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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09BERLIN1403, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BERLIN1403 | 2009-11-05 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO0135
    PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #1403/01 3091603
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 051603Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5694
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001403

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREF MNUC AF RS IR KPAL KWBG GM
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO
    BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10

    Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Berlin warmly welcomes you to
    Germany for the historic 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the
    Berlin Wall. Berlin is hosting all four-powers and EU
    leaders at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate to mark this occasion.
    Your visit includes meetings with Chancellor Merkel and
    Foreign Minister Westerwelle. Chancellor Merkel will likely
    raise concern about General Motors' November 3 decision to
    keep its German subsidiary, Opel, and Westerwelle may likely
    raise his interest in removal of nuclear weapons from
    Germany. You may wish to encourage from them:

    -- Assurances that the proposed Afghanistan conference will
    not slip past January and that Germany will go immediately to
    the Bundestag if increases in contributions are warranted;
    -- Support for including banking and insurance relations with
    Iran in calculations for possible new sanctions, and no
    backsliding on export controls;
    -- Assurances that Germany and the EU will work with the U.S.
    at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate;
    -- Agreement to tone down the public rhetoric on Opel;
    -- German prodding of Russia to engage constructively on
    security issues and human rights.

    Recognizing Germany's prominent and international role on
    this occasion is important to Merkel. She is still trying to
    get a sense of working with the new Washington Administration
    and seems uncertain at times. Of course, Westerwelle is
    learning the ropes and being watched by Merkel to see if he
    can be an effective FM for her. Alternatively, Merkel may
    look to new Defense Minister zu Guttenberg (CSU) to play an
    alternative role on foreign policy. End summary.

    Political Climate
    -----------------

    ¶2. (C) The political divisions that marked the recent
    election campaign, culminating in the October 28 swearing-in
    of a center-right coalition led by Chancellor Merkel, will be
    swept aside for your celebratory visit. Merkel just returned
    from what she considers an exceptional visit to Washington,
    which front-paged her address to Congress in every
    publication. Merkel will be focused on setting her
    priorities for the next legislative term -- she gives a major
    state of the union-like address on November 10 on all issues
    -- and will seek U.S. cooperation in promoting economic
    recovery and growth (Opel, regulation), progress in
    addressing climate change (Copenhagen), and strengthening
    Germany's international profile (Afghanistan). Westerwelle
    will have spent a total of some two days work in the foreign
    ministry by the time your arrive. His ministry is not sure
    what he wants yet.

    Economic Climate
    ----------------

    ¶3. (C) Germany's export-driven economy is showing initial
    signs of recovery from its deepest recession since WW II.
    For the full year 2009, GDP will shrink around 5%, but should
    show modest growth of 1% next year. Unemployment has
    remained relatively low thanks to government-subsidized
    programs, but is expected to rise next year. Given the
    government's record budget deficit, there is heated debate
    over the wisdom of the new coalition's proposed tax cuts,
    intended to boost growth. Germany was pleased with the
    outcome of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, but is keener on
    the G-20's regulatory agenda than addressing global
    imbalances.

    ¶4. (C) GM's sudden decision on November 3 to cancel the sale
    of its European subsidiary Opel in a deal underwritten by the
    German government shocked and angered Germans. Merkel's
    chief economic advisor told the Ambassador November 4 that
    Merkel was so furious at GM's about-face that she refused to
    take a call from GM CEO Fritz Henderson. Merkel subsequently
    called the President. Federal and state governments are
    demanding that GM immediately pay back 1.2 billion Euros in
    bridge loans they had extended to the car maker. What
    particularly irked the Germans was that GM had failed to
    forewarn them of their latest flip-flop after months of
    laborious negotiations and a total of 4.5 billion Euros in
    loans/guarantees in exchange for promises to retain most Opel
    jobs and plants in Germany. (Merkel found out about the GM
    decision just hours after delivering her address before
    Congress.) The Opel story has dominated the news November
    4-5. Opel workers are likely to strike in the next few days,
    and politicians and others are citing the GM action as
    another example of American "turbo-capitalism."

    Berlin 00001403 002 of 003

    Iran/Export Controls
    -----------------------

    ¶5. (C) You should express appreciation for Merkel's strong
    statement during her speech to Congress that there should be
    "zero tolerance" for Iranian acquisition of weapons of mass
    destruction. You should stress the importance of German
    support for EU measures or measures taken by "like-minded"
    countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to a possible
    Iranian rejection of the engagement track. With Westerwelle,
    it remains imperative that you raise the importance of P5 1
    unity again. In addition, you should stress the particular
    importance of continued German leadership on export control,
    particularly in light of recent interdictions of Iranian arms
    shipments. The new German coalition seeks to expand exports
    by normalizing German export control policy (of arms and
    dual-use items) with the EU. Germany contends that its
    intention is to raise the EU to the German standard, but the
    danger is that German standards could be watered down to an
    EU lowest common denominator.

    Arms Control/Disarmament
    ------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Westerwelle is on a bit of a tangent by publicly
    calling for removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, although
    he insists that Berlin will not act unilaterally. This gets
    him attention and he then offers assurances that everything
    must be done in the NATO context, but it distracts from other
    issues. This is one of the few foreign policy positions that
    distinguishes his FDP from Chancellor Merkel's CDU, and
    Westerwelle may feel pressed to mention this. The MFA
    emphasizes that Westerwelle's position does not necessarily
    mean that Germany intends to cease participation in the NATO
    nuclear share. Germany may be willing to maintain its fleet
    of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear
    weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Westerwelle also
    understands that some Allies may want to maintain their
    current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. Your meeting with
    Westerwelle is a good opportunity to emphasize any red lines
    or concerns we have before this effort gets too far down the
    road. For its part, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD are
    uncomfortable with Westerwelle's push and sees no reason to
    tackle this issue right now.

    Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) FM Westerwelle has strongly defended German
    engagement in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as
    vital to German national security interests. However, he
    supports the Chancellor's recent decision to put off any
    consideration of deploying additional German soldiers until
    after the proposed international conference on Afghanistan
    early next year, notwithstanding the significantly
    deteriorated security situation in the north. The new
    government sees the
    conference as critical for setting a new framework and
    benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan,
    as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan
    government in return. It is in our interest to capitalize on
    the Germans' sense of "ownership" of the north in getting a
    commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop
    increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year,
    if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then.
    Within this context, it would be important to acknowledge
    that Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian
    development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic
    supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD)
    civilian police training program, which it joined in January
    of this year.

    Middle East
    -----------

    ¶8. (C) You should thank Merkel for her strong statements
    before Congress where she stressed the overarching importance
    of Israel's security and a two-state solution. In general,
    Merkel has been very supportive of U.S. efforts in the Middle
    East. She is now planning the second round of German-Israeli
    government consultations, likely before the end of the year.
    She may raise this with you and seek your advice on messages
    to Netanyahu. We understand that Westerwelle may also be
    planning to visit Israel. The MFA said that Westerwelle may
    seek a greater German role to promote peace, for example to
    offer German support in coordinating Middle East policy with
    the EU. According to the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the
    concept of creating some type of OSCE-like security structure

    BERLIN 00001403 003 of 003

    for the Middle East.

    Reluctance with Overseas Deployments
    ------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) Germany continues to wrestle with the issue of
    overseas deployments. Westerwelle, and the FDP in general,
    tend to be more skeptical than Merkel's CDU on this topic and
    this is reflected in the government coalition agreement. The
    coalition agreement calls for a "gradual reduction" of German
    participation in UNIFIL "with the perspective of bringing it
    to an end." Similarly, the agreement calls for a "critical
    review" of the "multitude" of parliamentary mandates for the
    Bundeswehr to participate in counterterrorism and piracy
    operations off the Horn of Africa, again with a view toward
    reducing them. It would be helpful for you to emphasize how
    important we view Germany's contributions to these
    international operations.

    Russia/Energy Security
    ----------------------

    ¶10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian
    bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs
    of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of
    former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his
    relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to
    continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good
    relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement
    and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal
    with this difficult "strategic partner." Germany is Europe's
    largest energy user and is highly dependent on Russia for
    energy supplies, but Berlin does not view this as a
    vulnerability, believing that Moscow is equally dependent on
    Germany as a consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that
    it must diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of
    energy generation to gain greater energy security.

    Climate Change
    --------------

    ¶11. (C) As the Chancellor's remarks underline, German
    officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the
    Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified US/EU
    position towards the major emerging economies, particularly
    China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national
    actions at Copenhagen. They are looking for signals of our
    commitment to domestic and international actions that will
    allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German
    leaders recognize the challenge of passing climate change
    legislation in the U.S. and have lowered their expectations
    for the possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement
    next month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the
    Summit as one step in a larger process -- a politically
    binding framework -- and may be preparing the German public
    for a less ambitious outcome.

    Mission Germany
    ---------------

    ¶12. (SBU) Madam Secretary, the U.S. government presence in
    Germany currently numbers 744 US direct-hire (USDH)
    employees, 683 locally engaged (LE) staff, and 951 USG EFMs
    and a State operating budget of $153 million annually. This
    includes a Frankfurt cohort of over 500 USDH employees whose
    responsibilities support USG operations globally. Berlin's
    USG presence -- over 500 USDHs and LE staff -- is centered in
    the new Chancery next to the Brandenburg Gate. The LE staff
    includes many employees who have worked for the USG for over
    30 years. Mission Germany is on the cutting edge of using IT
    solutions xxxxx.
    MURPHY

`