Currently released so far... 220 / 251,287

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/11
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE AU AR AF AORC AJ ASEC AM
BH BA BY BU
CASC CF CH COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV CVIS
EG ECON EINV ETTC EFIN ENRG ETRD EFIS EXTERNAL EPET EAID EUN ELAB ECUN EU EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GR GM GOI GE GG GA
HO
IR IZ IS INRB IN IRAJ IQ IAEA IT
JO JA
KPAL KNNP KU KWBG KJUS KG KSPR KDEM KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KCRM KHLS KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KPKO KUNR KTIA KWMN
LE LY
MASS MK MNUC MCAP MARR MOPS MU MAR MTCRE MY ML MR MPOS MOPPS
NATO NG
OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA OPDC
PREL PARM PGOV PTER PINR PHUM PINS PBIO PA PBTS PREF PROP PK PECON POLITICAL PARTIES PM PEPR
QA
RS RW RU
SA SY SM SU SCUL SNAR SOCI SENV SYR SP SG SO SF
TU TI TX Terrorism TRGY TFH01 TC TSPA
UZ UE UK US UNESCO UNSC UP UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 10ANKARA302, U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others.
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10ANKARA302.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10ANKARA302 | 2010-02-25 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXRO3002
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV
    RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHAK #0302/01 0561105
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 251105Z FEB 10 ZDK
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2242
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1577
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 7044
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RHMFISS/MNF IRAQ C2 OPS
    RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
    RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
    RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
    RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020
    TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
    SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S
    SINIRLIOGLU

    REF: ANKARA 263

    Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  During February 18 "Shared Vision and
    Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara,   Turkish MFA
    Undersecretary Sinirlioglu:

    -- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols
    ratification and the Minsk Process;
    -- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM
    Malaki;
    -- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit
    substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist
    PKK;
    -- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus
    reunification talks, and;
    -- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile
    defense.

    End Summary.

    IRAN
    ----

    ¶2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to
    convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course.
    Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear
    Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact
    military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions
    would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the
    opposition.  Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the
    economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but
    reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel
    were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of
    nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek
    nuclear arsenals of their own.  He said the international
    community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian
    refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the
    clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent
    decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%.  The
    IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for
    the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically
    unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange
    in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies.  Carefully
    constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the
    increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian
    Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international
    community's unity and determination.  "We'll keep the door
    open to engagement," he stressed.  A visibly disheartened
    Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important.  He
    acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a
    growing threat:  "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus."

    ARMENIA
    -------

    ¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between
    Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process.  He
    emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among
    ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government
    would hazard a ratification effort.  He warned Congressional
    passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate"
    his government's domestic political calculations regarding
    ratification.  He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani
    President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols
    forward.  Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's
    announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress
    would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover.
    Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural
    gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan.  Sinirlioglu implied

    ANKARA 00000302  002 OF 005

    Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling
    of the protocols:  "He doesn't trust us."

    IRAQ
    ----

    ¶4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing
    dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending
    "to get out of control."  "He is preoccupied with his
    political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued,
    the GoT is in frequent contact with him.  The MFA hosted
    Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to
    meetings 10 days prior.  Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts
    to influence the election.  He noted Saudi Arabia is also
    "throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq
    because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia
    dominance there.  "We want a free, transparent and fair
    election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the
    sectarian divide."

    ¶5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey
    would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the
    Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500
    million.  He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within
    two years.  He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline
    because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni
    areas.  Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would
    give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to
    Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota.  He
    asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several
    Iraqi communities together into a common project.  The
    creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more
    important for its politically unifying effect than its
    economic impact.

    ¶6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I
    Commanding General Odierno's recent visit.  He hoped for the
    early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more
    cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
    against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
    leadership harboring in northern Iraq:  "We want the KRG to
    understand that working with us is important."

    ISRAEL
    ------

    ¶7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with
    Israel.  Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral,
    but general."  He attributed increasing regional country
    frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process,
    especially on the Palestinian track.  He blamed the lack of
    progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional
    stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals.  He contended
    the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a
    punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish
    popular anger against Israel.  Even so, bilateral cooperation
    with Israel is continuing.  Turkey is acquiring Israeli
    military equipment, notably Heron UAVs.  Direct flights
    between the two countries are routine.  Two-way trade is
    healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will
    recover."  Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister
    Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good."  He noted the
    MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting
    between the two prime ministers on the margins of an
    international gathering.  Returning to a GoT obsession, he
    recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks,
    "which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008
    military operation in Gaza.  Burns noted Syria places high
    value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator
    Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can
    make an important contribution to the Peace Process.

    ANKARA 00000302  003 OF 005

    SYRIA
    -----

    ¶8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are
    beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit.  He said a
    shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for
    their unlikely alliance.  "Now, their interests are
    diverging."  Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity
    talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as
    a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and
    further isolate Iran.

    EU, CYPRUS and GREECE
    ---------------------

    ¶9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being
    obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several
    member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus.  He
    reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy.  He accused
    France of changing the rules mid-game.  He contended French
    opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural
    divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world:  "A
    wider audience is watching this."

    ¶10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency
    regarding the island's reunification talks:  EU "membership
    makes them invulnerable."  Greek Cypriots, he said, want the
    world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in
    ¶2004.  They pretend relations between the island's two
    communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty,
    it's been an international issue for 50 years.  Talat's
    cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have
    been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react.
    Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the
    Turkish Cypriots.  He implied the island's Turkish community
    would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC
    "president" in April.  He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher
    profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations.

    ¶11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated
    response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new
    discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running
    disputes.  He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable
    in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute
    financial crisis.  Based on Papandreou's response,
    Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with
    Greece soon.

    AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA
    -------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with
    praise for Turkey's military, training and development
    contributions there.  Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to
    focus on three Afghan challenges:  "the marriage of Wahhabism
    and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces
    deficit.  He said Turkey plans to address the first by
    ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second
    by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors
    meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and
    intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a
    police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of
    5160 trainees per year.  Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan
    Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO
    PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in
    Afghanistan a failure.  He said the EU's  criticism of
    Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is
    unjustified.  He argued, since Turkey does not have a
    security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the

    ANKARA 00000302  004 OF 005

    European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a
    legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL.  "We would like
    the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of
    our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership.  He
    urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to
    support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation
    with the EU on security issues through NATO.

    ¶13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin
    Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan.  He described the
    Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan
    Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional
    responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems.  He
    said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in
    deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed,
    Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the
    nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake.
    He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested
    President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's
    visit to New Delhi the previous week.  Acting on that
    request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was
    skeptical of Indian intentions.  Gul is planning to visit
    Pakistan later this year.  Soysal said Iran is proposing a
    quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan
    and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate
    enthusiasm.

    ¶14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said
    the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari,
    remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior
    officers' patience may not be infinite.  Zardari needs to
    increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament.  Soysal
    offered.  Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive
    player.

    ¶15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan.
    Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite
    Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau.

    BOSNIA
    ------

    ¶16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to
    resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the
    Balkans, particularly Bosnia.  He identified effecting
    rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate
    diplomatic goal for the region.  Towards that end,
    Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been
    in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian
    "genocide."    The United States and Turkey have "agreed to
    disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia;
    nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans."

    BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO
    ----------------------------------

    ¶17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations
    with Europe.  Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's
    unhappiness with Sarkozy.  He described his country's
    relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic
    prejudice.  He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant
    to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in
    their countries.  Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009
    POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to
    the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary
    General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal
    requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for
    the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece.  This still needed
    to be done, Ildem said.

    ¶18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the

    ANKARA 00000302  005 OF 005

    POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a
    qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary
    General.  Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit
    was selected.  "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and
    Merkel."  Ildem complained high-level positions should be
    part of NATO reform:  "We missed an opportunity with the
    selection of the Assistant Secretary General."  Sinirlioglu
    added:  "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we
    trusted you."

    MISSILE DEFENSE
    ---------------

    ¶19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on
    missile defense.  Burns said the Russians are much more
    relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we
    hope to have more conversations on missile defense
    bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council.
    Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent
    meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be
    highlighted to justify PAA.

    ¶20. (U) Participants:

    Turkey

    Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu
    Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal
    Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas
    Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International
    Security Affairs
    Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence
    and Security Affairs
    Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the
    Americas
    Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas

    United States

    Undersecretary William Burns
    Ambassador James Jeffrey
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow
    Bridget Brink, NSC
    Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor
    Tamir Waser, P Staff
    Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker

    ¶21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable.

    Jeffrey

               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

`