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### Viewing cable 09CAIRO1349, GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09CAIRO1349 | 2009-07-14 11:11 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXRO6737
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHEG #1349/01 1951144
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 141144Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3182
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 001349

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
    TAGS: PREL PARM MASS IR IZ KPAL IS EG
    SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

    REF: A. CAIRO 1227
         ¶B. CAIRO 746

    Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  Key Points:

    -- (S/NF) During a June 29 meeting with CENTCOM Commander
    General Petraeus, Egyptian General Intelligence Service
    (EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman shared his views on Iraq, Iran, and
    ongoing efforts on Palestinian reconciliation.

    -- (S/NF) On Iraq, Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were
    taking a "new position" on supporting Iraqi Prime Minister
    Maliki following the Iranian elections and described Egypt's
    plans to increase cooperation with the Iraqi government.

    -- (S/NF)  Soliman believed that the Iranian elections and
    Hezbollah's electoral defeat in Lebanon presented a "good
    opportunity" to reduce Iranian regional interference,
    including by improving Syria's relations with the Arab world.

    -- (S/NF)  On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman was
    pessimistic that an agreement would be reached, but promised
    that Egypt would "not give up" and would continue efforts to
    undermine Hamas, including by preventing money and guns from
    entering Gaza.

    ----------------------------
    Iraq: Extending an Arab Hand
    ----------------------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said Arab countries were looking for ways
    to support Prime Minister Maliki during this "crucial time"
    for Iraq.  General Petraeus thanked Egypt for supporting the
    Iraqi government, including by nominating a new Ambassador to
    Iraq (ref A) and encouraging other Arab countries to "hold
    out a hand in friendship."  On President Mubarak's
    instructions, Soliman explained, Egypt plans to increase
    cooperation with Iraq on a wide variety of political,
    security, and economic issues.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were taking a
    "new position" on Iraq following the Iranian presidential
    elections.  He believed that Iranian leaders would "change
    their attitude" towards neighboring countries and "supporting
    terrorism" abroad, and would focus instead on domestic
    issues.  Iran cannot afford to "challenge the international
    community now," Soliman opined.  The challenge, Soliman
    explained, was to "bring Iraq back to the Arab world" and
    foster support for Maliki.  According to Soliman, President
    Mubarak told King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia "not to search for
    another man," but should instead accept Maliki as Iraq's
    leader and support him.

    ---------------------------------------------
    Iran: Elections Present Opportunity for Arabs
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S/NF) Soliman stressed that Egypt suffers from Iranian
    interference, through its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies, and
    its support for Egyptian groups like Jamaatt al-Islamiyya and
    the Muslim Brotherhood.  Egypt will confront the Iranian
    threat, he continued, by closely monitoring Iranian agents in
    Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any Egyptian cells.
    Improving relations between Syria and the Arab world would
    also undermine Iran's regional influence.  Soliman noted "a
    little change" in Syria's attitude on engaging with the Arab
    world, adding that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia shared this
    view and planned to visit Damascus soon "to help change
    Syria's attitude."

    ¶5. (S/NF) Soliman anticipated that Hezbollah's recent defeat
    in the Lebanese parliamentary elections would force the group
    to "remain quiet for sometime" as they rebuild domestic
    support and counter the perception that Hezbollah is a "tool
    of outsiders." With Iran itself focusing on domestic issues,
    he continued, it was a "good time to make changes" in Lebanon
    and reduce Iran's influence.  Egypt will support a Saad
    Hariri government and the Lebanese army, Soliman emphasized.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Soliman said that Iran heeded Egypt's warning
    against meddling in domestic affairs (ref B) and supporting
    groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. He received a "very
    positive message" from Iran's intelligence chief indicating
    that Iran would not interfere in Egypt.  Egypt planned to
    "remain quiet inside Iran" for the time being, but would
    continue to recruit agents who "will do what we ask," if Iran
    insists on interfering in Egypt.  "We hope Iran will stop

    CAIRO 00001349  002 OF 003

    supporting Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other cells"
    within Egypt Soliman said, "but if not - we are ready."
    Soliman said Iranian President Ahmadinejad wanted to attend
    the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Egypt July
    11-16.  If he did attend, President Mubarak would meet with
    him and clearly explain that Iranian interference in "Arab
    issues" was unacceptable.  "We are ready for good relations
    with Iran," Soliman noted, but only if Iran ceased
    interfering and supporting terrorists in the region.

    ¶7. (S/NF) Because of domestic problems, Soliman believed that
    Iran would seek better relations with the Arab world and
    suspend its nuclear program for a period of time to avoid a
    "war."  He also anticipated Iran would try to strike more of
    a "balance" between supporting its Hezbollah and Hamas
    "tools" and trying to build better relations with the Arabs.
    Soliman expressed concern that Iranian influence in Iraq
    would spread after the re-deployment of U.S. troops out of
    Iraqi cities and the eventual drawdown.  General Petraeus
    noted that 130,000 U.S. troops remain and that the drawdown
    would be gradual.  He expressed confidence that Iranian
    influence could be contained if Arab countries moved
    aggressively to support Iraq.

    ----------------------------------
    Palestinian Reconciliation, Israel
    ----------------------------------

    ¶8. (S/NF) Soliman explained that Egypt's three primary
    objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in
    Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for
    Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.  On Gaza, Soliman said
    Egypt worked closely with Israel to coordinate humanitarian
    assistance shipments and was encouraging the Israelis to
    allow more assistance into Gaza. Soliman said he was still
    seeking a "tahdiya" (calm) agreement between Hamas and
    Israel, but noted that Israel's lack of a Gaza strategy and
    desire to keep Hamas under pressure made any agreement
    difficult.  On undermining Hamas, Soliman said Egypt has
    "stopped" money and arms from entering Gaza.  "Hamas feels
    they are losing their capabilities," Soliman said, as they
    are unable to re-arm using the tunneling network under the
    Egypt-Gaza border.  The pressure, especially from Egypt's
    success at dismantling Hamas' funding mechanism, may render
    Hamas "more flexible" than before.

    ¶9. (S/NF) Palestinians must believe that Abbas is capable of
    securing a Palestinian state, Soliman stressed.  He noted
    recent positive developments in the West Bank, including
    improvements in the Palestinian security forces and the
    lifting of some Israeli roadblocks to facilitate commerce and
    movement.  He expressed concern, however, that continued
    settlement activity, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's
    recent "radical" speech, and insufficient economic
    development in Palestinian areas were undermining the chances
    for resuming peace negotiations.  Soliman added that
    President Mubarak may invite Nentanyahu and Abbas to Cairo if
    efforts to re-start negotiations became "blocked."

    ¶10. (S/NF) Soliman briefed General Petraeus on his efforts to
    facilitate Palestinian reconciliation.  Reconciliation
    remains elusive, he noted, as neither Hamas nor Fatah really
    want an agreement.  The Palestinian factions were currently
    in Cairo, he said, for discussions on releasing detainees.
    Talks were at an impasse, however, as Hamas had suspended
    reconciliation talks until Abbas released all Hamas detainees
    in the West Bank, which Soliman said Abbas would never
    accept.  Soliman also doubted that a reconciliation agreement
    would be reached by July 7 as Egypt previously announced, and
    anticipated that talks would be suspended for one-two months.
     Despite the challenge and frustrations, Soliman promised
    that Egypt would "not give up" on Palestinian reconciliation.
     "It is hard," he continued, "but I am always optimistic.  I
    consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing patience."

    -------------------
    Syria, Yemen, Afpak
    -------------------

    ¶11. (S/NF)  Soliman hoped Syria would improve its
    relationship with the Arab world and the U.S. and stop
    serving as "Iran's lifeline" in the region.  He also stressed
    that Syria must cooperate with Iraq to improve border
    security and stem the flow of foreign fighters.  Soliman also
    called on Syria to drop its insistence that the
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be solved before Syria will
    reach an agreement with Israel on the Golan Heights.

    ¶12. (S/NF) Soliman expressed concern over instability in

    CAIRO 00001349  003 OF 003

    Yemen and said Egypt was trying to help President Saleh,
    including by providing information on Iranian and Qatari
    support to the al-Houthi insurgents.  General Petraeus noted
    U.S. efforts to improve Yemen's capacity to combat
    extremists.  On Pakistan, General Petraeus said he was
    encouraged by the Pakistani military's operations in the Swat
    Valley and Northwest Frontier Province, including their focus
    on holding and rebuilding effected areas.  Soliman credited
    the Pakistani government for doing a better job of convincing
    people that extremists pose a real threat to Pakistani
    national security.  On Afghanistan, General Petraeus stressed
    the importance of arresting the downward spiral of violence
    and improving governance after the September 20 national
    elections.

    ¶13.  (U) General Petraeus cleared this cable.
    SCOBEY

`