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### Viewing cable 06ABUDHABI1725, SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
06ABUDHABI1725 | 2006-04-29 13:01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001725

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN

    STATE FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
    TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP IR IZ AE Terrorism
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR
    CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE

    REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243
         ¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565
         ¶C. ABU DHABI 409
         ¶D. ABU DHABI 779
         ¶E. ABU DHABI 1228
         ¶F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)
         ¶G. ABU DHABI 176
         ¶H. ABU DHABI 605
         ¶I. USDEL 00007
         ¶J. ABU DHABI 1123
         ¶K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
         ¶L. ABU DHABI 1520
         ¶M. ABU DHABI 1716
         ¶N. ABU DHABI 1422
         ¶O. ABU DHABI 1724

    Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

     ¶1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
    you to the UAE on May 7.  U.S. and UAE officials have had a
    number of productive meetings on the topic of
    counterterrorism, the most recent of which came on April 22,
    when Fran Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland
    Security and Counterterrorism, met over lunch with Abu Dhabi
    Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and his brother,
    Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ).  Your visit
    builds on our ongoing dialogue and efforts to push the UAE on
    several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism,
    counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological
    extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter).  We have
    requested separate meetings with Foreign Minister Sheikh
    Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ), whom you met in New York last
    September, and State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin
    Zayed, whom Deputy Coordinator Urbancic met last October.  In
    your meetings, you should commend the UAE for its assistance
    and cooperation, including its strong condemnation of the
    April 24 bomb attack in Dahab.  The UAE remains a committed
    partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take
    an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the
    problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
    transnational basis.  In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
    the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
    Committee (JTFCC).  Treasury U/S Levey is currently in the
    UAE to hold a second meeting that will focus on cash couriers
    and charities.

    ¶2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
    serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
    reluctant to take actions that could provoke their neighbor
    and compromise their extensive trading relationship.  At the
    same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of
    the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval
    of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  As tensions escalate
    between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
    growing increasingly nervous.  The UAE leadership, which has
    told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization, plans
    to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
    to the Palestinian people.  The UAE has taken an active role
    in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
    process and continues to condemn the sectarian violence that
    is preventing stabilization of the country.  In the face of
    growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership
    is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to
    gain a foothold on UAE soil.  End Summary.

    Counterterrorism Efforts
    ------------------------

    ¶3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
    UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
    reducing its vulnerability (ref A).  The UAE considers
    homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
    prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
    focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
    and procuring equipment.  In your meetings, we recommend that
    you inquire about the government's plan, announced by
    President Khalifa in December 2005, to place all the security
    agencies under a newly established National Security Council.
     MbZ, asked by Townsend if the UAE was worried about its oil
    infrastructure, responded emphatically, "absolutely."  He
    told Townsend that there are three international companies
    currently conducting risk assessments of the UAE oil
    infrastructure and maritime security for the UAEG.  Townsend
    offered U.S. assistance in helping the UAE to reduce its
    vulnerability (ref O).

    ¶4. (S) The UAEG reacts quickly when presented with evidence
    of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach
    the problem from a transnational posture.  The UAE's
    immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
    them.  UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
    the problem goes or whether there is an international network
    involved.  Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
    is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
    specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead
    information found in the possession of individuals in their
    custody with each other or with the U.S. Government.  These
    tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
    ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
    planned attacks.  The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
    solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
    address the nature and scope of the problem.  Townsend
    discussed this matter with MbZ and urged the UAE to instead
    to fully investigate terror suspects and share the results of
    those inquiries with the USG.
    Counterterrorism Finance
    ------------------------

    ¶5. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
    financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
    financing (ref B).  Although the UAE now has a strong legal
    framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
    It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
    prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
    cash courier, and charity laws and regulations.  To date,
    investigation and prosecution have been weak.  In an effort
    to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing,
    the
    first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
    Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
    January 24, 2005 (ref C).  The UAE team had representatives
    from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
    Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice.  However, no one
    participated from Dubai.  In order for the JTFCC to be an
    effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
    and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
    participate.  The April 30 meeting will focus on cash
    couriers and charity regulations.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶6. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating
    tensions between Iran and the international community.  AbZ
    publicly expressed his country's concern, and the entire
    region's "vulnerability," at a press conference in Kuwait
    April 25, while urging a peaceful resolution (ref M).
    Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
    is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
    the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
    encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
    Iranian proliferation activities.  Although the UAEG is
    worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
    decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
    neighbor.  The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
    January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
    of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs.  None of
    those instances has resulted in a successful interdiction.
    In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
    take action (refs F and G).  The Director of Dubai's State
    Security Organization explained during the 11 February
    U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
    decision not to inspect the containers had been a political
    decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
    (ref H).  In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had
    been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
    Abbas.  AbZ told U/S Joseph during his April 8 visit to Abu
    Dhabi that the USG should approach the UAE on interdiction
    requests "only as a last resort" (ref N).  Two weeks later,
    he assured Townsend that the UAEG does not want Iran to take
    advantage of the UAE's open trading environment.  He said the
    UAE was in the final stages of ratifying its export control
    law and that it would be announced "soon."  In an encouraging
    development, the UAE on April 15 privately endorsed the
    Proliferation Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction
    Principles (ref L).

    ¶7. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, Abu
    Dhabi's ruling family has expressed clear support for U.S.
    initiatives against Iran.  The U.S. and UAE have a "common
    desire to succeed," AbZ told U/S Joseph, noting that the
    combination of Iran and terrorism is something that cannot be
    tolerated.  "The threat from al-Qa'ida would be minor if Iran
    has nukes," AbZ said (ref N).  MbZ told Townsend April 22
    that the Iranians think that the U.S. will not do anything
    about their recent declaration that they have successfully
    enriched uranium.  He added that he thought the Iranians were
    wrong.  MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
    Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23
    about the need to counter Iran's growing influence in the
    region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified
    that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership,
    not the Iranian people (ref I).  MbZ told A/S Welch March 28
    that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
    proceeding with any U.S. plans against Iran (ref E).  He told
    A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to
    USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the
    challenge posed by Iran.  In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM
    Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat
    with a greater sense of urgency.  He was strongly in favor of
    taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather
    than later.  "I believe this guy is going to take us to war.
    ... It's a matter of time," MbZ warned, adding that action
    against Iran and President Ahmedinejad should be taken this
    year or next year.

    ¶8. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
    Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
    the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
    should not be considered a guarantee.  Hazza assessed that
    Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
    terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
    financial support to Hamas.  He added that the relationship
    between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
    also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
    influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world.  MbZ also
    expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
    was supporting Hamas.  During your meetings, you should
    explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
    United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
    isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash.  You
    should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
    with the USG on interdiction requests.  These meetings will
    be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with AbZ
    April 8, when Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for
    Iran.  (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S.
    initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come
    to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
    something without involving the UAE, please do so."  End
    Note.)

    Palestinian Territories/Hamas
    -----------------------------

    ¶9. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
    terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
    unless they denounce violence (refs D and E).  However, after
    Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
    March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
    Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
    Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
    that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
    assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
    MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
    come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
    Meshaal."  MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
    Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
    Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
    "going to the right people."  In his meeting with Townsend,
    MbZ said that the UAE "felt the Muslim Brotherhood rally
    behind Hamas" after its electoral victory in the Palestinian
    territories, and that the Hamas victory should be a lesson to
    the West.  UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
    Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told
    Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, "with some pressure,"

    SIPDIS
    would understand the need to respect the will of the
    international community.

    ¶10. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant
    financial assistance to the Palestinian people.  Typically,
    the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
    charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
    UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
    Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
    2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries.  In the wake of the Hamas
    electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
    their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
    (including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
    that was announced last year).

    ¶11. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
    Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
    negative side to the Hamas election win.  On the negative
    side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
    their violent agenda.  On the positive side, Hazza noted the
    fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
    international community.  He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
    posed by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Hazza also asked A/S Welch
    how the USG would react to those countries that did support
    the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
    U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
    A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
    that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
    renounced violence and accepted Israel.  A/S Welch also told
    Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
    Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
    government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
    accountability.  MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
    "official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
    Kuwait, and Qatar.  MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
    in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.

    Iraq
    ----

    ¶12. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues
    to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
    other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
    Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.  The UAE has also
    been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
    process.  It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
    figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
    consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
    about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq.  The UAE has
    publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
    in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
    al-Askariya Shrine.  MbZ told Townsend that he had "no
    confidence" in the new Iraqi Prime Minister-designate, Jawad
    al-Maliki, and he reiterated his concern about Iran's
    meddling in Iraq's internal affairs.  He has pledged the
    UAE's support to the fight against al-Qaida.

    Ideological Extremism
    ---------------------

    ¶13. (S) The Abu Dhabi ruling family continue to be outspoken
    on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to
    the region.  MbZ told Townsend that if there were an election
    in Dubai tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over.
    He said the challenge is to find a way to remove the
    extremists in a way that they never come back.  One way he
    and his brothers have been trying to accomplish this is by
    reforming the education system, which they say was penetrated
    by the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s.  (Note: The UAE
    has announced that half of the members of the Federal
    National Council would be elected while half would continue
    to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
    Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
    Gulf states in terms of democratization.  End Note.)  UAE
    officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and
    terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of
    government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques.
    SISON

`