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### Viewing cable 09CAIRO231, SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09CAIRO231 | 2009-02-09 16:04 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXRO6435
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHEG #0231/01 0401610
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 091610Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1586
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000231

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019
    TAGS: PREL KPAL EG IS QA IR SY
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED  EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
    MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY

    Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey
    for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has
    been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was
    first announced.  The Egyptian leadership, including
    President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's
    immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the
    President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians
    believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous
    Administration and hope to see improvements.  Aboul Gheit
    likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to
    influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets.
    He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the
    region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some
    pending bilateral matters.  He may ask for your support for
    Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the
    candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for
    Director General of UNESCO.  He may not raise human rights
    (specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or
    democratization; but you should.  Aboul Gheit will want to
    discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling;
    Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  On Iraq and
    counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely
    eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective;
    and our military-to-military relationship is durable but
    stuck in a force-on-force mindset.

    ¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued:  Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane,
    with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian
    failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign
    pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you
    and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen.
    You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional
    leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring
    about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to
    continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a
    permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and
    conflict.  You should also stress the need for Egypt to more
    effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling
    across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza.  Aboul
    Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza
    Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful
    Qatari and Syrian behavior.  He will also want to explore US
    intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator
    Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose
    our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe
    a word they say."  End summary.

    ------------------------
    Respect and Appreciation
    ------------------------

    ¶3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East
    Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during
    his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that
    he was here to "listen and hear your advice."  The Egyptians
    have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and
    at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to
    force our point of view on them.  You may wish to thank Aboul
    Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a
    ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last.  You
    should ask him what the current state of play is between
    Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the
    future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and
    vis a vis Israel.  Note:  Although the Egyptians will react
    well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very
    often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally.  In addition, Egypt's
    self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is
    contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues,
    including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

    -----------------------------------------
    Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about
    the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic
    political goal for the Egyptians.  They are proud of their
    role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the
    only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all
    Palestinian factions.  Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers
    them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he
    sees as his own most dangerous political threat.  Since the

    CAIRO 00000231  002 OF 004

    June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the
    leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto
    national security advisor with direct responsibility for the
    Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to
    intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the
    Hamas-Israel ceasefire.  Soliman brokered a half-year-long
    truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to
    the Israeli invasion of Gaza.  He has recently re-started
    those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a
    year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to
    bring about their political goal of Palestinian
    reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government
    headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.

    ----------------
    Gaza and Tunnels
    ----------------

    ¶5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza
    is an old and complicated problem for Egypt.  Egypt views a
    well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat,
    a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008
    border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and
    more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt,
    unchecked and hungry.  Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza
    border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most
    smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground.
     The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as
    honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant
    colony.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's
    bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence
    forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas
    is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the
    Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians).  Long
    criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms
    smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining
    and started acting.  Egypt has increased efforts to counter
    arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded
    tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and
    requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray
    machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and
    explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this
    EGIS-originated request).  Egypt also continues to cooperate
    with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent
    militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from
    crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity
    in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President
    Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."

    ¶7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be
    perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and
    they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that
    foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to
    counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from
    our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into
    Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with
    Secretary Rice and me about its contents.  The Egyptians do
    not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able
    to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the
    Palestinians.  At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing
    and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to
    open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza.  Even during
    the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent
    medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all
    other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at
    Kerem Shalom.  They likewise insist that Rafah will only
    reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is
    under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.

    ¶8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic
    and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms
    smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza
    and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade.  While
    in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with
    technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling
    success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to
    smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate
    economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza
    borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to
    smuggle.

    ----------------------------------
    The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
    ----------------------------------

    ¶9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he

    CAIRO 00000231  003 OF 004

    wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors
    Conference in Cairo.  Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to
    accept this invitation.  He is keen to keep up the momentum
    on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the
    lead in helping the Palestinians.  It is very important to
    him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he
    will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.

    -------------
    Iraq and Iran
    -------------

    ¶10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting
    members of Congress how he warned former President Bush
    against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a
    wag of his finger.  In addition, there are Egyptian
    misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in
    Iraq.  Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to
    continue to take steps to help  rehabilitate Iraq into the
    greater Arab world.  You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans
    to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange
    accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian
    ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated).  As for
    Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic,
    referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing
    them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region.  He
    sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and
    liars themselves.  There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and
    its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear
    capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution."
    Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not
    oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did
    not "believe a single word they say."  Aboul Gheit will be
    keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards
    Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit
    carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more
    interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again;
    President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the
    Syrians at this time.

    ------------------------
    U.S. Assistance to Egypt
    ------------------------

    ¶11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago --
    Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance
    to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest
    understanding of the state of play with the FY2009
    appropriations language.  Beyond the issue of conditioning,
    the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF
    in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09,
    a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because
    they need the money (they say), but because it shows our
    diminished view of the value of our relationship.  In my
    view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program
    aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to
    demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a
    strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been
    unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in
    Egypt.  It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt
    accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program
    funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a
    serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to
    resolve them as soon as possible.

    ¶12.  (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian
    political and military leadership feel that they have been
    "short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3
    billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and
    which they contrast with increases to our military assistance
    to Israel.  Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in
    international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef
    Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's
    policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a
    developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for
    your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.

    ---------------------------------
    Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
    ---------------------------------

    ¶13.  (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public
    chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition
    Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal
    affairs and infringement on national sovereignty.  Mubarak
    takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we
    raise it, particularly in public.  Aboul Gheit's view is that
    we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and

    CAIRO 00000231  004 OF 004

    distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with
    Egypt.  Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
    the outspoken political science professor and democracy
    activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of
    spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming
    Egypt.  In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s
    Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only
    criminal case pending against Ibrahim.  You should press
    Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE
    to stop arresting other less prominent political activists.
    Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his
    sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to
    lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization
    and human rights concerns.  You might note that although you
    and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt
    could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues
    from the agenda.

    ------------
    Farouq Hosny
    ------------

    ¶13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international
    campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq
    Hosny for Director General of UNESCO.  The Arab League and
    the African Union have already publicly stated their
    commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have
    the support of several Europeans, notably the French.  Aboul
    Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to
    actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next
    Director General of UNESCO.  The U.S. informed him last year
    that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to
    put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's
    merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to
    narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression.  U.S.
    objections have been to statements Hosny has made that
    "Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from
    others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable
    remarks.  If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must
    provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or
    Muslim.
    SCOBEY

`