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### Viewing cable 10DOHA71, SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10DOHA71 | 2010-02-24 09:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Doha

`

    VZCZCXRO1707
    PP RUEHBC RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHDO #0071/01 0550944
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 240944Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9704
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000071

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020
    TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL IR QA
    SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER

    Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

    --------------
    (C) KEY POINTS
    --------------

    --  Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) told
    Senator John Kerry February 13 that we will all lose us 4-6
    months of time in pursuing the recently announced "proximity
    talks" between the Israelis and Palestinians.

    --  HBJ underscored that it is a mistake to ignore Hamas in
    seeking a lasting agreement.

    --  From Qatar's perspective, there are differences in style
    and approaches between the two wings of Hamas, but in
    principle both are fundamentally aligned.  Hamas leaders in
    Damascus and Gaza can accept recognition of Israel, but must
    calibrate the timing very carefully because Hamas supporters
    are not ready for this change.

    --  According to HBJ, Egypt has a vested interest in dragging
    out Palestinian reconciliation talks for as long as possible.
     Egypt "has no end game; serving as broker of the talks is
    Egypt's only business interest with the U.S."

    --  The Prime Minister suggested that one or two GCC members,
    Morocco, and Syria form the core membership of an Arab League
    committee to address Palestinian-Israeli concerns.  Giving
    Syria a role would create jealousy among the Arabs, which HBJ
    said would help the U.S. move talks forward.

    --  HBJ said putting economic pressure on Iran by targeting
    its oil revenues is the best way to get Tehran to rethink its
    quest for nuclear weapons.  For the sanctions to work, it
    would be vital that Russia and other countries bordering Iran
    implement them fully.

    End Key Points.

    ¶1. (C)  The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee (SFRC), Senator John Kerry (D-MA), accompanied by
    Ambassador, P/E Chief and SFRC staff Frank Lowenstein and
    Fatema Sumar, met February 13 with Prime Minister (and
    Foreign Minister) of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani
    (HBJ).  HBJ opened the meeting by observing that President
    Obama's presidency had brought a lot of optimism to the
    region.  Senator Kerry agreed, adding that now we "need to
    deliver."

    ---------------------------
    PROXIMITY TALKS NOT HELPFUL
    ---------------------------

    ¶2. (C) HBJ expressed dissatisfaction that "everyone in the
    region" seems to have a separate plan for moving ahead on the
    Israeli-Palestinian dispute when only one plan was needed --
    a plan that both the Israelis and Palestinians would accept
    and finalize.  More disconcerting to Qatar, he said, was the
    announcement by Special Envoy Mitchell that both parties
    would now engage in "proximity talks."  Such talks "will lose
    us 4-6 months of time," stated HBJ.

    ¶3. (C) Senator Kerry responded that we "are where we are."
    He assessed that the Goldstone Report and dissatisfaction in
    Fatah's ranks in the West Bank made it difficult for Abu
    Mazen to "give something to Israel" that would allow direct
    negotiations to begin between the parties.  Add in Abu
    Mazen's previous statements on the need for a full settlement
    freeze, and the ingredients for the Palestinian people to
    accept direct talks simply are not there.

    ¶4. (C) Abu Mazen is out on a limb, responded HBJ.  "He
    climbed a tree (drawing a line in the sand on settlements)
    and can't get down."  HBJ suggested that President Obama's
    address to the UN General Assembly at the opening of its
    current session could serve as a "roadmap" forward:  two
    states (Israel and Palestine) remain the goal, and the
    establishment of settlements must stop while negotiations
    take place.  HBJ stressed again that the "proximity talks"
    will cause a "lot of problems."

    -----------------------------------
    NEED FOR PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION
    -----------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) HBJ told Chairman Kerry he had met recently in Doha
    with an Israeli delegation and had encouraged them to work
    with Palestinians of all stripes in the pursuit of peace.
    HBJ underscored that it is a mistake to work with just one
    partner, Fatah, and ignore Hamas.  Saying this does not mean

    DOHA 00000071  002 OF 004

    that Qatar expresses a preference for Hamas.  HBJ pointed out
    that Abu Mazen had taught in Qatar for 30 years and remains a
    friend of Qatar.  Qatar has no differences with him or those
    around him, but the Palestinian Authority (PA) cannot sign
    off on an agreement on behalf of the Palestinians where open
    divisions exist.

    ¶6. (C) HBJ noted that in conversations Qatar has held with
    Hamas' leadership, it is clear that Hamas is ready to accept
    Israel's right to exist.  But the acceptance must come about
    gradually, not in one day.  Senator Kerry said he had heard
    this elsewhere, but in his own conversations in Damascus --
    where a many leaders of Hamas reside -- he did not get the
    sense that Hamas was ready to accept Israel's existence.

    ¶7. (C) Qatar's PM observed that the biggest obstacle on the
    Palestinian side to an eventual agreement with Israel is the
    reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah.  HBJ maintained that it
    would have happened during the previous U.S. administration,
    but President Bush told Abu Mazen not to sign off on it.
    Now, said HBJ, progress is slow, and bringing the two parties
    together in the spirit of reconciliation is hampered by Arab
    politics.  Reconciliation can happen, HBJ asserted, but only
    "if bigger countries in the region allow it."

    8, (C) Senator Kerry, noting that he had seen Yasser Arafat
    make the transition from PLO fighter to signer of an
    agreement on the White House lawn, observed that people can
    come around and change their position.  But was that the case
    here?  The Senator asked HBJ if the differences at play
    between Hamas' leaders in Damascus and Gaza were too wide to
    bridge.

    ¶9. (C) From HBJ's perspective, there are differences in style
    and approaches between the two wings of Hamas, but in
    principle both are fundamentally aligned.  They can accept
    recognition of Israel, but have to calibrate the timing very
    carefully because Hamas knows that its supporters in the
    Palestinian territories are not ready for this change.  HBJ
    said Hamas leaders in Damascus and Gaza are aligned on
    wanting to open the border crossing at Rafah, for example,
    but differ on tactics in reaching this goal.  The leaderships
    in Syria and Gaza consult each other, and no one leader in
    Hamas can take a decision alone, reported HBJ.

    --------------------------------------------
    EGYPT INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS, NOT RESULTS
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Chairman Kerry asked HBJ if Hamas is feeling
    political pressure from Gazans over their current living
    conditions.  HBJ responded that anytime people do not have
    housing, schools or public utilities, their political leaders
    feel pressure.  Hamas, however, has a greater sense of
    urgency in reconciling with Fatah, observed HBJ, than does
    the broker of the talks between the Palestinian parties.

    ¶11. (C) According to HBJ, Egypt -- the broker -- has a vested
    interest in dragging out the talks for as long as possible.
    Egypt "has no end game; serving as broker of the talks is
    Egypt's only business interest with the U.S."  HBJ likened
    the situation to a physician who has only one patient to
    treat in the hospital.  If that is your only business, "the
    physician is going to keep the patient alive but in the
    hospital for as long as possible."  HBJ emphasized that
    Qatar, on the other hand, is interested only in bringing
    about peace in the region -- and as quickly as possible.

    ¶12. (C) Short term, HBJ said Hamas wants to form with Fatah a
    unity government and rebuild the Israeli-inflicted damage in
    Gaza.  Senator Kerry, steering the conversation toward Hamas'
    long-term aims, acknowledged that Qatar's leaders speak
    frequently with Hamas.  The Chairman asked HBJ to explain why
    Hamas does not seem "to move when we need Hamas to move."

    ¶13. (C) Simply put, answered HBJ, "Hamas does not trust Egypt
    and the Quartet enterprise."  HBJ noted that since its
    inception the Quartet has been anti-Hamas and aligned with
    the interests of Abu Mazen, Egypt and Jordan.  These partners
    of the Quartet, observed HBJ, are the very partners who have
    not delivered a Palestinian-Israeli agreement.

    ¶14. (C) Returning to his theme that "peace brokers" act in
    their own self-interest, HBJ observed that President Mubarak
    of Egypt is thinking about how his son can take his place and
    how to stave off the growing strength of the Muslim
    Brotherhood.  The Egyptian government, said HBJ, has jailed
    10,000 Muslim Brotherhood members without bringing court
    cases against them.  The Egyptian "people blame America" now
    for their plight.  The shift in mood on the ground is "mostly
    because of Mubarak and his close ties" to the United States.

    DOHA 00000071  003 OF 004

    His only utility to the U.S. is brokering peace between
    Palestinians and Israelis, so he has no interest in taking
    himself out of the one game he has, underscored HBJ.  "Tell
    your friends (in Egypt) they must help themselves."

    ¶15. (C) As for Qatar, "We want to help Abu Mazen and the
    Palestinians," declared HBJ.  The short-term needs of
    Palestinians in Gaza are acute, said HBJ.  We need to broker
    a quick reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah and move
    forward quickly on rebuilding Gaza.  Senator Kerry asserted
    that HBJ was preaching to the converted and told the PM he
    was "shocked by what I saw in Gaza."

    ¶16. (C) Continuing to illustrate how Egypt had not delivered
    for the U.S. on Palestinian issues, HBJ said Qatar was told
    in late 2008 that Israel and the U.S. needed the Egyptians to
    deal with the crisis in Gaza.  Yet former Israeli PM Olmert
    later complained to Qatar that Egypt is a big country and not
    nimble; it could not move fast enough.  Senator Kerry pointed
    out he was in Cairo at the time Qatar was calling for an Arab
    League Summit in December 2008/January 2009 and asked HBJ for
    his perspective on the rift between Qatar and Egypt at that
    time.

    ¶17. (C) HBJ told Senator Kerry that Mubarak refused to come
    to Doha for a meeting of Arab leaders, preferring that the
    meeting take place in Riyadh.  The request to move the
    meeting was relayed to Qatar by the Saudis, not the
    Egyptians.  Saudi Arabia, as a big country like Egypt, has a
    vested interest in keeping Egypt afloat, said HBJ.  The
    Saudis agreed to host the meeting in Riyadh not because they
    objected to traveling to Doha, but because the Egyptians did.
     "So we argued over the meeting location" while the
    Palestinians suffered, and we in Qatar "called a meeting and
    said whoever comes, comes."

    ¶18. (C) Qatar is worried, said HBJ, about Egypt and its
    people, who are increasingly impatient.  Mubarak, continued
    HBJ, says Al Jazeera is the source of Egypt's problems.  This
    is an excuse.  HBJ had told Mubarak "we would stop Al Jazeera
    for a year" if he agreed in that span of time to deliver a
    lasting settlement for the Palestinians.
    Mubarak said nothing in response, according to HBJ.

    ¶19. (C) Asked his advice on bringing about an agreement
    between Israel and the Palestinians, HBJ said President
    Clinton recognized before leaving office that Egypt was a
    problem.  When President Clinton sought help at the end of
    his term in reaching a final deal, the Saudis and Egyptians
    did not encourage him, said HBJ.  "They told him to do what
    he thinks right."  Culturally, said HBJ, that is the way
    Arabs say "you are on your own."  And President Clinton was,
    said HBJ.

    ¶20. (C) Now we are at a stage, said HBJ, where Egypt does not
    want Arab League involvement in brokering a reconciliation
    agreement among the Palestinians unless the talks bog down.
    HBJ said he had told Abbas that climbing down from his tree
    on no settlement activity so that talks can go forward will
    require Arab support.  But the Egyptians won't allow it.

    ¶21. (C) Asked if tabling a more specific plan for peace
    between the Israelis and Palestinians would help, HBJ said it
    would be a mistake to table a plan that is too specific.  HBJ
    then reiterated that the problem is more with those carrying
    out the negotiations.  "The good cooks (Egypt) have not given
    good food to now."

    ¶22. (C) Senator Kerry noted that Special Envoy Mitchell had
    made a lot of requests of Arabs but with little success.
    Leaving Qatar aside, the Chairman asked HBJ for proposed next
    steps.  HBJ said he trusts the Saudis, but because they talk
    openly to Egypt and do not want to create more problems for
    Egypt than the Egyptian government already has, it is
    essential to bring in the small countries and start there.

    ¶23. (C) HBJ suggested one or two GCC members, Morocco
    (although the King there is hesitant) and Syria as the core
    membership of an Arab League committee to address
    Palestinian-Israeli concerns.  HBJ told Senator Kerry the
    inclusion of Syria might surprise him, but having Syria play
    a role would create jealousy among the Arabs.  Some jealously
    and rivalry is just what the U.S. needs, opined HBJ, to get
    the process moving.

    ----------------
    IRAN AND LEBANON
    ----------------

    ¶24. (C) Turning to Iran, Senator Kerry said he understood
    Qatar's need to find the right balance in dealing with bigger

    DOHA 00000071  004 OF 004

    neighbors, especially Iran given the natural gas field both
    share.  Due to the working relationship Qatar maintains with
    Iran, the Chairman asked HBJ for his advice as the
    international community becomes more serious about economic
    sanctions against Iran.

    ¶25. (C) HBJ said Iran's president views the U.S. as a country
    that is overstretched and in difficulty as a result of too
    many commitments.  Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. economy
    are the three main problems President Ahmadinejad sees.  HBJ
    observed that a Western attack against Iran for Ahmadinejad
    would be good politics, because it would allow him to take
    out his opposition using the war as a pretext.  Senator Kerry
    asked clarification of whether Ahmadinejad had said these
    things, or if HBJ inferred them from conversation.

    ¶26. (C) Qatar's PM said Ahmadinejad had told him, "We beat
    the Americans in Iraq; the final battle will be in Iran."

    ¶27. (C) HBJ said putting economic pressure on Iran is the
    best way to get the leadership to rethink its quest for
    nuclear weapons.  To be successful, he told Senator Kerry,
    Russia would definitely have to be on board, as would the
    Central Asian countries bordering Iran that provide food and
    supplies.

    ¶28. (C) Asked his perception of the state of play with the
    opposition, HBJ said the U.S. had done a good job of standing
    back and not becoming the symbol of the opposition.  Cracks
    in the regime are appearing.  It is highly significant that
    many demonstrators ignored Khamenei when he called on them to
    stop their protests.  The four key pillars of Iranian power
    -- the court, oil sector, imams, and Revolutionary Guards ---
    all must stick with him, stressed HBJ.  There are cracks in
    the system, but the downfall of the regime may not be in the
    cards.

    ¶29. (C) Asked what the sanctions should target, HBJ said the
    money that Iran derives from oil.  Depriving Tehran of this
    revenue would force the regime to negotiate.

    ¶30. (C) Senator Kerry observed that Ahmadinejad was making it
    easier by his actions.  There is wide consensus in the
    Executive and Legislative branches of Washington to press
    ahead.  Senator Kerry warned that Ahmadinejad "should not
    equate Afghanistan and Iraq with what he faces."

    ¶31. (C) HBJ encouraged Chairman Kerry to bear in mind that
    Iran is clever and makes its opponents dizzy in the quest for
    deals.  They will keep you working on a deal and then start
    from scratch with a new interlocutor.  HBJ stressed that Iran
    will make no deal.  Iran wants nuclear weapons, and HBJ said
    he would not be surprised to see Iran test one to demonstrate
    to the world its achievement.

    ¶32. (C) On Lebanon, Senator Kerry asked if Iran and Hizballah
    are ratcheting up their weapons stockpiles as part of Iran's
    war against Israel.  HBJ affirmed that is the case.

    ----
    IRAQ
    ----

    ¶33. (C) On Iraq, HBJ told Senator Kerry that Prime Minister
    Al-Maliki wants a Shia state, even though the Sunnis (when
    you count Kurds and non-Kurds) have the majority.

    ¶34. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message.

    Lebaron

`