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### Viewing cable 10STATE17263, U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT TALKS -

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10STATE17263 | 2010-02-24 22:10 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    R 242212Z FEB 10
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 017263

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2035
    TAGS: ETTC IR KN MTCRE PARM RS TSPA

    SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT TALKS -
    DECEMBER 2009

    REF: 09 STATE 082572

    Classified By: ISN Acting A/S Vann H. Van Diepen.  Reason 1.5 (D)

    -----------
    (U) Summary
    -----------

    ¶1. (S) A U.S. interagency team -- lead by ISN Acting
    Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen -- met with a Russian
    interagency team lead by Vladimir Nazarov, Deputy Secretary
    of the Russian National Security Council (full participants
    list is provided in paragraphs 76-77 below), on December 22,
    2009 for a second round of discussions on a Joint Threat
    Assessment (JTA), as agreed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev
    in the 2009 U.S.-Russia Summit Joint Statement on Missile
    Defense Issues.  The Russian delegation came prepared to
    engage seriously, and made  presentations on their evaluation
    of the missile programs of Iran and the DPRK; a conceptual
    framework for evaluating the risk posed by various missile
    programs; Russian concerns about instability in Pakistan and
    the security of nuclear weapons and missiles there; and the
    work of the FSB (Federal Security Service) in countering
    efforts by Iranian and North Korean agencies to either obtain
    nuclear and missile technologies and materials in Russia or
    to transship the
    m through Russian territory.  While the Russians were
    prepared for discussions of cooperation at a strategic level
    on countering missile proliferation, their position remained
    the same: in their analysis, the missile programs of Iran and
    the DPRK are not sufficiently developed, and their intentions
    to use missiles against the U.S. or Russia are nonexistent,
    thus not constituting a "threat" requiring the deployment of
    missile defenses.  The discussions included a vigorous
    exchange of questions and answers, and concluded with an
    invitation by the Russians to hold the next round of the JTA
    in Moscow in March or April 2010.  The discussions lasted the
    full day.  End Summary.

    -------------------
    (U) Opening remarks
    -------------------

    ¶2. (S) Van Diepen recalled that the July 2009 U.S.-Russia
    Joint Statement called for U.S. and Russian experts to work
    together to analyze ballistic missile threats and that the
    U.S. side had provided analyses of Iran's and North Korea's
    missile programs at the September JTA.  He said that the U.S.
    side looked forward to receiving Russian perspectives on
    these programs and discussing areas of agreement and
    disagreement.  He added that the U.S. hoped that development
    of a more shared perspective on these issues would help
    inform how the U.S. and Russia address missile threats
    bilaterally and multilaterally.  Consistent with the Joint
    Statement and the non-paper U/S Tauscher provided to Russia
    in November, this effort also could help the U.S. and Russia
    assess how to defend against missile threats if that becomes
    necessary.  Van Diepen ended by underscoring that the U.S.
    looked forward to detailed discussions and then deciding on
    potential next steps.

    ¶3. (C) Nazarov thanked Van Diepen for reminding both sides of
    the context for the work of the JTA.  He noted that the July
    6 Joint Statement said that experts of both countries would
    analyze threats of the 21st century and make recommendations
    for political and diplomatic means to address them.  Russia
    takes this seriously, and President Medvedev has given the
    highest priority to this work and has instructed that this
    work be coordinated under the Security Council of the Russian
    Federation.  Accordingly, Nazarov said, the Russian
    delegation includes representatives from all of the Russian
    agencies responsible for tracking missile threats and
    countering them.   He added that the Russian side planned to
    make presentations, focusing primarily on Iran and North
    Korea.  After that, the Russian delegation would be prepared
    to comment on the presentations made by the U.S. at the last
    JTA meeting in July.   He said the Russian delegation had
    studied these materials closely and had several comments and
    questions.

    ¶4. (S) Nazarov concluded by noting that Russia looked forward
    to a creative dialogue and robust exchange of opinions
    between the experts of both sides.  He said Russia would
    focus primarily  on the threats from Iran and North Korea,
    noting that Russia believed the long-term strategic interests
    of the U.S. and Russia largely coincide and that the
    acquisition of nuclear and/or missile capabilities by Iran,
    North Korea, or other threshold states is unacceptable.
    Nazarov hoped that the discussions would be productive and
    potentially lead to the drafting of a joint assessment, and
    perhaps to the creation of a joint document.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    (U) Russian Presentations on Iran and North Korea
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    Iran:

    ¶5. (S) Evgeny Zudin of the Russian Ministry of Defense gave
    detailed presentations on the Russian assessment of the
    Iranian and North Korean missile programs, and the degree to
    which Russia believes these programs constitute threats
    requiring missile defense responses.  For Russia, the bottom
    line is that, in essence, neither program constitutes a
    threat at the moment or in the near future.

    NOTE:  Russia did not provide paper copies of either
    presentation to the U.S. delegation.  END NOTE.

    ¶6. (S) On Iran, Zudin made the following points concerning
    Scud missiles:

    --Given the challenging and complex situation of the regional
    context that surrounds Iran, Iran's leaders view acquiring a
    missile capability as a deterrent to existent threats.  To
    that end, they also consistently exaggerate Iran's
    achievements in missile production.

    --The core of the Iranian missile program has been the
    evolutionary development of liquid-fueled missiles based on
    Soviet Scud technology from the 1960s.

    --Tehran acquired Scud B systems from a number of countries
    during the 1980s.

    --The Iranian version, called the Shahab-1, has a range of
    300 km and a reentry vehicle of 1 ton.

    --With scientific and technological assistance from North
    Korea, Iran acquired production capabilities for both the
    Scud B and the Scud C.

    --The Scud C, called the Shahab-2 by the Iranians, has a
    range of 550 km with a 700 kg payload.

    --Iran has also developed and commissioned a medium range
    ballistic missile (MRBM) called the Shahab-3, based on the
    North Korean No Dong-1 and using Scud-based technologies.
    The Shahab-3 has a range of 1,500 km and a 700 kg payload.

    --Iran has done a good deal of work to improve the precision
    and range of this system, creating the Shahab-3M, which Iran
    claims has a range of 2,000 km, although so far the confirmed
    range is only 1,600-1,700 km.

    --Russia's analysis indicates that this was achieved by
    reducing the re-entry vehicle weight to 250 kg and improving
    the engine.

    -- Russia also believes that this very nearly exhausts the
    potential for Iran to increase the range of the Shahab-3 or
    make further improvements to Scud-based missile technology.

    ¶7. (S) Moving on from Scud-based technology, Zudin made the
    following points on Iran's development of a 2,000 km-range
    solid propellant system:

    --Iran has been developing solid propellant MRBMs/IRBMs with
    better operational capability since 2000.

    --Currently, Russia is seeing the development of a two-stage
    intermediate (2,000 km) solid propellant missile.

    --The first test of this system in November 2007 failed.
    During the second test on November 12, 2008, Iran
    successfully accomplished the uplift stage of the missile.

    --Following the third test of the missile in May 2009, Iran
    announced that the launch was successful and that it would
    begin serial production of this missile.

    --This system was tested again on December 16, 2009, and Iran
    also claimed this test was successful.

    --The Russian assessment is that regardless of optimistic
    statements from Iran, the test of this missile was actually
    just a test of a successful prototype and that what the test
    did was allow Iran to practice first stage operation and
    stage separation.

    --Russia believes Iran will need another 2-3 years of testing
    to perfect the missile.  Russia believes it will not actually
    be deployed for 5-6 years.

    ¶8. (S) Zudin said that another potential success indicator
    for Iran's missile program is the Safir space launch vehicle
    (SLV) program.  He said the Safir launch on February 2, 2009
    was successful in putting the Omid  (26 kg) satellite into
    orbit.  However, Iran's first attempt to launch the satellite
    into orbit on August 17, 2008 was unsuccessful.  Russia
    assesses that in order to achieve the successful launch, Iran
    had used
    the maximum potential of its liquid-propellant technology
    (the first stage of the Safir was a Shahab-3).  As for Iran
    developing combat/offensive long-range missiles based on SLV
    technology, Russia believes, in theory, this is possible.
    However, from a military technological perspective, Russia
    believes this is unviable due to low throw weight of the
    system.  In addition, Russia believes that development of a
    long-range missile based on its SLV efforts would require
    Iran to intensify its research and development, conduct a
    series of test launches outside its territory, and increase
    throw weight and accuracy.  Thus, in Russia's view, despite
    Iran's successful launch of a satellite, it is premature to
    talk about Iran successfully developing the technology for a
    militarily useful long-range ballistic missile capacity.

    ¶9. (S) Zudin summed up his presentation on Iran by noting
    that over the last four years, Iran has successfully launched
    a 26 kg satellite into orbit and conducted several successful
    launches of a solid propellant MRBM, according to unconfirmed
    information.  However, Russia believes Iran's "success" boils
    down to creating Shahab-3-class liquid propellant missiles
    with an accuracy of several kilometers that can reach targets
    in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe, but given
    conventional warheads, these missiles cannot do substantial
    damage.  Under favorable conditions, Russia believes Iran
    might be able to begin a program to develop ballistic
    missiles with ranges of between 3,000-5,000 km after 2015,
    but Russia does not see Iran taking any steps in this
    direction.  Rather, Russia has concluded that Iran's
    ballistic missile program continues to be directed toward
    developing combat ready missiles to address regional concerns.

    North Korea:

    ¶10. (S) Zudin made the following points with regard to the
    DPRK's missile program:

    --Over the last two decades North Korea has paid increased
    attention to developing and producing ballistic missiles and
    SLVs.

    --The DPRK has commissioned the production of liquid
    propellant missiles such as Scud Bs and Cs (which North Korea
    calls the Hwasong 5 and 6), the No Dong I, the short-range
    KN-02, and the "Luna-M" tactical missile, plus solid
    propellant battlefield and tactical rockets.

    --The core of North Korea's missile capability is missile
    technology from the 1960s.

    --The potentially outdated No Dong-1, with a range of
    1,000-1,300 km and a reentry vehicle of one ton, is the most
    advanced missile commissioned by the North Korean military.

    --In Russia's assessment, only the KN-02, with a range of
    less than 100 km, is relatively modern.

    --Since early in the 1990s, North Korea has slowly developed
    missiles of the Taepo Dong class.

    --Russia estimates that the Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) was a
    prototype two-stage liquid propellant missile with a
    2,000-2,500 km range.

    --The TD-I first stage used a No Dong-1 engine, and the
    second stage used a Scud engine.

    --The only flight test of the TD-I was conducted on August
    31, 1998, during which the DPRK practiced separation of
    missile stages.  North Korea declared this test to be an SLV
    launch.

    --The Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) MRBM is a two-stage liquid
    propellant missile with a range of 3,500-6,000 km, depending
    on the weight of the warhead.

    --A July 5, 2006 test launch of the TD-II failed as the
    missile exploded 40 seconds into flight.

    --Russia estimates that North Korea tested elements of the
    Taepo Dong-2 with its April 5, 2009 SLV launch.

    --Russia believes North Korea has demonstrated a certain
    level of progress in the missile area by creating a first
    stage engine with a thrust of 100 tons.

    --North Korea conducted tests of nuclear devices on October
    9, 2006 and May 26, 2009.  However, it remains unproven
    whether North Korea can make a nuclear warhead of the size
    and weight that would allow it to be carried by a ballistic
    missile.

    ¶11. (S) Zudin said that in Russia's view, the widespread
    claims about North Korea's achievements in the missile area
    are dubious.  In particular, Russia notes that it is claimed
    that North Korea has a new missile based on the Soviet R-27
    (NOTE: SS-N-6.  END NOTE) submarine-launched ballistic
    missile (SLBM) that is capable of reaching ranges of
    2,400-4,000 km.  However, the many published reports
    regarding this missile, which is known as the BM-25, contain
    claims that are made without reference to any reliable
    sources.  Moreover, Zudin said, the fact is that there have
    been no successful tests of this missile in either North
    Korea or Iran.  Russia also is unaware that this missile has
    ever been seen.  There are claims that 19 of these missiles
    were shipped to Iran in 2005, but there is no evidence for
    this and concealment of such a transfer would be impossible.

    ¶12. (S) Zudin said Russia believes the real missile potential
    of North Korea is an impressive arsenal of outdated missiles
    with ranges no greater than 1,300 km and that are only a
    threat to countries in the region that North Korea considers
    to be enemies.  Russia estimates that in the years to come
    North Korea will devote considerable effort to improving and
    perfecting its SLV.  To this end, it will use the launch
    facility near the community of Tongchang-Dong (NOTE: Known to
    the U.S. as the Yunsong facility.  END NOTE).  Russia
    assesses that North Korean development of long-range
    ballistic missiles based on SLVs is possible in principle,
    but perfection will take years.  The prospects for North
    Korea developing a combat operational system from such a
    process is not likely due to the inability to conduct
    concealed preparations for launch and the long preparation
    times.

    ¶13. (S) Summing up, Zudin said Iran's and North Korea's
    missile programs can be characterized as follows:  the only
    real successes are liquid propellant intermediate range
    missiles with ranges of 1,300 km, and both countries would
    face real technical difficulties in trying to make additional
    advances to increase the range of their systems.

    --------------------------------------------- ------
    (U) Discussion on Iranian and North Korean Missiles
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶14. (S) Van Diepen thanked the Russian delegation for its
    presentations, noting that there appeared to be some areas
    where both sides agree, other areas where the two sides see
    the same thing a little differently, and areas where the two
    sides disagree.  He said it is good to have the opportunity
    to examine the differences and the reasons for them, and
    urged that this be done in a structured way.  Van Diepen
    proposed discussion begin with Iran and North Korea
    generally, and then move to specific categories of
    short-range, medium range, and long-range missiles.  On Iran,
    he said it appeared that both sides had similar assessments
    at the technical level with regard to short range missiles in
    Iran. On medium range missiles in Iran, both sides agree
    there is the original No Dong, a modified No Dong with longer
    range - although the U.S. and Russia have different ideas of
    the modifications made to achieve that longer range.  And
    both sides seem to agree that Iran is developing a two-stage
    solid propellant missile.
     Beyond that, U.S. and Russian assessments seem to diverge.

    ¶15. (S) Based on the Russian presentations, the U.S.
    delegation posed a number of questions.  The Russian
    delegation also raised a number of questions about U.S.
    comments and the U.S. presentations on Iran and North Korea
    from the September JTA talks.  The topics raised and
    follow-up discussions were as follows:

    ¶16. (S) Shahab-3 Reentry Vehicle Mass

    The U.S. noted that based on modeling, it assesses that the
    modified Shahab-3 has 600 kg re-entry vehicle mass at a range
    of 2,000 km, and asked for Russia to explain the basis for
    its assessment of 250 kg re-entry vehicle mass. The U.S. also
    asked how useful such a missile would be as a military
    weapon.  Russia responded that there is some uncertainty in
    its estimate, conceding that the 250 kg is at the low end of
    Russia's estimate.  However, Russia believes that the low
    weight of the Shahab-3 warhead makes it pointless as a
    military weapon.  Although the range could be further
    increased with a lighter warhead, Russia's view is that such
    a missile also is pointless.  Additionally, while Russia
    views the U.S. 600 kg estimate as being close to the 700 kg
    weight of the basic Shahab-3 warhead, it assesses that the
    range of the system with that warhead is 1,300 km, not 2,000
    km.  Russia does not believe that if the weight of the
    warhead is decreased by just 50 kg, it is realistic to assess
    that the Shahab 3 would
     achieve a 2,000 km range.

    ¶17. (S) Aluminum Airframe

    The U.S. said that its assessment of a 2,000 km range for the
    Shahab-3 is achieved through the use of an aluminum airframe
    instead of steel and increased engine thrust.  Russia asked
    whether the assessment that the Shahab 3 airframe is made
    with aluminum rather than steel is based on speculation or
    fact.  The U.S. responded that the assessment derives from
    information relating to Iran seeking various aluminum alloys.
     Additionally, during the Information Exchange (IE) portion
    of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary, a
    number of presentations, including by the UK and France, also
    assessed that the Shahab-3 has an aluminum airframe and
    described a number of Iranian attempts to procure aluminum
    for this purpose.  For this reason there also have been MTCR
    proposals to add the types of aluminum sought by Iran to the
    MTCR Annex.

    ¶18. (S) Safir Airframes

    The U.S. noted that it appears that the first stage of the
    Safir SLV is the Shahab-3, and asked whether Russia believes
    the Safir could achieve orbit with a steel airframe.  Russia
    answered that the facts are that the Safir was used to put a
    satellite with a very low mass into orbit.  It is likely that
    the technologies used to achieve this were exploited to their
    utmost.  Russian analysis showed that the size of the Omid is
    the limit of what Iran could put into orbit.  The U.S. agreed
     that a very low weight satellite was all that the Safir
    could put into orbit, but assessed that even orbiting such a
    small satellite could only be done using an aluminum
    airframe.  In U.S. modeling of the launch using a steel
    airframe, the Safir was not able to get close to putting
    anything into orbit.

    ¶19. (S) Russia remarked that even if the U.S. and Russia
    disagree over the materials used in the airframe, both sides
    can agree that the capability of this missile was used to its
    maximum to get a satellite into orbit.  If there is agreement
    on this point, then both sides should be able to agree that
    using this system as a weapon is pointless.  The U.S.
    responded that this was not necessarily so and would depend
    on how the rocket   is used.  The Safir launch might have
    been a technology demonstrator.  If one clustered or stacked
    the Shahab, it could be used as a longer-range system.  The
    U.S. added that something using a single Shahab as its first
    stage will have limitations, but that is not the only option.

    ¶20. (S) Using Clustered Engines

    Russia noted that during the JTA talks in Moscow, the U.S.
    discussed several options Iran would have with regard to a
    cluster scheme.  However, in Russia's view, the problem with
    a cluster scheme is that it makes the missile nonviable for
    military purposes.  The U.S. responded that a cluster scheme
    would make the system less mobile, but noted that it would
    provide a possibility for putting a missile further
    downrange.  However, the basic U.S. point is that the Safir
    could have been a technology demonstrator for staging,
    separation, ignition, and control of an upper stage.  Russia
    noted that it views the Safir launch as a success and has
    stated this.  Additionally, Russia agrees there are ways to
    increase the throw weight, including the clustering of
    engines, but the goal of the Russian review of Iran's missile
    capabilities was to examine whether the Iranian program could
    create a combat ready missile that meets certain
    specifications.  In Russia's view it cannot, and talking
    about the Shahab-3 as a long-range
     combat missile is unrealistic.

    ¶21. (S) The U.S. agreed it is not realistic for a mobile
    missile, but thought it would be realistic for use in a silo
    or underground.  Russia responded that such a missile would
    require a fixed launch pad.  Fifty years ago fixed launch
    pads deep inside a country were survivable, but now that is
    not realistic.  The U.S. countered that both Russia and the
    U.S. still have hundreds of such launch sites.  Russia said
    that was a topic for another discussion, not JTA.

    ¶22. (S) Iran Not Capable of Producing Longer-Range Missiles

    Russia said its bottom line is that Iran lacks appropriate
    structural materials for long-range systems, such as high
    quality aluminum.  Iran can build prototypes, but in order to
    be a threat to the U.S. or Russia Iran needs to produce
    missiles in mass quantities, and it lacks materials
    sufficient for the type of mass production needed to be a
    security threat.  Russia further noted that the technology
    for longer-range missiles is sophisticated and difficult to
    master.  For example, the elongated airframes Iran is using
    might not survive the stresses of a ballistic flight path,
    and the guidance system for the missile (Shahab-3) is
    outdated and does not allow for precision steering.
    According to Russian calculations, if the control system is
    used at a range of 2,000 km, it could veer as much as 6-7 km
    off its target; at 5,000 km, the accuracy could be off by
    50-60 km.  In addition, the liquid propellants used by the
    Iranians are of low efficiency.  Iran is working to improve
    the power of the engine and develop
    more efficient kinds of fuel.  However, it faces significant
    challenges.  Iran also has problems with launch preparation
    times, although it has made some recent improvements.

    ¶23. (S) Launching from Silos

    Russia said it does not think a Shahab-3 derived system could
    be launched from a silo.  Ground launch sites that are for
    SLVs are not suitable for military launches, and missiles
    with side-based vent engines and clustered engines cannot be
    silo-based.  The U.S. responded that this might be an area
    where U.S. and Russian assessments differ.  For example, the
    U.S. thinks the Taepo Dong-2 is a clustered missile that can
    be launched from a silo or underground launcher, adding that
    there are scenarios to compensate for shortcomings of this
    technology should the Iranians or North Koreans choose to
    pursue them.

    ¶24. (S) Iranian Solid Propellant MRBM

    The U.S. said it does not see the solid-propellant MRBM as a
    technology demonstrator.  This system has been tested four
    times in the past two years, and the U.S. assesses Iran will
    be ready to field it in less than the 5-6 year timeframe
    Russia envisions.  Russia asked how soon the U.S. thought the
    system could be ready.  The U.S. said that it would not be
    surprised if a two-stage system with a range up to 2,000 km
    were fielded
    within a year, at least in limited numbers.  The U.S. also
    noted that not all countries follow the same testing
    procedures as the U.S. and Russia.  North Korea is an extreme
    example, but Iran does not have the same test philosophy as
    either the U.S. or Russia.

    ¶25. (S) The Path to Long Range Missile Development in Iran

    The U.S. said the main potential avenue for Iran developing
    long range missiles is by using current systems as building
    blocks.  For example, using the Shahab-3 with clustered or
    stacked engines could be one path.  Another path might be the
    so-called BM-25 missile that the U.S. believes was sold to
    Iran by North Korea.  A third path might be development of a
    solid-propellant MRBM with more powerful motors.  Russia said
    that its views on the Shahab 3 had already been discussed.
    Russia had some questions about the other two paths the U.S.
    had identified.  In addition, Russia thinks it also will be
    very important to consider the intentions of Iran and North
    Korea that could lead to creation or improvement of its
    missiles.  This will affect what each side (U.S. and Russia)
    does to monitor what these countries (Iran and North Korea)
    do to acquire missile technologies, including procurement
    methods.  It also will help define the key technologies
    required by these countries now and in the future and in
    finding a means for protecting these technologies.

    ¶26. (S) The BM-25

    Russia said that during its presentations in Moscow and its
    comments thus far during the current talks, the U.S. has
    discussed the BM-25 as an existing system.  Russia questioned
    the basis for this assumption and asked for any facts the
    U.S. had to provide its existence such as launches, photos,
    etc.  For Russia, the BM-25 is a mysterious missile.  North
    Korea has not conducted any tests of this missile, but the
    U.S. has said that North Korea transferred 19 of these
    missiles to Iran.  It is hard for Russia to follow the logic
    trail on this.  Since Russia has not seen any evidence of
    this missile being developed or tested, it is hard for Russia
    to imagine that Iran would buy an untested system.  Russia
    does not understand how a deal would be made for an untested
    missile.  References to the missile's existence are more in
    the domain of political literature than technical fact.  In
    short, for Russia, there is a question about the existence of
    this system.

    ¶27. (S) The U.S. repeated its earlier comment that Iran and
    North Korea have different standards of missile development
    than many other countries, including the U.S. and Russia.
    North Korea exported No Dong missiles after only one flight
    test, so it is not unimaginable that it would build and seek
    to export a system that has not been tested.  This is
    especially true for North Korea because of its need for hard
    currency.  In the U.S. view, the more interesting question is
    why would Iran buy a missile that has not been tested.  One
    possible answer is that Iran has recognized that the BM-25's
    propulsion technology exceeds the capabilities of that used
    in the Shahab-3, and that acquiring such technology was very
    attractive.  Iran wanted engines capable of using
    more-energetic fuels, and buying a batch of BM-25 missiles
    gives Iran a set it can work on for reverse engineering.
    This estimate would be consistent with the second stage of
    the Safir SLV using steering engines from the BM-25 missile.

    ¶28. (S) Safir and BM-25

    The U.S. explained that based on a comparison of Internet
    photos of the second stage of the Safir, the U.S. assessment
    is that the steering (vernier) engines on the Safir are the
    same as on the R-27.  The weld lines and tank volumes from
    the Safir second stage show that the ratio of oxidizer to
    propellant is not consistent with Scud propellants and more
    consistent with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and
    nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), which were used in the R-27.  The
    U.S. does not have any information on why Iran has not flight
    tested the BM-25.  It may be due to difficulties assembling
    the missiles, but it appears that they have at least done
    work with the steering (vernier) engines.  Russia asked if
    the U.S. was saying that its case for the existence of the
    BM-25 missile is that individual elements of the Safir
    resemble the steering engines of the R-27 missile.

    ¶29. (S) The U.S. said that is only part of the case.  In the
    media, and more importantly in the MTCR Information Exchange,
    countries have offered direct evidence of the transfer of the
    BM-25 from North Korea to Iran.  Russia asked if the U.S. had
    pictures of the missile in Iran.  The U.S. did not, but noted
    that North Korea had paraded the missile through the streets
    of Pyongyang.  Russia disagreed.  Russia said it had reviewed
    the video of the North Korean military parade and concluded
    that North Korea had shown a different missile.  Russia does
    not think the BM-25 exists.  The missile appears to be a
    myth, and some say that it is based on a Russian missile.
    However, no one has seen it, and Russia cannot find traces of
    it.  The U.S. said it would endeavor to provide further
    information on the existence of the BM-25 at the next round
    of talks, noting that reaching agreement on this point will
    affect the joint assessment of Iranian and North Korean
    missile capabilities.

    ¶30. (S) Safir Fuel

    Russia asked whether the U.S. had any clear images of the
    Safir that allow for the assessment of tank volumes and the
    ratio of fuel to oxidizer.  The U.S. said that the weld lines
    of the second stage are clear in the pictures Iran put on the
    Internet, and U.S. analysts were able to make pretty good
    calculations based on this information.  Russia questioned
    this, saying that the photos did not allow for accurate
    measurements of distances.  The U.S. undertook to provide
    more information on this point at the next round of talks.

    ¶31. (S) The U.S. then asked Russia for its assessment of the
    types of propellant used in the Safir second stage.  Russia
    said it thinks that hydrazine is used.  The U.S. asked
    whether Russia thought UDMH might be involved.  Russia did
    not.  It said that there might be different combinations of
    fuel and oxidizers, but the base is hydrazine.

    ¶32. (S) More on Propellants

    The U.S. asked whether Russia assesses that Iran is moving
    beyond Scud propellants.  Russia responded that it believes
    Iran is trying to move in this direction because it wants
    something more powerful - something that can lift 40-50 tons.
     With bigger engines, Iran can improve missile range.  Thus,
    Iran has been working to acquire more-energetic fuels and
    trying to produce UDMH and N2O4.  However, Iran has been
    working on this for approximately 10 years, and Russia has
    not seen any serious results.  Russia further noted that
    Malik Ashtar University in Tehran has been working on fuel
    combinations, but it apparently has not been successful.  The
    fact that Iran has not succeeded in this area is evident in
    Iran's effort to seek this technology from abroad.

    ¶33. (S) The U.S. noted that it was significant that both the
    U.S. and Russia assess that Iran is working on more-energetic
    propellants, even if the two sides differ in how far along
    they are.  Russia responded that this is due to the fact that
    Iran has not yet launched any longer range missiles.  There
    have been no tests, and statements from Iran that it has
    missiles that can fly 2,000 km have not been substantiated.
    The longest range that Russia has seen is 1,700 km, and that
    was achieved only because of a reduced throw weight.  If the
    U.S. has additional data to share, Russia would be
    interested.  The U.S. agreed to look into the matter and
    elaborate further at the next JTA talks.

    ¶34. (S) However, the U.S. also noted that modeling shows that
    achieving a greater range is possible.  Just because a
    capability has not been demonstrated operationally does not
    mean that it is not possible.  Once a program has achieved
    1,500 km, going a few hundred kilometers more is not that
    much of an obstacle.  Going from 1,700 to 2,000 km is not a
    great technological stretch.  Russia said it could not agree
    because with a longer flight, various parts of the missile
    could burn through, the missile could fall apart, or it could
    go off course.  It needs to be tested at its maximum range.
    As discussed earlier, the U.S. believes Iran can achieve the
    increased range due to a combination of increased thrust from
    more powerful engines, a slightly reduced payload, and the
    use of aluminum instead of steel.

    ¶35. (S) Russia disagreed with the U.S. assessment that Iran
    has been able to buy technology to produce solid propellant
    engines.  Russia believes Iran continues to work on the
    technology to mix and pour the propellant.  This is a very
    difficult process.  Solid fuel has to be very evenly mixed to
    work properly.  It must be put into the motor case and then
    allowed to solidify, and the resulting fuel must be
    homogeneous.  In addition, fuel loading is more complicated
    for larger engines, and Iran has not mastered this.  Russia
    also believes Iran is experimenting with fuel composition,
    how long fuels can be preserved, and how temperatures can
    affect the mixture.  Russia does not think that Iran has
    solved the problem of thermal isolation of the engine from
    the airframe, as the junction with the engine tends to burn
    through.  Russia also does not think that Iran has solved the
    problem of thrust vector control and gas steering
    technologies.  The old technologies are not reliable, and
    Iran has had a hard time getting
     components from abroad.  In addition, Iran cannot produce
    high-quality spherical aluminum powder and without this it
    cannot reliably produce solid fuel.  Russia noted that even
    Israel needs to buy ammonium perchlorate from abroad.  Iran
    has been trying to produce it indigenously, but Russia has no
    information indicating it has been successful.  In Russia's
    view, Iran appears to be having very serious problems with
    engine development.

    ¶36. (S) The Ashura

    Russia said that in June 2008, it had received information
    from the State Department that within the framework of the
    Ashura program, Iran is producing a 3-stage missile called
    the Ghadr-110.  At that time, the U.S. told Russia that this
    missile is very similar to the Pakistani Shaheen-II and has a
    range of 2,000 km with a throw weight of one ton.  Testing of
    the Ghadr-110 may have started in 2008, and Russia would like
    additional information on this system.  The U.S. said that
    there appeared to be some confusion:  the Ashura is a
    two-stage solid propellant missile with a 2,000 km range, and
    the Ghadr-110 is the Fateh-110, a single-stage SRBM.

    ¶37. (S) Sejjil

    Russia asked whether the Sejjil was part of the Ashura
    program.  The U.S. said it thinks the Sejjil is another name
    for the Ashura.  In addition, Iran also has a short range
    solid propellant system called the Fateh-110.  The experience
    gained from that program has been used in the development of
    the Ashura and helps explain how Iran acquired the capability
    to develop larger motors.  In the 1990s, Iran received
    production technology and infrastructure from China to
    develop solid propellants.  That infrastructure was used in
    the Fateh-110 and now is being used as the technological
    basis for the Ashura.  While the U.S. would agree that a
    larger solid propellant engine is challenging, Iran has over
    a decade of experience producing solid propellant motors and
    it got an important head start from China.  Independent of
    what Iran has since acquired, this head start allowed Iran to
    develop the Ashura, which has been flight tested
    successfully, and also to work toward longer-range systems.
    Russia did not fully agree,
    saying that the technology for an SRBM is quite different
    from medium and longer range systems.

    ¶38. (S) Iranian Challenges

    Noting that Russia had mentioned several problems with Iran's
    efforts to develop larger motors, the U.S. asked for the
    basis of Russia's assessment and specifically whether it
    derived from the results of ground testing.  Russia responded
    that Iran is having problems generally because it did not
    develop the technology in Iran and is trying to work off of
    North Korean technology.  The U.S. then asked how Russia
    would explain
    the Ashura having been flight tested twice successfully.
    Russia said there is nothing special there as the technology
    is all old technology as described in detail in the
    literature of the Chinese Long March 4 engine.  The U.S.
    pointed out that the Long March is a liquid propellant
    system, and the Ashura is a solid propellant system.  If Iran
    has successful tests, it shows Iran has built MRBM rocket
    motors.  Russia countered that all it shows is that Iran is
    testing parts of the missile.  Iran may have claimed success
    but that is not the reality.  If Iran wants it to be
    reliable, the missile has to be tested many times before it
    can be deployed.  This is what Russia believes.  Russia
    understands the U.S. has a different point of view and this
    can be discussed again another time.

    ¶39. (S) North Korean Scuds

    The U.S. said it seemed that both sides had a common
    evaluation of what types of short range systems North Korea
    possesses:  the Scud B, Scud C, and the new solid propellant
    MRBM.  Russia said that in 2008, the U.S. indicated that
    North Korean Scuds were launched at longer ranges.  Russia
    asked for any specific data on these missile launches and for
    U.S. thinking on why these systems are extended range Scuds
    and not Scud C missiles.  The U.S. said that it would try to
    provide more information on this issue at the next round of
    talks.  However, it is known that there have been at least
    two cases of North Korea helping other countries to develop
    Scuds with longer ranges than the Scud C.    One example is
    Libya.  When Libya gave up its MTCR-class missile programs in
    2003, it showed the U.S. a missile it called the "Scud-C."
    However, it had a longer range than the missile we refer
    generally refer to as the Scud-C.  Additionally, many
    presentations in the MTCR Information Exchange have reported
    that North Korea is helping other countries, particularly
    Syria, develop a Scud with a longer range.  These
    presentations have referred to this longer range system as
    the Scud-D.

    ¶40. (S) No Dong

    The U.S. thought that both sides had similar assessments of
    the No Dong.  Referring to the U.S. presentation from the
    previous JTA talks, Russia noted that the U.S. said there
    were seven launches of the No Dong in July 2009 by North
    Korea.  Russia has no information on such tests, and wondered
    if there U.S. had been referring to 2006.  The U.S. said that
    there had been tests of the No Dong just after July 4, 2009,
    and that there had been plenty of South Korean and Japanese
    reporting at that time.  Russia agreed there were July 4
    missile launches, but of missiles with shorter ranges, not
    Scuds or No Dongs.  Given the confusion on this point, Russia
    urged that the issue be revisited during the next round of
    talks.

    ¶41. (S) UDMH

    Russia asked whether the U.S. thinks North Korea is trying to
    develop a new engine that uses UDMH.  The U.S. said it
    believes this effort is connected with a new system North
    Korea is working on.  The U.S. thinks this new system is an
    IRBM.

    ¶42. (S) IRBM

    Russia asked whether the U.S. has any specific data on this
    system.  The U.S. said it believes the system exists and has
    been sold to Iran as the BM-25.

    ¶43. (S) Taepo Dong

    The U.S. agreed with Russia that the Taepo Dong-1 was a
    technology demonstrator that is no longer being used, and
    that the Taepo Dong-2 has had two tests that have been
    unsuccessful.  However, there is not agreement on the purpose
    of the Taepo Dong-2 system.  In tests, the intent has been
    billed as putting a satellite into orbit, but the U.S. also
    thinks it is very much intended as part of the development of
    an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).  Russia noted
    for clarification that North Korea calls the Taepo Dong-2 the
    Unha-2.

    ¶44. (S) Russia believes the system has an engine with a 100
    ton capacity that uses clustered designs based on old
    technology, and asked whether the U.S. thought the Taepo
    Dong-2 uses any new technology.  The U.S. responded that it
    has not seen any new technology associated with this system.
    Nevertheless, one path to acquiring a longer range system
    would be to cluster or stack engines for the new IRBM in the
    same way North Korea used Scud and No Dong engines in the
    Taepo Dong-2.  Russia pointed out that so far this has not
    been observed and there is no new technology associated with
    an ICBM in North Korea.  The U.S. agreed that no new
    technology has been observed in the ICBM, but it has been in
    the IRBM.

    ¶45. (S) Russia noted that in its presentations the U.S. had
    given a range of 10,000 km - 15,000 km with a 500 kg warhead
    for the Taepo Dong and asked how the U.S. had calculated
    this.  The U.S. said that for the 10,000 km range, it had
    assumed a clustered first stage and a No Dong second stage.
    For the 15,000 km range, it assumed a 3-stage configuration
    with the same clustered engines and second stage.

    ¶46. (S) Taepo Dong-2 and Military Applications

    Russia pointed out that the Taepo Dong-2 would be hard to use
    for combat due to a lack of sites and its long launch
    preparation time.  The U.S. noted that North Korea could
    mitigate those problems by placing it in a silo or using it
    as a first strike weapon.  These would not be optimal
    approaches but if North Korea is sufficiently desperate, it
    would go with the systems available to it.  Moreover, North
    Korea puts great political value on these systems.  In the
    wake of the nuclear test and the UNSCR that followed, North
    Korea threatened to conduct an ICBM test.  This is another
    manifestation of the political value of this program for
    North Korea.

    ¶47. (S) North Korean Path to an ICBM

    The U.S. said it saw three potential paths for North Korea to
    follow to obtain an ICBM: 1) use the Taepo Dong-2 as an ICBM;
    2) further develop the technology for an IRBM based on their
    new MRBM, in the same way the No Dong was a path to the Taepo
    Dong; and 3) use the very large launch facility that is being
    constructed on the west coast of North Korea to launch a very
    large missile.  Russia said that the first two paths could be
    discussed at a later date.

    ¶48. (S) With regard to the third path, Russia wonders whether
    North Korea is building the new launch site to avoid
    launching over Japan and for safety reasons.  The U.S.
    responded that the size of the facility is of concern.  It
    does not simply replicate other sites.  This facility is much
    larger than the Taepo Dong launch facility.  This is not to
    say there is evidence of a new missile system larger than the
    Taepo Dong-2 being developed, but it suggests the
    possibility.  North Korea does not spend money on things
    unless they really matter.  Russia noted that North Korea
    does not have so much money, so it must economize.  However,
    Russia can probably agree that the new site is being built to
    test new missiles.  That said, Russia still thinks North
    Korea has problems developing more-powerful engines and
    accurate guidance systems.  This merits further observation
    and analysis.

    ¶49. (S) General Comments

    Russia said it sees it as significant that Iran and North
    Korea are trying to buy more materials abroad and trying to
    get around existing export control regimes.  However, each
    country is different and Russia cannot say they are working
    according to the same principles.  On clustering, Russia has
    a different point of view than the U.S., but will look
    further into this.  Russia also has a different view on
    silos, but that can be discussed in more detail next time.
    In short, North Korea is complex and neither the U.S. nor
    Russia fully understands its capabilities.  Both sides need
    to monitor this carefully and work together on this issue.

    --------------------------------------------- -------------
    (U) Russian presentation of a framework for evaluating
    missile risks, dangers and threats; and discussion
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶50. (S) Nazarov said Russia believes any missile assessments
    should be based not only on modeling, but also on
    consideration of the real technical barriers faced by Iran.
    Serious attention must be given to these technical problems.
    Otherwise, we will use erroneous assumptions to evaluate the
    problem.  For example, we can count the number of
    centrifuges, multiply by production capabilities, and say
    Iran can produce enough uranium for several warheads.
    However, this would not be correct because the models do not
    take into account the technical difficulties in cascade
    technologies that Iran has not worked out yet.

    ¶51. (S) In the same way, Russia thinks that when talking
    about the Shahab-3, there is no possibility of Iran using
    these missiles in a launch silo configuration.  Also, Russia
    does not see Iran increasing the throw weight or range to the
    declared capabilities.  Thus, as regards attempting to draft
    a joint report, Russia foresees no problems in an evaluation
    of the basic systems, but does foresee a difference in the
    evaluations of the technical barriers faced by the Iranians.
    With regard to timeframes, Nazarov said that if we talk about
    real threats, and not just potential challenges, then we need
    to think about all the systems that need to be developed and
    tested.  To facilitate this, Russia thinks the JTA
    discussions should be divided into discussions on missile
    risks and missile threats.  The two sides should agree on
    what these are and then work to prevent missile risks from
    growing into missile threats.

    ¶52. (S) Nazarov then asked Vladimir Yermakov, Director for
    Strategic Capabilities Policy, Russian Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs, to introduce Russia's proposed methodology for
    evaluating missile risks and missile threats.  Yermakov said
    Russia views the December JTA talks as the first step in
    implementing the goals of the July 2009 Presidential Joint
    Statement.  These consultations build on many years of work
    with the U.S. on missile defense, including missile threat
    assessment, and Russia would like to underscore that the
    dialogue and close collaboration on missile defense is due to
    the positive decisions taken by the new administration on
    missile defense.  Russia's official assessment of Obama's
    missile defense policy is that it is a step in a positive
    direction.  Russia commends the U.S. decision to drop the
    fielding of missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech
    Republic and replace it with a multi-phased program for
    missile defense in Europe.  Russia will only be able to give
    its assessment of the new
     project after it has seen the implementation of the first
    phase.  Further collaboration in missile defense will depend
    on how the project will be developed on the U.S. side.  But a
    key part of our collaboration will be the joint assessment of
    missile threats.

    ¶53. (S) Continuing, Yermakov said Russia believes that any
    further practical cooperation on missile defense will be
    based on a concrete joint assessment of the missile threats.
    The U.S. and Russia need to have a clear understanding of
    whom we are cooperating against and we need to make clear
    distinctions between missile risks, missile challenges, and
    missile threats.  Russian and U.S. perceptions may coincide
    and may differ, that is understandable.  We can work together
    to address threats we both agree on.  But there may be
    threats the U.S. sees as real and Russia sees only to be
    perceived ones, and vice versa.  In such cases, the extent of
    our cooperation may be less or lower, but we can still do
    something jointly to address these threats as well.

    ¶54. (S) Yermakov said that Russia sees as an end-goal of the
    JTA consultations a document outlining jointly assessed
    missile threats and challenges.  Naturally, in working on
    such a document, the U.S. and Russia will recognize that
    their views differ and those differences will have to be
    reflected in this document.  We can take as an example our
    record of cooperation within the NATO Russia Council (NRC).

    ¶55. (S) Yermakov then distributed a paper on a framework of
    criteria for assessing the level of risk of a given missile
    program.  He explained that the material on the first page is
    a graph presented in simplified form in which Russia presents
    two categories - a threat and a challenge.  In order for
    there to be a threat, it is necessary to have two components:
     intention and capabilities.  Only when both components are
    present does a threat become real.  From the Russian point of
    view, lack of either component makes the threat hypothetical.
     When both components are lacking, the threat is only
    "perceived," and the threat of a nuclear missile strike is
    zero.

    ¶56. (S) Yermakov noted that on the second page, Russia
    suggests four categories:  missile challenge, missile danger,
    missile threat, and missile strike.  Russia views a missile
    challenge as an aspiration to obtain capabilities in the
    field of rocketry to fulfill one's legitimate national goals.
     These goals can be a space program or missiles as weapons.
    A missile danger emerges when nations envision in national
    guidelines a doctrine that they could/could use missiles.  A
    missile threat is a more advanced category in which a country
    has the intention to use its missile capability to further
    its national military and political goals.  A missile strike
    is self evident.  Yermakov urged the U.S to review the paper
    and, at a later stage, provide an assessment of this
    approach.  At that point, the two sides can compare views,
    theoretical approaches and assessments of threats, and use
    this framework to develop a joint document of challenges,
    risks, and threats.

    ¶57. (S) Nazarov thanked Yermakov for his presentation, saying
    that he believed the U.S. and Russia needed to continue their
    joint work based on a shared methodology.  The methodology
    proposed in the Yermakov presentation will allow us to
    address challenges and threats concretely, and to overcome
    differences of opinion.  Nazarov said he did not see U.S. and
    Russian differences as significant for a joint document and
    thought they could be overcome.  In this context, Russia has
    prepared  a memorandum with respect to drafting a joint
    assessment.  The essence of the paper is that the two sides
    would work together to draft a document on a joint
    understanding of the problems of missile proliferation.  It
    would be an assessment of the current trends, conditions, and
    factors that make up today's situation, and appropriate
    conclusions.

    ¶58.  Nazarov suggested the two sides agree on a timeframe for
    drafting the document, which would lay the foundation for
    cooperation and make it more dynamic.  Russia thinks the JTA
    work could finish by the end of 2010 and believes that
    following this round, the group could come up with a draft
    report and then work to improve it and flesh out some of its
    provisions.  Based on the principle of rotation, Russia also
    thinks the next round of JTA talks should be in March or
    April, 2010 in Moscow.  Finally, given the sensitive nature
    of the eventual final document, it should be treated as
    confidential and only made available to third parties with
    the consent of both our parties.  (Passed over non-paper.)

    ¶59. (S) Van Diepen appreciated the thought put into the
    Russian document and the invitation to Moscow, which he
    accepted.  He said the U.S. would study the paper and provide
    comments at a later date.  This will lay the groundwork for
    productive meetings in Moscow.  However, he also cautioned
    that the two sides must be careful not to let process get in
    the way of substance.  He said the U.S. and Russia need to
    share assessments first and then think about what to do with
    them.  He also said the two sides should identify the
    differences in our assessments and the reasons for those
    differences, rather than get bogged down in wordsmithing and
    nuances.

    ¶60. (C) Nazarov said Russia shares the opinion that the JTA
    study has a practical goal.  He said Russia is serious about
    the problem of future missile threats and that the JTA work
    is under the close scrutiny of the President of the Russian
    Federation, who demands that the Russia side give an
    impartial and objective assessment.  Russia believes there is
    a danger in over- or underestimating the threat as it could
    prod us to move in the wrong direction.  When it comes to
    missile and nuclear threats, errors in estimation in both
    directions are dangerous.

    ¶61. (S) Yuriy Korolev, an expert from the Russian Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs, explained that during a meeting in Budapest
    in February 2008, Russian experts presented a collection of
    interesting approaches on assessing missile proliferation
    threats.  Using that document, Russia thought one could give
    a more unbiased assessment of missile threats.  However,
    there has been no reaction from the U.S.  This may be due to
    the fact that only limited numbers of the document were
    distributed and they did not reach all appropriate senior
    U.S. officials.  Russia continues to believe this document is
    interesting and would appreciate U.S. views, analysis,
    comments, and proposals on how to make our efforts on
    countering missile proliferation more effective.  Russia's
    view is that the methodology presented would make assessments
    of missile threats more impartial (handed over copies).

    --------------------------------------------- -------------
    (U) Russian presentation on the security threat presented by
    instability and Islamists in Pakistan and discussion
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶62. (S) Korolev noted that while the focus of the discussions
    had been on the missile threats from North Korea and Iran,
    Russia did not think discussion should be limited to only
    those threats from Iran and North Korea.  In the Russian
    view, there is another serious threat that should be
    discussed: Pakistan.  Pakistan is a nation with nuclear
    weapons, various delivery systems, and a domestic situation
    that is highly unstable.  Russia assesses that Islamists are
    not only seeking power in Pakistan but are also trying to get
    their hands on nuclear materials.  Russia is aware that
    Pakistani authorities, with help from the U.S., have created
    a well-structured system of security for protecting nuclear
    facilities, which includes physical protection.  However,
    there are 120,000-130,000 people directly involved in
    Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, working in these
    facilities and protecting them.  However, regardless of the
    clearance process for these people, there is no way to
    guarantee that all are 100% loyal
    and reliable.

    ¶63. (S) In addition to the Islamist interest in these
    facilities, Russia also is aware that Pakistan has had to
    hire people to protect nuclear facilities that have
    especially strict religious beliefs, and recently the general
    educational and cultural levels in Pakistan has been falling.
     Due to these facts, extremist organizations have more
    opportunities to recruit people working in the nuclear and
    missile programs.  Over the last few years extremists have
    attacked vehicles that carry staff to and from these
    facilities.  Some were killed and a number were abducted and
    there has been no trace seen of them.  Also, even if places
    are well protected, transportation of materials is a
    vulnerable point.  In Pakistan, it is hard to guarantee the
    security of these materials during transportation.  For these
    reasons, Russia thinks Pakistan should also be a particular
    focus of JTA discussion.

    ¶64. (S) Nazarov clarified that Russia believes the focus of
    the JTA discussions should be the missile programs of Iran
    and North Korea.  Russia assumes the nuclear and missile
    programs of Pakistan are regionally oriented and thus outside
    the scope of the current JTA discussion.  However, Russia
    recently hosted a delegation led by Senators Hagel and
    Harkin.  The Senators told a meeting of the Russian Security
    Council that Pakistan poses the greatest threat to the world.
     Therefore, Russia would appreciate any additional
    information the U.S. can provide on the actual situation with
    regard to the protection, storage, and transportation of
    nuclear and missile weaponry in Pakistan.

    ¶65. (C) Van Diepen appreciated Russia's concern with Pakistan
    and interest in getting further information but noted that
    the issue as described is primarily nuclear materials being
    acquired by terrorists, it is more of a nuclear issue and
    less related to ballistic missiles.  He undertook to report
    back and facilitate a response from the appropriate office
    outside the context of the JTA.

    ¶66. (S) Nazarov said Russia is interested in using all
    channels to cooperate with the U.S. on this subject.  First
    and foremost, Russia is talking about the threat of nuclear
    terrorism.  If the scenarios include future development, the
    threat of missile technology getting into the hands of
    terrorists should also be considered.  Russia would like to
    put its concern on the record, and particularly with regard
    to the possibility of Islamists coming to power in Pakistan.
    Russia would appreciate the U.S. providing additional
    information on the subject - perhaps at the follow-up meeting
    in Moscow.

    ¶67. (C) Van Diepen said he would report Russia's concerns but
    noted that the U.S. response would likely come through
    diplomatic channels rather than at our April/March meetings.
    He also urged that Nazarov raise his concerns with Special
    Advisor Holbrooke or his Deputy.

    --------------------------------------------- -------------
    (U) Russian presentation on FSB work to interdict Iranian and
    North Korean attempts to buy restricted technology, or to
    transship third party materials through Russia
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶68.  (C) Anatoliy Raikevich, First Deputy Department
    Director, Federal Security Service (FSB), said that both Iran
    and North Korea appear to depend heavily on illegally
    obtaining equipment and technology from abroad for missile
    and WMD programs.  The FSB has information that Iran and
    North Korea both have programs to try to acquire Russian
    technology.  One of the basic tasks of the FSB is to prevent
    them from acquiring WMD-related production technology in
    Russia.  To do this, the FSB takes action based on Russian
    law and export controls.  In particular, the FSB monitors and
    takes measures to prevent WMD technology exports.  This
    includes criminal investigations of attempts to export
    contraband and items on the prohibited list.  Russian
    analysis shows that that these efforts have significantly
    reduced the achievements of the Iranian security services in
    this area.  However, the Iranians continue to try to use the
    territory of Russia for transits and reexports of such
    materials.

    ¶69. (C) A key effort of the Iranian services is the company
    to company approach, whereby they use fake companies run by
    the Iranian security service to procure Russian goods.  The
    FSB has set up sting companies to uncover Iranian activities.
     In the past two years, the FSB has cut off a good deal of
    the exports of such technology.

    ¶70. (C) The FSB has determined that Iran is trying to get
    equipment such as measuring devices, high precision
    amplifiers, pressure indicators, various composite materials,
    and technology to create new missile engines from Russia and
    from sources in Western Europe.  To produce these items
    itself, Iran would need to seriously modernize its
    technological base.  To combat this, the FSB must cooperate
    with the U.S. and European security services.  Russia has
    many years experience cooperating with U.S. security services
    and has moved from information exchanges to operational
    activities.   The FSB thinks U.S. services are very
    professional and well prepared, and hopes cooperation will
    continue.

    ¶71. (C) Van Diepen thanked Raikevich for his presentation,
    noting that he had had lots of experience during the 1990s
    working with Russian counterparts on the problem and trying
    to reduce the success of Iran in acquiring missile
    technology.  Van Diepen said he was impressed by the people
    in Russia working on export controls and appreciated that
    Russia recognized that Iran is still trying to acquire
    technology from Russia.  He said he would pass on to U.S.
    security services the FSB's interest in continued
    cooperation.  He added that the U.S. would want to work with
    Russia in those channels as well as in diplomatic channels as
    the need arose to address specific shipments of concern.

    ¶72. (S) Raikevich replied that discussing these issues with
    the U.S. will help Iran and North Korea to "boil in their own
    oil."  He said Iran and North Korean may have small successes
    here and there with procurement, but the FSB will see to it
    that their successes remain small.  The FSB is grateful for
    information the U.S. passes along regarding various Russian
    organizations that may be working with Iran or North Korea,
    and wants continue to work together to prevent the spread of
    this technology from Russia and other countries.

    ----------------------
    (U) Concluding remarks
    ----------------------

    ¶73. (S) Yermakov said that Russia thought the discussions had
    been productive and cooperative.  He noted that both sides
    have significant homework assignments to complete before the
    next round and can test the results at the end of
    March/beginning of April.  He then offered concluding remarks
    on behalf of the Deputy Secretary of Russia's National
    Security Council:
    -- With regard to Iran, Russia believes the possibility of
    improvement of its liquid propellant missiles is nil.

    --It is impossible from the Russian point of view for Iran to
    put a nuclear device on existing missiles with an improved
    range and throw weight.

    --Iran has no ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear
    weapons at this time, and Russia sees no threat from missiles
    in Iran.

    --In Russia's view, Iran presents a missile challenge.

    --A missile threat would only develop if Iran seceded from
    the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and successfully
    developed an MRBM with a 3,000 km range and a warhead of one
    ton.

    --Iran does not have the military-industrial capability to
    develop such a program.  If Iran could gain access to foreign
    technology, it might develop such a program but this is
    unlikely due to export controls.

    --In any case, even with the assistance of foreign
    technology, Russia assesses it will take Iran 6-8 years to
    gain the ability to launch an MRBM with a nuclear warhead.

    --With regard to an ICBM, Russia considers this purely
    hypothetical and does not see the possibility of Iran having
    this capability for the next 10 years.

    --For North Korea, Russia assesses that its only real
    capabilities are outdated missiles with ranges of no more
    than 3,500 km.

    --While it is possible to develop missiles with greater
    ranges based on an SLV program, that would take many years,
    even with a successful program.

    ¶74. (C) Yermakov said these were the basic conclusions Russia
    wanted to make.  If the conclusions are agreeable to the U.S.
    side this could be noted.  If not, they can be discussed
    again at a later date and will be the basis for future work,
    to continue successful bilateral cooperation.  He said Russia
    is not at all concerned about differences regarding various
    aspects of these programs.  Russia sees this as natural.
    Having differences just means that we need to meet more often
    and exchange information through appropriate channels.
    Russia looks forward to a U.S. interagency delegation coming
    to Moscow.  Until then the two sides can communicate through
    diplomatic channels or even just by telephone.

    ¶75. (S) Van Diepen thanked the Russia side, especially
    Nazarov, for its thorough preparation and professionalism.
    He said the U.S. was pleased with the interagency character
    of the Russian delegation and appreciated that Russia had
    given a lot of thought to both conceptual issues and
    technical matters.  The challenge going forward - as shown in
    the contrast between the technical discussions and Russia's
    concluding remarks - will be to come to a greater shared
    understanding of the issues.  On the technical side, there is
    a fair amount of agreement, but as we go up in range, our
    views diverge.  Based on common data, we have different
    perceptions.   The conclusions the U.S. would draw would be
    different in each case from the conclusions Yermakov
    outlined.  That is not bad, but both sides need to work to
    understand the conceptual and technical basis for these
    views.  There is a great deal to discuss, and we will need to
    be well prepared for fruitful and informative discussions in
    Moscow in the spring.  The U.S.
    will study the Russian papers and follow up through
    diplomatic channels.  The U.S. also will do its homework
    assignments, propose specific dates for the next round of
    talks, and be prepared for "our exams" next time in Moscow.

    ---------------------
    (U) Participants
    ---------------------

    ¶76. (SBU) U.S. Delegation:

    Vann H. Van Diepen, Acting Assistant Secretary, ISN
    (Head of Delegation)

    Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, VCI

    Pamela Durham, Director, ISN/MTR

    Kimberly Hargan, ISN/MTR

    Michael Kerley, ISN/MTR

    David Hoppler, ISN/MDSP

    Steve Rosenkrantz, ISN/MDSP

    Kathleen Morenski, Deputy Director, EUR/PRA

    Caroline Savage, EUR/RUS

    Michael Fogo, EUR/RUS

    Joshua Handler, INR/SPM

    Anita Friedt, Director for Arms Control and
    Non-Proliferation, National Security Council (NSC)

    Daniel Menzel, Intelligence Analyst

    Michael Barnes, OSD Office of Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia
    Policy, Defense/OSD

    Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

    ¶77. (SBU) Russian Delegation:

    Vladimir Nazarov, Deputy Secretary of Russia's Security
    Council (Head of Delegation)

    Vyacheslav Kholodkov, Deputy Department Director, Security
    Council

    Oleg Khodyrev, Senior Counselor, Security Council

    Vladimir Yermakov, Director for Strategic Capabilities
    Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    Andrey Shabalin, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    Yuriy Korolev, Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    Anatoliy Raikevich, First Deputy Department Director, Federal
    Security Service

    Alexander Novikov, Deputy Department Director, Ministry of
    Defense

    Evgeny Zudin, Office Director, Ministry of Defense

    Alexander Derevlev, Senior Officer, Ministry of Defense

    Alexander Serenko, Deputy Department Director, Roscosmos

    Evgeny Bobrovskiy, Counselor, Russian Embassy

    Oleg Pozdnyakov, First Secretary, Russian Embassy

    Vadim Sergeev, Interpreter, Russian Embassy
    CLINTON

    NNNN

    End Cable Text

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