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### Viewing cable 09KABUL3068, AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR WEESA ON GOVERNANCE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09KABUL3068 | 2009-10-03 04:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO0787
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #3068/01 2760446
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 030446Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1794
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003068

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
    STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
    USFOR-A FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
    TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF
    SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR WEESA ON GOVERNANCE
    IN KANDAHAR

    Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
    ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: in a lengthy and cordial introductory meeting
    with Kandahar Provincial Council Chief Ahmed Wali Karzai
    (AWK) and Governor Tooryalai Weesa, Senior Civilian
    Representative (SCR) for the South Frank Ruggiero underscored
    the need for improved governance in Kandahar, and highlighted
    the importance of naming credible provincial governors and
    district officials before the inauguration to send a positive
    signal on good governance to the Afghan people and the
    international community. Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged the
    weakness of the government in Kandahar, and outlined their
    proposals for local solutions, including the empowerment of
    shuras of district elders for local dispute resolution rather
    than the courts.  AWK also emphasized large-scale
    infrastructure projects rather than smaller cash-for-work
    program, and his desire to see private security companies in
    the province under one licensee.  AWK discounted the role of
    elections and their importance to Afghans.  End Summary.

    AWK Nervous but Eager to Share Views
    ----------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) SCR Ruggiero met with AWK and Governor Weesa on
    September 28 in the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City.  The
    Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) Ben Rowswell also
    attended the meeting, which was held in a wood-paneled room,
    beneath a large photo of President Hamid Karzai.  (Note:
    While we must deal with AWK as the head of the Provincial
    Council, he is widely understood to be corrupt and a
    narcotics trafficker.  End Note)  AWK, dressed in a crisp
    white shalwar kameez and pinstriped vest, appeared nervous,
    though eager to express his views on the international
    presence in Kandahar.

    The Importance of Good Governance
    ------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) SCR emphasized the criticality of good governance in
    the province, and said the United States would like to see
    improvement in the post-election period.  He said the United
    States is ready to work with the GIRoA to strengthen key
    provincial and district level governance, but we are only
    willing to expend our resources in people and programs if we
    have confidence those resources will pay off and make a real
    difference.

    ¶4. (C) Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged there was a
    credibility gap between the public and the government.  Weesa
    said it was a problem that in the 10 months he had been in
    office, the government had not been able to deliver 24-hour
    electricity to the people, and that 150 factories had closed
    because of it.  He said people looked to NGOs more than to
    the government to deliver services, and he complained that
    NGOs poach workers from the government by offering higher
    wages.  SCR emphasized the importance of naming credible
    provincial governors and district officials before the
    inauguration to send a positive signal on good governance to
    the Afghan people and the international community.

    ¶5. (C) AWK suggested one way of fighting corruption in the
    province would be to re-establish and empower district
    shuras, instead of judges or police, to settle local
    disputes.  Currently there is only one judge for the five
    districts around Kandahar City, he said, and a council of
    local elders would be more effective at resolving land, water
    and other disputes. (Note: there are a total of seven judges
    for all 17 districts in the province.)  "You can easily bribe
    the chief of police or a judge,8 he said, &but you can't
    bribe 50 elders."  He said the provincial council, with the
    support of the governor, could initiate the formation of
    these district shuras, which would consist of 10-15 elders
    elected by the people.

    Infrastructure Priorities, Private Security Contractors and
    Conflicts of Interest
    --------------------------------------------- -----------------

    ¶6. (C) AWK said he had been in Kandahar almost continuously
    since 1992, and that the U.S. reputation in the province was
    built on the back of two key infrastructure projects done in
    the 1950s and 60s.  He said what would make a difference to
    the population today would be similar large-scale,
    labor-intensive projects that would provide jobs to the
    people and keep them from being recruited by the Taliban.
    AWK cautioned against the use of small scale projects and

    KABUL 00003068  002 OF 002

    additional cash-for-work programs; he stated that the use of
    implementing partners does not allow expenditure of
    development resources to reach villagers and other local
    Afghans.  Both he and Weesa added that it should be the local
    elders who are empowered to distribute these jobs, not
    officials or companies from outside.

    Putting Private Security Under the Direction of the
    Provincial Council
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶7. (C) In the same vein of providing "local solutions to
    local problems," as he put it, AWK recommended a "local
    solution" to the problem of providing security in the area.
    He said that currently, there are many jihadi commanders with
    militias who independently provide protection to convoys and
    projects, but that a proposal before the Ministry of Interior
    would bring all these commanders under one umbrella in
    Kandahar, with one person given the license for the private
    security sector.  He said there would be a meeting Wednesday
    (September 30) of all the security companies, under the
    auspices of the Provincial Council, to appoint this
    representative to send to Kabul.  (Note: AWK is understood to
    have a stake in private security contracting, and has
    aggressively lobbied the Canadians to have his security
    services retained for the Dahla Dam refurbishment.  Both he
    and the governor have tried to exert control over how
    contracts are awarded in the province ) all of which could
    be a significant conflict of interest in the province. End
    Note.)

    Elections: What's the Point?
    ---------------------

    ¶8. (C) In answer to a question from the RoCK and the SCR
    about the credibility of the elections, AWK said democracy
    was new for Afghanistan, and that people in the region did
    not understand the point of having one election, let alone
    two.  "The people do not like change," he said.  "They think,
    the President is alive, and everything is fine. Why have an
    election?"

    Comment
    -----

    ¶9. (C) The meeting with AWK highlights one of our major
    challenges in Afghanistan:  how to fight corruption and
    connect the people to their government, when the key
    government officials are themselves corrupt.  Given AWK's
    reputation for shady dealings, his recommendations for large,
    costly infrastructure projects should be viewed with a
    healthy dose of skepticism.  Still, his observations about
    the unintended consequences of how NGOs and other
    international partners do their work, e.g. "poaching" of
    government staff, track with some of our own concerns,
    including about how to promote Afghan-led solutions.  We will
    continue to urge AWK to improve his own credibility gap as
    well as that of the GIRoA.
    EIKENBERRY

`