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### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD2992, IRAN'S EFFORTS IN IRAQI ELECTORAL POLITICS

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD2992 | 2009-11-13 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO7222
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHGB #2992/01 3171246
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 131246Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5418
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002992

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO LIMBERT, NEA/IR AND NEA/I. NSC FOR
    TALWAR, MAGSAMEN, PHEE AND VROOMAN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TU IR IZ
    SUBJECT: IRAN'S EFFORTS IN IRAQI ELECTORAL POLITICS

    REF: BAGHDAD 2288

    Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (S) SUMMARY: Iran is a dominant player in Iraq's
    electoral politics, and is using its close ties to Shia,
    Kurdish, and select Sunni figures to shape the political
    landscape in favor of a united Shia victory in the January
    election.  A pro-Iran, Shia-dominated, and preferably
    Islamist government, led by a united Shia alliance remains
    Iran's top priority.  Toward that end, Iran is seeking to
    increase pressure on Maliki to join forces with the other
    prominent Shia coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) led by the
    Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).  END
    SUMMARY

    ¶2. (S) Iran is arguably the most influential regional power
    seeking to shape and influence the outcome of Iraq's
    election.  This message offers an assessment of Iran's
    efforts to shape Iraq's electoral politics in anticipation of
    the national election in January.

    Iran's Policy Goals and Tools
    -----------------------------

    ¶3.  (S) Iran's over-arching political objective for Iraq's
    January election is the re-election of a Shia-dominated,
    preferably Islamist, coalition led by Tehran's closest
    allies, notably ISCI and the Sadrist Trend under the rubric
    of the Iraqi National Alliance coalition (INA) (reftel).
    Iraq, given its proximity to Iran and its shared Shia
    heritage, represents a vital foreign policy priority for the
    Iranian government's (IRIG) efforts to project its ideology
    and influence in the region.  An economically dependent and
    politically subservient Iraq would foster greater strategic
    depth for Tehran. Iranian president Ahmadinejad has referred
    to Iraq in recent press statements as "a Shia base"
    confronting the broader menace perpetrated by those opposed
    to Iraq's identity and stability (i.e., Sunni states, the
    West).

    ¶4.  (S) Iran's approach to its bilateral relationship with
    Iraq ranges from political micro-management to broad
    strategic guidance emanating directly from Supreme Leader
    Khamenei in Tehran. The IRIG recognizes that influence in
    Iraq requires operational (and at times ideological)
    flexibility.  As a result, it is not uncommon for the IRIG to
    finance and support competing Shia, Kurdish, and to some
    extent, Sunni entities, with the aim of developing the Iraqi
    body politic's dependency on Tehran's largesse.  While exact
    figures are unknown, Tehran's financial assistance to Iraqi
    surrogates is estimated at USD 100-200 million  annually,
    with USD 70 million going to ISCI/Badr coffers.

    ¶5.  (S) Since at least 2003, Brigadier General Qasem
    Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
    Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), has been the point main directing
    the formulation and implementation of the IRIG's Iraq policy,
    with authority second only to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
    Through his IRGC-QF officers and Iraqi proxies in Iraq,
    notably Iranian Ambassador and IRGC-QF associate Hassan
    Kazemi-Qomi, Soleimani employs the full range of diplomatic,
    security, intelligence, and economic tools to influence Iraqi
    allies and detractors in order to shape a more pro-Iran
    regime in Baghdad and the provinces.

    ¶6.  (S) Soleimani enjoys long-standing close ties with
    several prominent GOI officials, including President
    Talabani, Vice-President Adel Abdal-Mahdi (ISCI), Prime
    Minister Maliki (Da'wa), former PM Jaafari, and more
    recently, Speaker Samarra'i (Septel reports Iranian Speaker
    Qrecently, Speaker Samarra'i (Septel reports Iranian Speaker
    Larijani's November 4-7 visit to Iraq at Samarra'i's
    invitation.).  Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad, Speaker
    Larijani, and former president Rafsanjani consult regularly
    with visiting GOI officials as part of the IRIG's broader
    "strategic" council of advisers seeking to influence the GOI.

    ¶7.  (S) Iran's tools of influence include financial support
    to (and pressure on) a cross-spectrum of Iraqi parties and
    officials; economic development assistance, notably to
    religious organizations; lethal aid to select militant Shia
    proxies; and sanctuary to Iraqi figures fearful of USG
    targeting or those seeking to revitalize their
    political/religious credentials, most notably Moqtada
    al-Sadr.  This leverage also extends, to a lesser extent, to
    select Sunni actors, including such public figures as Iraqi
    Speaker Samarra'i, whose September visit to Tehran included

    BAGHDAD 00002992  002 OF 003

    meetings with several senior IRIG officials.

    Pre-Election Jockeying
    ----------------------

    ¶8.  (S) Predictably, Iran is actively lobbying and recruiting
    Iraqis of various political stripes and affiliations,
    including Sunnis, in the run-up to the election to ensure a
    united Shia-led coalition government.  Given the likelihood
    of a Shia-led victory in the election, Iran appears more
    concerned about the strength of a united Shia bloc in the
    post-election phase of government formation.  For Iran, a
    "rebellious" Maliki pursuing a more nationalist vs. sectarian
    agenda risks splitting the Shia vote, which in turn weakens
    the Shia political bloc's negotiating strength during the
    government formation period post-election.  Iran's greatest
    fear for the upcoming election is a fractured Shia coalition
    that is unable to coalesce and thereby dominate the next
    government.  Iran's worst-case election scenario
    (increasingly unrealistic) is a coup d'etat of former regime
    elements hostile to Tehran.

    ¶9.  (S) A weak Shia coalition before or after the election
    would further undermine the INA and their pro-Iranian
    entities, notably ISCI and the Sadrist Trend.  The Kurds,
    historically closer to ISCI, remain the important swing vote
    and are unlikely to reveal their true coalition intentions
    until after the election.  As seasoned masters of the Iraqi
    political chessboard, Kurdish leaders such as Talabani and
    Barzani will likely exploit their political strength among
    Shia/Sunni counterparts to protect and expand Kurdish
    influence in a future government. Iran's historic ties to the
    PUK, and to a lesser extent KDP officials, make the Kurds an
    important element in ensuring a pro-Iranian Shia victory in
    the election.  INA officials are confident that the Kurds
    will join their coalition, all but guaranteeing an election
    victory.  An unknown factor in national elections is the
    Kurdish opposition party, Goran List, under the leadership of
    former PUK Secretary General Nawshirwan Mustafa.  Goran is
    committed to unseating the PUK (and Talabani) in Suleymaniyah
    province but needs financial backing to ensure its long-term
    viability in the KRG and national politics.  Iran could
    conceivably alleviate Goran's financial woes, particularly
    through its close ties with the Kurdish Jaff tribe, some of
    whom are Goran members.  However, doing so would undermine
    the IRIG's valued relationship with Talabani, while also
    proving exceedingly duplicitous, even by IRIG and KRG
    standards.

    ¶10. (S) It is important to note that Iran's power in Iraq,
    although extensive, is not without limitations.  The IRIG's
    greatest political roadblock remains the domineering
    authority and religious credibility embodied in Grand
    Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Despite his Iranian heritage, Sistani
    is Iraq's most revered Shia religious (and political)
    authority.  A critic of Iran's "Velayet-e-Faqih" (rule of the
    jurisprudent) system of theocratic governance, Sistani's
    abstemious (aka Quietest school) approach to Shia politics
    has kept him well above the political fray while at the same
    time ensuring him significant impact on those rare occasions
    when he pronounces on politics.  For example, Sistani's
    public support for an open list ballot was instrumental in
    prompting ISCI, Sadrist Trend, Maliki's State of Law, and
    other Shia parties to follow suit, despite Tehran's
    preference for a closed list.  Domestic political realities
    will continue to force Shia political parties like ISCI, Dawa
    Qwill continue to force Shia political parties like ISCI, Dawa
    and Sadr Trend, with close historic ties to Iran, to balance
    between support for a broader Iraqi-Shia agenda, as
    championed by Sistani, and the alternative, championed by
    Iran, that would subordinate Iraqi interests to Iran's
    broader objectives (septel).

    Soft vs. Hard Power
    -------------------

    ¶11.  (S) Following the GOI's crackdown on Iranian-supported
    Sadrist militias in Basrah during the "Charge of the Knights"
    operation in March 2008, Iran has calibrated its operations
    in Iraq to encompass more "soft power" (economic, religious,
    educational) support and investment as part of a broader
    "hearts and minds" campaign. (NOTE: Iranian lethal aid to
    militant proxies continues; however, on a less visible scale.
     END NOTE).  With annual bilateral trade estimated at USD 4
    billion (up 30 percent since 2008) and comprised mostly of
    Iranian imports (approximately 48 percent of Iraq's imports
    are Iranian goods), the IRIG continues to jockey for economic
    domination in Iraq through targeted development assistance,
    focused largely on refurbishment of Shia religious shrines,

    BAGHDAD 00002992  003 OF 003

    and trade deals and bilateral agreements aimed at fostering
    greater Iraqi economic dependency on Iran.  This measure has
    been successful, largely because of Iran's geographic
    proximity and access to Iraqi markets that are otherwise
    financially or politically less appealing to other states,
    notably the United States, Europe, and other industrialized
    nations.  Turkey, on the other hand, remains Iran's biggest
    economic competitor, particularly in the Kurdistan Regional
    Government (KRG).

    Implications for U.S. Policy
    ----------------------------

    ¶12.  (S) COMMENT:  Concerns about long-term U.S. influence,
    albeit tempered by the withdrawal deadline, continue to
    inform IRIG decision-making to ensure its strategic foothold
    in Iraq.  Iran views Iraq as a natural (and more junior)
    strategic partner.  As a result, Iran will continue to flex
    its muscles to ensure it's strategic outcomes are met.  This
    should not lead to alarmist tendencies or reactions on our
    part.  The next Iraqi government will continue to cultivate
    close ties with Iran given long-standing historical realities
    that precede Iraq's ties with the United States.  On the
    other hand, Iran's influence in Iraq should not be
    overestimated.  As the GOI continues to gain its footing,
    points of divergence between Tehran and Baghdad become
    increasingly evident on such sensitive bilateral issues as
    water, hydrocarbons, maritime borders, and political parity.
    Some prominent Iraqi leaders, including those with close ties
    to Iran (i.e., Maliki, Ammar al-Hakim) are increasingly
    sensitive to being labeled Iranian lackeys.

    ¶13.  (S)  COMMENT CONT'D:  Our objective in Iraq should be
    less about countering all-things Iranian, and more about
    developing viable alternatives and approaches that gradually
    alter the GOI's political, economic, and social worldview.
    Development of viable international alternatives in Iraq is
    one of the most effective measures of countering Iranian
    ambitions and, ultimately, integrating Iraq as a constructive
    member of the international community.  Specifically, our
    ongoing efforts to bolster the GOI through capacity-building
    and assistance within the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA)
    and to remove Iraq from Chapter VII remain our most valuable
    tools in this regard. Given the value placed on the SFA by
    the GOI and the Iraqi public, our ability to recognize,
    enhance, and exploit the value of the partnership will
    constitute an essential element of any effort to counter
    "malign" Iranian influence.

    HILL

`