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### Viewing cable 10ANKARA126, SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL VISIT:

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10ANKARA126 | 2010-01-26 11:11 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAK #0126/01 0261123
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 261123Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1558
    RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 1658
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1090
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0180
    RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 1404
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 6834
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1844
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T ANKARA 000126

    SIPDIS

    FOR BACKGROUND

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR TU AF PK IR IZ IS AM
    SUBJECT: SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL VISIT:
    SCENESETTER

    Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d)

    ¶1. (S) PM Erdogan welcomed President Obama's reiteration of
    support to the fight against the PKK during the December 7
    meeting in the Oval Office, but the Secretary should expect
    questions about how we will operationalize that commitment as
    plans to withdraw from Iraq move forward.  A key issue will
    be how to reduce the gap between the time when the U.S. is no
    longer able to provide ISR support and when we will be able
    to help Turkey acquire its own capability.  On missile
    defense, we will look for the Secretary's help in advancing
    our work with Turkey to persuade the Turks to allow a key
    radar system to be based here.  The Turks are struggling to
    define what they will need in terms of NATO political cover
    to lessen the high cost - both in terms of domestic politics
    and in relations with Iran - that Erdogan's government
    believes it will have to pay should they agree.

    ¶2. (S) Although our agenda with Turkey is broad and complex,
    the following issues are likely to come up during the
    Secretary's trip:

    "Need To Raise"
    ----------------

    - Our commitment to continue sharing real-time intelligence
    to support Turkey's counter-PKK fight, but caution that the
    process for Turkey to acquire an armed UAV system from the
    U.S. will be long and complex. (para 3-5, 14)

    - The need for a NATO BMD system with Turkey's participation
    and the Iranian threat against NATO interests. (para 6-9)

    - Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan,
    particularly for its new commitments to training security
    forces. (para 10-11)

    - Appreciation for support to OIF/OEF through Turkey's
    territory, including the Incirlik Cargo Hub; easing transit
    of non-lethal mil cargo shipments from Iraq to Afghanistan.
    (para 12)

    - Our advocacy support for Raytheon and Sikorsky on sales of
    air defense systems and utility helicopters (para 13).

    "Be Ready To Respond On"
    ------------------------

    - Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras 5)

    - Turkish requests for 24/7 Predator coverage of the
    Turkey-Iraq border to counter PKK operations and activities
    (para 5).

    - Turkish requests for immediate delivery of AH-1W
    helicopters (para 15)

    Counter - PKK Operations: Still Turkey's Top Priority
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶3. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
    have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
    military action alone.  Although the government's renamed
    National Unity Project (initially called the "Kurdish
    Opening") was not fully developed when launched and appears
    to be moving slowly, the government has increased social and
    economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey,
    dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own
    language, and increased educational opportunities as well.
    It is post's view that the military success against the PKK,
    supported by our intelligence-sharing operation, has given
    the civilians the political space to explore this opening and
    to deal directly with Masoud Barzani and other Iraqi Kurds.
    Turkish military operations against the PKK continue,
    however, and on October 6, 2009 Parliament extended the
    government's mandate to conduct cross-border operations
    against the PKK in Iraq for another year.  Turkey's leaders
    have learned from us and from their own experience that only

    a whole-of-government approach will succeed against the PKK
    insurgency.

    ¶4. (C) Our November 2007 decision to share operational
    intelligence was a turning point for the bilateral
    relationship, and President Obama's declaration before the
    Turkish Parliament in April 2009 and during his oval office
    meeting with Erdogan in December 2009 of our continuing
    commitment to support Turkey's fight against the PKK were
    warmly welcomed.  Our cooperation has helped to improve the
    bilateral relationship across the board, particularly by
    making it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq
    as a safe haven.  We can never reiterate enough our
    continuing committment, as President Obama did effectively
    with PM Erdogan in December.

    ¶5. (C) Nevertheless, Turkish causalities are still occurring.
     Turkey still looks for more support, and will press us for
    more concrete action before the U.S. completes its withdrawal
    from Iraq.  CHOD Basbug will likely repeat the GOT's request
    for laser-designation of targets and/or direct U.S.
    operations against the PKK.  In December, PM Erdogan also
    asked POTUS for 24-hour Predator coverage.  At present we
    provide approximately 12-hour coverage, with an occasional
    surge to 24 hours to support specific Turkish operations,
    such as against High Value Targets.  A move to 24-hour
    coverage is not easy due to resources requirements elsewhere;
    however, we may be able to provide a few weeks of 24-hour
    coverage during crucial spring months, and are working with
    TGS to determine exactly where and when it would be most
    useful to do so, and what assets the Turkish military would
    employ if additional UAV support is made available.

    Missile Defense
    ----------------

    ¶6. (S) The Turks asked us to postpone a return visit from
    Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
    International Security, as they are still considering how
    best to respond to our request to base an AN/TPY-2 and
    (potentially) other MD assets in Turkey.  While some of the
    Turks' technical questions remain unanswered, the key
    questions are now political.  During his meeting with
    President Obama, PM Erdogan said that such a system must be
    implemented in a NATO context to diminish the political cost
    that his government will likely bear, both in terms of
    domestic politics and in Turkey's relations with Iran.  The
    ball is now in the court of the civilian leaders here to
    determine just "how much NATO" will be enough for them
    politically; NATOs inability to fund an "interim capability"
    makes it harder for us to show parallel development of a NATO
    BMD system with PAA.  Erdogan is concerned that Turkey's
    participation might later give Israel protection from an
    Iranian counter-strike.

    ¶7. (S) We have made the point to the Turks that a decision to
    not base the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey is essentially a
    decision to opt out of missile defense coverage for Turkey;
    this would not be a political consequence, but just a fact
    based on physics and geometry.  It is important to make this
    point again (gently) with PM Erdogan, but also underscore
    that we value Turkey's participation and will try to
    "NATOize" the system, if Turkey will tell us how much NATO
    would be enough.

    ¶8. (S) Behind all this, we fear, is a manifestation of both
    the Turkish government's, and to some degree the Turkish
    public's, growing distancing from the Atlanticist world view
    now that most dangers for Turkey are gone.  While Turks are
    not naive about Iran (see below), MD places them in a pickle,
    forcing them to choose between the U.S./West and a Middle
    East "vocation" - which, while not necessarily includes
    coddling Iran, requires palpable space between Turkey and
    "the West."

    Iran
    ----

    ¶9. (S) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and
    international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is
    hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part
    due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a
    trade route to Central Asian markets.  It has worked quietly
    with us to prevent some proliferation-sensitive shipments to
    and from Iran.  Turkey's top civilian and military officials
    may have come to the conclusion that a military strike
    against Iran would be more harmful for Turkey's interests
    than Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capability; they believe
    international pressure against Iran only helps to strengthen
    Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners.  PM Erdogan himself is a
    particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position.  However,
    Turkey did press Iran (albeit quietly) to accept the P5 plus
    1 Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) offer and FM Davutoglu had
    been personally engaged in trying to rescue the TRR deal,
    which would have removed a significant portion of Iran's
    lowly-enriched uranium stockpile.  As a current member of the
    UNSC, the Turks would be very hesitant to support sanctions
    against Iran.  We need nevertheless to encourage PM Erdogan
    to support UN actions if Iran does not comply with Iran's
    international obligations while underscoring that we view
    Iran's program as a serious threat to NATO interests in
    Europe and would like to see a non-military solution
    (including Turkish participation in NATO BMD).

    Afghanistan/Pakistan
    ----------------------

    ¶10. (SBU) Turkey has been a dedicated partner in Afghanistan.
     It has commanded ISAF twice since its inception and again
    took command of RC-Capital in November. Turkey leads PRT
    Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan (also
    covering Sar-e-Pol) in mid-2010.  Turkey has sponsored the
    "Ankara Process" dialogue, one of several efforts to
    encourage constructive communications between Kabul and
    Islamabad, and is a leading participant in the Friends of
    Democratic Pakistan.  It hosted a trilateral summit on
    January 25 and a Afghanistan Regional Summit (including all
    of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors as well as select other
    countries including the U.S.) on January 26, just prior to
    the January 28 London Conference on Afghanistan.

    ¶11. (C) Turkey pledged significant aid to both countries:
    USD 200 million to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to
    Pakistan, as well as USD 1.5 million to the ANA.  There are
    1750 Turkish troops in Afghanistan, and Turkey has four OMLTs
    currently in Kabul and, since December, pledged two more
    OMLTs and one POMLT. Because of its culture, history and
    religious orientation, as well as Foreign Minister
    Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is well disposed to
    act as an agent of the international community's goals in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan.  In 2010, Turkey has pledged to
    offer 6-8 week trainings for up to a brigade's worth of
    Afghan military and police personnel in Turkey and will
    establish a training center in Kabul capable of training up
    to 600 ANSA personnel at a time.

    Retrograde through Turkey
    -------------------------

    ¶12. (S) Turkey's agreement to allow us to use its territory,
    facilities and airspace has been essential to our ability to
    support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  We now look to
    expand current capabilities to transit materiel from Iraq to
    join up with the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to
    Afghanistan.  CENTCOM logisticians, working with us and our
    EUCOM Office of Defense Cooperation, seek to take advantage
    of improved commercial ties between Turkey and Iraq to move
    non-lethal equipment across Turkey to join the NDN.  We are
    working to expand our current retrograde agreements to
    minimize the time and bureaucracy involved, and to expand
    permissions to allow non-lethal military equipment, including
    armored transport vehicles.

    Advocacy for U.S. Defense Industry
    ----------------------------------

    ¶13.  (C) We much appreciate SecDef's help in advocating for
    U.S. firms competing for key projects in Turkey, and hope he
    can raise both Sikorsky's and Raytheon's cases in person.
    Sikorsky's "International Blackhawk" proposal holds
    remarkable benefits.  This deal represents a new level of
    industrial partnership; Sikorsky guarantees that it would
    build in Turkey - for sale outside of Turkey - one Blackhawk
    for each one the GOT builds and buys for itself; this is a
    boon of hundreds of millions of dollars for the Turkish
    economy.  On Air Defense, Raytheon's PAC-3 is competing in a
    tender for Turkey's air defense.  Raytheon also seeks to take
    advantage of Turkish industry's ability to co-produce complex
    systems with us and would produce systems for sale in the UAE
    and elsewhere.  The benefit to Turkey's economy from such
    co-production would likely exceed USD 1 billion.  Technically
    and operationally, there is no system which can compete with
    the PAC-3, but Turkey's Defense Ministry seeks to broaden
    competition to include lower-cost options from Russia and
    even from European producers.  Raytheon often asks us to
    remind the Turks that a decision on requests for support on
    Missile Defense should not necessarily affect a decision on
    PAC-3.

    UAV's, Attack Helicopters, and Intel Surge
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶14. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own
    ISR capability to replace the US assets currently being used
    in anti-PKK operations.  President Obama told PM Erdogan in
    December that we support Turkey's request to acquire armed
    Reaper UAVs.  Nevertheless, approval for armed Reapers is
    complicated due to Hill concerns.  We have explained this to
    the Turks.  However, even if those could be overcome, the
    delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
    leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
    intelligence support until they can replace it.  While we are
    working to enhance Turkey's ISR capabilities, we have not
    made this commitment to date.

    ¶15. (C) Bad GOT procurement decisions led Turkey to a severe
    shortage of dual engine, high altitude attack helicopters,
    which it desperately needs to fight the PKK.  PM Erdogan
    raised this issue with the President in December 2009; SecDef
    should expect this issue to be a top priority in meetings
    with Minister Gonul and with GEN Basbug.  The Turks took
    SecDef's May 2009 letter to provide up to four AH-1W
    helicopters each in 2011, 2012 and 2013 as a firm commitment,
    and now have asked us to advance that date to 2010.  They do
    not accept our explanation that these aircraft are simply not
    available from our inventory, as they believe they have --
    just like the U.S. -- "troops in contact" and need the close
    tactical support.  While SecDef should make no commitment, we
    should also explore whether we can persuade Taiwan to sell or
    lease some of its own AH-1W aircraft now that Taiwan is
    taking delivery of Apaches.

    Support For The US-Turkey-Iraq "Tripartite Security Dialogue"
    --------------------------------------------- ----------------

    ¶16. (S) SecDef's visit will take place just as USFI's GEN
    Odierno will have left.  We expect that GEN Odierno's visit
    will give a political boost to the U.S.-Turkey-Iraq
    Tripartite Security talks.  Turkey's civilian leaders are
    taking heat from their domestic political opposition for
    pressing the "Kurdish Opening" while casualties from PKK
    attacks continue.  They hope to use GEN Odierno's visit to
    show that their whole-of-government approach against PKK
    insurgency is producing results and that it has the support
    of senior USG officials in Iraq.

    ¶17.  (S) Trilateral meetings continue regularly and a new
    Tripartite operational office in Erbil, established to share
    counter-PKK intelligence was established over the summer.
    The most recent tri-lat meeting took place in Baghdad in
    December, followed by a joint Turkey-Iraq visit in Erbil.
    The Turks remain frustrated that, in their view, the KRG is
    not doing enough to combat the PKK.  The Turks remain shy in
    sharing intelligence data; they are not convinced that they

    can trust Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information
    concerning operations secret.  Turkish officials have become
    more strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action
    against the PKK. The cooperation that does exist is a step in
    the right direction; however, it will need to improve
    significantly prior to the U.S. pullout of Iraq.  CHOD Basbug
    and PM Ergodan want the U.S. to put more pressure on the
    Iraqis - and particularly Masoud Barzani - to take actions to
    cut PKK supply and logistics lines in northern Iraq.  We
    should stress the need for more trust and collaboration
    between Turkey and Iraq, eventually on Turkish CBOs.  Absent
    greater cooperation, we could see significant bilateral
    problems post-2011, to include Iraqi claims of Turkey's
    violation of its sovereign territory.

    Northern Iraq
    --------------

    ¶18. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the
    political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has
    become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities
    of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the
    Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)).  Turkey's policy remains
    focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the
    KRG is expanding.  This outreach is reinforced by the
    continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in
    the KRG's healthy economy.

    Armenia
    -------

    ¶19. (S) The signing of the Protocols to reestablish
    Turkish-Armenian relations and open the common border in
    Zurich on October 10 was a landmark for the region.  However,
    neither Turkey nor Armenia have taken steps toward
    ratification; the GOT argues that progress toward withdrawal
    of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani provinces surrounding
    Nagorno-Karabakh is a pre-condition.  (Note:  This was
    not/not part of the agreement, and not a position the U.S.
    supports.  End note.)  Future relations will nevertheless
    still be heavily linked to the 1915 "Armenian genocide"
    issue.  Any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as
    "genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and
    the effect on our bilateral relationship -- including
    political, military, and commercial aspects -- would be
    devastating.

    Israel
    ------

    ¶20. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
    Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
    is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to
    shore up his domestic right flank through continued populist
    rhetoric against Israel and its December 2008 Gaza operation.
     His outburst at Davos and the last-minute cancellation of
    Israel's participation in the Fall 2009 Anatolian Eagle
    Exercise (a multilateral Air Force exercise which had US,
    Turkey, Italy, and Israel as planned participants) were the
    most noticeable examples of this rhetoric, which we and his
    staff have sought to contain.  The latest incident, a snub in
    early January of the Turkish Ambassador by Israeli Deputy
    Foreign Minster Danny Ayalon, almost caused the GOT to both
    recall its Ambassador and cancel the visit of Israeli Defense
    Minister Ehud Barak.  However, the very public row was
    resolved with an Israeli apology and Barak's visit on January
    17 helped to stem the downward spiral for now.  Nevertheless,
    we assess that Erdogan is likely to continue anti-Israel
    remarks and the issues will continue to cast a shadow on the
    TU-IS bilateral relationship.

    Political Environment
    ---------------------

    ¶21. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
    (AK) Party remains Turkey's strongest political party,  but
    its poll numbers are slumping, and it continues to fear an
    erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist

    parties.  Civilian-military relations remain complex.  Chief
    of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with
    PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's
    secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists
    (represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds.
    Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug
    has seemingly learned to live.  Alleged past military
    involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate
    generation of internal chaos remains political theme number
    one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their
    respective underlings.  Public trust in the military is
    starting to decline, the result of several very public
    on-going investigations into the alleged planning against the
    government.
    Jeffrey

               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

`