Currently released so far... 220 / 251,287

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/11
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE AU AR AF AORC AJ ASEC AM
BH BA BY BU
CASC CF CH COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV CVIS
EG ECON EINV ETTC EFIN ENRG ETRD EFIS EXTERNAL EPET EAID EUN ELAB ECUN EU EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GR GM GOI GE GG GA
HO
IR IZ IS INRB IN IRAJ IQ IAEA IT
JO JA
KPAL KNNP KU KWBG KJUS KG KSPR KDEM KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KCRM KHLS KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KPKO KUNR KTIA KWMN
LE LY
MASS MK MNUC MCAP MARR MOPS MU MAR MTCRE MY ML MR MPOS MOPPS
NATO NG
OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA OPDC
PREL PARM PGOV PTER PINR PHUM PINS PBIO PA PBTS PREF PROP PK PECON POLITICAL PARTIES PM PEPR
QA
RS RW RU
SA SY SM SU SCUL SNAR SOCI SENV SYR SP SG SO SF
TU TI TX Terrorism TRGY TFH01 TC TSPA
UZ UE UK US UNESCO UNSC UP UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 07DUBAI59, UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH UAE VICE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others.
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07DUBAI59.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07DUBAI59 | 2007-01-28 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Dubai

`

    VZCZCXRO0724
    RR RUEHBC RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHDE #0059/01 0280812
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 280812Z JAN 07
    FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5072
    INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 2084
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8134

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 000059

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/28/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PINS MARR AE IR IS LE
    SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH UAE VICE
    PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND DUBAI RULER MOHAMMED BIN RASHID AL
    MAKTOUM

    REF: DUBAI 00018

    DUBAI 00000059  001.2 OF 002

    CLASSIFIED BY: Paul R Sutphin, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

    1.(C) Summary: In a January 23 meeting in Dubai with U/S Burns,
    UAE Vice President, Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler Sheikh
    Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum (MbR) expressed concern about the
    potential negative impact on Dubai of  possible future UN
    sanctions against Iran; he urged the quiet US-UAE cooperation on
    financial and export control restrictions against Iran, offering
    to set up a "joint committee" to this end.  He agreed that Iran
    should not have nuclear weapons, but warned of the dire regional
    consequences of military action.  U/S Burns said the US would
    protect its interests in the region and support Gulf governments
    in resisting efforts by Iran to dominate the region. He
    emphasized the importance of continued support for the Siniora
    government in Lebanon, and the high priority the US put on a
    renewed effort to move the Israelis and Palestinians toward
    peace.  U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa Valapour, which
    has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for nearly 16
    months without charges before a court(although under the local
    system police charges have been filed); MbR asked his aides to
    ensure the case moved forward as rapidly and transparently as
    possible  End Summary.

    2.(C) On January 23, U/S for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns
    met with MbR for one hour in MbR's downtown office.  Burns was
    accompanied by NEA PDAS Jim Jeffrey, the Ambassador, the Consul
    General, P Staff assistant Herro Mustafa and ConGen notetaker.
    MbR was accompanied by his sons Sheikh Hamdan (who chairs the
    Dubai Executive Council, the Emirate's governing body) and
    Sheikh Mayed; Minister for Cabinet Affairs (and Dubai Holdings
    head) Mohammed Gergawi; federal Minister for Education Dr. Hanif
    al Qasimi; Dubai General Security Service head Brigadier
    Mohammed al Qemzi; Dubai World head Sultan bin Sulayem; and
    Emirates Airlines chairman and Dubai Civil Aviation head Sheikh
    Ahmed bin Sayed al Maktoum. U/S Burns expressed admiration for
    the Dubai's rapid development, hailing it as an open and
    productive model that was now being emulated throughout the
    region.

    3.(C) Lebanon: U/S Burns conveyed the gratitude of the Lebanese
    government for financial and other assistance from the UAE.  MbR
    said the UAE understands that the Siniora government needs
    regional support. U/S Burns urged continued assistance, noting
    the US will soon offer the Siniora government $1 billion for
    security and reconstruction efforts.

    4.(C) Iran sanctions: U/S Burns highlighted the significance of
    the June 2006 international offer to negotiate with Iran to
    resolve the nuclear issue--the first official US offer to
    negotiate with Tehran in 27 years.  Tehran had rejected this
    broadly-supported, reasonable proposal, which offered economic
    incentives such as sanctions relief and the sale of civilian
    airliners in addition to negotiations.  U/S Burns said that the
    UNSCR 1737's limited sanctions were a first step to pressure
    Iran to compromise, but that absent Iranian movement another,
    more restrictive, sanctions resolution is likely in February.
    The US was also taking bilateral action through Treasury
    designations against Iranian banks that were funding terrorism.

    5.(C) MbR expressed willingness to cooperate in financial
    restrictions against Iran, but urged that the cooperation be
    conducted quietly; he offered to set up a "joint committee" to
    do so (he did not offer details); he later repeated this offer
    with regard to military transfers (see para 8).  He voiced
    concern regarding the potential negative impact of economic
    sanctions on Dubai, and against the "good Iranians" -- including
    Dubai's estimated 350,000 Iranians residents. U/S Burns and
    Ambassador Sison expressed readiness to engage with Dubai on
    financial cooperation against Iran. (Note: the number of
    resident Iranians was supplied by Al Qemzi, and is higher that
    the 200-300 thousand usual cited by the Dubai officials.)

    6.(C) Iran and Gulf Security: U/S Burns stated that the US will
    protect its interests and support its allies, like the UAE, in
    the face of Iranian attempts to dominate the Gulf.  This is why
    we have stationed a second carrier battle group there, and have
    detained Iranian agents in Iraq who were providing arms and bomb
    components used to kill US troops.  MbR stated that the UAE does
    not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, and urged continued
    international pressure on Iran, but expressed deep concern about
    the destabilizing consequences to the UAE and to region of a
    military strike.  He urged that the US find a way to stop or
    disarm Iran without using military force.  U/S Burns reiterated

    DUBAI 00000059  002.2 OF 002

    that the US wants a diplomatic solution, and is working with the
    UN and its allies toward this end; strong UAE support was
    important to this effort.

    7.(C) MbR expressed hope for change inside Iran, which U/S Burns
    echoed.  Burns noted the US wants to support the influence of
    moderate Iranians and encourage Iran to engage in negotiations.
    Minister Gergawi mentioned rumors that Supreme leader Khamenei
    is suffering from prostate cancer.  Gergawi opined that the
    merchant class in Iran has been pressuring Ahmadinejad over his
    failing economic policy.  He asserted that the growing sectarian
    conflict in Iraq, as well as the hanging of Saddam Hussein
    (which, he implied, was inspired by Iranian pressure), have now
    undermined the possibility of a regional alliance between
    extremist Sunnis and Shia.  Regional Sunnis now blame Iran for
    instability in Lebanon and Iraq. (Note: Gergawi's family is of
    Iranian origin, and he acts as one of MbR's principal advisors
    on Iran.)

    8.(C) Security cooperation: U/S Burns called the Gulf
    Cooperation Council a good forum for quiet security cooperation,
    and reiterated that the US seeks a close, productive dialogue
    with the UAE on Gulf security.  The US opposes arms sales to
    Iran and will urge its partners in the European Union, Russia
    and the Middle East to cooperate on this front.  MbR reiterated
    his offer to set up a committee to cooperate on these issues.

    9.(C) Israel/Palestinians: U/S Burns stressed that the US
    believes progress between Israel and the Palestinians toward
    peace is central to regional stability, and supports the
    creation of a Palestinian state.  This would be "the best
    thing," MbR replied; a peace deal would make radical groups like
    HAMAS "everyone's enemy". Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
    should be supported, particularly since HAMAS is funded by Iran.
     MbR noted UAE assistance was again flowing to the Palestinians,
    although it had been suspended for a time because of corruption
    concerns.  U/S Burns said the US is careful to ensure its
    assistance is going to the Palestinian people, rather than the
    HAMAS government, and is confident in the assistance mechanisms
    now in place.

    10.(C) Valapour case: U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa
    Valapour, who has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for
    nearly 16 months. U/S Burns said the US sought return of
    Valapour's passport, which has been held by the Dubai police.
    He underscored that, while he was taking no substantive position
    on the merits of the case, the US believes the case should move
    forward with due process as quickly as possible.  MbR was
    unfamiliar with the case, and turned to Gergawi for background.
    Gergawi outlined the Dubai government view of the case, saying
    the bottom line is that Valapour and his non-USC partners had
    profited from insider information in a deal on the Dubai Metro
    project with a corrupt Dubai official. "We don't tolerate
    corruption," Gergawi concluded.  The Consul General noted that
    he had recently met with the Dubai Attorney General (reftel) on
    the case.  The AG had agreed to meet with Valapour's US and
    Emirati representatives to help to resolve the issue.  MbR asked
    his aides to ensure the case moved forward as quickly and
    transparently as possible, and promised Valapour would receive
    fair treatment.

    11.(C) Afghanistan: U/S Burns expressed appreciation for UAE
    assistance in Afghanistan, and urged support for the Karzai
    government. MbR asserted the UAE and US are partners against
    drugs, money laundering, and terrorism and in Afghanistan.  He
    said the best weapon against the Taliban was economic
    investment. U/S Burns outlined ongoing reconstruction efforts,
    and noted the difficulty of creating economically viable
    substitutes for drug crops.  MbR said Karzai is reluctant to
    tackle the drug issue because he fears decreased support in the
    provinces.

    12.(C) Comment: MbR offered little new, other than his somewhat
    vague offer to create a bilateral committee to address financial
    and arms/technology flows to Iran. He is clearly concerned
    regarding the prospect of more comprehensive UN economic
    sanctions, given that Iran is Dubai's largest trading partner,
    an assertion often cited by Dubai officials (although good
    Dubai/Iran trade numbers are hard to come by).  We will follow
    up to try to get a better read on the scope of MbR's offer.
    SUTPHIN

`