Currently released so far... 220 / 251,287

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/11
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE AU AR AF AORC AJ ASEC AM
BH BA BY BU
CASC CF CH COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV CVIS
EG ECON EINV ETTC EFIN ENRG ETRD EFIS EXTERNAL EPET EAID EUN ELAB ECUN EU EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GR GM GOI GE GG GA
HO
IR IZ IS INRB IN IRAJ IQ IAEA IT
JO JA
KPAL KNNP KU KWBG KJUS KG KSPR KDEM KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KCRM KHLS KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KPKO KUNR KTIA KWMN
LE LY
MASS MK MNUC MCAP MARR MOPS MU MAR MTCRE MY ML MR MPOS MOPPS
NATO NG
OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA OPDC
PREL PARM PGOV PTER PINR PHUM PINS PBIO PA PBTS PREF PROP PK PECON POLITICAL PARTIES PM PEPR
QA
RS RW RU
SA SY SM SU SCUL SNAR SOCI SENV SYR SP SG SO SF
TU TI TX Terrorism TRGY TFH01 TC TSPA
UZ UE UK US UNESCO UNSC UP UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 09BERLIN1528, COALITION TESTED AS US-EU TFTP/SWIFT AGREEMENT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others.
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BERLIN1528.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BERLIN1528 | 2009-12-03 10:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO6301
    PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #1528/01 3371019
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 031019Z DEC 09 ZDK
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5948
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001528

    SIPDIS

    TREASURY FOR OFAC SZUBIN, MONBORNE, MAHER
    JUSTICE FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
    USEU FOR CHASE, DODMAN, SNYDER
    STATE FOR S/ES-O, EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, L AND S/CT

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KHLS GM
    SUBJECT: COALITION TESTED AS US-EU TFTP/SWIFT AGREEMENT
    PASSES ON GERMAN ABSTENTION

    REF: A. BERLIN 1393
         ¶B. BERLIN 1377
         ¶C. BERLIN 1167

    Classified By: DCM Greg T. Delawie for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: German Federal Interior Minister Thomas de
    Maiziere overruled Justice Minister Sabine
    Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and abstained from voting at the
    November 30 COREPER vote in Brussels on an interim U.S.-EU
    agreement to continue the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.
     De Maiziere's decision allowed the agreement to pass and
    followed weeks of engagement in Berlin, Brussels and
    Washington as well as high-level interventions from Secretary
    Clinton, Treasury Secretary Geithner, Attorney General
    Holder, National Security Advisor Gen. Jones and Ambassador
    Murphy.  De Maiziere's decision was difficult for him to make
    given that the coalition agreement called for specific
    revisions to the SWIFT agreement, none of which Germany
    achieved, except a shortening of the interim period from 12
    to 9 months.  The episode has tested Germany's new coalition
    government just weeks after its formation with
    Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger heavily criticizing the
    abstention.  This experience suggests that we will need to
    pay close attention to Germany during our negotiations on a
    long-term TFTP agreement.  END SUMMARY

    Germany Relents Following Intense Pressure
    ---------------

    ¶2. (C)  Ambassador Murphy met with Interior Minister de
    Maiziere on November 27 and urged him to support U.S.-EU
    negotiations on an interim TFTP agreement, to which de
    Maiziere indicated that he would abstain from voting on the
    agenda item at the November 30 COREPER meeting.  De
    Maiziere's decision, which followed a German request to
    shorten the duration of the interim agreement to nine months
    rather than twelve, facilitated the passing of the agreement
    as Germany was the strongest holdout.  De Maiziere's decision
    followed two weeks of intense lobbying in Berlin, Brussels
    and Washington by Embassy Berlin, USEU, the Departments of
    Treasury, State and Justice and the NSC.  The campaign
    included calls by Secretaries Clinton, Geithner, the Attorney
    General and the National Security Advisor to their German
    counterparts.  State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator
    Benjamin urged support for the agreement during a two-day
    visit to Berlin (see septel).  Ambassador Murphy twice wrote
    to all five relevant ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance,
    Chancellery, and MFA) and made repeated calls to senior
    decision makers, stressing the importance of the interim
    agreement and the need for Germany to not block it.  The DCM,
    Econ M/C, and staff from multiple embassy sections heavily
    engaged on the issue as well.

    ¶3. (C)  De Maiziere (CDU) stressed that his decision was not
    an easy one given that the Christian Democrat/Social Union
    (CDU/CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition had
    differing views on the TFTP program.  The outcome
    particularly irritated Justice Minister
    Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger because she had expressed
    concerns about the TFTP dating back to the initial July
    decision to give the negotiating mandate to the Swedish EU
    Presidency.  Furthermore, in October
    Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger had inserted language into the
    CDU/CSU-FDP coalition agreement specifically addressing the
    TFTP negotiations and directing Germany to call upon the EU
    to work towards a higher level of data protection (see Ref
    B).  Following de Maiziere's decision, the Justice Minister
    complained that her views were ignored and that the decision
    has "upset millions of citizens of Europe."  De Maiziere told
    the Ambassador that he would be expressing some criticisms of
    the agreement publicly in order to reflect MoI concerns and
    to deflect public criticism.  He was subsequently quoted as
    saying that "a not completely satisfactory agreement is
    better than none at all."

    BERLIN 00001528  002 OF 002

    German Vote Comes with Costs for the Coalition
    ----------

    ¶4. (C) De Maiziere intimated, and working level contacts have
    confirmed, that Germany would like to avoid a repeat of our
    all-out lobbying effort during the negotiations for a
    long-term TFTP agreement.  De Maiziere's strong preference is
    to seek consensus with his ministry colleagues.  He
    particularly wants to avoid another clash with the Justice
    Minister on this issue as it has caused no small amount of
    discord between the new coalition partners, who are having a
    rocky start on a number of fronts.  The incident is
    particularly difficult for de Maiziere as he entered the
    Interior Ministry stressing that he represented a break from
    his predecessor Wolfgang Schaeuble, whom he felt overly
    focused on security issues (see Ref A).  De Maiziere surely
    finds this whole experience regrettable as it put him in
    exactly the position he did not want to be in: seemingly
    siding with the U.S. over German interests, causing
    disruption within the coalition, and compromising the data
    privacy rights of German citizens.

    Engaging the FDP on Data Privacy
    ---------

    ¶5. (C) It is not altogether surprising that this disagreement
    arose given the FDP's reputation as a staunch defender of
    citizens' privacy rights (see Ref C).  Nevertheless, the
    intensity of this dispute should be a wake up call - we must
    avoid repeating this as we look to completing the long-term
    U.S.-EU TFTP agreement.  The coalition agreement calls for
    strict limitations on the use of TFTP data, no automatic
    access to the system, data deletion requirements, clear rules
    on sharing information with third parties and legal redress.
    These positions will guide Germany's views in the follow-on
    negotiations, and we need to consider how to take them into
    account in a way that does not complicate TFTP
    implementation.

    ¶6. (C) Embassy Berlin is examining how we can reach out to
    FDP ministers and parliamentarians to educate them on U.S.
    data protection structures as this experience has
    demonstrated that they are often misinformed on the nature of
    our policies.  We will likewise reach out to CDU/CSU decision
    makers, in part to enlist their help in reaching the German
    public.  We also intend to make the point that countering
    terrorism in a globalized world, where terrorists and their
    supporters use open borders and information technology to
    quickly move people and financing, requires robust
    international data sharing.
    MURPHY

`