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### Viewing cable 09STATE16285, IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE16285 | 2009-02-22 20:08 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #6285 0532034
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    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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` `

    S E C R E T STATE 016285

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2029
    TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SYR TRGY
    SUBJECT: IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

    CLASSIFIED BY: ISN - C. S. ELIOT KANG, ACTING FOR
    REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

    ¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  See paragraphs 6-9.

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶2.  (SBU) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
    Director General (DG) ElBaradei released his latest
    reports on the status of the IAEA's investigations into
    Iran and Syria's nuclear programs on 19 February 2009.
    Both reports conformed to expectations in describing the
    absence of any meaningful steps by either country to
    address the serious issues that exist with respect to
    their nuclear programs.

    ¶3.  (SBU) With respect to Iran, DG ElBaradei's
    description of the dichotomy between the stalled
    investigation and rapid pace of Iran's centrifuge
    advances is stark.  The report underscores the number of
    outstanding issues that need to be clarified regarding
    possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program.
    The IAEA simply notes that it has "still not received a
    positive reply from Iran" regarding its request for
    access to relevant "information, documentation,
    locations or individuals."  Consequently, "the Agency
    has not made any substantive progress on these issues."
    Iran's failure to cooperate with the IAEA in this regard
    suggests Iran continues to wish to hide the nature of
    these activities.

    ¶4.  (SBU) At the same time, the IAEA reported that, far
    from having complied with its UNSC obligation to suspend
    its uranium enrichment and heavy water-related
    activities, Iran has continued to expand its activities
    at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Arak Heavy
    Water Research Reactor.  Approximately 5,500 centrifuges
    are operating, up from approximately 3,800 in November
    ¶2008.  Of particular concern, the IAEA notes that since
    February 2007, Iran has produced 1,010 kilograms of low
    enriched uranium (LEU), a substantial increase over the
    630 kilograms reported in November 2008.  Approximately
    1,300 kilograms of LEU would be sufficient for one
    nuclear weapon if Iran decided to go that route.
    Currently, this material remains under IAEA safeguards.
    Nevertheless, the risk posed in an Iranian breakout
    scenario, either from diversion of safeguarded nuclear
    material or through the covert enrichment of undeclared
    nuclear material, is higher than in the past.  Morever,
    Iran continues to deny the IAEA access to the Arak
    reactor to conduct a Design Information Verification
    inspection which would provide the IAEA assurances that
    the construction of the reactor does not serve as a
    pathway to divert nuclear material for weapons purposes.

    ¶5.  (SBU) DG ElBaradei's report on Syria reinforces our
    conclusion that Syria was engaged in a clandestine
    effort to construct and operate a nuclear reactor at Al
    Kibar.  The report also helps to confirm that uranium
    found via environmental samples collected at the site is
    not naturally occurring, lending credence to the fact
    that the facility in question was a reactor.  Although
    the report does not categorically dismiss Syria's
    explanation that the uranium was from Israeli missiles
    used in the attack on the reactor in September 2007, it
    suggests that this explanation is highly unlikely.
    Syria delivered an eleventh-hour letter on 17 February
    2009 attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation
    immediately before the report's release.  The report
    notes that the responses in the Syrian letter "were only
    partial ... and did not address most of the questions
    raised in the Agency's communications."  Importantly,
    the report also calls on Syria to allow access to other
    locations and allow inspectors to take samples of the
    debris removed from Al Kibar as soon as possible, noting
    that these measures are "essential" for the IAEA to be
    able complete its assessment.

    ---------------
    Action Requests
    ---------------

    ¶6.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS:  Posts are
    requested to convey U.S. views regarding the IAEA
    reports to appropriate host governments.  Posts should
    underscore that these reports demonstrate that neither
    Iran nor Syria have taken any meaningful steps to
    cooperate with the IAEA in the past six months.  Posts
    should stress that Syria's refusal to do so only deepens
    concerns regarding the nature of its clandestine nuclear
    activities.  With respect to Iran, Posts should
    emphasize that while Iran has stalled the IAEA's
    investigation and still refuses to provide the IAEA with
    requested transparency, its centrifuge program continues
    to make progress.  The net result is that in neither
    case can the international community have confidence in
    the exclusively peaceful nature of these nuclear
    programs.  For Iran, the UN Security Council has imposed
    a mandatory requirement that it suspend all
    proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate
    fully with the IAEA.  On Iran, we should stress that
    with international rights, come responsibilities.  Iran
    needs to live up to those responsibilities.  We believe
    that Iran's continued failure to do so is another
    opportunity lost.

    ¶7.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS CONT:  With
    respect to the upcoming 2-6 March 2009 IAEA Board of
    Governors' meeting, Posts should stress the need for the
    following from host governments:

    -- Strong national statements on Iran and call on Iran
    to impement its international nuclear obligations
    without delay.  Statements should urge Iran to take
    advantage of this critical opportunity for engagement by
    addressing the concerns of the international community
    and underscore the need for full transparency with the
    IAEA (including Iran's implementation of the Additional
    Protocol) and cooperation with the IAEA's investigation,
    as well as suspension of all proliferation-sensitive
    nuclear activities;

    -- Strong national statements on Syria and a demand that
    Syria cooperate with the IAEA's investigation;

    --      Strengthened statements on Iran and Syria from
    regional or other groups, e.g., European Union, the
    Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement, the
    Group of Latin America and the Carribean; the Africa
    Group, etc.  To the extent possible, Posts should
    encourage host goverments to instruct their delegations
    not to accept statements from any group to which they
    are a member that would downplay the factual reports of
    the IAEA, or undercut the Agency's ability to obtain the
    necessary information and access needed to resolve these
    serious issues; and,

    -- Board members should support, by vote if necessary,
    releasing the Syria report to the public.  This is
    essential for the public to appreciate the serious
    nature of Syria's failure to cooperate with the IAEA.
    This report will also demonstrate the level of
    transparency in IAEA affairs that we believe Syria
    should manifest in its approach to the IAEA.

    ¶8.  (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR UNVIE:  In addition to
    conveying these messages to local IAEA Missions, UNVIE
    should continue working to promote support within the
    IAEA Secretariat and among IAEA Board Members for
    continuing and expanding the investigation into both
    Iran and Syria's nuclear activities and pressuring both
    to cooperate with the respective investigations.
    Mission is requested to place maximum effort into
    securing strong national statements demanding Iranian
    and Syrian cooperation with the IAEA by as many Board
    members as possible, particularly those in the EU.
    Mission should also work to support a P5+1 statement on
    Iran.  Mission's efforts to build support for such
    statements should begin as soon as possible, and will be
    facilitated by technical briefings on Iran and Syria's
    nuclear efforts to Board members in Washington and
    Vienna the week prior to the Board meeting.  These
    briefings will be provided by State and IC
    nonproliferation experts.  Mission is also requested to
    ensure that the IAEA Director General's forthcoming
    report on Syria is made public, including by laying the
    groundwork for a vote in the Board if necessary.  If
    possible politically and statutorily, Mission should
    seek the concurrent release of the November 2008 Syria
    report, which was denied public release by NAM/Arab
    intervention at the November 2008 Board meeting.
    Mission should begin coordinating with likeminded Board
    members at the earliest possible date.

    ¶9.  (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW,
    BERLIN, AND BEIJING:  In addition to conveying U.S.
    views regarding the Iran and Syria reports, Posts should
    stress that the United States believes that the Iran
    report reinforces the need for a strong P5+1 statement
    demanding Iran's immediate and full cooperation with the
    IAEA.  Discussions regarding specific texts will be
    addressed in Vienna and Washington.

    ---------------------------
    POCS AND REPORTING DEADLINE
    ---------------------------

    ¶10.  (SBU) Mission is requested to report on the status
    of its efforts in advance of the Board.  Richard Nephew
    (202-647-7680) and Matt Goldstein (202-647-4196) are the
    Department's POCs for this issue.
    CLINTON

`