efforts to persuade PM Erdogan to adopt a
    tougher public stance against Iran will be a tough sell.
    Even if Erdogan were to hew closer to P5-plus-one criticism
    of Iran, Tehran would likely pay him little heed.  On the
    other hand, our contacts point out that Iran's regime has a
    clear recent history of making tactical concessions in the
    face of concerted international pressure, especially pressure
    from the UNSC and IAEA.  If this holds true, we can and
    should encourage Turkey to play a supportive role at the UNSC
    and IAEA as the USG and partners consider raising pressure on
    Iran in those fora.  As noted Ref G, however, any USG effort
    to try press Turkey to sign up to tougher international
    measures on Iran, especially on issues that might impact the
    Turkish economy, will have  costly domestic political
    consequences for the GoT.  The key to securing Turkish
    acquiescence at the UNSC and IAEA, a Turkish professor
    explained, is to keep the engagement track on the table and
    even further sweetened (especially with trade incentives from
    which Turkey might also benefit), even as tougher measures
    are being pursued.
    WIENER

`