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### Viewing cable 10KABUL693, AHMED WALI KARZAI: SEEKING TO DEFINE HIMSELF AS

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10KABUL693 | 2010-02-25 04:04 | SECRET | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO2601
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #0693/01 0560405
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 250405Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5873
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000693

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
    STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
    USFOR-A FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020
    TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM PREL AF
    SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI: SEEKING TO DEFINE HIMSELF AS
    U.S. PARTNER?

    REF: A. (A) KABUL 673
         ¶B. (B) 09 KABUL 3068

    Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee
    for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Begin Summary.  Senior Civilian
    Representative (SCR) Frank Ruggiero met one-on-one with Ahmed
    Wali Karzai (AWK) on February 23.  SCR informed AWK that
    coalition attention will turn to Kandahar in the next phase
    of Operation Moshtarak (Together) and the United States will
    play a far greater role in Kandahar on the military and
    civilian sides.  SCR outlined the coalition governance
    strategy for Kandahar and cautioned ISAF will seek
    non-interference by powerbrokers in police matters.  AWK
    discussed the recent capture of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar
    in Kandahar, district and provincial-level politics, Kandahar
    economics and security, the role of Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) in
    Helmand, narcotics, a southern Pashtoon political party,
    competition with Nangarhar Governor Gulaga Sherzai, and AWK's
    life in Chicago from 1983-1992.  AWK appeared nervous, but
    eager to engage with a U.S. official.  End Summary.

    Focus on Kandahar
    -----------------

    ¶2. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR told AWK the attention of the
    Afghan government, with ISAF support, would turn to Kandahar
    in the months ahead and it was likely this would be
    predominantly a political contest that would require the
    leadership from the highest level of the Afghan government.
    SCR discussed the governance strategy for Kandahar City and
    surrounding districts.  AWK understood the next phase of
    operation Moshtarak would be on Kandahar and offered his
    support.  SCR responded this would be an Afghan
    Government-led effort and the coalition would be focusing its
    resources on building up that capacity.  SCR was clear the
    coalition would not tolerate individuals working at odds to
    ISAF campaign aims.  AWK stated "nobody is that stupid."

    Better Security and Economy in Kandahar
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶3. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK told the SCR that security has
    improved in Kandahar over the past year.  Freedom of movement
    had increased across the province, he said, citing his
    driving to the meeting at Kandahar Airfield with minimum
    security.  AWK said insurgents no longer have the capability
    to launch large scale attacks; for example, AWK does not fear
    an insurgent attack on his home.  AWK expressed concern about
    a series of assassinations aimed at Afghan officials and
    Afghan citizens who work for the coalition in the city,
    noting this could only be solved by intelligence assets.  AWK
    said economic activity had increased in the Kandahar City
    area, but noted his belief that President Karzai is largely
    unaware of these gains.  AWK told the President about
    increased economic activity in Arghandab related to AVIPA
    Plus and the President was very surprised, he said.  AWK said
    the President did not understand the changing circumstances
    in the province.

    Kandahar Politics Are Local
    ---------------------------

    ¶4. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) AWK said that it was important to get
    district-level tribal dynamics right to bring stability to
    Kandahar City and its environs.  AWK specifically stated the
    need to rely on local, village elders to choose
    representatives to district shuras.  This would ensure a
    representative shura for district level officials, said AWK
    and pointed to the succession of Arghandab-based Alikozai
    leader Mullah Naqib.  AWK said the Alikozais chose Mullah
    Naqib's son, Karimullah, to lead the Alikozai.  SCR pointed
    out coalition conventional wisdom that President Karzai had
    interfered in that process to appoint Karimullah, which led
    to certain Alikozai elements to support the Taliban in
    Arghandab.  AWK said, unconvincingly, this was not the case.
    AWK then contradicted himself and said Karimullah, in fact,
    did not lead the Alikozai, but AWK's deputy at the provincial
    council Dastegeeri, was the most influential Alikozai in
    Kandahar.

    Police in the South and Abdul Rahman Jan
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶5. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR told AWK the coalition would not
    accept powerbroker interference with the police and used the
    example of citizens in Marjah telling Marines they would not

    KABUL 00000693  002 OF 003

    support GIRoA due to past Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) abuses when
    he was the Helmand police chief between 2003 and 2006.  AWK
    concurred ARJ was problematic.  SCR reiterated coalition
    would seek to make certain ARJ did not re-establish links to
    police officials in Marjah (Note: SCR brought this discussion
    up so that AWK would report it to Kabul. End Note.).  AWK
    said the Noorzais in Marjah would support ARJ, but other
    tribes would resist.  Kandahar does not have similar issues
    of interference with the police, he said, but SCR pressed
    saying we are aware of a recent incident when the Kandahar
    governor sought to remove the Panjwa'i chief of police, but
    someone had intervened to halt that removal.  AWK, who is
    believed to have prevented Governor Weesa from firing the
    police chief, said the governor had the power to remove
    police officials and should exercise that authority in
    Panjwa'i.  AWK characterized Governor Weesa as honest and a
    powerful figure in Kandahar, but he needed to be more
    aggressive.  In the same breath, AWK said he was the most
    powerful official in Kandahar and could deliver whatever is
    needed.

    Capture of Mullah Baradar
    -------------------------

    ¶6. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR asked AWK his views on the recent
    capture in Pakistan of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar.  AWK
    said Pakistan detained Baradar and other Taliban leaders
    because they were prepared to discuss reintegration with the
    Karzai government.  Senior Taliban fighters in Pakistan may
    be prepared to reintegrate, he said, but are forced by the
    Pakistan Government to continue to fight.  AWK said some
    Afghan Taliban commanders cannot return to Afghanistan
    because they are on the Joint Priority Effects List (JPEL)
    and are told by the Pakistanis they must continue to fight or
    will be turned over to the coalition.  It is important to
    remove such fighters from the JPEL for reintegration to work,
    he argued, adding that he has been working on the
    reconciliation issue with the Saudis for two-three years.
    AWK offered a meeting with SCR and his older brother and
    former Member of Parliament for Kandahar Kayyum Karzai in the
    next few weeks to discuss ongoing reintegration discussions
    with the Saudis.

    Drug Trafficker: Where is the Polygraph?
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶7. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Unprompted, AWK raised allegations of
    his involvement in narcotics, telling the SCR that he is
    willing to take a polygraph anytime, anywhere to prove his
    innocence and that he has hired an attorney in New York to
    clear his name.  He suggested that the coalition pay mullahs
    to preach against heroin, which would reduce demand for poppy
    cultivation.  AWK dismissed the narcotics allegations as part
    of a campaign to discredit him, particularly by the media,
    saying the allegations are "like a spice added to a dish to
    make it more enticing to eat."

    A Political Party for Southern Pashtuns?
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶8. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR asked AWK if there are discussions
    to create a Pashtun-oriented political party in the South.
    AWK said such a party would be announced shortly and it would
    encompass southern Pashtuns from Herat to Kandahar; Tajiks
    also would be represented.  AWK said Afghans are reluctant to
    join political parties because they are associated with the
    communist party and Islamic fundamentalist movements, like
    the Taliban.  He added that he could not be part of another
    election because he had to personally manage promises to
    hundreds of thousands of voters in the last election.

    Gulaga Sherzai: Competitor
    --------------------------

    ¶9. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) SCR raised the recent 1,500 person
    shura co-hosted by AWK and Sherzai in Kandahar City (Reftel
    B).  AWK said Sherzai was not to be trusted, but he was
    willing to work with him on a peace jirga to deliver peace to
    the south.  AWK passionately presented his history of working
    with the United States since 2001 and told the SCR that he
    could deliver anything needed.

    Missing Wrigley
    ---------------

    ¶10. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) Further emphasizing his links to
    the United States, AWK fondly recalled his days in Chicago as
    a restaurant owner close to Chicago's Wrigley Field.  His

    KABUL 00000693  003 OF 003

    restaurant was a hub for American in the Midwest who had
    worked or lived in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion,
    he said.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶11. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF)  AWK was eager to engage and rarely
    stopped talking in the two hour meeting.  While he presented
    himself as a partner to the United States and is eager to be
    seen as helping the coalition, he also demonstrated that he
    will dissemble when it suits his needs.  He appears not to
    understand the level of our knowledge of his activities, and
    that the coalition views many of his activities as malign,
    particularly relating to his influence over the police.  We
    will need to monitor his activity closely, and deliver a
    recurring, transparent message to him of where are redlines
    are and what we expect of him in the months ahead.
    RICCIARDONE

`